after the new order

space, politics, and jakarta

Abidin Kusno



writing past colonialism



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SPACE, POLITICS, AND JAKARTA

Abidin Kusno


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To Herlambang, Jo, and Kemal, the gang leaders of Grogol School of Planning
In memory of Wastu Pragantha (Pak Tjong)



Pak Tjong in front of Jakarta's City Hall, which he helped design, 2010. Photo: A. Kusno.

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ACKNOWLEDGMENTS

I HAD THE PRIVILEGE of living in the three largest cities in Indonesia during the first twenty-five years of my life. I was born in Medan the same year Suharto came to power. My family moved to Surabaya when I was sixteen and, after completing my architectural engineering degree, I moved to Jakarta and worked there. Out of these three cities, however, Jakarta was the one I knew the least, and this is largely because I only lived there for less than two years before I left for graduate study in the United States, thanks to a Fulbright award. Like other recent migrants to the capital city, I knew of the vast opportunities Jakarta offered but had difficulties in making sense of a city, which in the early 1990s, was changing far more rapidly than the two cities of my youth.

Today, every opportunity to visit my family in Jakarta is also a reencounter with the continuing rapid change of the city and its impact on people's lives. Little did I realize that my frequent visits would both deepen my understanding of the city and limit my view of Indonesia. I have learned to see Jakarta as the Indonesia I have come to know, and therefore most of my academic work thus addresses aspects of the city's political cultures, with a degree of ignorance about other places. The main reason, I think, has to do with the fact that the capital city is still the core of Indonesian life and the center of rapid change, for better and worse. Furthermore, the majority of my extended family and many of my friends and schoolmates from Medan and Surabaya have moved to Jakarta and made the city their home. These factors perhaps have made it important to me that I write about Jakarta in order to make sense of the city.

After the New Order could be seen as part of my continuing conversation with the city, a loose successor to *Behind the Postcolonial* and *The Appearances of Memory*. Like the previous books, *After the New Order* is discursive in its choices of topics, but its narrative structure progresses in a direction that indicates both changes from and continuities with the previous political order. Readers will notice that I have organized the chapters using terms associated with Fernand Braudel. The notions of *longue durée* and "conjunctures," for instance, I owe to Binghamton University's Fernand Braudel Center where I attended many seminars as a graduate student in the 1990s, picking up ideas to think about linkages between diverse yet simultaneous phenomena, especially from those presented in the "Culture and the World-System" series organized by my mentor, Anthony D. King, and Ali Mazrui. The influence of this attendance is not so much the adoption of a world-system approach to

Jakarta, but rather a sense that the worlding of the city might be linked to currents in postcolonial studies and Foucauldian discourse analysis in vogue at the time.

While I can locate my intellectual subjectivity in this past learning experience, it is far more difficult to recapture the influence of different people whom I have had the opportunity to meet since then who have shaped the present work. So as with my previous works, I owe a debt of gratitude to friends and colleagues, old and new, who have supported my work. I especially thank Tony King, Greig Crysler, Michael Leaf, Terry McGee, Manneke Budiman, Suryono Herlambang, Jo Santoso, Gunawan Tjahjono, and the late Wastu Pragantha Tjong for the generous combination of friendship and intelligence that they continue to bring to my intellectual life as well as to my understanding of Jakarta and the larger world. Among my intellectual peers from this time I include Melani Budianta, Iswanto Hartono, Wardah Hafidz, Herlily Lila Kurnia, Marco Kusumawijaya, Abdou Maliq Simone, Kemal Taruc, and Mohammad Nanda Widyarta. They have provided important feedback on matters concerning Jakarta, its urban politics, and cultures.

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I wish to thank my family in Jakarta for their love and support over many years without which this and other works on Jakarta would never have been possible. Fatiin, Fatima, Fatini, and Isaak, along with my parents, have supported my intellectual pursuits for many years. My family in Canada—Hong, Christine, Isabel, and now Leia—have provided love, friendship, and joy while I completed this book.

Finally I dedicate this book to the memory of Wastu Pragantha (Pak Tjong), whom I first met in 1990 soon after I moved to Jakarta and worked as his teaching assistant at Tarumanagara University. We were good friends right up until his death. I turned to him for discussion during every field trip. His generosity allowed me to find a way of seeing and also living the world of Jakarta. Pak Tjong was a classmate of the leading developer, Ciputra, and worked for the legendary Governor Ali Sadikin, two of the most influential as well as controversial figures who have occasionally formed part of my critical stories of Jakarta. In August 2010, Pak Tjong took me to the City Hall, which he helped design, and where he worked for many years. Throughout the many years of our friendship, he was always generous and open to my reading of the city and its people, pointing out my reductive accounts but also continuing to encourage my writing about the city. He would have been keen to see the result of our latest field trip, which turned out to be our last, and my depiction of his Jakarta City Hall that appears as the first chapter in this book.

Earlier versions of some chapters have appeared in the following journals: chapter 2 in *International Journal of Islamic Architecture* 1, no. 2 (2012); chapter 5 in *Inter-Asia Cultural Studies* 12, no. 4 (2011); chapter 6 in *Singapore Journal of Tropical Geography* 32, no. 3 (2011); chapter 7 in *Indonesia* 94 (October 2012). I want to thank the publishers of these journals for their permission to reuse these materials.

Four months after this book manuscript was delivered to the publisher, card-carrying residents of Jakarta elected a new governor. Joko Widodo, previously the mayor of Surakarta, defeated the incumbent Fauzi Bowo. Popularly known as Jokowi, this unassuming, populist leader and his vice governor, Basuki "Ahok" Tjahaja Purnama, are both known as upstanding politicians. They are now expected to manage the complex city of Jakarta, which is plagued by flood, corruption, and debilitating traffic, and is divided by socio-economic

disparity as well as occasional ethnic or religious conflicts. So far they have been doing exceptionally well—giving citizens hope that a new time has finally arrived. They seek to bring the social into the consciousness of urban subjects by overcoming uneven development, unfairly distributed public services, and a divided city. One could say that they seek justice *within* the time of capital. It is however, still not clear what kind of space will be produced in their construction of a new time after Suharto.

INTRODUCTION

After the end of Suharto's New Order regime, Jakarta was abuzz with stories about both the problems and the future of the city. Important stories include that of Rio Tambunan, who was head of the City Administration Office (Dinas Tata Kota) from 1971 to 1975. In an interview in 2002 Tambunan revealed that since the beginning of the 1980s, the office where he used to work had become simply a client of property developers. "Land use was changed following the wishes of property developers who were allowed to make profit from selling lands."[1] He saw half of the 160-hectare green areas (*ruang terbuka hijau*), including water catchment areas, had been converted to real estate properties, which according to Tambunan, contributed substantially to the regular flooding in Jakarta where he lives today.[2] Interviewed in the post-Suharto era, Tambunan accused both developers and the authorities, including those from his own office, of being responsible for the environmental devastation.

Jakarta's spatial plan keeps changing following the priorities and interests of both the authorities and developers. For instance, in the 1965–1985 spatial planning bylaws, the city government set out to make 37.2 percent of the city green space. In the 2005–2010 bylaws, however, the target was reduced to just 13.94 percent.[3] If there were spatial plans made to encourage the authorities to repair the damage done by previous plans, they often resulted in further violations. Such flexible legislation not only permits excessive urban growth, but also encourages extralegal initiatives and practices in urban governance. It involves corruption, weak law enforcement, and transactional politics, which cause profound disorientation in the policy and practices of urban development. If we accept Tambunan's opinion that Jakarta's high-end establishments and urban authorities are involved in the violation of land use regulations, then they are no different from the occupants of irregular settlements who are often blamed for causing environmental degradation in the city. We can say that both the ruling elites and the urban poor perform what Ananya Roy calls "urban informality"—a mode of interchange between legality and illegality "where squatter settlements formed through land invasion and self-help housing can exist alongside upscale informal divisions formed through legal ownership and market transaction but in violation of land use regulation."[4]

Others talked about the policy paradigm adopted by the government. Andrinof Chaniago, an analyst for the Center for Indonesian Regional and Urban Studies, pointed out in 2012 that since the 1980s the primary concern of the

urban government has been to make money by permitting developers' high-end projects. Such collaboration has given Jakarta the nickname "the project city," meaning a city that develops on the basis of making deals for profit.[5] As a result Jakarta is marked by uneven development: strategically located clusters of highly developed city blocks stand side by side with neglected areas. Pockets of high modernist luxurious commercial "superblocks" (huge upper-middle class multipurpose complexes of commercial offices, residential facilities, and shopping centers) seem to float on a sea of *kampungs* (urban villages), the urban wards of the lower-middle class and underclass population.

The issue is not only the increasing visibility of class disparity in the contrasting cityscape, but also the reality of environmental degradation. A series of devastating floods along with almost daily traffic jams has long frustrated the urban population. It is perfectly clear in the public mind that the city has gone drastically wrong and even beyond repair, and with no real improvement visible on the horizon, the only way out is to imagine an escape from the city. President Soesilo Bambang Yudhoyono seems to imagine just such a possibility of escaping from Jakarta. Toward the end of 2010 he declared that the seat of government should be moved away from Jakarta so that it could become "the real capital, the real government center, like Canberra, Brasilia, and Ankara."[6] A team of four experts was formed under the banner of "Vision Indonesia 2033" to explore the idea of moving the capital. Chaniago himself was a member of the team. Like everyone else, he agreed that Jakarta carries "too heavy a burden" and for the past thirty years has had no vision for its future.[7] Chaniago noted the growing difference between rich and poor, the higher crime rates, the declining health of people, and the rise of mental illness in the city. In 2010, Chaniago warned that "if there is no political decision to move the capital city, we may experience again in about 20 years from now violence comparable to the magnitude of the May riots in 1998."[8] Chaniago and his colleagues suggest that the capital city should be moved to Palangkaraya, a relatively quiet town on the island of Kalimantan.[9] In Palangkaraya, Chaniago envisioned the building of a "new epicentrum" that could positively impact Kalimantan, especially in its efforts to catch up with other more developed regions.[10] While this may sound dubiously optimistic, everyone nevertheless believes that, unlike Jakarta, a new capital would be a well-planned city. For academic planner Mohammad J. Siregar, the move would allow the capital city to become a truly "global city," which in Siregar's definition, would be a city with clear spatial planning and a well-organized urban morphology, providing for efficient transportation and settlement.[11] The new capital city would have what Jakarta is missing today, namely "city planning."

What does Jakarta hope to do? Can the city still be planned? Can it be saved? This of course depends on how "planning" is defined. While many think it is too late, some believe that Jakarta could still make some small changes, some locally based mini-planning through private initiatives, but not implement any kind of master plan. For instance, in 2009 one of Indonesia's celebrated architects, Ridwan Kamil, offered an idea of how Jakarta's problem could be realistically resolved by some architectural and urban design strategies:

> If we want to fix Jakarta, we can't use "re-master planning" any more. That era is over. What we can do is to create well-planned and independent clusters of small territories. Small pieces (*recehan*) of well-designed spaces will contribute to the whole. For instance, if one private home is designed with "green architecture," a million such houses will reduce the temperature of Jakarta. If one public building opens its front space for the public, a million such public spaces will reduce the stress of urban residents. If the areas of superblocks are designed to be well integrated, for mixed use, and humane living, and if there are many of them, there will be less people traffic and energy consumption. The superblock belongs to the controlled "cluster development" concept.[12]

Recehan is an apt term; it refers to "small change" such as pennies and dimes, the leftovers of which, when accumulated over time, could secure a substantial amount of purchasing power. According to this conception, the desired urban environment could be achieved eventually if every ordinary household submitted itself to a standard of green building and every public and commercial building offered a public space. Kamil's idea is not without irony as he considers the superblock a "small" project (*proyek recehan*) despite the fact that it is actually a mega-project that involves extensive capital investment and occupies a large amount of land, often secured by taking over substantial green areas. Kamil's use of *recehan* not only suggests a homegrown response to the challenges faced by Jakarta, it also points to the condition of a city that is filled with problems too large for any master plan. The only solution is to resort to a piecemeal method involving each citizen's own private initiative. It also points to a city that seems beyond governance and which exists without coordination or guidelines. In such a city, a commitment to the environment, to planning, and to public space would have to be built up from scratch in the manner of a grassroots "bottom-up" approach and in small pieces, with the hope that every bit will contribute to a larger whole and thus, collectively, save the fallen city.

These scattered opinions about the future of Jakarta have stemmed from the desire in post-Suharto Indonesia to correct the past wrongdoing and find ways to solve the city's problems. They point to the unplanned nature of the city, the weakly regulated form of urbanism, and the yearning for modernist planning (in the form of a new capital, a superblock, and a green design initiative) as an antidote to urban chaos and environmental degradation. The new architecture is expected to stand above the fallen city and represent a legitimate structure in the remaking of the city.

Worlding the City

This book is about the efforts to remake Jakarta and the political, economic, and cultural rationalities behind them. It shows how global and populist ideologies of "modernism," "green environment," and "the right to housing" as forms of power and knowledge come to offer an opportunity to local players to direct urban change in Jakarta, and how they are implicated in legitimating the rules of capital and the state. This book thus looks at the "worlding urban projects" of Jakarta. "Worlding," according to Aihwa Ong, "is the very act of reimagining or redesigning an urban milieu—whether in changing the material infrastructure, political possibilities, or aesthetic styles—[that] is by definition aspirational, experimental and even speculative."[13] Worlding also produces effects that are profoundly political.

Since the 1980s, scholars of urban Asia have grappled with the processes of Asian urbanization while also attempting to define its aesthetics, history, and politics.[14] In the process, some of them question the "knowledge construct" of Asian cities in terms of the global cities paradigm.[15] They seek to move us away from established theories of global urbanism, which they find, conceptually, to be Eurocentric and thus reductive. By doing so, they have directed our attention to local dynamics. Jennifer Robinson, for instance, problematizes the Eurocentric perspective of the world cities paradigm that privileges first world cities as a reference point for analyzing cities in other parts of the world.[16] Robinson proposes instead that we recognize that all cities are sites of modernity even though each carries a different dynamism, innovation profile, and set of power relations and that they unevenly relate to each other. Robinson invites us to approach a city through its specific history and ethnography rather than through high theory, which often emphasizes only the story of global forces.

Others have sought to escape from the local and global binarism by looking at the interstices between the worlds of the formal and the informal, the city and the *kampung*, the imagined fullness of design and the messy spatial practices of everyday life to grasp the meaning of modern life. The recent work of Abdou-

Maliq Simone on Jakarta and Dakar, for instance, has helped reveal the local social and economic networks of the urban poor and how they survive strategically and precariously in and through a linkage with the formal sector.[17] Far from being traditional and unchanging, the multitudes at the local level anticipate and process translocal forces in order to live productively as well as marginally in the city. At the level of urban governance, Roy and others have offered the concept of "urban informality" to capture the politics of both the rich and the poor urban populations in asserting their rights to the city.[18] This recalls Tambunan's comments above about how both real estate housing and *kampung* settlements in Jakarta are practicing "urban informality," but with different degrees of legitimacy. One would imagine that a city run by informality would be chaotic, but such a practice is neither primitive nor crude. Rather it rests on a regime of power that makes use of informality to govern society. These recent works force us to acknowledge that in a city like Jakarta there are plural informalities—those of the developers, the state, and the urban poor, each of which occupies different kinds of legitimacy and power relations.

This book draws some insights from these recent works. It shows, for example, both the practices of urban informality, which involve all social strata, and their spatial effects in Jakarta and argues that they are different from one period to another. It is thus crucial to situate them in historical contexts. I allude particularly to concepts and insights that have been developed in recent postcolonial urban studies as they are helpful in considering the case of Jakarta. Yet this book also represents my continuing dialogue with the city and could be seen as a continuation of my previous work.[19] I tease out some events and stories that would otherwise have gone unnoticed in the interstices of time that flows rapidly across different spatial regimes. My aim is to identify lines of continuity and rupture from previous eras. I tell stories of buildings, urban agendas, and the city's architects from different eras. I touch on spatial practices, but the book is mostly about the elite's imaginings of how the city ought to be.

The main thesis of the book is that the neoliberal ideology of development and its practices of urban informality from the time of Suharto (1966–1998) continue to influence the post-Suharto era. I use the term "neoliberal" here not to suggest a singular unified concept or "more of the same" tendency, nor to propose the rolling out of neoliberalism or that only the power of the global forces matters. Instead neoliberalism, like modernism or nationalism and other concepts, is always subjected to what historian of Southeast Asia Oliver Wolters calls "localization." "Materials," writes Wolters, "be they words, sounds of words, books or artifacts, [have] to be localized in different ways before they

could fit into various local complexes of religious, social and political systems and belong to new cultural 'wholes.' "[20] In this sense, what Indonesians call *neolib* refers to the neoliberal ideology that has been "localized." It is a term recognized locally as a tendency of the state to simultaneously create, temper, and harness capitalism in order to legitimize its rule even if this may involve extralegal, informal measures. Such an understanding suggests the importance of attending to the local players and the sociopolitical and historical contexts within which they are embedded.

This book, for instance, shows how the neoliberal ideology, which used to be dressed in nationalist terms such as "development," has been recast in popular discourse into such terms as "the global city," "green environment," and *perumahan rakyat* (housing for low-income people). The previous centralized "nationalist urbanism" (defined as an ideology that allowed the state to transform the capital city under the notion of "development" and "nation-building") brought with it its association with Suharto's authoritarianism. The era of "nationalist urbanism" is now over but its collapse did not wipe out the opportunities to imagine and remake the city, especially in the current post-Suharto period of expanding possibilities.[21] In part affected by decentralization and democratic expectations, opportunities for reimagining the city have been translated into a competition between different urban agendas and practices of worlding from central and city governments as well as developers, architects, urban designers, and urban middle-class residents. Their diverse interests coexist in competition with each other to define what is legitimate in an urban environment governed by the "urban informality" of the state and capitalism.

What I propose is that urban informality gains legitimacy by way of appropriating global discourses such as "green," "rights to housing," and "urban mega-project." This book also shows how these ideas are claimed and reworked at different moments in the city's history. To see how Jakarta could, over time, come to be conceived in a series of global discourses, we have to look at its history in the recent past as well as in the *longue durée*. This book thus also discusses the ways in which the colonial and revolutionary pasts are integral to the present, even as they are newly configured. While focusing on Jakarta, I address issues that I believe are broad enough for comparative thinking. I seek to contribute to the ongoing exploration of city politics and urban imaginings through a consideration of what I identify as Jakarta's four contemporary issues and challenges: 1) uneven spatial development; 2) the legacy of colonialism; 3) the progressive urban agendas and its countervailing forces; and 4) identity politics and morality.

The Leapfrog of Uneven Urbanism

Recent scholarship on postcolonial urbanism has identified the unevenly planned cities, which Matthew Gandy (referring to Lagos) argues result from "amorphous urbanism." Such a city is impossible to define for it is "simultaneously growing, dividing, polarizing and decaying."[22] Jakarta is one of these postcolonial cities of amorphous urbanism that seems to resist comprehensive planning. Jakarta—"the project city"—has sustained the paradigm of "cluster development," which in turn contributes to the fragmentation of urban space and governance. It produces a series of exclusive zones that claim exceptional status through branding (rather than modeling). For instance, the developers of one of the newest superblocks in West Jakarta, the St. Moritz, declare that

> The CBD of West Jakarta has been master-planned with benchmarks taken from major global cities such as, London, New York and Hong Kong. The city-block is a concept that allows residents to conveniently walk around the city in close proximity and is travel-friendly through the well-coordinated city planning. If you love the cosmopolitan lifestyle of cities like London and New York, this is the place that is not to be missed out.[23]

Here a 135-hectare block is promoted as a "city" that resembles London, New York, and Hong Kong. It reproduces the convention that a piece of well-designed architecture could be seen as a metonym for a city as a whole. The text is really an advertisement after all but it effectively suggests that there is in fact no city planning outside the block itself. The superblock of St. Moritz constitutes a structure of difference. The spectacular architectural complex contrasts dramatically with Jakarta's real problems. It neglects the bitter reality of West Jakarta where, according to one report, "250 neighborhood administrative units (*Rukun Warga*) out of the total 578 can be classified as *kumuh* (slum-like)."[24] It rises above the realities of its surroundings that would otherwise affect the architecture itself.

St. Moritz is a product of a leapfrog development, whereby developers advance by leaps and bounds between strategic spots in the city, leaving behind pockets of unprofitable areas to survive or die on their own. What is produced is a self-contained complex that exists apart from the surroundings that it seeks to negate. All that is in the complex is the subject of attention, planning, and knowledge, and all that is not is invisible—"out there" and irrelevant. The complex stands on a platform above the ground. The imagery of newness and planned environment constitutes what Partha Chatterjee would call "a neces-

sary self-deception" of development discourse for it omits the existing physical and historical contexts.[25]

The image of the superblock (such as that of St. Moritz with its reference to the global city) is often read by developmentalists in a larger teleological narrative of modernization or by world city theorists as the reorganization of global capital that homogenizes the world through competition for admission to the ranks of world cities by way of city planning and urban design. What has been overlooked in these narratives is how the rhetoric of "well-coordinated city planning," a favorite term of superblock promoters, also depoliticizes a complex process of irregular land acquisition and turns questions of power and displacement into issues of design efficiency.

The strategy of leapfrogging urbanism and the production of the superblock are not unique to Jakarta. In fact it has become a trendy urban form throughout Asia. Gavin Shatkin calls the superblock an "urban integrated urban project," which he argues, is an indication of a larger tendency of "the privatization of urban and regional planning."[26] In the case of Jakarta, the process of privatization came with a mobilization of terms associated with the nation's revolutionary past, such as the mega-commercial projects of "Grand Indonesia," the "Archipelago," and "Senayan City."[27] The effects of the "looseness in the center" caused by the collapse of Suharto's centralizing regime have produced a variety of decentralized urban projects that claim to represent the nation. Elsewhere I have discussed the contexts for the emergence of these mega-structures. Clearly private developers are taking up more aggressively the course of urban development, but it was also the declining influence of nationalist ideology and there was also the need to indicate to the public that the "reformed" nation was continuing to develop the city. A few big developers compete among themselves to build the center of consumption by offering spectacles of development, falsely certifying "progress" in an environmentally decaying city.

The superblock exploits the city's deteriorating environment. Its self-promotion as a new center, a new city, or a new world is a stark reminder of the chaotic condition of the city. We could say that the superblock stands out by selling tickets to an ark (or a cruise ship) to salvage the upper middle class from the deteriorating built environment. It takes upon itself the mission of improving the urban environment but neglects the reality that it actually contributes to the worsening of the city's ecology. It claims to offer a corrective measure even though mega-commercial projects have contributed to the depletion of well water and caused seawater to intrude into the city's water system. However, as will be discussed in chapters 5 and 6, architects of superblocks conceive

of the discursively constructed clusters of development as corrective measures, often by way of promoting them as "green superblocks."

Postcolonial Modernism

Iconic superblocks such as St. Moritz claim convergence with cities across nation-states. Benchmarking London, New York, and Hong Kong, it sets up its own space and time that do not quite match the temporal and spatial heterogeneity of *kampung* dwellers in West Jakarta. The phenomenon of transnational connections between major cities on the one hand and physically close but relatively unconnected spaces in the same city on the other hand however is not new. It was an essential feature of colonial cities. Jakarta is a city that was historically constituted under a colonial regime of differentiation in which infrastructure and public services were marked by an uneven heterogeneity. This was long before the opening up of the city to the contemporary privatized market competition of neoliberal international regimes.

As is shown in chapter 1, the colonial state is powerful in many aspects, but it is also weak in many ways. In the case of Indonesia, the Dutch colonial government was unable to control everything. It governed the colony through alliances with local powers, and it only partially managed the city. The limited power of the colonial state resulted in the production of differentiated treatments of space and legality. For example, in the regulation of lands, Dutch town planner Thomas Karsten noted with frustration the pluralism of land rights in colonial Indonesia in 1920:

> The Indies town presents us an unsurpassed variegation from the point of view of land rights: there is what is often a practically inextricable jumble of Native land rights, ownership in fee simple, hereditary tenure on municipally-owned land, rights to own dwellings on, or temporarily occupy, government-owned lands, "private estates," lands not registered as having an owner and hence belonging to the government (whether or not occupied illegally, rented, or placed under the administration of some public authority), "unknown lands" (whose present owner is not known, sometimes occupied and sometimes not), here and there "agrarian ownership," and rights of utilization, as well as residence under *adat* law on land belonging to another (*menumpang*) and "Batavia land lease."[28]

The multiplicity of land rights reflects less a colonial fascination with classification and the detailed order of things than a lack of capacity, resources, and political will to impose a universal law to unify the colony. In effect, colonial space

is filled with "spaces of exception," where heterogeneity, differentiation, and division are modes of governance.

To enlist Susan Buck Morss, in the colony, there was no attempt by the colonial state to "construct mass utopia [as] the dream of the twentieth century."[29] The question of mass society so crucial to the formation of a mass utopia of democracy and popular sovereignty in the West was clearly outside the mission of the colonial state. Instead, uneven heterogeneity in the provision of housing, infrastructure, and public services was the socially and politically prescribed norm. Colonies were thus created with what Ong calls "zones of superior privilege" that divide society along class and racial lines.[30] For instance, in colonial Jakarta (Batavia), differentiated citizenship produced unequal access to collective consumption. The production capacity of the water supply in the 1920s, for instance, was designed to serve "90 percent of the European households with 140 liters/capita/day, 65 percent of Chinese and Foreign Easterner households with 100 liters and 33 percent of native households with 65 liters."[31] There are many more examples of differential treatment of urban space, and it is sufficient to say that the unevenness of colonial urban development kept the colonial city heterogeneous.[32]

With differentiated treatment of urban space being the norm and the form of governance, are Indonesians today experiencing fewer discriminative practices of collective consumption than in the past? In their study of urban infrastructure, Stephen Graham and Simon Marvin have shown how, under the current global regime of liberalization, the major urban infrastructure networks in less developed countries have been opened up to international financial markets.[33] The absence of planned convergence in many (post)colonial cities became a foundation for the subsequent "parallel set of processes (that) are underway within which infrastructure networks are being unbundled in ways that help sustain the fragmentation of the social and material fabric of cities."[34] Moreover, the fragmented urbanism of today is not a new happening; nor is it evolving from the core countries, following the expanding neoliberal ideology of the Western world, as suggested by Graham and Marvin. Instead the "highly fragmented and differentiated styles of service provision with highly complex, and often hidden, geometries and geographies"[35] was a characteristic of colonial cities. This past differentiation of urban services and spaces made cities in postcolonial societies unequally heterogeneous long before the opening up of the city to the contemporary privatized market competition of neoliberal international regimes. In this sense, uneven heterogeneity is implicated in colonial power relations and postcolonial neoliberal global capitalism.[36]

I use the colonial condition to reflect on the neoliberal present because the history of colonialism continues to mark the social life and urban politics of our contemporary era.[37] And, perhaps more importantly, it allows us to understand, historically, the leapfrogging development of Jakarta and the production of a profound unequal heterogeneity in the city today. The linkage between the colonial past and postcolonial present has also led to a range of responses that attempt to break away from or reverse the effects of colonialism. As discussed in chapter 3, the discourse of nation-building following decolonization signals an opposition to the uneven development of colonial times. The result is a modernist approach to decolonize urban space. Yet, limited resources and capacity, compounded by divisive ideological conflicts, prevented the realization of mass utopia, and produced yet another layer of exceptional space to mark independence. In the 1960s, the first president of Indonesia, Sukarno, who was also an architect, built a spectacular boulevard and public buildings in modernist architectural style to shock and to awaken the public. The vision of a future world embodied in modernist architecture was made to arrive "now, not later."[38] For some, however, this was a make-believe project designed to enable escape from the reality of conflict, scarcity, and poverty during the reign of Sukarno. Located in a special zone in the city, the new spatial configuration rose above the *kampung* and the colonial town, thus creating what Clifford Geertz called an "exemplary center" for Indonesians to see a new world emerging from decolonization.[39]

Sukarno's exemplary center could be seen as a predecessor of today's superblock under "market modernism."[40] This type of modernism, which stemmed from the capitalist modernization of the 1980s when the state liberalized its economy, has brought home financial globalization to transform the built environment of the city. Market modernism seeks to rise above the chaotic city in a manner similar to that of Sukarno's (inter)nationalist boulevard. Constituted under market modernism, the superblocks today have surpassed the earlier monuments of decolonization and contributed further to the uneven development characteristic of colonial times.[41] Nationalism can be both a resistance to, and a form of complicity with, power and capital accumulation.

What the Future May Hold: The People, the Ecology, and the Nation

Having historicized the amorphous urbanism of Jakarta, we could say that the capital city is undergoing a condition of postcoloniality, which, according to Edward Said, is characterized by those "who had freed themselves on one level but who remained victims of their past on another."[42] If this colonial gift of self-conflicting subjects has produced postcolonial space of Jakarta, what might the

future hold for the city? Here Karl Marx's dialectical vision of historical process is useful to understand how colonial domination and contemporary capitalism have created new times and spaces that carry with them both profound instability and internal contradictions.

The fall of the authoritarian regime of Suharto and the rise of urban social and ecological movements in Jakarta today can be seen as both an expression of the enormous instability inherent in capital accumulation and as evidence of an extraordinary change in Indonesian consciousness with respect to the social and natural environments. Two of the most exploited subjects, labor and the environment, after a long period of complicity with the state and capital, have emerged as a force of resistance to capital accumulation and repressive political regimes.

In the labor domain, shrinking job opportunities caused by the closing down of factories in the periurban industrial zone during the long period of financial crisis, which began in 1997 and spanned about eight years, have brought people "back to the city" (to appropriate a slogan of a real estate company) to work as informal workers on the streets of Jakarta. I have discussed elsewhere the impact of the crisis on the urban space of Jakarta during this period, and the responses of the city government, developers, and the middle class.[43] It is sufficient here to note that the rapid deruralization has given workers both no choice and also nowhere to go—they can only fight for their rights to work and live (informally) in the city. Long suppressed as a political force by the New Order (as discussed in chapter 4), the workers who are often called *rakyat* (common people) today have joined social movements demanding their right to survive in the city. They also demand higher wages and freer space to operate in the city. For a brief period they appropriated the space of the city for themselves, making Jakarta a center of vendors and spontaneous settlements. They were able to force the new government to tolerate their presence and to finally initiate populist projects such as *perumahan rakyat* (housing for low income people) as a manifestation of a democratic era.

In chapter 7, I document a series of new pro-poor housing initiatives and explain how they work to legitimate the new government on the one hand and to revive capital accumulation in the housing industry on the other. The pro-poor housing agenda revives the 1950s nationalist commitment to housing the *rakyat*. For a brief period of decolonization in the 1950s and 1960s, nationalism was indeed an important social and political force of decolonization, but its revolutionary impulse for socialism was fractured, hollowed out by the New Order's pursuit of market modernism. However, as will be shown in chapters 3 and 7, nationalism continues to be associated not only with freedom and sover-

eignty, but also with the people (*rakyat*). The market revolution of the New Order, while turning peasants into cheap labor to support export-oriented industrialization, did not erase the idea that the *rakyat* remain, in Doreen Lee's words, "the good and moral citizens of the nation."[44] The pro-poor housing agenda revives the influence of nationalism and its historical association with the common people. It has become a highlight of the recent urban agenda.

The return of the *rakyat* to the center of urban politics has been accompanied by the emergence of the ecological movement. Since the end of Suharto's rule, environmental activists have increasingly directed their criticism onto developers and also the government for ignoring ecologically sound decisions. As discussed in chapter 5, the first significant environmental movement emerged in response to the city's plan to reclaim the north coast of Jakarta and build a major profit-driven waterfront superblock. The environmentalists considered the project a violation of environmental regulations and human rights as it would displace local communities.

As far as theoretical perspectives are concerned, the issue of the environment, like that of labor, can be understood within the framework of the political economy of historical capitalism. When Tambunan complains about the environmental degradation of Jakarta and identifies (correctly) the privatization of land in the 1980s as the cause of the problem, he could have traced the ecological problem back to the time of colonialism. As early as the mid-eighteenth century, the vast area of land surrounding Batavia had been cleared of the forest in order to make way for colonial plantations.[45] Sugar cultivation consumed forests, polluted the water that ran through Batavia, and eroded the tropical soil.[46] In other words, the natural ecological equilibrium had already been disturbed if not destroyed by the mid-nineteenth century. The introduction of sugar plantations also led to the evacuation of the government and European communities to the south, in the area of Weltevreden. Flooding continued to be a problem throughout the Dutch colonial era. The conversion of forest into hillside plantation areas to the south of Jakarta also resulted in floods and the river overflowing into the city.

Ecological degradation continued throughout the postcolonial era. It sped up in the 1980s as the greater periurban areas of Jakarta have developed into the nation's center of export-oriented industrialization. The enterprises built there not only received a concession of exceptional space, but also the convenience of cheap labor from the countryside and exploitation of environment. The immediate spatial implication of these developments is the deruralization of the countryside, the expansion of "urban land" and the degradation of the natural environment. Meanwhile real estate developers and a consortium of

property investors were allowed to acquire massive areas of land, including those in ecologically sensitive areas, to build new towns with almost no attention given to the preservation of the ecological balance.[47] With what Shatkin calls a "planning privatopolis," developers plan to fulfill the dream of the upper middle class, searching for a well-planned built environment away from the *kampungs* of Jakarta.[48] In less than a decade after economic liberalization in the mid 1980s, as Mike Douglass points out, the two ecologically sensitive areas of greater Jakarta, the north and the south, have been destroyed.[49] The expansion to the south has polluted the region's aquifer and also reduced the amount of trees and vegetation. The expansion to the north meanwhile has reduced the mangrove forest, which had previously served as a water catchment area. This conquest of the south and north has led to flooding in Jakarta and its surroundings.

Throughout the Suharto era to the present, enterprises never contributed to the cost of restoring the environment, and the government has never done anything really meaningful about it. Members of civil society have largely remained indifferent to issues of ecology, partly because of political repression of social movements and partly due to a belief that ecology belongs to a different domain and that such problems will resolve themselves.[50] The rivers of major cities in Indonesia continue to absorb toxins and trees continue to be cut down to make way for lands with nonporous surfaces. It is hard not to see the large-scale development of superblocks in the center of the city during the post-Suharto era as a major contributor to ground subsidence and floods in the city.[51]

As indicated above, Jakarta has experienced flooding throughout its history, but today the scale and impacts are far greater than in the past. Major floods have now occurred every five years since 1996, with the worst in 2002 when 75 percent of the city was inundated and twenty-five people drowned. In 2007, 70 percent of the city was inundated and fifty-seven lost their lives, with more than 400,000 forced to flee, and in 2012, after several floods inundated different parts of Jakarta, over 2,400 were displaced and forced to live in tents across the city.[52] As shown in chapter 5, the speeding up of this environmental degradation has created an ecological consciousness in the public mind and has also produced grassroots green and ecological movements. In chapter 6, I show how community groups, nongovernmental organizations, private sectors, planners, architects, urban designers, artists, and journalists have formed a multitude of ecological movements (some with social justice in mind), which in turn have forced the government to embrace green initiatives even though they will not be enough to repair the damage that has been done to the city.

These two emerging movements in Jakarta, one ecological and the other focused on social justice, are set to challenge both the city government and the state at the moment when the city, following decentralization, is experiencing neoliberal globalization.[53] They mark the urban politics of Jakarta today. They question the moral values of accelerated growth, and the spaces produced by development.

The major part of this book surveys a range of discourses that seek to fix urban problems and reimagine the city and the nation anew. They occur in the post-Suharto era but are inflected by the nexus of practices formed elsewhere in national time and space. The government and private developers continue to build Jakarta on past ideologies even though they seek to "correct" the past damages that have been done to the built environment.[54] I argue that the corrective planning effort in the form of superblocks, green environments, and housing, while addressing important issues of ecology and the urban poor, still predominantly serves the interests of capital and its utopian vision of Jakarta. As such, this book argues that the neoliberal ideology of urban development from the Suharto era continues to influence the present.

Politics of Morality: Ethnic and Religious Identities

The last theme of the book concerns issues of moral sensitivity and identity politics, which have become central to the post-Suharto era. Since the fall of Suharto in 1998, the city of Jakarta and its greater region have been subjected to competing values and morality. Hard-line Islamic groups, which have proliferated since 1998, have been claiming their right to reimagine the city and to offer their own versions of utopia.[55] The hard-liners argue that the health and the prestige of the city would be best secured by Sharia law. They have taken to the street; some marching and others attacking places they consider to be violating morality (*maksiat*).

The shift of power from nation to the city as a result of decentralization has made the city a site for the assumption of power. As Yudhi Latif of the Indonesian Reform Institute has noted, the influential Islamic party, the Prosperous Justice Party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera [PKS]), "has for a long time been aiming to turn Jakarta into the governing center for the implementation of Sharia. How and when is a matter of timing."[56] In 2007, PKS supported a retired police general, Adang Daradjatun, as the governor of Jakarta. Had he won, Latif believes, Sharia law could have been "gradually and systematically implemented in the capital city—a step that [was] needed for PKS to dominate the 2009 general election."[57] Partly in response to this, nineteen of the twenty-four political parties in the city went off to jointly support the front-runner, Fauzi Bowo.

The election of Fauzi (2009–2012) could be seen as an attempt to prevent Jakarta from falling into the hands of Sharia Islam, and Jakartans were won over by his slogans of "a city for all" and "leave the city to the experts."[58] Fauzi's agenda was aligned with that of the upper middle class and their utopian dream of a cosmopolitan city for all, except, alas, the poor, the informal workers, and the vagrants. Fauzi's success showed that Jakarta remains a city committed to pluralism and secularism; its "other" is not only the Islamic hard-liners, but also the destitute. PKS, however, have not given up. The influence of the Islamic party retreated to the periurban areas of Jakarta, and by 2010 it had taken over Bekasi and Depok and with increasing influence in Tangerang and other parts of greater Jakarta.[59] In this periphery of the capital city, the Bill of Regional Regulation for Immorality (Rancangan Peraturan Daerah [Raperda] Anti Maksiat) issued by the regional government was passed and is gaining a foothold.[60] In some villages in West Java, Sharia has become a regional regulation (*peraturan daerah*). Some activists who work against the implementation of Sharia believe that Jakarta is currently surrounded by a periurban population that is increasingly pro-Sharia.[61]

For PKS, Sharia "will create a better society where harmony and peace prevail."[62] In Depok, located just south of Jakarta, Sharia activists believe that "the implementation of Sharia will decrease the crime rate."[63] This view and the presence of Sharia law on the outskirts of the city have already taken on a spatial dimension and encouraged the growth of Islamic housing. In Depok alone there are at least fourteen Islamic housing complexes that have made the city the top of the list for Islamic housing production.[64]

Housing with an Islamic theme is not new. It emerged in the mid-1990s, but then it was limited to decorative features, and it was never popular. In the current post-Suharto era, Islamic developers have moved from the merely decorative to offer a full-scale "religious atmosphere in the Islamic built environment."[65] Islamic housing has moved from calligraphy on the wall to the *musholla* (prayer room) at home with a special hose for *wudu* (to clean the body before prayer) and a toilet that does not face *kiblat* (the direction that should be faced when a Muslim prays). Islamic concepts drawn from the order of Sharia have been applied to environmental design. For instance, Umar Sutoyo, director of PT Bumi Darussalam, a company that develops Islamic housing in Depok, reveals that Islamic housing design has been extended to the design of a whole settlement.[66] In the housing complex, there is a mosque and even a house for Ustadz to teach the Qur'an to both adults and children. Sutoyo also plans to "build a center for the education of Al Qur'an for children so that they do not have to go outside the housing complex to learn about the basic knowl-

edge of Islam."[67] Meanwhile, Nasrullah, director of Orchard Realty, is planning to build a swimming pool that regulates the hours of operation in order to separate men and women.[68] And once all financial transactions are being conducted through Sharia banks, the totality of an Islamic environment would be complete.[69]

Islamic housing complexes have proliferated in periurban Jakarta, offering yet another form of social life.[70] Yet, while the Islamic housing complexes could be said to be responding to the influence of Islam and Sharia law promoted by PKS, which dominates in the regions, they are encountering the same problems seen in Jakarta. The design of Islamic housing complexes does not include housing for the poor.[71] Instead, these complexes have contributed to diminishing the amount of affordable land for the construction of low-income housing around the city.[72] While applying the concept of Islamic settlement, they also emulate the paradigm of the new town in Jakarta, including the single-gated 24-hour security system.

In Indonesian cities, such defensible space used to be associated with the ethnic Chinese, rather than the Muslims.[73] It is not clear why gated communities have become a common feature of Islamic housing. It may well be the danger of class disparity or the threat to a properly religious life that has seen religious communities feel the need to secure their neighborhoods with a one-gate 24-hour security system. The issue of morality seems important and so does the freedom to express Islamic identity after Suharto's repression of it. On one level the appropriation of gated communities as a housing paradigm for middle-class Muslims tends to reinforce not so much the idea of difference as the "similarities" between members of the middle class, regardless of whether one is Chinese or Muslim. In chapter 2, I discuss the issue of building and identity through one building type associated with the Chinese, namely the "shophouse," and show how it survived Suharto's repression of difference and is now part of the growing trend toward Islamization in Indonesian society. It also shows how middle-class Muslims are reworking the Chinese shophouse into a public expression of Islamic piety.[74] The shophouse, known as *ruko,* bears witness to the city's and the nation's political cultures, and to the intergroup contact and moral sensitivities of post-Suharto Jakarta.

The Shape of the Book

The stories in this book situate the theoretical perspectives discussed above within the politico-cultural dilemma of Jakarta as it makes the leap from an authoritarian era to a democratic one. While the contents of the book are largely limited to the politics, culture, and history of Jakarta, the issues and

concerns are broader than the city and it touches on the wider debates about postcolonial urbanism and how to represent it. The chapters are ordered in a rough chronological progression, and follow Fernand Braudel's idea of three interrelated time scales in the narration of history. I have loosely appropriated his three tiers of "*longue durée,* conjunctures and events" and turned them respectively into a *longue durée* of Jakarta's colonial and postcolonial history, the *remembered/forgotten moments* of intellectual consciousness and the production of space in the eras of Sukarno and Suharto; and the *spatial conjunctures,* which show the significance of events (beyond their existence as dust) in the forms of urban programs and struggles over the rights to the city in both shaping and challenging the structure of the city.

The chapters are therefore organized into three parts. The first, *"Longue Durée,"* contains two chapters focused on the city hall and the shophouse respectively and highlights and contrasts the sociopolitical changes in the city; the second, "Time Remembered/Time Forgotten," contains two chapters, on Sukarno's and Suharto's eras respectively, that reveal the shift in political culture and its effect on the struggle after the New Order; and the third, "Spatial Conjunctures," contains three chapters, each diagnosing a set of particular problems that have emerged from the various eruptive moments in the city's past and the nation's present. Through an analysis of three key discourses—the waterfront superblock, the green environment, and housing for the poor—the book explores how they are implicated in legitimating the rule of capital and the state and how the public both identifies with and resists them.

Moving to the individual chapters, chapter 1 focuses on the colonial history of Jakarta and the nation. It traces the changing forms of the city and the nation by examining the political symbolism of the city hall from colonial times to the present. The aim is to show how the idea and form of the city hall offers a critical locus to understand the shift in state–society relations in colonial and postcolonial Jakarta. Through a spatial and architectural analysis of the city hall, this chapter shows the colonial origins of leapfrogging development and the transformation of urban politics in Jakarta. The chapter is concerned with the role of city government in post-Suharto Indonesia as the nation-state is being further transformed by the force of neoliberal ideology.

Chapter 2 explores the meanings of Chinese shophouses (*ruko*) in Jakarta and other major cities in Indonesia in terms of sociopolitical action and interaction in various historical contexts. It mobilizes discourses beyond the specific domain of architecture, and in relation to a complex array of social perceptions and receptions of *ruko,* it aims to reveal the context of the power relations shaping the meanings of this building type. Proceeding roughly in chronological

sequence, the chapter addresses the changing styles of the *ruko* as catalysts for political repression, economic recovery, and identity formation. The last part of the chapter addresses the connection between architectural form and moral sensitivities as the secular *ruko* is reworked to express Islamic religiosity. There is a growing trend toward Islamization in Indonesian society, which is being matched by an expansion of business interests.

Chapter 3 examines the changing meaning of modernism as a key ideology for nation- and city-building after decolonization. It looks at the fate of modernist social thinking before and after the market revolution of the Suharto era. The writing of this chapter itself is an attempt to revive the socialist legacy of modernism that has been buried under the subsequent regime of the market economy. The focus is on a series of individuals and groups in Jakarta who articulated an important dimension of changes in the Indonesian practice of modernism. The chapter shows how Indonesian architects in the 1960s appropriated modernism as a social strategy to help create a nation out of a former colony. It also asks how modernism, which has been central to the political life of decolonization, might remain an important vehicle for thinking about the future of postcolonial city and nation-building.

Chapter 4 looks at the politics of space in the aftermath of the 1965 massacre of communists that led to the establishment of the Suharto era (1966–1998). The political and economic upheaval of urbanization in postrevolutionary Indonesia has produced exceptional spaces in the periurban area, which I argue are connected to the politics of space in the aftermath of political violence and the new governance of both capital and labor. This chapter looks at the unwitting creation of the periurban area out of the destruction of the political bases of the peasantry in villages, and the control of population growth in the city. The scale of the analysis is the urban region, which is seen as an arena for the development of both globalized and localized knowledge and power.

Chapter 5 concerns the nature of the neoliberal development ideology and its spatial and ecological consequences. It extends the theme of spatial expansion under the name of national development by looking at the recent history of city branding and the waterfront superblock project on the northern coast of Jakarta. It outlines the environmental exhaustion of the city and the emergence of ecological movements that are beginning to constitute a new stage in collective identifications in the post-Suharto era.

Chapters 6 and 7 address the recent progressive urban agendas such as the greening of the city and pro-poor housing and the ways in which they are linked to the spectrum of the capital's needs and the governing of space and society. Chapter 6 foregrounds the theme of urban ecology by tracing the current waves

of popular environmentalism in Jakarta. The recent interest in the "clean and green" is illustrative of the practice of becoming a citizen of Jakarta today. The ongoing demand to reclaim and produce green space, however, entails the displacement of those who are considered to be blocking the success of urban green initiatives. This chapter points to ways in which contemporary forms of power are built on the premise that a green environment requires individuals to reconfigure themselves to gain social legitimacy. It shows how the greening of Jakarta can be understood as part of the evolving technology of governance associated with postauthoritarian Indonesia.

Chapter 7 explores current national housing policies for the urban poor and their effects on citizenship and urban form in Jakarta. It looks at the way in which the pro-poor housing program, part of a remaking of national identity, has been integrated into urban renewal, land certification, and "slum-free initiatives" of the city. The new housing program for the poor operates under conditions of neoliberalism, which demands an integration of the land market. This requires a redefinition and displacement of the poor to the fringes of the city. This chapter also considers the effects of the housing program on the utopian imagining of the future geography of Jakarta.

The epilogue discusses my discursive approach to the city of Jakarta. Taking the form of an interview, this final chapter considers, empirically and theoretically, some of the subjects explored in the book: the *rakyat* (people), informality, cosmopolitanism, the periurban, the wish-image, memory, and the recent *banjir* (flood) that paralyzed the city, and how they are tied to Indonesian notions of movement, development, and people's sense of time. In the process, this chapter focuses on writing urban history as a form of engagement with the city. It alludes to the impacts of the weakening of the state, the erosion of national solidarity, and the proliferation of identity politics. It also maintains hope for the emerging socio-ecological movements, which involve the engagement of urban multitudes under the auspices of the "right to imagine the city," and may herald a new form of collective identification.

Cutting across these chapters are issues concerning fragmented urban space, leapfrog development, urban informality, modernist corrective planning, spaces of exception, and the violence of utopia. They represent on various scales not only debates in postcolonial urbanism but also a general anxiety about the larger destiny of Jakarta undergoing a postauthoritarian era.

LONGUE DURÉE

Chapter 1

The Nation-State and the City Hall

The city hall is a crucial feature of the European transformation of social space and of the emergence of urban modernity.[1] However, it did not always represent civic identity, especially when situated in a colonial context. In a colony, the city hall often enacted practices that contradict its ideal form as an institution of civic pride. There was thus a discrepancy between the meaning of "city hall" in Europe and its meaning in the colonies, even though the term refers to the buildings of the same type and similar architectural style. Therefore, an investigation into the city hall could not be anything other than an inquiry into power relations within a specific context, as Anthony King points out:

> The main point is that buildings, building types, architectural symbols, and forms have no permanent social meaning beyond the history, society, and culture—maybe only the speech community—in which they exist. Meanings are not stable. It is the constantly changing social order that forever inscribes, and reinscribes, its socially and culturally differentiated categories onto the built environment. In the same way, those categories are then inscribed onto the subjectivities of different social selves.[2]

The significance of the city hall in Jakarta therefore needs to be understood within the sociopolitical relations of colonialism, postcolonial nation-building, and democratic transformation in the current era. This chapter outlines a history of the city hall in Jakarta across different times, giving particular attention to the architectural and spatial representation of power. It draws on the ideas of the governing elites, the system of governance and the sociohistorical contexts of which the city hall is a part. The account is loosely chronological, starting from the early formation of Batavia under the Netherlands East Indies Company

(Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie [VOC]) and the colonial state to the era of decolonization, the subsequent authoritarian regime, and the present period of democratic reform. It traces the history of Jakarta's city hall from its status as the *stadhuis* (city hall) of European merchant-administrators and the colonial state to its postcolonial incarnations. Along the way, I interpret the city hall's symbolic elements in the urban setting to create what Laura Kolbe calls "a narrative element in the townscape" central to the justification of political rules, and reveal its contradictions by addressing the following questions:[3] How did the city hall contribute to the development of the political cultures of the state? What is the position of the city hall within the broader dynamics of power relations between the city and the nation? How has the city hall developed the inherited structures, leadership styles, and mission to address the challenge of the present? In the context of the shifting of power, what kind of new sociopolitical spaces has the city hall tried to open up? And finally, what can the symbolism of the city hall tell us about old and the new political practices?

Such questions are framed around the idea that the city hall is a symbol of civic autonomy embodied in the urban "public" space, in a critical relation to the authority of the state and private capital. While adorned with iconographic and symbolic elements to represent political idealism, the city hall can also be subjected to different public perceptions. As Chattopadhyay and White point out, a city hall "is more than a shell or a stage."[4] Instead, it is "the most public of public space." Yet, "its ability to accommodate the 'public' has yet to be explored."[5] This ability has to be understood within the historical context of the formation and transformation of the city hall in a particular place.

As is shown in this chapter, the colonial foundations of the city hall in Batavia/Jakarta, along with its centralized mode of state governance, continued to structure its meaning in much of the postcolonial era. The attachment of the city to the nation-state has made the city hall a citadel of authority rather than a space for interplay between citizens and officials. With governors and council members appointed by the government and its ruling party (instead of being elected by citizens) throughout the twentieth century, the city hall thus offered only limited access to the public. Such practices have contributed to the insulation of the city hall from the general population. This is the main story of this chapter, and it ends by addressing the weakening of the national authority in the midst of the neoliberal urbanization at the turn of the twenty-first century, which has turned the city hall into an arena of urban conflict as well as a space of hope in Jakarta today. Since the origin of Jakarta's city hall is embedded in the ideology of the VOC, which itself evolved into a colonial state, I shall start with the *stadhuis* of Batavia.

VOC and the *Stadhuis* of Batavia in the Eighteenth Century

Figure 1.1 is a drawing by Johannes Rach (1720–1783) of the *stadhuis* of Batavia in the mid-eighteenth century. Rach was a Danish painter and a member of the Royal Dutch East Indies Army. He drew the *stadhuis* in 1770, sixty years after it was built. The building served as a background to the square (known as the Stadhuisplein); flanked on two sides by a row of tropical kanari trees. On the right behind the row of trees stand a fence and the New Dutch Church (Nieuwe Hollandse Kerk). On the left are the Tiger River (Tiger gracht) and the houses of the wealthiest Batavians.

The *stadhuis* of Batavia was located at the center of Batavia *intramuros,* which was enclosed and surrounded by a deep moat and high coral rock walls, forming a VOC town about 2,250 meters long and 1,500 wide.[6] The *stadhuis* itself is a two-story edifice, surmounted by a cupola tower in the seventeenth-century Baroque style (figure 1.2). It is one of the very few historic buildings left in Jakarta and dates back to the heady days of the VOC and Dutch colonial rule. Originally, the building housed "most of the attributes of Dutch municipal administration: the Board of Aldermen, trustees of the orphanage, civil court and jail, the Board of Marriage Registration."[7]



Figure 1.1. Johannes Rach's "Stadhuis," 1770. Photo: Courtesy of KITLV/Royal Netherlands Institute of Southeast Asian and Caribbean Studies.



Figure 1.2. The *stadhuis* of Batavia, now the Museum of Jakarta. Photo: A. Kusno.

The building had a total area of about 1,300 square meters and two main wings. Today it is a museum with a collection of artifacts chronicling Jakarta's history since precolonial times. The building was restored in the early 1970s under Governor Ali Sadikin following the suggestion of the Italian-American architect Sergio Dello Strologo and Adji Damais, a Jakarta cultural expert.[8] Strologo's design for the restoration was based on Rach's drawing.[9] Today, as a tourist area, every year the *stadhuis* offers a variety of festival events, such as the Jakarta Old Town Art Festival and the Coastal Tourism Festival 2011, which showcased a multicultural Carnival of Cultures, from *Gambang Kromong* (traditional Betawi musical) to *Barongsay* (Indo-Chinese dragon dance).[10]

The circumstances that led to the building of the *stadhuis* in 1710 are unknown but it was built to replace an earlier, smaller, and perhaps unofficial building meant for the administration of the VOC.[11] Constructed under the rule of Governor-General Abraham van Riebeeck (1709–1713), the *stadhuis* was completed in three years (1707–1710) by the VOC's craftsman W. J. van de Velde under the leadership of its chief carpenter, J. Kemmer. It is not clear if the style of the *stadhuis* was authorized by the VOC or suggested by the governor-general, but every social group in the town was coerced to contribute

to the cost of construction. According to historian Leonard Blusse, the Chinese, an important minority group, "paid three times as much as did all other groups together."[12]

The monumental building and its square obviously has an important story to tell, as evidenced by Rach's drawing. The artist located the building and the square at the center of his composition, for these major structures represent a conspicuous statement of Dutch colonial rule and its cultural authority. The *stadhuis* and its square stand for the VOC's authority and also its relation to the population, both within and outside the city walls. On a larger scale it represents the VOC's regional or global role and its relation to the Dutch Republic, with its architectural style modeled on that developed in the Netherlands. For some, it recalls the Paleis op de Dam, the former town hall of Amsterdam, designed by Jacob van Campen in the seventeenth century.[13] One could also say that the architectural style of the *stadhuis* of Batavia belonged to the Age of Enlightenment, in which public buildings sought to reflect the democratic values of the Dutch Republic by quoting the styles of classical antiquity. Rach's drawing seems to capture such a spirit.

At the center of Rach's lithograph is the square, where we can see the Batavia ambience in the morning. This may well be a typical everyday scene but its various figures skillfully capture the social structure of Batavia. There is a horse and carriage carrying officers to the *stadhuis;* ladies accompanied by servants carrying an umbrella; slaves bringing water from the fountain at the center of the square; a merchant or vendor wandering around the square. After all, Batavia was a multiethnic town the occupants of which were brought together by the VOC from different parts of Asia and the Indonesian archipelago.[14] From Rach's depiction we can imagine the square as a secular "civic center" or even a place of "civic pride" where the diverse population of Batavia met with or without interaction. It may well be a kind of "public space" with a sense of common good as represented by the water fountain and the groups of trees providing shade. The space here seems to be for everyone. But appearances can be deceiving, especially in a painting. Batavia remained a slave town until Rach's death.

The slaves in Batavia were kept not merely for work in mills and households, but also as a display of material wealth of the slave owners who were, according to historian of Jakarta, Susan Abeyasekere, "mostly Europeans."[15] The work of slaves was highly specialized. Abeyasekere points out that the domestic slave positions included "cook, lamplighter, houseboy, housemaid, *sambal* (spicy side-dish) maker, bread-baker, tea-maker, and coachman."[16] In a town where "slaves stood out as the single largest population group,"[17] some were always

going to find their way into the public square of Rach's painting. Van Riebeeck, the governor-general under whom the *stadhuis* was built, embodied perfectly the contradictions of an eighteenth-century enlightenment figure. He was said to be a "hater of all pomp but he nevertheless took advantage of his wealth and position to indulge his passion for race horses, and he liked to be followed, when he rode, by a great train of slave women on donkeys."[18]

As a colony, Batavia was basically run by the oligarchic barons of a corporation who recognized no civil rights. The governor-general acted like a local king, approving or disapproving decisions of the municipal board. The historian of the VOC Leonard Blusse summarizes:

> [Batavia] citizens lacked all political power or privilege. The VOC director denied the town and its population the right to become a real town. [The VOC] never intended to treat [Batavia] other than as its headquarters, its place of rendezvous in Asia. Always and everywhere the mighty government made its decisive hand felt. The firm decision to treat Batavia as a kind of super trade-factory explains why the town's lot was tied in such an inextricable way to that of the trade institution which had created it: Batavia *intramuros* survived the VOC for a mere decade.[19]

Blusse's "citizens" were the Dutch burghers who were given no political power and were thus unable to form any real town community. The governing body of the VOC had made clear that "we must remain the masters of the enterprise, even if that means the disposal of the Batavian citizenry"[20] but it nevertheless protected its "citizens." It made efforts to create conditions that would prevent the Dutch from becoming the target of revolt or social unrest. For instance, the wall that separated Batavia and its surroundings prevented an uninvited population from entering the town. From the beginning the VOC had banned Javanese (whose kingdoms the Dutch subdued) from living within the walls.[21] The different ethnic groups that populated Batavia were divided into their separate *kampungs*, each organized by its head who, in collaboration with colonial government, kept the order of the ward.[22] They were allowed to cultivate their diverse customs, religions, languages, and social institutions to a degree that it was difficult to form a common will shared by all segments of society. This sociospatial strategy of "divide and rule" continued throughout the history of Batavia, thus creating multiple affiliations and different quarters in the segregated city. In each of the separate *kampungs*, for instance, each ethnic group formed a relatively autonomous *kampung* quarter under the su-

pervision of its own leaders, with different levels of connections to the European power. For the "Indonesians" the *stadhuis* was probably above and beyond their world. It was a symbol of the VOC's absolute power that ruled not only by force and domination but also by preventing the population from forming a town "community." Under these circumstances, how relevant was the *stadhuis* and the principle of civic government it stood for? For the majority of the inhabitants of the kampong, the *stadhuis* represented a world far removed from their day-to-day lives.

As far as the colonized were concerned, the history of the *stadhuis* and its square would not be one of civic engagement. Instead, they would have heard stories of people being put in underground jails or torn to pieces, beheaded, hanged, or whipped as a public spectacle. Such stories have survived until today. As a symbol of colonial absolute authority, one would imagine that the *stadhuis* would have been the target of unrest, demonstrations, and revolts, but this did not happen. The only serious threat came in 1740 and it came from the oppressed Chinese peasants and coolies who marched to the town after hearing of the VOC's plan to deport them to Ceylon, and rumors of them being thrown overboard on the trip.[23] Alarmed by the possibility of revolt by the sizable numbers of Chinese who lived inside the wall, Europeans and Indonesians "spontaneously" attacked and burned six to seven thousand Chinese homes and massacred about a thousand of their inhabitants. While the governor-general did not order the massacre, he did nothing to stop the violence. Killing even took place in the jails of the *stadhuis* where five hundred Chinese were brought out and killed, one by one.[24]

The Colonial State and the New City of the Nineteenth Century

Rach's drawing is probably both a parody and an idealized depiction of an unsustainable sociopolitical life of the colony in the eighteenth century. The painting was made three decades after the massacre of 1740 and three decades before the collapse of the VOC and the defeat of the Netherlands by the French army. Louis Bonaparte, Napoleon's brother, made Herman Willem Daendels governor-general in 1808 and the latter brought the town into the nineteenth century by dismantling Batavia *intramuros* and demolishing the VOC's fort. He used the rubble to build a new center of power at Weltevreden, some ten kilometers south of Batavia.[25] With the European exodus to the south, to the healthier and drier Weltevreden, old Batavia was left crippled with an unhealthy environment and left to die. It became "the other space" of the capital city where the colonized multitudes lived. The historian of Batavia Bob Hering notes that

> In the *Benedenstad* (downtown) or *Betawi kota,* though vacated since the 18th century by almost the entire *totok* and Indo-European community as a permanent place of dwelling in favour of the more up-hill, cooler, and less malaria, regions to the south, the commercial heart of Betawi still throbbed. But by now, it was almost exclusively inhabited by *Vreemde Oosterlingen* (foreign Orientals), mainly engaged in medium-scale trading and peddling. These Orientals, predominantly, *peranakan* (Indies-born) Chinese, with recently arrived Hokkien, Hakka and Cantonese Chinese added to it, concentrated habitation and their *toko* (shops) around their *klenteng* (the temple) in the suburb of Glodok. In between were sprinklings of Arabs and Indians, *bith koja* and *keeling* (Indians originating from South India) and the little *bungs* (Eurasians), stuck in *Betawi kota,* since they could not afford the exodus to the South.[26]

The "new Batavia" belonged largely to the European community and to the age of the nineteenth-century colonial state. It was centered on the suburban environment surrounding two major squares: the Koningsplein (King's Square) and Waterlooplein (Waterloo Square). The vast spaces to the south allowed the colonial power space to revivify itself through the building of monumental governmental structures around the two squares that were designated as the new seat of colonial administration in Batavia. The pseudo-Greek facades, in what the historian Handinoto calls the "Empire style," gave an air of authority to the palace, gentlemen's club, theatre, officers' houses, military barracks, and hospitals around the area.[27] Wealthy Europeans followed suit by building spacious bungalow-style residences, known as Indische Woonhuizen, and filled the area around the squares with tropical trees. The architecture and space of Weltevreden replaced the old VOC town and gave an impression that "everything in Batavia is spacious, airy and elegant."[28]

But we should not forget that this new public architecture and the squares in Weltevreden were all meant to represent the establishment of a colonial state. There was no new town hall to register the urban consciousness of the inhabitants. The old *stadhuis* of Batavia in the north continued to serve as the home of municipal government throughout the nineteenth century. It continued to handle civic and criminal cases and so, even as the new Batavia established its new form of dominance, the *stadhuis* of the old Batavia continued to enact its authority, particularly through the public spectacle of punishment (figure 1.3).

On 14 January 1889, the celebrated Dutch journalist P. A. Daum wrote an account of what he had witnessed in the square in front of the *stadhuis:* an execution of an Indonesian, named Wangsa, accused of murdering G. M. Wigman, a principal clerk working in the Finance Department, in his "Indies house" at



Figure 1.3. The hanging of two men at the *stadhuis*, late nineteenth or early twentieth century. Photo: Courtesy of KIT Tropenmuseum, Amsterdam.

Kwitang, in the Weltevreden area.[29] Daum's narrative is worth quoting at some length for it conveys in minute detail the enactment of the power of the city hall, less through its architecture and more by way of a visually compelling ritual.

> It was still early; along the lower part of Molenvliet it was busy. Even before the stream-tram service had started, hundreds of natives were hurrying citywards with hurried steps. They were walking along the houses and on the raised path near the water; the women moving along more hurriedly than men, dragging their children along, for fear of arriving too late at the nerve-tickling performance awaiting them, to the free display of a human being about to be killed. . . .
>
> . . . With a silent, dark crowd in colorful dress against which the shining white coats of some Europeans shone garishly, the dark silhouette of the gallows stood up sharply against the whitewashed walls of the big town hall built in the old Dutch style; the gallows, standing on the portico, was tarred black with three large hooks on its cross beam, the meat hooks of justice. Wangsa, Wigman's murderer, would hang from the central hook. . . .
>
> . . . The town hall square was so quiet, as if there were not one living soul instead of thousands. While the ceremony took place in the portico of the town hall and during the reading of the death sentence which now and then was accompanied by the drum roll, one could hear nothing else but some

> rumbling and ringing trams, passing each other and driving on indifferently; a symbol of continuous coming and going which takes no notice of life and death, of feats and executions.[30]

Daum's description focuses less on the spectacle of the execution than on the fact that it disrupted the relatively boring life of the colony. His narrative, as Gerard Termorshuizen points out, reveals sympathy for the condemned Wangsa, whom he believed was innocent.[31] By showing the integrity of Wangsa, who had been tortured into accepting the charge, Daum's writing offers his own sense of justice that could not be delivered by the Justice Council of the *stadhuis*. Linking the old Batavia with its "white" suburb, Daum also reveals the inequality of the colonial city: the public spectacle of the execution applied only to "natives"; the punishment of Europeans was conducted within the confinement of the prison walls in Weltevreden. Finally, he shows how the decaying city of old Batavia was enlivened only by a ritual of death. Only then could the *stadhuis* induce in people's consciousness a sense of its visibility, and by extension, the functioning of colonial power.

As the *stadhuis* entered the nineteenth century, it shifted from being the town hall of a company to being an apparatus of the colonial state. It remained, however, as we have seen from Daum's narrative, an institution of the ancien régime that provided no space for civic engagement, and a symbol of the centralized power of the governor-general. The burghers of Batavia, the European citizenry, were "small in numbers and without leadership, representation, influence, money or prestige," and throughout much of the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries they were subordinated to the government.[32] It was only in the early twentieth century that the urban citizenry (mainly Europeans) emerged as an important force, after the issuing of the 1903 Law of Decentralization by the Dutch king, who was looking for ways to minimize the cost of governing the colony.

The City Council and the New *Raadhuis* in Late Colonial Times

On 23 July 1903, the Law of Decentralization was passed allowing Batavia to assume autonomy over the city and, for the first time, establish a municipality.[33] The creation of the Batavia city council was the result of at least two factors. First, the Dutch wanted to minimize the city's financial burden on the Netherlands and saw decentralization as a means of prompting the local government to generate its own revenues. Second, the Dutch had developed a liberal conscience and a concomitant awareness of their neglect of the Indonesians who

constituted a majority of the urban population.[34] The creation of the urban municipality was thus a mixture of colonial benevolence and entrepreneurialism, and not a product of popular pressure. Nevertheless, for the first time, there would be the possibility of civic engagement, embodied in a city council.

Establishing an urban municipality however was not a smooth process, as political negotiations between different levels of government stifled progress. In a valuable study of the origin of urban municipality in colonial Indonesia, Peter Nas has shown how the institution was formed from "above," mainly for the interests of the Netherlands and the colonial state. Only later did it evolve, unofficially, into a relatively autonomous institution for the European (burgher) communities in the colony.[35] We thus have an instance where an urban municipality in colonial times was initially formed without the primary aim of local representation. It started out as an apparatus of the Netherlands Indies Government, with the Dutch Resident as the head of the municipality, and council members appointed by the colonial state. Nothing could be more indicative of this complex reform within the structure of the colonial state than its spatial representation in the architecture and urban setting. The office for the city council and the palace of the governor-general were located respectively at the south and north ends of the Koningsplein. At the symbolic level, an axis was formed that linked the king (at the center) with the governor-general (at the north) and the city council (at the south). This configuration has survived decolonization. Today, the Koningsplein has been transformed into Independence Square, with the National Monument at its center, and the palace of the governor-general has become the palace of the president of the postcolonial state. The site of the original city council building has been converted into the Balai Kota (city hall) of Jakarta (see below).

With the structure of command dominated by the office of governor-general, a municipal meeting could be nothing more than a meeting of state officials, which as Nas points out, eschewed political discussions.[36] This state-dominated city council remained largely intact throughout the colonial era, although dramatic changes nevertheless occurred behind the scene. Nas succinctly summarizes the internal restructuring over the years:

> While political meetings were still forbidden, the municipal councils and local election associations offered the possibility of discussing local affairs officially and trying to realize fruitful ideas. The domination of the Netherlands Indies Government became restricted in the course of time. In 1908 the requirement that officials should constitute the majority of the appointed

> Europeans in the municipal council was abolished; after 1916 the place of the Assistant Resident heading the municipality was taken over by the more independent—council-nominated though government-appointed—mayor; after 1917 all the members of the council were elected; and after 1926 collegial executive councils (*colleges van wethouders*) were introduced. So, step-by-step the concept of administrative decentralization was redefined as the strengthening of the local autonomy of the European citizenry.[37]

From the 1920s onward, with the "Indonesianization" of the civil service, "a small Indonesian elite served in the municipal councils . . . and even a few Indonesian mayors were appointed."[38] This new arrangement altered from within the body of the state-dominated municipality and may well have been a response to the rise of an Indonesian elite and anticolonial sentiment in the colony, but it was also a reflection of the increasing power of the municipality to autonomously manage the city.

The increasing legitimacy of the municipality helped the architects and planners at the time to gain a prominent position in colonial society and they in turn visualized the idea of the self-government of the city through their urban design. A most expressive attempt in this direction was carried out by Thomas Karsten, the renowned architect and town planner in colonial Indonesia. In 1937, Karsten was commissioned to redesign Koningsplein so as to give dignity to the local government. He proposed a *raadhuis* (a building for the city council) to be at the center of the square. For Karsten, the municipality, not the state, should be at the heart of the city. Surrounding the *raadhuis* were the palace of the governor-general, offices for local administration, foreign consulates, radio stations, the law college, museum, police headquarters, a new railway station, and several sports grounds. Karsten had in mind an architectural complex for a new form of governance with the civic town hall at the center. The plan clearly displaced the palace of the governor-general as the embodiment of power. By situating the *raadhuis* at the center of the Koningsplein, Karsten was representing the power of the municipality as equal to if not superior to the authority of the state. To deepen the significance of local government, Karsten borrowed a Javanese spatial concept, the *alun-alun* (the square found in the court of the traditional *keraton* [royal palace] of the Indonesian sultan), but he replaced the *keraton* with the *raadhuis* to symbolize the emergence of civic power. The result would be a new civic idealism inextricably woven with traditional symbolism. In hybridizing European and Asian forms, Karsten sought to register the idea of local autonomy (away from both the Crown and the governor-general) where Europeans and Indonesians could coexist in the civic life of the city.

The decentralization process and Karsten's proposed redesign of the Koningsplein could be seen as revolutionary.[39] By giving the city the authority to manage itself, the role of the state would be minimized and this in turn would lead to civic participation in urban politics. However, Batavia's basic nature was still that of a Dutch colonial city. Despite the proposal that the *raadhuis* should be at the center of the square to symbolize the democratic ideal of civic supremacy, the repressive police system and the different living conditions of the Batavian population brought into relief the inequalities of urban life. Karsten's plan was not realized, nor was his vision of coexistence between the colonizer and the colonized guided by urban planning and civic governance. His plan never got beyond the drawing board, as the Dutch were forced to surrender to the Japanese military in 1942.

Nevertheless, throughout the last four decades of Dutch colonialism, the municipality gained more legitimacy as an agent of change for European communities. The benefits for the Indonesian population however remained minimal. Indonesians' participation in the council, while influencing some policies, had not produced any meaningful results for their communities.[40] The improvement of the indigenous *kampung* in the mid-1920s was more a result of concern over the Europeans' built environment. This initiative however was not entirely successful for it lacked the support and political will of the central government. In 1925, an Indonesian representative on the council, Dr. Soetomo, resigned. Other Indonesian members such as M. H. Thamrin and Abdoel Muis became famous only for their role in voicing criticism of the Euro-centricity of the municipality.[41] In their eyes, the municipality was formed to promote the primary interests of the European community. Thamrin, concerned for the plight of Betawi's urban poor in 1924, even warned the city council "not to be lulled into sleep when it came to redress the sorrowful economic situation of the natives. The municipality as a part of the country's authoritative power needed to take its share securing sound economic conditions to prevail in order to ward off the population sliding towards communism and bolshevism."[42] While the council was responsive to Thamrin's admonition, the Jakartan leader regretted that, in the words of Hering, "intimate contact between the municipality and the native community was absolutely missing, apart from through a small group of intellectuals."[43] Thamrin died in 1941, a year before the Japanese took over, but the urban municipality had nevertheless helped produce a circle of Indonesian nationalist elites who, after decolonization, replaced the colonial government and the municipality.



Figure 1.4. The *stadsgemeente raadhuis* of the Dutch colonial era became the Balai Kota (city hall) in 1945. This picture is dated 1956. The building was demolished in 1972 and replaced by Blok G, a 24-floor office of the municipality (see figure 1.8). Source: Damais (ed.), *Gedung Balai Kota Jakarta*.

The Symbolic Power of Indische Woonhuizen

Decolonization can be understood as both a rupture and a continuation of the existing power relations. It entails the appropriation of symbols and the investment of meanings into the architecture of the colonial era. Batavia's name was changed to Jakarta, whereas the Batavia city council building (*stadsgemeente raadhuis*) was renamed Balai Kota (figure 1.4).

In 1954, the mayor of Jakarta, Sudiro, integrated the neighboring building, which had formally housed the Dutch Resident, into the city hall complex and used it as his office (figure 1.5). This office has since become the office of the governor of Jakarta, and it soon became the representative icon of Jakarta's city hall. Since these two buildings shared a similar architectural style, and one of them (figure 1.5) has survived until today as the office of the governor, some outline of their architectural style and symbolism is in order.

Both the Balai Kota and the office of the governor were built in the Indische Woonhuizen (Indies house) style. One might argue that the Indies house was inspired by the idea of the British colonial bungalow, but colonial Jakarta was characterized by free-standing houses, in contrast to the densely packed rows of buildings of old Batavia. The Indies house thus emerged only in the nineteenth century, following the European exodus to new Batavia. Abeyasekere states that, in the nineteenth century, "the Europeans built in a very different manner from that of the lower town [the old Batavia], adopting the colonial empire style: uniformly white-painted, simple single-storey buildings with



Figure 1.5. The office of the governor, first used in 1954 and today the core of the city hall. Next to it is the high-rise Blok G (see figure 1.8), which replaced the Balai Kota (see figure 1.4). Photo: A. Kusno.

colonnaded galleries. Here the Europeans lived in a relaxed fashion in airy rooms overlooking potted plants, palms, sweet smelling frangipani and massive tamarind, kenari and other tropical trees."[44]

The Indies house style encourages not only leisure activities and social gatherings, but also displays power, social prestige, and government rank.[45] The elevated veranda was often supported by a series of columns (normally in Doric style). The veranda at the front was the mark of a respectable urban house. With a slightly raised floor like a stage, it makes the house and its inhabitants objects able to be seen from the street. It is a device for the expression and enactment of a respectable and thus powerful self.

The historian of Jakarta Adolf Heuken calls the Indies house style "tropical classicism" because it brings together both European classical and Javanese/Betawian references.[46] The veranda recalls the *pendapa* (pavilion for welcoming guests) of the traditional Javanese house, and the architectural language, especially the Doric columns, offers the authority of the West. Be that as it may, the Indies house has been seen as an architectural language of power, especially when the colonial state incorporated it into its political symbolism. Architectural historian Cor Passchieur points out that "in 1854 for reasons of both hierarchy and economy, the central government felt the need to regulate the different types of housing for diverse higher- and lower-ranking governmental officials, and later on (in 1870) decreed standard designs for the housing of the

indigenous regents (*bupati*), followed (in 1879) by standards for the European district officers (resident and controlleur)."[47]

The Indies house of the Dutch Resident was part of the architectural order of power, but what is more important here is that this building style is also favored by Indonesian elites. Photographs from the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries often show the Indies house of the Dutch Resident and Javanese regents. Also common are images of both Dutch and Javanese elites posing in front of their verandas. A product of what King calls the "colonial third culture,"[48] the Indies house is a symbol of authority to Indonesian nationalist elites as it was to the Dutch. As an ambiguous and hybrid cultural product, the Indies house is open to appropriation and claims of ownership.

The Nationalist Municipality (1950–1998)

As indicated above, in 1954 Mayor Sudiro (1953–1960) expanded his Balai Kota by taking over the Indies house next door, that served as the office of the Dutch Resident to Indonesia. The house has since become the office of the governor of Jakarta and is today the "face" of the city hall (figure 1.5).[49] The front yard is adorned with potted plants and a "welcoming" fountain. The house appears modest and open to public, but its veranda serves only as a platform for receptions, welcoming dignitaries, and launching municipal events. The whole complex is fenced off from the street. The building itself is registered as a heritage building, an amalgam of neoclassical and indigenous Betawi architecture. It has received several renovations, the most extensive of which was in 1995, when the preservation effort was most "thorough, systematic and planned."[50] Several alterations have been made to the building, but the facade has been kept "according to the original."[51]

Through its facade, the building projects a certain ethos. Its veranda is a symbol of elite dignity, a projection of the self-image of the occupant. From there the body of the governor is framed in a ritualized performance in relation to the interior space, which is divided into three core areas along an axis line: the Governor's Room, the Balairung (the royal audience hall), and the Balai Agung (the grand hall).[52] The Balairung, located in front of the governor's office, is adorned with additional pillars to resemble a Javanese *pendopo* (pavillion). The 1995 renovation placed much emphasis on calibrating the sequences of spaces, by way of elevation and decoration in order to emphasize the hierarchy.

By the end of Mayor Sudiro's term in 1960, the municipality of Jakarta had been upgraded to Pemerintah Ibu Kota Jakarta (the capital city of the Indonesian government), headed by a governor.[53] By then Jakarta had already been

launched by President Sukarno as the "beacon of the newly emerging forces" of the decolonized nations of Asia and Africa. The Koningsplein was renamed Lapangan Merdeka (Independence Square) and Sukarno ordered the design of a National Monument and placed it at the center of the square. Gone by then was Karsten's idea of a town hall at the center of the square, which would have symbolized Jakarta's own autonomous authority, pride, and values. As a capital of the newly decolonized nation-state, the city could not be left autonomous. Instead, it was given the burden of representing the nation. It was expected to symbolize national unification and progress.

The subordination of the city to the nation is symbolized by the emblem of the municipality that has the National Monument at its center (figure 1.6). The site plan of Independence Square also reflects the order of power (consistent with the layout of the colonial era) (figure 1.7). At the north of the square is Istana, the president's palace (formerly the palace of the Dutch governor-general) and at the south is the city hall (previously the seat of the *stadsgemeente raadhuis*), noted in the map as DKI (Daerah Khusus Ibukota), the special municipality of the capital city, constituting a north–south axis with the National Monument at the center. The city hall complex does not have a public square of its own; it shares Independence Square with the palace. The south side of the square thus "belongs" to the city hall and the north part is reserved for activities related to the palace of the president. While this is seemingly a form of power sharing between the city and the nation, this configuration (as I discuss below) actually reveals the power of the president over the governor.

From the memoirs of the five postcolonial governors of Jakarta under Sukarno from 1945–1966, it is clear that the interests of the centralized nation-state dominated the city's during that period.[54] And all through the subsequent Suharto period (1966–1998), the capital city was under the direct control of the



Figure 1.6. The emblem of the municipality of Jakarta at the entrance to the city hall complex with the National Monument at the center. Photo: A. Kusno.




Figure 1.7. The site plan of Independence Square indicating the Istana (the President's Palace) to the north and DKI (the city hall of Jakarta) to the south. Source: Pamphlet for visitors to Jakarta in 1977.

central government, with the president appointing its governors, all of whom came from military backgrounds. With such a structure of command, the city hall represents only the agenda of the state, with no need to justify its policies and actions in front of the public—a condition that has contributed to the formation of what Jo Santoso calls a *kota tanpa warga* (a city without citizens)—or to put it more mildly, a city with restricted citizen participation.[55] The city council, the members of which were elected via political parties, was a collaborator on, rather than a critic of, the governor's policy. All the governors during the

Suharto era worked within a social regime, which demanded that the governor be responsible to the head of state rather than the urban citizenry.

This is not to say that the governors and city councils did not care about the citizenry. They carried out government development programs to ensure that the living standard of the citizens was improved. But with the appointment of a governor and key members of the city council at the discretion of the president and his ruling party, it is unlikely that the city hall could speak for the public. Safely guarded by the authority of the state, the city hall is not politically accessible to the public. It is located in front of the heavily guarded presidential palace across Independence Square, and it is unlikely that public protests could be mobilized near it.

While the national agenda structured the priorities of the city, the governor of Jakarta was not always a passive agent. Governor Ali Sadikin (1966–1977), perhaps the most independent-minded governor of the Suharto era, demonstrated how he could work for the city by empowering the citizens of Jakarta to voice their concerns about social justice.[56] This was conducted primarily through his support of what he called "free and responsible" journalism.[57] He also proposed a centralized communication unit to make the city hall appear transparent and prevent conflicting messages coming from the government to the public. He established connections with the public especially via the popular annual folk festival known as the "Jakarta Fair," which was held on the southern part of Independence Square facing the city hall. He was able to increase the revenue of the city hall and establish a budgetary right to develop urban programs.

Sadikin is remembered today as a governor who (to a certain degree) promoted public participation and encouraged journalists to put forward critical comments on the city's performance. He is perhaps an exceptional case as he worked during the formative period of Suharto's New Order when his personal leadership was much needed to impose the authority of the city hall and help modernize the physical space of the capital city. Sadikin nevertheless worked within the context of the state's pursuit of order and stability, with almost zero tolerance for mass protests against the ruling regime. During his administration he kept tabs on every social organization, making sure that it would never evolve into a political protest movement.[58] He enjoyed some freedom of maneuver and established his idealism even though his mandate was to promote the agenda of the national government. Behind all these activities however there stood an administration dominated by the military-supported central government.

In 1972, Sadikin expanded the office space of the municipality by constructing a 24-floor high-rise "international style" building. Known as Blok G,



Figure 1.8. The 24-floor Blok G, constructed in 1972 to replace the Balai Kota (see figure 1.4). Photo: A. Kusno.

the building was seen as an architectural wonder at the time and today still serves as the main landmark of the surrounding area (figure 1.8).

For Sadikin, Blok G was a representation of national development and urban administrative reform. He believed that the city hall needed a building that would symbolize the modernity, innovative capacity, and integrity of the administration. In addition, such a building would contribute to the beautification of the city.[59] He considered the construction of Blok G as a historic moment for it replaced the Dutch city council building (see figure 1.4).[60] Blok G, planned and constructed by Indonesian engineers, was intended to showcase the national engineering capacity and become the model for all subsequent high-rise buildings in Jakarta. Along with the construction of Blok G, officially opened by

President Suharto on 28 April 1976, a series of administrative buildings were built around the office of the governor, all named in the same way, that is, "Blok" followed by a single letter. In 1982, the Dewan Perwakilan Rakyat Daerah (Regional People's Representatives Assembly) was completed. Each of these buildings is run according to complex interconnected systems, creating the impression of a well-planned cluster of impersonal bureaucracy.

Under Sadikin's tenure, the administration of the city was divided into five centers (each headed by a mayor overseeing the territories of East, West, North, South, and Central Jakarta).[61] The administrative centers decentralized the administration of the city hall, despite having no autonomous power of their own. They were nevertheless the places where citizens of Jakarta went for their land certifications, building permits, and licenses. With administrative tasks for the citizenry being covered by these mayoral offices, the city hall represented a higher authority and became more abstract and more insulated from the general population.

In their study of the Jakarta municipality Manasse Malo and Peter Nas offer a comprehensive account of the structure of governance and the achievement of different governors during the Suharto regime. One of the most important points they make concerns the dominance of the "strategic groups" who directed urban development in Jakarta.

> The most important groups operating in the Jakarta urban arena are the central and local administration, the military, the business community, and the common people. The military and the administration form one governmental strategic group that is very dominant in administrative affairs and urban planning. The business community, including the banks, industry, and large developers also has strategic resources at its disposal, and in co-operation with the government strategic group it effectively determines the development of Jakarta by the construction of offices, malls and houses.[62]

Malo and Nas also identify "the common people . . . the migrants who settle on empty space" as shaping the city, but they do not constitute a strategic group for "they are not organized and do not promote common plans."[63] Malo and Nas however do not consider the role of the urban middle class in directing urban change in Jakarta. The reason may well be that this social group, cultivated in the cradle of the state, belongs to the domain of the governmental and business strategic groups. Their aspirations were often harnessed and redirected by the government and the business community to fulfill the state agenda of development and the governor's wish for a city with a "Bersih (clean), Manusiawi

(humane) and Wibawa (dignified)" environment, often at the expense of migrants who "settle on empty space."[64] Throughout much of the Suharto era, the participation of the middle class was largely limited to supporting the urban development policy and practice of the governmental and business strategic groups behind the city hall.

For Rio Tambunan, who was head of the City Administration Office (Dinas Tata Kota) from 1971 to 1975 during the Sadikin era, the city hall has since become a client of the governmental and business strategic groups.[65] This feeling has become particularly strong since the 1980s, when the state liberalized the Indonesian economy and encouraged the city to privatize urban development. By the end of the 1980s, large-scale private urban development projects, such as shopping malls, office spaces, and "new towns," began to massively encroach on urban parks and displace settlements in the low-income neighborhoods of the city. In this (public-oriented) private space, property developers could write their own rules and in several instances violated city bylaws. The pervasive "privatization" of land in both the city and the periurban areas has further diminished the authority of the city hall. While any large-scale new towns are located outside the territory of the Jakarta administration, several of them are in the city. In these self-contained towns, relatively autonomous townships developed with almost no relationship to the city hall. This means that, to the residents of these private estates, the developer's management office is more relevant to their lives than the city hall.

For urban planner and critic Suryono Herlambang, the demise of the city hall in the late Suharto era was marked by the removal in 1991 of the Jakarta Fair (started in 1968) from the southern part of Independence Square to the former airport land of Kemayoran, where the fair has turned into a corporate "trade exhibition."[66] As noted above, the south side of Independence Square was symbolically part of the city hall and the north part belonged to the palace of the president. For Herlambang, the removal of the Jakarta Fair signified the end of the city hall's ties to the public. Assessing in the 1980s the differences between the colonial and postcolonial city halls, Abeyasekere concludes that "as far as the Municipal Council is concerned, a big difference is that in the colonial period there was outspoken public criticism of the urban executive of a kind which does not exist today."[67]

The Return of City Hall?

In 1999, a year after the fall of Suharto, the new government of Indonesia, through a consultation process with the World Bank and the International Monetary Fund, introduced legislation conferring regional autonomy. As part of the

efforts to dismantle the centralized authoritarian system of the country, regional autonomy set in motion conditions that have allowed the city hall to play a leading role in urban development for the first time. For some this is a "neoliberal" withdrawal of the state and the promotion of the city as an "autonomous" entity to release its entrepreneurial spirit to compete over resources from both domestic and foreign investments. The 1999 legislation is basically an initiation of the transfer of power and resources from the state to the city (*kota*) and districts (*kabupaten*). By 2001, city and district administrations found themselves in the position of controlling their own political and economic affairs. While the idea behind this decentralization of power was to enhance productivity and economic recovery by increasing privatization of public services at the local level, it has also ushered in a new era of more efficient government and greater public participation.[68]

The city government in Jakarta, while empowered by the new policy, was also subjected to unprecedented pressures from its residents who now bring to the streets socioeconomic issues almost on a daily basis. Unlike in the past, today the target of demonstrations includes the city hall.[69] Governor Sutiyoso, who was appointed during the authoritarian regime and survived the post-Suharto era, witnessed what he called the "time of madness" and "people's changing behavior." He was shocked to note that, during his first term (1997–2002), "4,538 demonstrations were staged by Jakartans against me . . . from small-scale rallies to ones that led to anarchy."[70] For many Jakartans, the local autonomy program was not working well. The governor was still appointed by the ruling party and president whereas the city council, the only institution controlling the governor, in the words of one critic, "did not exercise its authority properly as the councillors did not really serve as the people's representatives."[71] Instead, "the views of the public were often ignored by the City Council as corrupt councillors frequently colluded with the governor or other executive leaders."[72] The legacy of excluding the public in the policy-making process continues to mark the city hall of the post-Suharto era, but it encounters today an increasingly aggressive public who demands "democracy," "accountability," and the "rights to the city" by staging protests right in front of the city hall.

In 2002, as protests against city policies and the reappointment of Sutiyoso as governor heightened, Sutiyoso decided to surround Independence Square with a four-meter-high fence to prevent protests being mounted in it. The city hall itself has been barricaded, leaving protesters with a limited space for demonstration. Meanwhile, as if to anticipate the challenge of protests and demonstrations, the five supporting administrative centers, the mayoral offices (*Kantor Walikota*), have been rebuilt in new locations. Located relatively far

from Independence Square and thus a distance from the secured area, these buildings are carefully designed to prevent easy access by the public. The design of the complex is monumental and intimidating, resembling a fortress, and is protected by moats.

Sutiyoso was the last appointed governor of Jakarta. In 2007, a governor was elected by residents of Jakarta for the first time. Candidates sought support from political parties who consider Jakarta to be an important base for the mobilization of their ideologies. City hall has thus again registered itself as the site of struggle between different political parties. In the 2007 election for instance, Adang Dorodjatun was supported by the Partai Keadilan Sejahtera, an influential Islamic party. Alerted by the possibility that Jakarta might implement Sharia law if Dorodjatun won, fourteen political parties came together to support Fauzi Bowo, who was victorious.[73] City hall thus matters today as urban politics becomes more relevant to the daily life of people in Jakarta. As an important arena for a struggle to define urban citizenship, the city hall has become the target of protests from a variety of emerging social movements in the city.

Unlike rallies at national institutions, which often address more general issues, protests in front of city hall focus on more concrete grievances. For instance, in December 2008 a group of residents of Jakarta's coastal areas staged a protest in front of city hall demanding the administration deal with the ecological disasters, such as regular floods and heavily polluted seawater, which have affected their livelihood.[74] In October 2009, around one hundred drivers of three-wheeled "bemo" public transportation vehicles rallied in front of city hall demanding the municipality to stop raiding them. They parked some fifty old and rusty bemo along the green strip of the street in front of the city hall. They argued that the raids meant the loss of their livelihood.[75] In the same month, a rally was also staged by the Street Parliament Alliance in front of the city hall to push the newly elected councilors to sign a "pro-poor" political contract. Toward the end of 2009, hundreds of labor unions and thousands of workers across Jakarta rallied outside the city hall to demand a higher minimum wage.[76] Contract teachers also staged a protest demanding an increase in their salary. They hurled plants, garbage, and tomatoes at the building after being denied a meeting with high-ranking administration officials.[77] In March 2010, over a thousand chicken vendors staged a series of protests against the plan to relocate poultry slaughterhouses out of the inner city. The plan was drafted in response to the spread of avian influenza but vendors feared it would put them out of business.[78] In the same month, dozens of protesters representing progressive nongovernmental organizations such as the Urban Poor Consortium, the Jakarta Legal Aid Institute, the Indonesian Women's Coalition,

and the Urban Poor Network forced their way into the city hall and demanded that the governor repeal the 2007 law on public order that allows the public order agency to act repressively.[79] Meanwhile, hard-line ethnic organizations too, such as the Betawi Brotherhood Forum, staged protests in front of the city hall to demand a review of public order legislation.[80]

All the above instances show that the city hall has become increasingly important in post-authoritarian Jakarta. The legislation and plan for the city is still laid down by the city hall without public consultation, but they have become the object of argument, especially by those who are adversely affected. The city hall continues to maintain its authority by supporting the middle class who vote for the governor and by empowering certain values and practices while excluding others. However, the politics of city hall today are neither singular nor stable. With a relatively democratic election process in place, the governor has to defend his position in a public who are increasingly aware of the importance of urban politics and social movements.

In 2012, a huge banner covering the facade of the high-rise Blok G showed the image of Governor Fauzi, who was running for reelection. The banner, advertising the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN) meeting in Jakarta, does not include the vice governor, Priyanto, because he had decided to run against Fauzi. Jakartans passing by the city hall would have read the banner in a variety of ways. They might have read it as the sign of the governor's commitment to ensure the success of the ASEAN meeting, seeing it as promoting the success of Fauzi in governing the city and thus his bid for reelection. But they might also have seen it as an indication of the rift within the governor's office, as the vice governor had resigned his post. In any case, the banner showed that the figures of governor and city hall matter. Today Jakarta's residents are invited to engage in municipal affairs via electoral politics as well as protests in front of the city hall. Fauzi was defeated in the 2012 election. He was replaced by Joko Widodo who today seeks to mark a new time for Jakarta.

Chapter 2

The Shophouse and the Chinese

Ethnic Chinese occupied a peculiar position in the history of Batavia/Jakarta. Despite paying three times the amount paid by all other groups for the construction cost of Batavia's city hall, they were still considered foreigners or the others by both the colonial and postcolonial regimes. Little work has been done on ethnic Chinese in Jakarta and how their material cultures tell us about social change after the New Order. This chapter examines the shophouse as a distinctive type and symbol of Chinese commercial establishment and how it responds to political changes in Jakarta.

Referred to as a *ruko* (an abbreviation of *rumah-toko* or "house-shop"), the Indonesian shophouse is a vernacular architectural building type commonly seen in urban South East Asia and predominately associated with Chinese settlers in the region (figure 2.1).[1] Typically it consists of a shop on the ground floor, which opens up at the front to a public arcade known as a "five-foot way" (*kaki lima*) and has residential accommodation upstairs. There is also a small inner courtyard that serves as a skywell, bringing air and light into the interior space. While the architectural style of the *ruko* has changed over time, most *ruko* have retained the same floor plan over generations and thereby sustained an identifiable building typology.[2]

The *ruko* is perceived as a historical artifact in other parts of South East Asia, notably in Singapore where it is has been conserved (after large-scale destruction) as part of the national heritage and tourist industry.[3] However, in the Indonesian architectural establishment, the *ruko* has not been treated as an important building type. Instead, as this chapter shows, it is more often viewed as a source of agony and a building form that lacks the entitlement to be included under the rubric of "heritage." It is a building type that both masks and also discloses the unsettling history of the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia.



Figure 2.1. The old *ruko* in the Glodok area of contemporary Jakarta. Photo: A. Kusno.

The dominant forces in society prefer to consider the *ruko* as a renewed space in the economy rather than any part of the national heritage or culture, as indicated by a cursory look at some mainstream magazines aimed at local entrepreneurs of the 1980s, when the *ruko* was experiencing phenomenal growth. Article titles such as "Ruko: Primadona Baru Properti" (*Ruko:* The new prima donna in the property market) and "Rumah-Toko: Alternative di Tengah Koreksi Pasar" (*Ruko:* An alternative choice for market recovery) reveal the importance of this type of building in the property business of Indonesia.[4] However, the growth of the *ruko* slowed down and declined in the wake of the May 1998 riots against the ethnic Chinese, which included much destructive violence on Chinese-identified built spaces such as the *ruko*. The riots, generated by elements in the military who exploited grassroots anti-Chinese sentiments, led to psychological as well as physical damage.[5] It took a few years after the riots for the *ruko* to reemerge on the property market.

In 2006, for instance, *Properti Indonesia,* a real estate magazine, featured a special issue titled *Ruko Terus Diburu/Continuing the Hunt for the Ruko* that promoted the potential of this building type for business investment.[6] Since

then there have been many descriptive accounts about the *ruko* as a precursor to economic growth in a changing Indonesia. The return is not modest. Observers use words such as "flooding" and "epidemic" to describe the phenomenal resurgence of the *ruko*. For instance, in a research paper published by a university in Jakarta, the author Christine Wahyuasih points out:

> Today the *ruko* has achieved epidemic proportions in the major cities of Indonesia. It wouldn't be an issue if the spread of the *ruko* was confined to a particular territory. Trouble begins when many unplanned *ruko* spread uncontrollably to various areas. This has caused traffic jams, a decline of public safety, an increase of garbage, and the degradation of the visual environment.[7]

The report further indicates that the *ruko* has lost its character as owners "modernize its appearance with no regard to its earlier typology. Furthermore, the *ruko* are getting higher and continue to stage more and more billboards."[8]

This chapter shows how the *ruko,* in its various expressions and transformations over time, engages in the history, culture, and politics of thriving urban environments in Indonesia. It also reveals how the identity of the *ruko* does not depend on its architectural characteristics or its building typology. Instead, the *ruko* owes its identity to the circulation of ideology, common perceptions, and a social and political consensus. In other words, the *ruko* can be associated with a Chinese identity only if such an association is sufficiently circulated and accepted in the media and public imagination.

The *ruko* is therefore discussed here as a building type situated within a dynamic sociopolitical context rather than in terms of its stylistic and functional dimensions.[9] The focus is on the contextually defined meaning and practices that in turn help to create and sustain the accepted building type. I integrate discursive sources of data and field observations to create a diachronic account for the continuity and change over time of the meaning of the *ruko*. What emerges is neither objective nor complete. Instead it remains open-ended, subjective, and even speculative. This interpretative account seeks to emphasize the irreducibility of meaning-making and highlights the unlimited layers of interpretation that one could offer on the formation and transformation of the *ruko*. This chapter thus is divided into several layers of evocations with the objective of showing, first, how a building type and socially constructed set of ideas mutually constitute each other and how different expressions of and responses to the *ruko* have produced Chinese identity in Indonesia. Second, how this relation between architecture and identity is up for renegotiation prompted

by the appearance of new forms of *ruko* and new political circumstances and demands.

A few caveats are in order. First, although the *ruko* belongs to a transnational regional type of shophouse that can be found in various parts of South East Asia, I focus solely on Indonesia as the political cultures in that country offer a complex case to address the life cycle of the type. Second, to reveal the general contour that gives the *ruko* its distinct identity, I assemble together different materials from various cities even though each of the cases I address has its own specific sociopolitical context. I mobilize and organize them diachronically, following the materials at hand, with the risk of generalization, in order to constitute a "national memory" of the Indonesian shophouse. Third, I use the term *ruko* instead of shophouse to give a local flavor to this regional building type even though the notion of the *ruko* only became popular in the 1980s when it was more fully integrated into the activities of the large-scale property industry and markets in Indonesia. Finally, I show how the ethnic Chinese are conceived rather narrowly as an economic entity via their association with the *ruko,* even though the ethnic Chinese in Indonesia, like any other ethnic group, are a diverse population. In the words of the Indonesian sociologist Arief Budiman, "there are many kinds of Chinese: rich, poor, business tycoons, workers, small traders, and unemployed. Some Chinese make money and become rich; some others remain poor, discriminated against, and exploited."[10] One can also add that not all ethnic Chinese live in *ruko* or can be associated with them.

The Chinese Layer

In a relatively recent anonymous website posting, an Indonesian writes,

> If we look at the buildings along the streets of Indonesian cities, we will see a row of *ruko*. All kinds of business can be conducted by the owners who live there, such as groceries, building materials, restaurants, computer shops, etc. What is particularly interesting for us is that the majority of the people who use or own *ruko* are ethnic Chinese (*orang Cina*).[11]

The author then asks, "Why do Chinese people prefer to live in a *ruko*?," to which he offers this answer:

> It appears that for Chinese people who are starting their own business, they will do everything to buy a *ruko,* but for what? The *ruko* is not only a place for

> living and doing business, but it is also for investment. How smart they are! While staying in the *ruko,* they accumulate capital until they have enough to buy a house.[12]

The author of this blog post identifies as non-Chinese and expresses an assumption that the diverse ethnic Chinese community is interested only in economic exchange and prosperity. The author represents Indonesians' widespread curiosity about Chinese business culture, which members of the Indonesian middle class have increasingly sought to emulate. What is of particular interest to us is the connection the author makes between the success of the ethnic Chinese and their *ruko*.

The connection between the *ruko* and Chinese business identity has long been established, and is sustained by real estate developers who are predominantly Chinese. In an item in *Kompas,* a national newspaper, that featured successful real estate developers, Ikawan, a developer, indicated that in the city of Palembang, South Sumatra, where he worked, "the economic players are largely Chinese (*orang Tionghoa*) who believe that if they have four children, they must buy four *ruko*. That is why I feel sure that if I build a *ruko,* there is always a buyer."[13] Here, the *ruko* is tied to the Fujianese notion of *hoki* (good luck), which in turn is linked to the reproduction of children. Because most ethnic Chinese have Fujianese roots, the *ruko* and children are perceived as products and sources of economic prosperity, the value of which can be kept and bestowed, by way of inheritance, on the next generation.

Jongki Wardiman, the architect of Adgraph Studio in Jakarta, is in charge of building *ruko* in several places in the Riau Islands and he tells a similar story, linking the *ruko* to Chinese subjectivity. He notes that the cities of Pekanbaru, Tanjung Pinang, and Batam have already been flooded with *ruko* and he attributes this extraordinary expansion to the rapid economic growth in the region. As a builder, Wardiman knows his clients well. He remarks that "almost all the owners of *ruko* in Riau are ethnic Chinese who open shops. They are the *ruko*'s fans."[14] He characterizes his *ruko* clients as

> simple-minded people who don't care about architectural and aesthetic considerations. They dislike trees around their *ruko,* and prefer to wall themselves off from the surroundings by adding an extra storey away from the street. They also prefer small windows. Yet they favour eye-catching colours to draw attention. . . . In short they think only economically of how to generate capital from the *ruko.*[15]

Wardiman also notes that the contemporary *ruko* rises up to four stories high, some with an additional penthouse designed to attract swallows to nest. He considers the proliferation of the *ruko* in the Riau Islands as part of the general pattern of its development in other Indonesian cities (figure 2.2).

Wardiman's observation reminds me of the story shared by Hendro Gondokusumo, a major ethnic Chinese developer who operates in Jakarta today. Gondokusumo recalls how difficult it was in the mid-1970s to sell suburban houses to ethnic Chinese who had been living in the *ruko* of Glodok (the old Chinatown of Jakarta constructed during colonial times). The young Gondokusumo then wanted to "modernize" the ethnic Chinese by moving them away from their old *ruko* in Chinatown to a "proper" housing estate. Gondokusumo recalls that "it was very difficult to sell houses then (*susah banget*)! They [the ethnic Chinese in Glodok] only want to live in *ruko,* so that if someone wants to buy something at midnight, they could open their doors."[16] Gondokusumo finally sold off his first housing project to buyers in Glodok after extraordinary efforts of persuasion.



Figure 2.2. Elevated *ruko* in Jakarta, 2010. Photo: A. Kusno.

It is important to understand that the *ruko*'s classification as an index of economic prosperity and the economic presence of Chinese in an area is a construct that draws on both myth and direct observation. All the commentaries above, by an ordinary anonymous Indonesian, an architect, and a developer, represent the dominant perception in society, one that associates Chineseness with the *ruko* but also ignores the realities that the owners of the *ruko* are by no means only ethnic Chinese. Moreover, it is not always possible to figure out the ethnicity of this particular building type, despite the commentaries above perpetuating the well-established stereotype that associates the *ruko* with the economically savvy Chinese. The disregard that the owners of the *ruko* hold for the aesthetics of the townscape and harmony of urban design is thus attributed to the economic priorities that ethnic Chinese are assumed to have. But, on the other hand, the general absence of urban planning regulations and lack of law enforcement in many Indonesian cities with regard to building height, infrastructure, and environmental considerations are legitimate factors that are not held to account for the unregulated growth of the *ruko*. In short, the moral economy of the *ruko* and the evocation of the position of ethnic Chinese in Indonesia are seen to be at odds with national culture and urban planning norms.

A Layer of Overseas Chinese History

The morpho-typology of the *ruko* in Indonesia has been relatively well studied and speculated upon, but the origins of this particular type of building remain obscure and scholars debate whether the first Chinese settlement in Indonesia took the form of *ruko*. Some refer to its evolution in relation to accelerated urbanization in the nineteenth century, others believe it to be older. Architectural historian Johannes Widodo indicates that in Pelabuhan Deli, near Medan, North Sumatra, one can find traces of an original Chinese settlement (probably established in the nineteenth century) that included examples of *ruko* with Chinese roofs.[17] The Chinese origin of the *ruko* has also been emphasized by architectural historian Handinoto who (following the study of David Kohl) notes that *ruko* can be found in the coastal provinces of Guandong and Fujian in China.[18] Chinese migrants were believed to have brought the idea of the *ruko* to their "Chinese quarters" in South East Asia.

The studies above indicate that *ruko* originated from the southern coast of China and then travelled to the region by way of cultural diffusion following the migration of early Chinese pioneers. The later development of this form of building is also linked to the phenomenon of sociospatial segregation in the colonial city. Under the Dutch colonial discourse of race, ethnic enclaves were a feature of the urban fabric, and the Chinese would occupy separate districts,

governed by their own mayors and cultural norms.[19] This policy of sociospatial segregation in the colonial city consolidated the Chinese districts and, therefore, territorialized the *ruko*. By the nineteenth century, the *ruko* had become an emblematic architecture associated with the diverse Chinese population of the region.

The social life of the colony, however, was more fluid and porous than a single ethnic association might suggest. There were intergroup contacts and interchanges of ideas between different communities that enhanced the urban fabric as expressed in an architectural morphology of segregation.[20] The architectural expressions of the *ruko* incorporated building elements from Dutch, Indian, Arab, Javanese, and Malay architectures, among others. Such a tradition of intercultural interaction, which went back to the precolonial era, has served to localize *ruko* in various ways. For instance, one still can find today devotions to Datuk Kong (the local guardian spirit of the land) at the front entrance and rear of *ruko*. The presence of this deity shows that local religious practices permeated the seemingly foreign *ruko*. Adopting local cultural practices and appropriating fashionable styles according to the spirit of the age, the *ruko* has survived different sociopolitical milieus. The mutation of the architectural space and form of *ruko* thus stems from sociopolitical contexts within which the *ruko* is embedded. The evolution of *ruko* from one to two or more floors is a case in point.

Most studies on the architecture of this building type indicate that the emergence of the two-story *ruko* was largely an anonymous process of urban transformation that stemmed from the quick pace of urbanization, increased population density, and the scarcity of land. However, we could also consider the history of violence against ethnic Chinese as providing the basis for the adoption of an elevated structure. In his study of Indies houses, historian Rudolf Mrazek points out that the two-story house (favored by the Dutch) in colonial Indonesia may have originated in Chinese communities who elevated their house as a safety measure against external threats. Mrazek sees the "living quarters with a built-up (imagined) safety off the ground" as a response to the "ever unpredictable and as often as not, anti-Chinese Indies environment."[21]

The introduction of modern town planning in the 1930s by renowned Dutch planner Thomas Karsten affected some well-off Chinese who decided to move out of the ethnic enclave to live in the "white suburb," but this did not do much to change the building and social traditions of the *ruko*. The *ruko* of the Chinese continued to be marked by mixed use, with families working downstairs and living upstairs, off the ground, thus enacting the bipolar identity of ethnic Chinese as commercial bourgeoisie (who engaged with the economy of the

street) and racial minorities (living above ground as refuges from anti-Chinese violence).[22]

The uniformity of *ruko* nevertheless has given way to a markedly variegated built fabric more recently. The *ruko* of businessman Oei Tiong Ham, for instance, was upgraded in the 1930s into an art deco style building, a fashion widely deployed for *ruko* in the late colonial era.[23] Art deco *ruko* constituted a feature of what Liem Thian Joe, a journalist in Semarang in Central Java, called "modern" buildings in 1993.[24] By the 1980s, many of these late colonial art deco *ruko* were in a state of ruin or being demolished, replaced by a new form of *ruko* covered with billboards.[25] Despite changes in external appearance throughout colonial and postcolonial history, the *ruko* continues to represent the streetscape of main streets and a market sphere dominated by ethnic Chinese.

Layering the Facade: The Billboard as Concealment

Scholars of the Indonesian legal regime have pointed out that the postcolonial governance of Indonesian citizenship by Suharto (1966–1998) was informed by colonial racial groupings that conceived the ethnic Chinese as a separate entity.[26] This "othering" of ethnic Chinese has given rise to the state-supported practices of both discriminating against and assimilating ethnic Chinese. As historian Tim Lindsey points out,

> after Suharto's New Order took control of the government from March 1966, a range of regulations were introduced, pressuring Chinese Indonesians to repudiate their "Chineseness" as with the adoption of Indonesian names; the limiting of public use of the Chinese language; the restriction of ethnic Chinese educational access; and the limiting of commercial opportunities for the ethnic Chinese.[27]

Such regulations were symptomatic of what sociologist Ariel Heryanto calls "the erasure of Chinese from public cultures" and were accepted by ethnic Chinese with a remarkable self-consciousness, which I would suggest, found expression in the external appearances of *ruko*.[28]

The question of visibility and signs of Chineseness thus was an issue during the New Order of Suharto. The state's assimilation policy sought to erase the exposure of Chinese cultures in the public space, and yet it still continued to identify the Chinese as an economic entity—a cultural code that has been partially accepted by the ethnic Chinese, via state pressures that oblige them to conform as "economic beings." In the 1980s, as the Indonesian economy took

off, such conditions gave rise to a variety of innovations, one of which was the use of billboards to reconstitute the external appearances of *ruko*.

The *ruko* covered with billboards could be named as a phenomenon of the New Order of Suharto. The architectural refashioning of *ruko* at the time dealt with the more difficult question of how to represent a building type largely owned or occupied by ethnic Chinese in the complex terrain of the Indonesian state's politics of "erasing Chinese culture from public space."[29] The "billboard *ruko*" is as much about townscape as it is about desire for representation, a theme that is at once profound and banal (figure 2.3). While some architects find the billboard *ruko* aesthetically distasteful, it is nevertheless part of a wide range of symbolic evocations of the sociopolitical context within which it is embedded. Billboard *ruko* can be seen as a form of interplay between self-concealment and self-revelation under conditions of the state's erasure of Chinese identity from public space.

During the Suharto era, large-scale billboards were widely adopted by *ruko* owners. We could say that the indexical character of the billboards has, in fact, replaced the shop front of the *ruko*. The billboards advertise products (mostly



Figure 2.3. An example of a contemporary billboarded *ruko*. Photo: A. Kusno.



Figure 2.4. *Ruko* of the 1970s with frames for billboards in ruins, Gajah Mada Street, Jakarta. Photo: A. Kusno.

imported) and carry explicit information for different interpretative communities to decode. The use of billboards may well be simply a business choice that has nothing to do with issues of politics and identity, but what the billboards bring to mind is the economy, the *ruko,* and the Chinese. Small wonder that the billboard *ruko* persisted all through the period of Suharto's New Order and only went out of favor after the collapse of the regime (figure 2.4).

Perhaps the reason for the rise and fall of the billboard *ruko* can only be understood by way of locating it within the context of the Indonesian state's politics of erasure of Chinese identity in public culture. The billboards expressed and evoked the cultural politics of the state. The development no doubt contributed to the change in the external appearance of the *ruko,* but it also expressed the darker side of the social formation that produced it. The shifting of external appearances of the *ruko* from shop front to billboard discloses contradiction and conflicts (rather than simply reflecting a development process) in the urban environment.

Moving Upward

Since the 1980s, along with the proliferation of billboards, the *ruko* has begun to be organized vertically, with multiple stories stacked one above the

other. This towering of *ruko* produces a shallower inner space, but the lack of depth has been compensated by the spaces organized vertically. The formation of the upper floors constitutes an extended spatial separation of living (on the upper floors) from working (on the ground floor). Unlike the semipublic space of the ground floor, the upper floors serve to demarcate boundaries, concealing activities unrelated to the first floor. The vertical layering gives the private space on the upper floors a sense of autonomy and with the windows and facade almost entirely covered by large-scale billboards, the *ruko* effectively screens the living space of the upper levels.

But the towering of the *ruko* and the masking billboards did not prevent the Chinese from becoming targets of the May 1998 riots. As indicated earlier, this unrest, which took place in several Indonesian cities, was state-instigated violence to distract public attention from the failure of the state to deal with economic and political crises. The incident resulted in the death of at least 1,200 people (including looters who were trapped in torched shopping malls), the mass rape of more than a hundred women of Chinese descent, and the raiding and torching of thousands of houses and *ruko* in Jakarta, Solo, and Medan, mostly owned by ethnic Chinese.[30]

During the riots, the *ruko* failed to register as an ordinary, everyday aspect of a built environment, but rather came to connote "Chineseness" and the domination of economic commodities. Thus the *ruko* became a prime target of looting and burning.[31] Owners of a *ruko* who considered themselves non-Chinese put signs on the doors of their *ruko* reading "Milik Pribumi" (owned by an indigenous person) or "Islam," for they apparently recognized that without such a sign their *ruko* would be easily susceptible to anti-Chinese violence. Such signs also show how the *ruko* is not and has not been the sole purview of the Chinese.

Fearful of future violence, many inhabitants abandoned their *ruko* after the riots. The building type came to be viewed negatively and its property value has dropped significantly.[32] In the words of Paulus Nugraha and his colleagues who studied the *ruko* market in 2000, "people are afraid of living in the *ruko*."[33] It took several years for this building type to regain buyers' favor, and from 1998 onward architects and developers began to mobilize against the billboard facades of the *ruko*.[34]

The New Layer: *Ruko* in the Post-Suharto Era

The *ruko* has entered a new phase in the era of *reformasi* (reform associated with the aftermath of the Suharto era). After a few years of decline, the *ruko* has asserted itself once more as an engine for economic growth, but with a new design concept. In 2006, *Properti Indonesia,* in a special issue entitled *Continuing the Hunt for the Ruko,* presented what it claimed to be the significant

advantages of the *ruko* today.[35] The report highlights recent innovations, the most important of which is the elimination of the residential function from the *ruko:*

> Although multifunctional in concept, the *ruko* today rarely includes the function of residence. Its prime function now is business. It is not surprising, therefore, that the *ruko* has been eventually categorized as commercial property and since then it has become the most profitable enterprise (*andalan*) for developers in marketing commercial areas. The *ruko* has been used to support the business of the shopping mall. With this [new function at the forefront of the commercial area], the *ruko* offers a variety of designs.[36]

Unlike the *ruko* from previous eras where living and working coexisted, the new design emphasizes business and is devoid of its core residential concept. The new *ruko* offers only a series of empty interior spaces, an invitation to all kinds of functions and buyers. Gone is the skywell, as the office space is designed to accommodate an air conditioner. *Properti Indonesia* observes that "Recently, the interrelated three to four floors [that constitute a unit] have been compartmentalized, with each floor representing an independent unit. It is this creativity in design concept that has made the *ruko* attractive to buyers."[37] While it is still self-consciously labelled a *ruko,* the building accommodates a variety of business activities, which according to marketing managers has made it more responsive to investment opportunities.

Additionally, *Properti Indonesia* also notes the changing appearance of this building type. For the *ruko* to assume a new identity, it must have an explicit architectural style (instead of a plain facade covered by billboards). The appearance of the *ruko,* which in the past has taken the form of either Chinese building styles or boxlike structures covered with billboards, has recently adopted fashionable thematic styles of architecture associated with the Mediterranean, neoclassicism, and minimalism (figures 2.5 and 2.6).

Contemporary *ruko* do not always tolerate any visual intrusions, such as billboards, as one of the objectives of the new design is to disentangle the *ruko* from its past associations. In fact, some are ornamented with rich profiles to prevent the easy mounting of billboards.[38] Another innovation concerns the location of the *ruko*. *Properti Indonesia* observes that developers have been disseminating *ruko* in various parts of the city, beyond the confinement of specific places associated with Chinese neighborhoods. The new *ruko* are located in growing areas, and in turn contribute to their economic growth. By integrating the *ruko* into new commercial zones (away from the established Chinese districts), the building type gains a new identity. Spatially, it becomes part of a



Figure 2.5. Newly built neoclassical-style *ruko* with car parking at the front, 2010. Photo: A. Kusno.

shopping mall complex or the commercial areas of a "new town" secured by gates and security posts.[39]

The reviving of the *ruko* and the expanding of its presence through design strategies is an economic, social, and political phenomenon. As a commercial building type that now targets a more flexible ownership, the new *ruko* has become emancipated from the relatively fixed identity of the Chinese. Identifying the *ruko* purely in commercial terms (rather than residential ones) means the owners or users of the new *ruko* assume a more abstract and certainly more distant identity. The marketing of the *ruko* as a new form of property has made it a commodity available to everyone who can participate in the market. However, in its new setting, the *ruko* is part of an emerging structure of exclusion that sets it apart from the street vendors with whom it used to coexist.

Displacing the Outer Layer

In the past, at the front of each *ruko* there was a five-foot-wide space called the *kaki lima,* which along with those of the neighbors, formed arcades that connected all of the buildings in a row at the street level. This extended area could



Figure 2.6. A minimalist style *ruko.* Photo: A. Kusno.

be seen as an intermediate space to ease transition from exterior to interior. It also functioned as a pedestrian arcade for buyers to move from one shop to another. The *kaki lima* was usually used by owners to display their goods, but also by street vendors (who became known as *pedagang kaki lima* [literally, "five-feet vendors"]) to sell petty commodities. The spaces were functionally composite and multiple, and were zones of contact between the shop, the buyers, and the vendors who appropriated the space. It was never entirely clear if the *kaki lima* was owned by the owner of the *ruko,* for in many cases it was controlled by the city government and local thugs who protected the space by excising fees from the vendors and *ruko* owners who used it. It was assumed that each user would exercise restraint and tolerance in this intermediate space, which carried connotative values of being relational and negotiable.

As we can see in figures 2.5 and 2.6, the new *ruko* emerged at a time when interactive spaces such as the *kaki lima* were disappearing as an integrated element of the building. The new *ruko* has no *kaki lima* and thus no space to welcome street vendors. Instead it claims the territory that was once used by vendors for car parking, monitored by attendants who are also often security guards.

Accommodating cars instead of vendors, the new *ruko* has become associated with the high-end establishment and by extension its exclusivity.

The new image of the *ruko* as a generator of formal economic growth in the post-Suharto era demands that it be located in prime areas, and this does not always happen without a challenge. The appearance of the *ruko* in a new neighborhood often marks not only the opening up of that area to a new variety of commodities, but also means the potential displacement of vendors and smaller traders in the traditional market. Some activists, working on the behalf of vendors and small traders, view the recent spread of the new *ruko* as contributing to the increased decline of the traditional marketplace.[40] They also express concern that the new *ruko* will displace petty traders who will then be forced to relocate further and further away from the prime areas of the main streets.

While the *ruko* has been transformed into a popular commodity that could potentially be owned by anyone in the market, this openness is limited to property owners, thereby excluding small mobile traders. Activist-architect Edwin Nafarin from Surabaya points out that the recently built *ruko,* which cost between 600 to 800 million rupiah ($60,000–$80,000), are clearly beyond the reach of traders from the traditional market.[41] For small traders, the new *ruko* is often a structure of exclusion imposed from outside (or from above by the local government, which benefits from the business) to impoverish small traders in the neighborhood's traditional market. As a result, in the city of Malang "traders from several traditional markets are coming together to form an association" to protect themselves from eviction as the city plans to build *ruko* and shopping malls in their areas.[42]

Earlier, I examined how a certain idea about the ethnic Chinese is tied up in the discourses of the *ruko* and economic development. The new *ruko* in the post-Suharto era may have overcome the stereotype by turning the ethnic *ruko* into a purely class-based commercial building—an innovation that might have released the *ruko* from its association with Chinese residence. Central to the issue is how architecture and the terms used to define that architecture overlap with social typologies and how this link can be disentangled and remanaged, ironically, by a new class category.

The Hidden Layer: What Is in the *Ruko* Today?

As a property of the market (rather than of the Chinese), today's *ruko* is open to a variety of owners and ownership. The diverse and thematic architectural styles of the new *ruko* project have become symbolic of the values of a transnational class and economy and they are open to any commercial enterprise and entrepreneur with enough capital. The new form assumes a variety

of architectural styles, ranging from the highly decorated neoclassical style to minimalism, but these surface treatments (unlike the traditional shop front and the billboard *ruko*) bear no indexical reference to the function of the building. Furthermore, most of the new *ruko* have no residents except perhaps the owner's shopkeepers who are paid to take care of the place. In effect, they conceal and in some instances contradict what goes on inside. Such a building often incites curiosity from different interpretative communities who use keywords such as hidden (*terselubung*), suspicious (*curiga*), suggestive (*sinyalir*), and deceiving (*mengelambui*) to describe the new *ruko*.

Recently, an Islamic website in Palembang, South Sumatra, shared with its readers an opinion about a *ruko* and what seems to lie behind it. A reporter wrote,

> one of the *ruko* in Yos Sudarso street seems to have become a hidden place for gambling (*perjudian terselubung*). The owner claims that the *ruko* is a hostel for office staff. But it is suspicious (*mencurigakan*)! It looks like a modest *ruko,* but the inside might appear like a high-class hotel protected by CCTV cameras around the building. This *ruko* could be deceiving (*mengelambui*) people.[43]

The suggestion here is that the orderly facade of the *ruko* might mask unruly acts in a deceptive manner. The interplay between visibility and invisibility may well be a familiar trope in the Indonesian world, but not all ambiguities are acceptable, especially if they are played out in the *ruko,* which is considered an extraneous building type.

Newspapers occasionally report on the misuse of the *ruko* for illegal activities. They state that the ground floor of the *ruko* is often used as a cover for the activities taking place on the upper floors. For instance, in December 2005, in Tangerang, a team of police broke into a *ruko* that operated under the guise of a perfume factory. The police discovered that the upper floors were used to process and distribute illegal drugs (*sabu-sabu*). It took the police ten days to detect and figure out the real activity in the interior of the *ruko,* which was designed in an innocuous-appearing modernist style.[44] In Surabaya, reports have come to the municipal office that many *ruko* used for spa and massage services (*panti pijat*) have extended these services to include prostitution.[45] Some bars offer a "double extra service" (*layanan plus-plus*) in their *ruko*. The first floor of the *ruko* is often used legally as a hair salon, but the upstairs is used as a nightclub and for prostitution, with women reportedly coming from foreign countries. Another newspaper reported that with several nearby *ruko* engaging in such services, the formation of a red light district had gone unnoticed. The report

recommends that security posts be set up in the neighborhood so that people can watch *ruko* and report if they host illegal activities.[46]

Finally, there is also a case of a *ruko* being used as a church. Because it is difficult to obtain a permit to build a church in Indonesia, some local Christian communities have sought alternative places to host a congregation. In February 2006, one of the biggest online media sources in Indonesia, *Detik.com,* reported that a *ruko* in the Bandung City Square complex was being used as a church. As this was a violation of building permit regulations,[47] the church was instructed to close down. We do not know if there was another dimension to the building permit violation, but the episode points to the harassment of *ruko* that facilitate activities considered as inappropriate.

All these reports point to the issues of transparency, morality, and sincerity that prevail in the political cultures of the post-Suharto surveillance era. As outlined in the incidents above, critical references to *ruko* owners' insincerity and corruption in using the building for (what are considered as) unscrupulous activities are not uncommon, and have become a regular spectacle in the mass media. While these stories are clearly founded on a certain amount of credible evidence, it is clear that the intolerant reception of the *ruko* derives, at least residually, from its previous identity as an index of estrangement and distance associated with Chineseness. The new designs of *ruko* have adopted external appearances that break away from the image of a Chinese shop front or billboard (that depicts the Chinese as dealers and suppliers of commodities). Yet while shifting away from previous associations, the new *ruko* is still unable to deliver transparency, sincerity, and loyalty—categories that in the recent past had been used for interrogating the subjectivity of ethnic Chinese in Indonesia. In these circumstances, the stylistic facade of the new *ruko* is unable to bridge the gap between concealing and revealing. The new building is still incapable of communicating to its inquisitive public what is inside the structure and it takes investigative members of civil society to unravel the truth behind the external appearances of the *ruko*.

The Emerging Layer: Islamic *Ruko*

In the previous section we saw how the new *ruko* is the target of the guardians of morality when suspicion arises in regard to what lies behind the facade. As in the case of the *ruko* being used as a church above, the concerns about morality are not only limited to issues of illicit conduct, but extend also to religion. In 2010, the mayor of the predominantly Islamic city of Depok on the outskirts of Jakarta promoted shopping centers with an Islamic atmosphere. In what is considered "the largest Islamic business complex" in Indonesia,

the "Ruko Islamiyah" consists of a series of *ruko* with Islamic motifs constructed as part of a larger plan for the Great Saladin Square on 1.5 hectares of land (figure 2.7).

The square features 48 golden domes and 47 minarets each 25 meters high to reflect the religion of the majority in Depok. Setyo, a Great Saladin Square sales executive, announced that such features will give a sense of place to the 120 *ruko* units. So far, according to Setyo, "30 units have been sold. . . . Insha Allah, the Great Saladin Square, will make the Muslim community in Depok proud."[48] The *ruko* will include such enterprises as a "showroom bank, minimarket, fast food restaurant, beauty salon, and bakery,"[49] and while a Chinese restaurant is allowed, only halal food can be served.[50] Beyond these facilities is a more serious proposal that would make the square distinctively Islamic. Arifin Ilham, an Ustad who was invited to promote the square, suggests that a mosque and a swimming pool for Muslim people be provided and shopkeepers should wear *jilbab* so that the square becomes "a model for doing business following the teaching of Rasulullah Shallallahu Alaihi Wasallam (the Prophet Muhammad)."[51] Depok's Ruko Islamiyah seeks to convey the truth of what lies



Figure 2.7. The *ruko* Saladin Square in Depok. Photo: Yudi Bachrioktora and A. Kusno.

behind the facade in a manner that is serious and transparent. For their part, the facades of the Ruko Islamiyah appropriate identifiable neo-Islamic imagery of Arabic windows, arches, and a dome. However, as much as these elements try to assert propriety of place, one can ask, again, what lies behind the facade?

In any case, the Ruko Islamiyah shows a desire to express Islamic presence and clearly demonstrates that today's *ruko* is widespread across different social groups, beyond those of the Chinese.[52] In distinction to the billboard facade and earlier *ruko* associated with Chinese shops, the new *ruko* indexes neither the agency nor the residency behind the architectural facade. Emptied of subjectivity, it is open to appropriation by different social groups who aspire to achieve economic success. Yet, unlike the new neoclassical and minimalist *ruko,* the Ruko Islamiyah seeks to develop a specifically Islamic mode of self-representation that involves an attempt to confer on the *ruko* the quality of transparency by breaking down the division between the exterior and the interior.

Conclusion

In this chapter we have seen how the design of *ruko* can be understood in terms of both entanglement and disentanglement in relation to the positioning of ethnic Chinese in Indonesian history. We have also witnessed how architecture gains its meaning not only through form, but by how it is spoken of, and how we are told about it. This chapter has also demonstrated both the tension and symbolic reconciliation of the exterior and interior in *ruko* across different political regimes in Indonesia. Such negotiation is shaped by the historical experiences of the Chinese and the shift in cultural attitudes, social perceptions, and political ideas toward them. The social structure of the colonial state and Suharto's New Order positioned ethnic Chinese as the other within a hierarchy of social and political power that found expression and evocation in the changing appearances of the *ruko*. The significant shifts from a residential *ruko* to a commercial building type following the fall of the Suharto New Order have produced yet another type of architecturalized *ruko* that supplies a stylistic facade to a landscape of broadening commodification and sharpening social division.

The *ruko* style continues to encounter a variety of resistances, but it has also found widespread acceptance. Its association with the Chinese and the economy remains unstable as it incorporates both dominant and local cultural practices. It can be adapted to other milieus such as that of Islam, which seeks to develop a particular mode of self-representation in generic forms such as pointed domes and towers. Today's *ruko* is categorized by Real Estate Indonesia, a developers' interest group, as a commercial building and not a residence as in

the earlier *ruko*. This marketing strategy, as we have seen in the example of Depok's Ruko Islamiyah, has made the *ruko* flexibly open to all kinds of businesses and owners, and subjected to unpredictable activities and redefinitions. This chapter has shown how the external appearances of the *ruko* (including billboards) not only represent aesthetic, utilitarian, and economic considerations, but also express and evoke societal intergroup contact, exchange, and contestation, although certainly not always in a transparent way.

While the position of the Chinese in Indonesia remains precarious and this still unstable society undergoes a transition toward democracy, the *ruko* supplies a facade to such a changing political landscape and cultural attitudes. The construction of Chinese identity and contestation of that identity are a set of practices associated with the idea of the nation. The attempt to transcend local identity is indeed critical to the process of creating what is perceived to be a coherent nation. In the next chapter I look at the role of modernism in nation- and city-building. I look at how modernism and the idea of the nation have interacted since Indonesia's independence, and how the meaning of modernism changes over time as it encounters regime changes. Such a consideration is important for grasping the aesthetic, history, and politics of Jakarta after the New Order.

TIME REMEMBERED/TIME FORGOTTEN

Chapter 3

Researching Modernism

On 14 April 1983, the first Pameran Karya Arsitektur Indonesia (Indonesian Architectural Exhibition) was held in Taman Ismail Marzuki (TIM), Jakarta. It drew considerable interest. Art critic Jim Supangkat visited the exhibition.[1] He had been a regular attendee at TIM, which had opened in 1968, and knew that it had often been a site of tension between artists and the state. Virtually all the important Indonesian artists had performed there and some had also seen their performances banned or censored. By the 1980s, for reasons that are not entirely clear, attendances at TIM had dropped significantly. It would be wrong however to think that the Pameran Karya Arsitektur could attract a larger audience, but the exhibition did increase the popularity of national identity in architecture design. Supangkat noted during his visit that there were extraordinary attempts, though totally unsuccessful in his opinion, "to incorporate elements of vernacular building into contemporary architecture."[2] He goes on to remark that "There is a big government building in Balikpapan [in Kalimantan] that looks like a giant traditional house" and "at the entrance to an office building in Palembang [in South Sumatra] there stood a canopy with a Joglo [traditional Javanese] roof."[3] There was a feeling that "tradition" had invaded "modern" Indonesia. It is not entirely clear why this type of exhibition aroused such interest, but by the mid-1980s such architectural experiments with the vernacular were exerting considerable influence. This interest in traditionalism was apparently top-down in nature as the government promoted traditional forms of architecture, and this had accelerated by the time the state began to deregulate its economy toward the mid-1980s, bringing the notion of globalization to the heart of public discourse.

We could say that, in this time of globalization, this experimenting with the vocabulary of vernacular buildings is widespread, but in 1983 Supangkat

was disgusted by it. Before he left the exhibition, however, he moved to another corner and experienced something that turned his visit around. Here, some drawings of the recently deceased architect Sujudi Wiryoatmodjo (1927–1981) were on display. Supangkat felt that he had been taken back to an earlier era, but he was pleased to find himself connected to the aesthetic of Sujudi, who was active during the 1960s and the 1970s. For him, Sujudi's work "does not indicate a feeling of being forced into a vocabulary of traditional architecture."[4] Yet he was not sure if he actually liked Sujudi's designs. The Indonesian embassy in Kuala Lumpur (1975–1976) (as represented in the photograph on display) was "disturbing," he felt, adding that "it is difficult to say that this building is nice (*bagus*), and yet this building stuns me, and perhaps because of this, I can say that this is what we call a building with Indonesian characteristics."[5]

We do not know whether Sujudi's architecture was included in the exhibition to honor the maestro who had passed away just two years earlier, but there was apparently a desire on the part of the exhibition organizer to show that with his death, modernism had come to an end. But such a desire must have been conditioned by the present. Perhaps his work was displayed, on one side, as a silent critical commentary on the central exhibit of pseudo-neo-vernacular postmodern architecture. If this were the case, the exhibition could be said to be an attempt to narrate a story of changing attitudes, of the emergence of a different desire and new demands conditioned by the country's present. In any case, for Supangkat, an exhibition featuring such neo-vernacular Indonesian architecture proved to not be of high enough quality, whereas an exhibition of the modernist architecture of Sujudi seemed to offer greater artistic possibilities. We do not know the source of Supangkat's appreciation of Sujudi's architecture. Perhaps Sujudi's architecture (at the time of the exhibition) fit in very well with the ideas of tension and resistance—so central to artistic freedom—against the state's version of modern traditionalism. Could it be that the modernist past was being retrieved in order to protest against present architectural representations?

I have used this brief account to introduce the subject of this chapter, which is the construction of a modernist period and its accompanying knowledge by architects and historians in Indonesia. I argue that modernism started out in postcolonial Indonesia as a medium of thought and discourse to build a new socialist society in the aftermath of colonialism. Such a revolutionary impulse however met its violent death in 1965 with the emergence of Suharto's New Order (1966–1998), which replaced the Sukarno regime (1950–1965). In this shift of power, the idea of traditional architecture provided an identity for the new regime. We thus have a situation where, after one generation had struggled to

work its way out of "tradition," the next tried to reestablish contact with it. The earlier generation leaped out from colonial times into the era of decolonization but it later found itself culturally and politically displaced by the next generation's paradigm. What follows then is an attempt to appreciate the work of these early modernists and their acts of social and national creativity.

I start with a particular construct of time in Indonesian architectural historiography and continue with a conversation with Han Awal, a modernist architect, about his life. I then turn to Suryono Herlambang, an architectural historian, and discuss a student group called ATAP formed in the 1950s, before looking at Sukarno, known as the father of modernist architecture in Indonesia. I conclude with a reflection on their various influences by commenting on some manifestos of contemporary modernists. Through a series of encounters, organized in a way that makes them speak to each other, I hope to address some basic questions, such as what was the meaning of modernism for Indonesian architects working in the 1960s? Why was it important? What sociopolitical conditions governed the kind of knowledge they produced? How do we recognize their works as modernist? And finally, has modernism really ended?

Prelude: Time, Discontinuity, and the End of Politics

In the most recent attempt to historicize "modern" architecture in Indonesia, a group of historians placed the "modernist era" as lying between the period of early independence and the more recent era of Suharto.[6] They see this period (roughly corresponding with the rule of President Sukarno [1950–1965]) as a remarkable time in which the past was repudiated for an endless present, a "state of becoming," which is associated with decolonization and an anticolonial revolution.[7] By demarcating the time of modernism as one specific to the Sukarno era, they seem to propose that a rupture in Indonesian history forced Indonesian architects to reorient themselves. This framing of architectural history (as a response to political change) points to the past of Indonesian modernism. The periodization they proposed has a broader significance in pointing to the specificity of Indonesian modernist architecture. The ruptures caused by two violent political events, the war against the returning Dutch in the late 1940s (known as the time of revolution) and the massacre of the communists (that ended Sukarno's rule) in the late 1960s, frame the modernist period of Indonesian architecture.

Following this construct, architects during the postrevolutionary era of the 1950s and 1960s identified themselves with the nation-building project of Sukarno and sought to build a new reality unfettered by the traditions of

architecture invented by both the Dutch and precolonial building cultures. Their works, such as those of Sujudi, were located in a belief in the optimism and goodness of the newly independent nation-state and its urge to make a new society after colonialism. They used modernism as a vehicle of thought to engage with the building of national character. Their aim was to constitute "state modernism" as the structure that gave meaning and a singleness of purpose to their work.

However, this situation changed completely after 1965. The utopian enthusiasm of *sosialisme, revolusi,* and *rakyat* (the people), espoused by modernist architects met with a violent death in the form of the massacre of over half a million people accused of being communist.[8] The terms that powered the grand narrative of Sukarno's state modernism, such as *sosialisme* and *revolusi,* were replaced in Suharto's New Order (1966–1998) with "counter-revolutionary," "communistic," and "Sukarnoist."[9] "Politics" became a dirty word that ought to be avoided, and few Indonesian architects, if any, continued to identify with politics of any kind. The historical rupture created by the events of 1965 distanced architects from anything associated with politics. Those modernists who survived 1965 and the generation that grew up in the New Order developed a different relationship with history and disengaged their aesthetic from the political and ideological movements of the Sukarno era. From the beginning of the New Order, modernism became a "floating signifier" that could be invested with all kinds of meaning except, of course, the political.

From the start of the New Order, modernist experimentations in art and architecture were dislodged from any association with the state and its "revolutionary masses." They were carried out in the name of artistic freedom and individual creativity. As early as 1968 (two years after the end of the Sukarno regime), Jakarta governor Ali Sadikin built the first center for the (creative) arts, the aforementioned Taman Ismail Marzuki (TIM), and declared that "this centre should not allow politics to intervene."[10] No one knew then what the governor meant by "politics" but it was clear enough that "politics" was a word associated with the Sukarnoist effort to unify the "revolutionary masses." As Indonesian writer and poet Goenawan Mohamad wrote in 1977, modernism was then associated not so much with "politics" but with the creative expression of the individual and the avant-garde.[11] Artists had to impress a public looking for more and more newness (*pembaharuan*) in their performances even though they were not sustained by any revolutionary impulse or political cause. This moving away from the social and political had become more apparent by the end of the 1970s. Goenawan noted that during that time "freedom (*kemerdekaan*) [unlike in the past] has become a symbol of status. Freedom is no longer about rice

and dried fish [the staple food of the poor], but it has become [a term as superficial as] a cosmetic."[12] Goenawan uses the gendered notion of "cosmetic" to refer to the sense of emasculated theatrical staging for a public who demands more and more spectacle in art. The term also points to the emergence of a market-based consumerist middle-class public demanding newer and newer performances even as this requires more and more layers of cosmetics to cover up unspoken realities.

The contemporary domination of market-based producers and consumers has its origins in the state's efforts to liberalize the economy, which began in the early 1970s and developed fully in the post-oil boom 1980s. Both the national and international private sectors were given expansive space to stage the cityscape of major cities in Indonesia. Private and joint-venture developers worked with the state to constitute market-based development that broke through barriers of the past. This "market modernism" displaced the 1960s discourse of "state modernism."[13] By the 1980s, as artistic intentions became increasingly emptied of historical substance and appeared more and more like cosmetics, the New Order state was promoting, especially in the world of architecture, the importance of "traditional identity."[14] In conjunction with the liberalization of the economy, all sorts of vernacular buildings from various regions were reintroduced as resources for the inspiration of an Indonesian architecture.[15] As if to register a rooted temporality and spatiality for the New Order, traditional forms were reinvented in order for people to both feel at home and live in modern surroundings.

Some architects liked this attitude, others were apprehensive. There were those who were able to mobilize modernist techniques of building typology in order to creatively evoke imageries of vernacular regionalism. However, many more ended up producing disjointed pastiche. Architectural historians refer to this era as "the search for locality."[16] Architect F. Silaban (1912–1984) and the modernists of the Sukarno era (whom I discuss below) strongly rejected this vernacular turn. In defense of his bygone state modernism, Silaban put down his thoughts just a few years before he died:

> Indonesian architecture has to be modern and characteristically tropical. Why do we need to be modern? Because we are living in a modern era and every era has the right to express itself according to the culture (*kebudayaan*) of its time. There is no need to imitate the unique expressions of Toraja, Minangkabau, Bali, and Batak and so on in order to create an Indonesian architecture. We must not emulate the form. Instead we tease out its essence (*jiwanya*), which refers to tropicality (*ketropisan*).[17]

Regardless of what "form," "essence," and "tropicality" might mean here, Silaban put forth a gloomy future for vernacular buildings in the 1980s, the time when Indonesian architects started to develop a strong desire for Indonesian *Volksgeist* in their works (a legacy that can be traced back to the Dutch architects of the early twentieth century). For Silaban, the language of vernacular buildings could be staged but that language was like a cosmetic, suppressing what he considered the reality of the modern era. It was a mere formalist performance without substance, a decontextualized form of architecture that made sense only in the context of the New Order's discourse of forgetting. Recall that Silaban was writing in the 1980s, a very different time from that when he was President Sukarno's architect in the 1950s and 1960s. By the 1980s, Silaban found himself in another modernist period, one that was filled with the "invention of tradition." He never said anything about the social and political changes in his lifetime, and perhaps he did not anticipate that Indonesian society would change so much, that the next generation would try to reestablish contact with the traditional forms that his generation had struggled to leave behind.

Remarkably, very little has been written about this sense of rupture and displacement of modernist strategies and the lives of what one might call, problematically, Indonesian modernists. This is a curious phenomenon in itself, perhaps because the notion of Indonesian modernism is itself a problematic category, for it suggests a series of unresolved questions related to the politics of time, space, and identity that are best forgotten. It calls for a searching of a "modernist past," one that is situated in a time and place outside the realm of our present time, of what is here and now.

Tracing Modernism: Han Awal, Ethnic Identity, and the ATAP

In the summer of 2010, I asked Suryono Herlambang, an Indonesian architectural and planning historian, about modernism, about Sujudi and Silaban, and about whom I should talk to in order to learn more about modernism in the Indonesian context. Herlambang suggested that I speak with Han Awal, a respected senior architect who has lived through the entire era of postcolonial Indonesia and is known as one of the first Indonesian modernist architects.[18] Han has been practicing architecture since 1960, and established his own firm in 1970. By then he had already designed several buildings, ranging from individual houses, schools, and churches to hospitals, pharmaceutical factories, and scientific research centers. He has also conducted research on housing for the poor and taught at universities in various cities of Java. Han also once worked closely with Sujudi for they were fellow graduates of TU Berlin and they both returned to Indonesia in 1960.

Han Awal (Han Hoo Tjwan) was born and grew up in Malang, East Java. His grandfather was a stage decorator for a local theatre owned by a Peranakan Chinese. By the time he finished high school, he was already determined to study the art of space. In 1950, upon receiving financial support from the archbishop of Malang, he went to the Netherlands to study architecture at the Technische Universiteit Delft. He was among the first group of young Indonesians who went to the Netherlands to study architectural engineering after Indonesian independence (figure 3.1).

During the course of his study in Europe, Han met a generation of Indonesian architects who came from various ethnic backgrounds (Liem Bianpoen, Soewondo B. Sutedjo, Mustafa Pamoentjak, and Sujudi Wiryoatmodjo, whom we have already encountered). Together they constituted a group called ATAP (Indonesian for "roof"), which signified their attempt to address issues of identity, nation-building, and the crisis of housing in Indonesia. The ATAP group existed briefly from 1953 to 1957 and it was loosely organized as an Indonesian architectural student discussion group. Members of this group were aware that they lived in the modern world, a world in which their nation had been produced. They sought (each in his own way) to find a way to make their knowledge relevant for the specific context of Indonesia. They developed a special affinity with the language of modernist architecture, especially after an excursion to Scandinavia. They were, to use Han's word (after a moment of pause to find a proper expression), *terpesona* (stunned) by the aesthetic of modernist



Figure 3.1. Han Awal and Soewondo B. Sutedjo in Delft in the 1950s. Photo: Courtesy of Suwondo B. Sutedjo.

architecture. The trip to Scandinavia was the last for members of the ATAP, however, as the conflict between Indonesia and the Netherlands forced them to leave Delft for Berlin. Bianpoen and Soewondo went to Technische Universität (TU) Hannover, and Sujudi and Han studied at TU Berlin. They all returned to Indonesia almost at the same time in the early 1960s, and were soon absorbed in their work as architects and teachers in the universities there.

For many Indonesians born in the time of the New Order, modernist architects such as Sujudi and Han are known individually and never quite as a group. ATAP, which brought them together, was only "discovered" in the twenty-first century when Herlambang published a brief but insightful piece about the group.[19] As there were no written sources about it, Herlambang interviewed three of the four key members (Sujudi had died in 1981). As someone committed to architectural history, Herlambang himself was interested in giving ATAP a place in Indonesian history. For him, the generational issue is paramount. The members of the ATAP are our seniors, he wrote. Only through them can we talk about continuity and rupture in architecture. Herlambang by then had already written about the journey of the Indonesian Young Architects (Arsitek Muda Indonesia [AMI]) who were active as a group from 1990 to 1995 (see the last section of this chapter).[20] He also had a grasp of what came before the AMI, that is, the architectural discourse of the 1980s, which (as we have seen, in part, in Supangkat's visit to the TIM) was marked by the search for an "Indonesian architecture" via the expression of vernacular buildings. For Herlambang, the interviews with members of ATAP from the 1960s and the 1970s allowed them to be placed into some sort of historical framework, giving them a definite perspective and enabling him to complete his chronology of a history of Indonesian architecture.

When interviewed by Herlambang, the members of ATAP understood his mission and showed a profound sense of group identity. There was some nostalgia in the remembrances of ATAP, but Han warned that "it would be wrong to aggrandize ATAP" and that it would be a myth to assert the study club as constituting an influential tectonic movement.[21] Herlambang nevertheless saw in them a commitment to "modernism." There was indeed a moment at the beginning of decolonization when people seriously asked themselves whether Indonesian vernacular architecture had any future at all. The general consensus of ATAP then was that it did not. Bianpoen made it clear to Herlambang that "Indonesian architecture, regardless of what form it might take, must be created by Indonesian people without continuing its traditional architecture."[22] For his part, Soewondo felt that "Indonesia has got not only many ethnic groups, but also a history of colonialism. Sources of the local [vernacular] architecture

had already been exploited by the colonizer. Their experiments with the vernacular do carry weight, and they could be treated as an input for us. . . . There is no need however for us to search for an old form."[23]

This antitraditionalist position does not necessarily amount to a set of architectural forms that might be identified as the expression of ATAP's modernist tendency, but it nevertheless caught hold in one respect at least.[24] The members' modernist attitude parallels the social and political revolution of Indonesia in the time of Sukarno (1950–1966). Like other nationalists of Sukarno's time they shared the idea of educating people in the national spirit, of forming a supralocal identity bounded by a unitary nation-state. Bianpoen indicated that one of the strongest forces that brought the ATAP members together as a group then was the heating-up of Indonesian and Dutch political relations.[25] The formation of a decolonized Indonesia and the kind of thinking associated with it had always been on their mind.[26]

In this reaction to the aspiration for social and political, if not stylistic, unity, ATAP found inspiration for their work not in the Dutch masters. Instead they admired Scandinavian architecture. For Bianpoen, what was most impressive about Scandinavian architecture was the "simplicity" in the organization of space within a building as well as between buildings: "this idea is what we brought home."[27] Bianpoen's mention of simplicity however was more than a formalist reference. The aspiration for simplicity points to a particular condition of the 1960s when Indonesia was trying to free itself from the tyranny of diversity. The idea of transcending the diversity of local expressions brought them to the aesthetic of Scandinavian modernism. Herlambang writes that the attraction of Scandinavia might well have been that "the strength of the socialist system in Scandinavian society has lifted architecture from the burden of history."[28]

Be that as it may, in our interview Han made a sociological reflection on what modernism might mean to him. I asked if his fascination with the modernist aesthetic had anything to do with his Chinese background. My question was related to the 1950s when Indonesia's ethnic Chinese struggled to work their way out of their Chinese identity in order to establish contact with the newly decolonized country. Many found they could integrate into Indonesian society by adopting a neutral professional identity. On this issue, Han said that he, like his peers, was looking for a way to contribute to the nation-building of Indonesia, but perhaps more than anyone else in the group he was also anxious about his identity as an ethnic Chinese. While in the Netherlands he had joined an organization that was concerned with the position of the ethnic Chinese in Indonesian nationalism. In some way, Han reflected, his architectural training

came as a solution to the dilemma of identity. He managed to show that he was not only Chinese but also an architect who, by virtue of his interest in modernist architecture, was capable of transcending his ethnic identity and thus contributing to the course of Indonesian nation-building. Han's professional training therefore came in tandem with a search for a translocal identity for himself as well as for his Indonesia. We can see here the process of identity formation for a Chinese (Catholic) by way of becoming an architect and an Indonesian via the architectural language of modernism, seen here less as a form than a vehicle to think about social identity.

Revolution, Socialism, and the *Rakyat*

For architects of the revolutionary era who were displeased with the oppression of the Dutch and Javanese traditions associated with feudalism, modernism offered an attractive medium of expression. The newness of materials and an artistic form seen as unbounded by historical memories allowed architects to feel the freedom to start anew. In other words, the lack of cultural resonance associated with modernism in turn opened up opportunities for the investment of new meanings. In the postrevolutionary era of Sukarno, we see a range of words used by Han and his colleagues to give modernism an Indonesian flavor, such as *rakyat* (the people), *karakter* (character), *perjuangan* (struggle), *kebangsaan* (nationality), and nation-building. These words only became a manifesto—a fundamental tool of modernism—through the figure of President Sukarno, whom Indonesian architects often endowed with the title of "the father of Indonesian architecture."[29] In fact, we could say that Indonesians were inundated with manifestos in the time of Sukarno, who indeed made himself the spokesperson of them. He saw himself as carrying the "tongue of Indonesian people" (*penyambung lidah rakyat*), and he spoke to the *rakyat* with manifestos proclaiming, among others, aspirations for the future built form of Jakarta.

According to James Siegel, the *rakyat* are followers of a leader.[30] They are both the observers and participants of political rallies associated with the nationalist movement. For Doreen Lee the *rakyat* are "the common people . . . with overtones of their being poor and uneducated, but nonetheless remaining the good and moral citizens of the nation."[31] Since the notion of the *rakyat* was central to the legitimacy of the new nation, Sukarno's rhetoric about being the tongue of Indonesian people suggests that he, the leader, sought to embody the *rakyat* and speak on their behalf. It suggests the idea of assimilation of the masses into the body of the leader, with all differences absorbed into a unitary state. The Indonesian nationalist held that the communication process between the leader and the people is best signified by inscribing a new spatial and

formal order that posits a radiant future. The best approach to achieve this was to give new characteristics to certain parts of the city. In the 1960s, the series of modernist buildings stretching along the boulevard of Thamrin-Sudirman to the Jakarta Bypass and the Parliament House was to serve as an exemplary center that would provide the shock Indonesians needed to wake up from their past. As Sukarno said, "Although Jakarta's alleys are muddy and we lack roads, I have erected a brick-and-glass apartment building, a cloverleaf bridge, and our superhighway, the Jakarta By-pass. . . . I consider money for material symbols well spent. I must make Indonesians proud of themselves. They have cringed too long."[32]

By the time Han and the other ATAP members returned to Indonesia, Sukarno had already provided for them a ground to express the social and stylistic unity of nation-building. In 1962, Sukarno hosted the Asian Games and the Games of the Newly Emerging Forces, which offered international participants a panorama of modernist buildings along the new boulevard of Jakarta. The ATAP members must have remembered many of Sukarno's speeches, of which the following is characteristic:

> I said Brasilia, the capital city of Brazil. In the middle of a field there stood a monumental city called Brasilia designed by famous architect Lee Mayer [Oscar Niemeyer]. Paris by Haussmann, Brasilia by Lee Mayer. . . . We, brothers, have searched, and searched for a place, but we still choose Jakarta. But our Jakarta must be built anew, in a manner that would inspire us all, inspire the development of all the Indonesian people. . . . Jakarta that can be seen not only through our naked eyes, but also the mental imagination of all the nations in Asia and Africa, as well as in the whole world."[33]

By using words such as inspiration (*inspirasi*), building up (*bangun*), people (*rakyat*), nation (*bangsa*), and by placing of Jakarta alongside Paris and Brasilia—and by extension Indonesian architects alongside Niemeyer and Haussmann—Sukarno powerfully expressed his vision of Indonesia's future, even as his people were becoming aware of the deep crises in the socioeconomic and political domains of his regime. The idea of city-building was not new to architects Han's generation, who were trained in the modernist tradition of advancing planning and architecture as solutions to the social crises of industrial capitalism. However, now the buzz words were coming from Sukarno, the leader of the revolution who had made them part of the revolutionary generation. They would in no way have denied, but rather reinforced, Sukarno's statement that modernist architecture was the language of hope for the future. Sukarno's

rhetoric accelerated the process of giving modernist architecture its national identity and that seems to have heightened the architects' sense of a national mission.

In the 1960s, modernist design had to harness the language of a national unifier. There was no meaning outside this framework, even though Han and his colleagues could offer other meanings for their design. Han remembered how in 1962 his spatial concept for Atmajaya University (commissioned by a Catholic foundation) was approved by Sukarno after the president was made to realize that the central plaza of the university was designed to allow students from different ethnic groups to overcome their differences and ultimately melt into a national body. The president asked for the drawing to be held high so that he could visualize the distinctive feature of the building complex from a distance. Sukarno seemed to also appreciate the scale and the placement of the university tower, which acknowledged the centrality of the nearby cloverleaf bridge on the new Thamrin-Sudirman thoroughfare.[34] The thoroughfare ends at Parliament House, which Sujudi designed with the assistance of Han. The architects acknowledged that the source of their inspiration was the sculptural monumentality of Niemeyer.[35]

The nationalist leader and the architects assumed that the language of modernist architecture had a free and revolutionary feel from the outset. Even though one could say modernism originated in Europe in the time of colonialism, in the hands of these nationalists it was considered completely free from colonial traits. Indonesian nationalists knew perfectly well that there was no "machine age" to mass-produce reinforced concrete and plate glass, and there were hardly any great urban masses of Indonesians who could turn modernism into a consumable popular culture. Yet, as the symbol and the promise of the future, they believed that modernist architecture could work as a medium of communication with the *rakyat*.

Like many other Indonesian nationalists, the architects of the early independence period were attracted to socialist ideals more than they were to Marxism–Leninism. They did not commit themselves to any rigid ideological doctrine and in fact many of them interpreted socialism in terms of "Indonesianization," that is, breaking the representation, the policy, and practice of colonial rule. The modernist aesthetic of erasure and reinscription offers just such a process of Indonesianization, and the legitimation of such a process involved identification with the *rakyat*. By then the Indonesian Communist Party (Partai Komunis Indonesia), which had the strongest claim over the *rakyat,* had declared their commitment to make Jakarta "a city of democracy, of unification and of mobilization" for the revolutionary masses.[36] The intersecting notions of

Indonesia, revolution, the *rakyat,* and modernism brought forth a distinctive period in the history of Indonesian architecture, but they also brought that period to an end. That phase of Indonesian history would only exist in retrospect, to be regarded with mixed (or unmixed) feelings in the New Order era.

A Requiem for Housing the *Rakyat*

No issue was more pressing for the Indonesian modernists than "housing for the people" (*perumahan rakyat*) (see chapter 7). Issues of housing had been a concern of Han since his student years. In the 1950s, ATAP visited various housing sites by Scandinavian architects and they even attended the Housing Expo 55 in Helsingborg.[37] One of the members, Bianpoen, was deeply affected by the trip. Upon his return to Indonesia, he worked in the city government of Jakarta and for most of his career he dealt with issues of planning while believing that only the state (not the market) could fix urban poverty and provide housing for the *rakyat*. Han wrote an article called "Architecture for the Poor in Indonesia," which was later published, in a university journal, in 1982.[38] In it he wrote that issues of poverty are social, economic, and political, but he preferred to focus only on building and its formal and technical innovation for the poor. Such focus however should not be taken at face value, because his project is inherently a social, if not political, one. His approach is characteristically modernist in the sense that he identifies the formal processes of production and spatial organization down to the aspects of economic life and social control.

In his article, Han proposes that the government build a basic structure for shelter that consists only of a few standardized columns (*tiang*) and a roof (*atap*). He called this basic unit or frame the minimum requirement for a shelter—a modernist "primitive hut," if you like. This incomplete basic structure would be completed by the occupants according to their specific needs. They could add walls, internal divisions, and openings to the outside. The frame could be replicated and stretched horizontally or vertically according to the development of the community. The individual frame then was less a permanent shelter than a point of departure for improving one's life. The basic frame invited a "freedom to design" as more layers could be added from within, but it could also be "regulated" for the harmony and security of the whole. The shelters could all be elevated, in the manner of houses on stilts, to provide a collective underneath space for economic activities. Both the shelters and the economic space would be supported by collectively supervised toilets and communal kitchens.

This design typology alludes to a commune. It redefines social organization by breaking down the distinctions between the collective and the individual, the civic and the domestic. As a whole, the shelter acted like an assisted

"mutual-help" transit station to produce social transformation. In this sense the shelter could be seen as a prescription for change. Its operation however assumes the role of the state in providing the frame and in securing the land and infrastructure services from the capital market. Only the state thus could guarantee Han's architectural innovations, which made Han's proposal rely on state modernism and as such it appears more like a legacy than a vision of the future. By 1982, when Han finally published his proposal, the state's development program had already left behind the idea of direct provision of housing for the poor. Instead, the government has already placed housing policy in the invisible hand of the market.[39] The engine for housing since then has been stoked by the private sector with its system of land acquisition and pursuit of profit, which often requires the urban poor to be displaced further and further away from the city (see chapter 7).

Since the transfer of sovereignty in 1950, the idea of sheltering the urban poor had been in the agenda of the nationalist movement. Housing for the *rakyat* was both a real and a utopian agenda because, with the exception of the Kampung Improvement Program, there was virtually no housing construction program for the poor during colonial times.[40] The postrevolutionary era of the 1950s thus inherited the housing problems of that period.[41] Housing expert Sardjono points out that during Dutch colonial rule, *perumahan rakyat* meant "houses built *by* the people (*masyarakat*)."[42] Except for some housing provision for civil servants and the discursively implemented Kampung Improvement Program in certain neighborhoods close to where Europeans lived, no program was initiated to provide housing for the poor.

There was, however, a series of important congresses on housing but none led to the actual construction of housing for the poor.[43] There is no doubt that these congresses, especially those involving socialist architects such as Thomas Karsten, were supported by a real sense of compassion for the housing needs of the Indonesian people. The issues of housing however are not only physical they are also socioeconomic and political. For the Dutch socialist architects, successful housing for poor Indonesians meant the emancipation and improvement of material life. For this to succeed, however, the colonial structure of society would have to be called into question. Within the Dutch colonial system, the approach to housing the people thus amounted to little more than a humanitarian corrective.

Newly independent Indonesia was fully aware of the housing gap in colonial rule. The nationalist elites immediately seized on the issue of *perumahan rakyat* in the first year of their rule. They sought to use housing to mark certain shifts in the political domain. Soon after the transfer of sovereignty, political

leaders organized the Congress of Healthy Housing for the People (Kongres Peroemahan Rakjat Sehat) (figure 3.2).[44]

At the congress, vice-president Mohammad Hatta pointed out that the majority of Indonesians were still living in substandard houses. He felt that efforts had to be made by the state to provide housing for the Indonesian people. For this to be done, various institutions, ranging from the conceptual and the technical to the financial, were set up. From then on, progress on the housing front was made, and in the direction it had always wanted to: that of building houses




Figure 3.2. Poster for the Congress of Healthy Housing for People (Kongres Peroemahan Rakjat Sehat), 1950. Courtesy of Arsip Nasional Republik Indonesia, Jakarta.

for the *rakyat* that were "healthy, comfortable, and enduring as well as inexpensive to buy and rent."[45] In the 1950s and 1960s, the regime's "nation-building character" and the goals of the Indonesian revolution were reflected in the provision of *perumahan rakyat*.

Han's *perumahan rakyat* seems to recall the sentiment of those decades. In the 1980s, however, his proposal looked more like a refuge of sorts. Regardless of the development of Indonesia and its productive Kampung Improvement Program under the New Order, in the mind of Han, poor people continued to live as if time had stood still. In his proposal, Han did not talk about the politics of the 1980s, but he nevertheless noted on the first page that the number of the poor in Indonesia was terrifyingly high (*mengerikan*). By the 1970s, programs of mass housing construction by the state had vanished. The government would only commit to the "creation of conditions that would stimulate the effort to provide housing."[46] By then the state merely played the role of enabling the private capital market to determine the prices of land and houses, and this opened up a space for local bourgeoisie and capitalists to play a role in the urban development of the capital.[47] In the 1970s the notion of *perumahan rakyat* had begun to erode into a past utopia that had failed to live up to its own expectations. Its legacy is nevertheless still evident, in the writings of Han, for example, and those of his peers from the ATAP generation. Yet these architects emerged under special historical conditions. Whether they were socialists, revolutionaries, ethnic Chinese, or, above all, modernists depended on the social strategies they used to engage with the field of cultural politics.

What I have discussed so far indicates that Indonesian modernism was more than a formal language of architecture; it is a social strategy embedded in a historical condition. It consists of certain sets of possibilities to deal with issues of identity, nationalism, and development in postcolonial Indonesia. The point to be made about Indonesian modernism as evident in the reminiscences of Han and the other ATAP members, and in Sukarno's enterprise, is that it was constituted at a particular moment in the history of Indonesia. But did modernism really end with the passing of the Han's generation?

The Enigma of Modernism

The violent death of Sukarnoist postrevolutionary socialism in 1965 ended the socialist mission of Indonesia's professionals, which as proclaimed by an engineer in the final year of Sukarno's rule, was to "help complete our Revolution to achieve a just and prosperous society, the socialist Indonesian society based on Pantjasila [the 'five pillars']."[48] For the artists, architects, and intellectuals who survived the events of 1965, what was so wrong about Indonesia in

the Sukarno era? Reflecting on the era, Goenawan Mohamad pointed out that it was "the subordination of artistic activities by *political* interests." In other words, "the disappearance of autonomy in artistic activity as an act with its own integrity and dynamism."[49] In place of the revolutionary impulse of the 1960s there was the ideology of the New Order, which forbade politics to enter the affairs of public life.[50]

In this new climate, use of the earlier buzz words, including "politics," was prohibited and the state modernism of the Sukarno era was seen as obsolete, if not dysfunctional, within the emerging system of market modernism. In the emerging market economy of the Suharto era, modernism as a form continued to exist, but it had to coexist with the suppression of the revolutionary past. The exclusion of politics from the New Order meant the liberation of the next generation of market modernism from the burden of the 1960s and of history. In the New Order, the capital city was quickly swallowed up by luxurious offices, gated "new towns," and shopping malls that soon outnumbered the monuments of Sukarno. Primarily generated by the market, a new modernism was quickly absorbed into state-supported capitalism and continues to prosper without engaging in the intellectual problems of *revolusi, sosialisme,* and *rakyat*. A recent example of this absorption can be seen in the rhetoric associated with Grand Indonesia, a "superblock" built on top of Hotel Indonesia that opened in 1962 to showcase the internationalism of the newly emerging nation. The brochure promoting the luxurious condominium and hotel that tower above the old Hotel Indonesia reads:

> President Sukarno inaugurated Hotel Indonesia in 1962 as the first international and luxurious hotel intended to accommodate presidential guests. With the grand Selamat Datang (Welcome) monument adorning the roundabout aptly named after the hotel, it has thus been widely acknowledged as being the global entrance to Indonesia. Forty years later, its glory has been restored by Grand Indonesia as the new icon of an exclusive lifestyle haven in Jakarta.[51]

Modernism has therefore not died; it has been subjected to transformation and appropriation by other forces such as the growth of corporate monopolies in a later period of Indonesian history. In the current force field of market modernism, what could be an alternative to modernism? Perhaps the easiest way of grappling architecturally with this change has been to work within the political culture of the New Order, which encourages the development of Indonesian architecture through a return to an older regionalist tradition. The problem with this approach, as we have seen in the uncreative works in the exhibition

witnessed by Supangkat at TIM, is not the conservatism of the New Order, nor its privileging of Javanese culture as the prime symbol of the nation, but rather the defeat of modernism as a vehicle of critical thought. In the New Order of Suharto, modernism was invested with a different meaning, one that entails a removal of modernism from its role in securing national autonomy and improving the life of the *rakyat*.

Coda: Legacies and Beyond

In 1993, ten years after the first Pameran Karya Arsitektur Indonesia and at the height of New Order development, a group of people who called themselves Indonesian Young Architects (Arsitek Muda Indonesia [AMI]) staged their own exhibition called Pameran Arus Silang (Cross-Current Exhibition) (figure 3.3).[52]

The stated objective of the exhibition was to "find a position in the competing forces of power," one that would "liberate members of AMI from any ideological tendency."[53] It is not entirely clear what different powers were competing then and how one could take a position without any ideological tendency, but AMI felt that because architecture had increasingly been undercut by events



Figure 3.3. Manifesto of AMI in 1993 as printed in the Pameran Arus Silang exhibition catalogue. Courtesy of Pusat Dokumentasi Arsitektur Indonesia.

such as the conservatism of the New Order's search for traditional identity and the influx of foreign architects driven by major private capital, it had become a language of the ruling elites. AMI however also did not associate itself with the *rakyat,* nor did it seek to reorganize social practice through the innovations of architecture. Instead members of AMI were more interested in "exploring design" (*penjelajahan desain*), which they understood as a way of liberating their individual creativity from the hegemony of functionalism and nationalism. There was thus a spirit of protest in AMI, an attempt to work out yet another modernism. Members felt a spirit similar to that a rebellious youth feels toward the establishment of state fatherhood. The members' relationship to each other shows a group spirit of friends sticking together, sharing a similar language, and emulating as well as criticizing one another's designs in order to develop a stronger character that is resolutely individualistic. The exploration of design is at bottom the exploration of self and with no ideological tendencies it falls back on the autonomy of design.

If modernism is defined by its experimentation against the establishment, then architects of the AMI generation are resolutely modernist, but their ecology and outlook are different from those of the past modernists. They no longer feel compelled to look into the future of the nation and its revolutionary potential as the early modernists had to in the 1960s. The future of architecture seems to no longer exist in the project of nation-building, as there is no longer a revolutionary road ahead of them, perhaps only the road back to their own self-creative interiority. Without a new way of looking at the world, the youthful energy turned inward, constantly in competition with itself. AMI members lacked the charged quality of the earlier modernists who saw in the nation hope and optimism for the future.

Members of AMI however understood their spirit as having its source in the anxiety over their own upbringing in the cradle of the New Order. Achmad Tardiyana, for example, recalls that "Our exploration of design did not aim at responding to the problems and realities that previous generations faced, such as housing for the underclass and issues of uneven development. AMI grew up in the era of private capital and depoliticization, and it thus was incorporated into the current of that era."[54] AMI is problematically a product of the politics of depoliticization of the New Order. In such circumstances, AMI exists within the material and political cultures of the New Order no matter how much it wishes (by way of exploring design) to transcend the space within which it is embedded. We therefore cannot say that architects' relationship with the nation no longer exists. The suppressive normality of the New Order simply shifted the

historical memories that give the nation its substance increasingly further from their reach.

Yet, historical memories can be suppressed for generations without being forgotten. In 2010, a group of even younger architects, all in their early twenties, presented a curious manifesto in their first exhibition called Pameran Nasional Arsitek Muda (National Exhibition of Young Architects). They reported the exhibition in their self-published e-journal, which opened with a quotation from Sukarno: "A thousand old people can only dream, but one youth (*pemuda*) can change the world."[55] The epigraph is followed by a reflection, or rather manifesto, from the editor of the journal:

> August (the month of Indonesian independence) has come, but it only reminds us of all the things that have gone wrong with this nation. It makes us feel nostalgia for the Indonesia we once aspired for: the great nation which liberated itself through great struggle and great thinking about the nation and nationalism. It brings us to the hope and the voice of what ought to be there. August awakes our sense of nationalism.

The exhibition was aimed at figuring out how far Indonesian architecture and its young architects (those in their twenties) have gone since the end of the New Order in 1998 (figure 3.4).

For this generation of architects, who graduated after 1998 and the end of the New Order, what Suharto's regime did to the nation was repellent, both morally and intellectually. At the same time they feel detached from the New Order, however, they also feel like they exist in some sort of vacuum. They feel that the old society has no way of absorbing them because they belong to a different space and time. This sometimes makes them rebellious and they thus named themselves JongArsitek! (Young Architects), which alludes to *pemuda* (the youth), a term used by the first generation of Indonesian nationalists and by the radical youths in the time of revolution.[56] Referring to Sukarno and the historical *pemuda,* they perhaps pictured themselves to be in the same kind of sociopolitical situation architects had to endure in the 1950s and 1960s, but their world today is radically different from those times. This has also made them wonder how they should position themselves in relation to a world they really never knew at all. What they have today is the technological revolution, which seems to help them define who they really are:

> After 1998, there was a fundamental change in the lives of Indonesian people. The fall of a status quo leads to an openness and freedom of life that


JONGARSITEK!
- CALLING FOR SUBMISSIONS -
Pameran Arsitek Muda Nasional 2010
yang akan di kuratori oleh
Marco Kusumawijaya | Avianti Armand | Suryono Herlambang

Figure 3.4. JongArsitek!'s call for submissions: a poster with a map of Indonesia. Courtesy of Danny Wicakono of JongArsitek!

> had never been felt during the previous thirty-two years of the regime. Suddenly everybody has the freedom of speech and the freedom to speak his or her mind. This has led to a more dynamic discourse in all subjects of life. For architecture, the fall of this regime also meant the end of a narrow regionalism of architectural perspective which was propagated by the regime. Another important thing that has happened after 1998 is the rapid progress of technology. After 1998, technology has changed the paradigm of architectural works all over again. Computers and software of all kinds with various different functions have put drawing tables aside. Then there's the Internet, a virtual world that has changed the way people communicate. Access to information has become really easy, and discourses can then be established easier among architects all over Indonesia. The Internet has shortened the distance, and given a book of unlimited pages to its users.[57]

These are the words of JongArsitek! They feel that they have a lot more possibilities than the previous generations, and they of course "have the chance to

see much more diverse architectural information in a very easy way." With new technology and methods they can "produce designs that could never have been produced by previous generations."

Thus JongArsitek! proclaimed their manifesto, one that is resolutely modernist in its allusion to Sukarno and the historical *pemuda* but also displays a strong faith in technology as a vehicle to outsmart the confinements of the past. It is too early to say if this generation will use the innovations of architecture to reorganize social practice and thus revive modernism as an autonomous vehicle of thought in order to achieve a just and prosperous society. We know, however, that they think differently about what architecture should be, but they are also seeking to find their modernist roots.

Finally, were the modernists of the 1960s influential? The Indonesians of the post-Sukarno generations, AMI and JongArsitek!, are aware of them and their works, but influences are hard to trace. Without a doubt, however, their existence certainly set something in motion and engendered further developments.

Conclusion

In this chapter I have shown a range of constructs of Indonesian modernism, an architectural language that emerged in the 1950s and continues to exist, albeit in a transformed state, today. Yet this does not mean that modernism constituted a unity of experience and obliterated the nation's internal diversity. Regardless of the different ascriptions of stylistic unity, it would be difficult to claim there was a single postrevolutionary or modernist style. There is nevertheless an underlying consensus that architectural change and political revolution are not two distinct entities. It nevertheless has become widely accepted that each period produced an architectural discourse appropriate to its social and political ends. As indicated above, Herlambang and his colleagues operated productively with this way of thinking. Their interest in periodization gave the generation of Sukarno, Silaban, Suyudi, and Han the signifier of modernism. The age factor gives substance and determines coherency, for in Herlambang's chronology, following the ATAP of Suyudi and Han, are architects who worked in the era of Suharto's New Order in the 1980s. This group of architects is remembered as carrying the burden of defining Indonesian architecture through the language of traditional buildings. They were followed, or rather countered, eventually in the 1990s by the generation of Han's son, who called themselves AMI. Further down the road, we see the emergence of the grandchildren of Han's generation, variously known in the post-Suharto *reformasi* era as the AMI. Next, the AMI Last, and, most recently, JongArsitek! This chronological ar-

rangement satisfies Herlambang for it shows a narrative of tension and continuity in the development of architecture in postcolonial Indonesia.

In the end what is striking about the construct of modernism in Indonesian historiography is a continuous allusion to the theme of youth (*muda*). This notion however refers less to a kin relationship or a subordinate form of that relationship than to *pemuda,* the term born in the revolution and the struggle for independence, which invests the future with the language of youth, and in some ways rebellion. *Pemuda* and *jong* exude a newness and radicality associated with the struggle for decolonization. The continuous retrieval of these terms seems to suggest that the revolution has not yet been completed. Perhaps it is in this sense that the movements of Indonesian architecture, from one generation to the next, seem to posses a quality of protest that we associate with modernism. To appreciate this is to see modernism less as a form than as a vehicle of thought, a social strategy of cultural intervention in relation to the governmentality of the Indonesian state and societal organization, which in securing social order, give modernism a meaning.

In the next chapter I turn to the New Order of Suharto and its construction of space in the aftermath of the 1965 massacre of communists. I will show how the construction of a territory known to geographers as the "periurban," and indeed the growth of urbanization and the strategy of controlling it at the time, were linked to or harnessed by the political project of eradicating the real and imagined threat of the revolutionary masses. This political project buried alive, accidentally or intentionally, the socialist vision that had been central to the modernist past.

Chapter 4

The Peasantry and the Periurban Fringe

In 1962, as Sukarno and his architects designed modernist buildings and a boulevard for the central part of the capital city, Kenneth Watts, a town planning advisor with the United Nations Assistance Program, addressed his proposal for the greater Jakarta region to the Ministry of Public Works and Energy, which he worked for from 1956 to 1959. Watts began in the following way:

> The problems attending rapid growth in tropical cities cannot be resolved within the boundaries of the cities themselves. . . . For, by enhancing the attractiveness of the city to the would-be migrant, they will only accelerate the rate of inward migration. . . . An alternative policy has often been urged—that of preparing complementary programmes for the surrounding region. They would have as their objective the improvement of conditions both in the rural area as a whole, which might encourage the prospective migrants to remain where they are, and in the smaller towns of the region, which might have the effect of deflecting migrational flow from its main objective.[1]

Watts was then facing unprecedented rapid population growth in Jakarta. The flow of migrants to the city was due to many factors, but among the most pivotal reasons was the political insecurity of the countryside in the aftermath of the Indonesian national revolution. The social and political unrest that plagued the surrounding regions of Jakarta, the economic difficulties in the villages, and, not least, the "modernity" of Jakarta, led many migrants to abandon their memories of ruin in order to occupy the city of the future.[2]

Confronted by "the magnitude of the rural-urban movement [that] is now so great that attempts to halt it—far less reverse it—are quite futile," Watts suggested the development of "small towns" on the outskirts of Jakarta to "create

counter-magnets to the pull of the big city."[3] He added that "if effort were made to stimulate industrial growth in the smaller town, the chances of attracting more migrants to them might be much better than is usually supposed."[4] Watts believed that his 1959 outline plan for a small "tropical" town in the greater Jakarta region was a "short-term" solution for the city. This proposal was never adopted by Sukarno, who had his own priorities. However, the idea of setting up a barrier zone at the periphery of the capital city to absorb rural migrants was dusted off and only developed during the New Order of Suharto (1966–1998), with assistance from the World Bank.[5] By then the reason for the flux of migrants to the city was due in no small measure to the effects of the cleansing the villages of communist infiltration and the restoration of order under military control.

The violence of 1965 and its aftermath in the form of a program of stabilization and rehabilitation, as I show in this chapter, contributed to the retrieval and alteration of Watts' original periurban plan. To create order and peace after the 1965 massacre of individuals (mostly peasants) who were accused of having communist ties, space was the key.[6] The terror aimed (though not exclusively) at the annihilation of the left and the political (as well as the physical and mental) body the Communist Party leader D. N. Aidit called "the majority in the villages in our country—the poor peasants together with the agricultural laborers [who made up] the largest force pushing the revolution forward."[7] In this aftermath of killing and detention, the New Order of Suharto looked to the periurban areas of the greater Jakarta region as a way to manage population in both the city and the village. The idea of creating counter-magnets of small towns around Jakarta thus goes back to the era of early decolonization, but the aftermath of 1965 and the pervasive concern over security could be seen as the turning point for the implementation of such spatial politics of periurbanization.[8]

The nature of Southeast Asian urbanization has been the object of academic attention for almost two decades. A central theme in the discussion revolves around the dissolution of the city and countryside divide, and it seems the focus is largely on whether the city is winning (through urbanization) or the countryside is losing in the development game.[9] Such issues however are much more complex. For Terry McGee, who was among the first to consider the specificity of the region, urbanization and the process of urban spread means "the emergence of regions of highly-mixed rural and non-rural activity surrounding the large urban cores of many Asian countries" that are "significant foci of industrialization and rapid economic growth."[10] McGee calls this formation *desakota,* from the Indonesian words *desa* (village) and *kota* (town). The term signifies an attempt to revise the conventional or Eurocentric view of

urbanization as a process that assumes a distinction between rural and urban. *Desakota* broadly signifies an extended urban region that includes the periurban (*pinggiran kota*) zones and an extensive area of mixed rural-urban land use around two large urban cores linked by transportation routes.[11]

The periurban areas thus, in Phillip Kelly's words, are a "new and enduring urban form which is neither rural nor urban but incorporates distinctive elements of both."[12] They are also spaces undergoing rapid urbanization; "transitional landscapes" that are a "dramatic new species of urbanism."[13] For Jonathan Rigg, the people living in these areas "cannot easily be squeezed into single categories like 'rural/agricultural' when their work not only crosses the agriculture/industry divide but they have also led 'split' lives in terms of where they live."[14] Similarly, Gregory Guldin argues that the migration of people from rural to urban China came in tandem with urbanization of the rural via, among others, rural industrialization.[15] This in situ urbanization of the rural raises not only the question "What's a peasant to do?" but also "Who are the peasants today, and where do they live?"

These studies have importantly identified and captured some central features of Asian urbanization that perpetuates, rather than challenges, the capitalist system. Yet, they are mostly centered on the *processes* of urbanization and very little attention has been given to the *political* formation of *desakota* or periurban area.[16] Also very little attempt has been made to place these extended spaces in their historical context to understand the political processes that have made their formation possible.[17] This chapter, which focuses on Jakarta is intended to fill, however imperfectly, this gap in the research. I argue that while expansion of industrial and residential development has created the periurban area, it serves the purpose of the New Order regime of Suharto who found it useful for the control of population. The periurban area became the site for turning peasants into industrial and commericial (cheap) laborers, which contained the movement of peasants to the city in the aftermath of the cleansing of the rural environment from the influence of communism. The state thus harnessed the periurban area to eliminate the political identity of the peasant (along with memories of mass political mobilization) and to form a new subjectivity through new occupations.[18]

Central to this governing strategy was the formation of an extended urban region beyond the administrative boundaries defined by the capital city. The rapid urbanization in this area can be seen as stemming from the nonagricultural job opportunities opened up by the state policy of industrialization and economic growth of capitalist countries in the region, but the periurban area was also a political space for the transformation of the peasants' identity. This

chapter thus aims to investigate the largely unnoticed relationship between the politics of urban planning and the transformation of the peasant world in Java. It is organized into three parts representing the rural, urban, and periurban areas of Jakarta respectively.

There are a few caveats to note at the outset. First, it is not the intention of this chapter to problematize existing studies that have clearly shown that the rationale for rural-to-urban migration is rural poverty and the perceived economic opportunities in cities. The aim instead is to offer a different way of seeing centered on the interplay between politics and space that helps to unravel the formation of the periurban area as a space of governmentality, a process common in, though not peculiar to, Indonesia's history. Second, regarding terminology and classification: I use the terms *desakota* and periurban area interchangeably, assuming that they both refer to a similar entity even though each designates a different geographical propinquity to the city. Both terms in any case designate what Guldin calls "a partially urbanized countryside." I use the terms "peasants," *rakyat,* and "the floating mass" to designate an imagined community either constructed by the state or by the people themselves in their engagement with the politics of identity and identification.[19] In reality, the notion of "peasants," like "village," is problematic since the social group is neither monolithic nor unchanging. Instead it has been characterized by internal class, gender, ethnic differentiation, tension, and conflict. The category of the floating mass is harder to explain and identify. It was constructed only in the aftermath of the events of 1965. The term refers to the *rakyat,* largely underclass rural-to-urban migrants, who after 1965 came to be identified as *massa* (the masses).[20] In the time of the New Order, the floating mass could be turned into productive subjects as long as they refrained from any engagement with politics or political parties. As will become clear, the floating mass is a both a real and imagined category created by the state to govern bodies and imaginations. As such, there are no statistics recording the members of the floating mass, but their presence can be *felt* through the voice of the state. Finally, the use of "space" here is not metaphorical; it is literal for only then can it function as a spatial technology of governance. As will become clear, it is through space that the movement of the floating mass to the periurban area—designated as economic space—is managed and controlled (almost) without the use of force.

The Rural

The Political Economy of Governing the Peasants

The coup of 1 October 1965 and the charges against the Communist Party as the cause served to change the social life and institutional direction of rural

Java, and by extension, Indonesia. The Communist Party, who had had remarkable success in mobilizing peasant interests in land reform, was decimated; many of its members were killed and imprisoned in a series of terrifying purges. The slaughter of over 500,000 people, many of whom were peasants, workers, and activists supportive of the Indonesian left, mostly in rural areas of Java and Sumatra, radically changed the village environment.

The agrarian land reform program, initiated under the Sukarno regime, was soon regarded as "communist-inspired."[21] In place of agrarian reform, the "Green Revolution" was introduced, under which peasants were transformed into farmers' groups and cooperatives in order to carry out state-controlled "intensification" of food production. In 1968, two years after the regime change, President Suharto laid out his new development plan on agriculture:

> For the next five years, industrial development will be concentrated on those industries supporting agricultural development, such as manufacture of fertilizer, insecticide and farm implements. . . . Increased use of fertilizer and insecticides will require outlays by farmers. Since their resources are very limited, finance may be a major obstacle. To meet this problem, plans have been made to establish village banks and village warehouses. . . . Government rural credit facilities will also be strengthened and extended. Additional finance may be provided by private domestic and foreign capital. Such companies could assist farmers by supplying fertilizers, insecticides, and farm implements on credits, and by providing training in the use of these implements, repayment to be made by delivery part of the additional production made possible by this assistance. A start has been made in this co-operation between farmers and private entrepreneurs.[22]

What underlay this state patronage mechanism of agro-commodity relations was the attempt to not only alleviate rural poverty and to promote rural employment, but also to control the peasants by integrating them into a network of agricultural labor dependent on the "patron-client." With the technologies of production and land in the hands of corporations, managers, and entrepreneurs, the poorer peasants lost the capacity to control their own agricultural base.[23]

In *Agrarian Transformations,* Gillian Hart, Andrew Turton, and Benjamin White indicate just how the mechanism of creating agro-commodity relationship is linked to the control of the peasantry.[24] The Green Revolution took away the peasants' control of their means of production (both land and tools), while increasing productivity and generating larger incomes.[25] In this sense, the

Green Revolution achieved its goal of dismantling the political base of the peasants and hence protected the regime from the possibility of rural unrest.

In great part this situation was accomplished through a systematic alteration of political and institutional life within the village. Gary Hansen points out that directly after the coup,

> nearly every district head (*Bupati*) on Java was replaced by an officer from the army, usually of colonel rank. Likewise, many village heads (*lurah*) were replaced by veterans or recently deactivated members of the army. To further buttress government hegemony in the countryside, the army created its own hierarchical structure parallel to the territorial units of local and regional government. Thus, all levels of civilian government from the province down to the village area are now complemented by a counterpart army command with functioning authority over the respective territorial jurisdiction.[26]

This technique of governance sought to cleanse the rural social environment of the "communist threat" in the name of the Green Revolution and destroyed the peasantry as a relatively autonomous unit of sociopolitical force, ending what White calls the "self-organization and resistance" of peasants and rural poor.[27]

In the Suharto era rural elites ran the show in the villages while serving the state by becoming the "police" of the countryside to help prevent the formation of unauthorized peasants' organizations. And with social hierarchy in place the rural police were able to monitor and control the type of labor that many were engaged in within their local space. Often many peasants at the lower end of the rural hierarchy were displaced if the police suspected them of having communist loyalties. The political capacity of the state and its rural elite was based on the mobilization of the militaristic and ideological discourses of stability and security. Through the discourse of "cleaning up" the rural areas, the political activities of villagers were eliminated. The traumatic experience of the 1965 massacre, along with the Green Revolution, therefore fundamentally reorganized the rural life and ended " 'peasants' lobbies at either local, regional, or national level."[28]

The Green Revolution thus was essentially part of the attempt to depoliticize the village by way of the intensification and commercialization of the rural economy under the disciplinary control of rural elites who had the military behind them. The program was part of the national "stabilization and rehabilitation" program in the aftermath of 1965. With local civilian government and its military counterpart standing out as the sole representatives of organized

power and with many peasants losing control of their tools and land, the peasants became what Michel Foucault would have called "docile bodies," available for elimination and transformation. Thus, programs to eliminate or reduce the number of peasants were spontaneously initiated with ease by the state. As White observes,

> In August 1984 Minister of Agriculture Affandi announced, seemingly out of the blue, that small farms of less than half a hectare (and in a later phase, those of less than one hectare) would be abolished: there were too many farmers in Indonesia, and the numbers were ideally to be brought down from 60–70 percent to 8 percent of the population. They would be encouraged to sell their farms or amalgamate with other farmers, to join one of the government's Transmigration or Nucleus-Estate programs outside Java, or to shift to non-agricultural occupations (*Kompas,* 20 August 1984).[29]

The minister of agriculture was basically expressing the general strategy of the nation's security measures. He recalled the concern of Major-General Ali Moertopo (1924–1984), a key member of the president's advisory board, who had long been preoccupied by the political arrangement of the Indonesian population as a prerequisite for accelerated economic growth. In 1972, Moertopo (then head of OPSUS, a special operations unit linked to the army under the Suharto regime), helped formulate a state ideology that was to be applied "to every aspect of life, to every government institution and state organization, as well as to all levels of urban and rural society."[30] One of his most important concepts was "the floating mass" (*massa mengambang*): "a demobilized and depoliticized population," which became a technique of enforcing order and stability for the New Order.[31]

The floating mass policy was essentially one of population control pursued in the aftermath of the terrorizing, arrest, or murder of people accused of being associated with communism or leftist ideas and their affiliated mass organizations. In Max Lane's words, it was "a policy of political restructuring aimed at making permanent the end of any form of open mobilization politics."[32] To ensure the death of popular radicalism, the military established bureaus that screened citizens to make sure that they were cleansed of communism. A citizen who passed the screening of the "clean environment" (*bersih lingkungan*) program could obtain a certificate of good behavior needed for a job and membership application. However, regardless of whether citizens passed or failed the screening, they remained members of the "floating mass." As Ina Slamet notes, the "deprived rural masses are floating politically because the govern-

ment wants them to stay unorganized. They are floating because they are more and more cut off from the land and even from work opportunities as labourers, as a result of changes in technology favourable to the richer peasants, to landed members of the bureaucracy and to agro-business."[33]

The Floating Mass and Its Spatial Governance

The floating mass could be said to refer to the *rakyat* in the villages who, after the coup of 1965, were seen as a potential threat to the stability of the New Order. Under the category of the floating mass, the *rakyat* in and from the villages were banned from having affiliations with any political party. Cleansed of political adversaries and identities, the floating mass could be moved around as "productive labor" to support national development. Moertopo's 1972 Doctrine reads as follows:

> It is worth remembering that in the past the people in general, particularly those in the villages with their own, often national, ways of thinking, were played upon and involved in the political and ideological conflicts of the parties. . . . The mass of people, especially those in the villages, always fell prey to the political and ideological interests of those parties. Their involvement in the conflicts of political interests had as its result the fact that they ignored the necessities of daily life, the need for development and improvement of their own lives, materially as well as spiritually. Such a situation should not repeat itself. . . . Therefore it is only right to attract the attention of the mainly village people away from political problems and ideological exclusiveness to efforts of national development through the development of their own rural societies. . . . Here lies the meaning and the goal of the *depolitisasi* (the process of freeing the people from political manipulation) and the *deparpolisasi* (the process of freeing the people from political party allegiances) in the villages. . . . In this way people in the villages will not spend their valuable time and energy in the political struggles of parties and groups, but will be occupied wholly with development efforts. Through this process there emerges the so-called "floating mass," i.e., people who are not permanently tied to membership of any political parties. This concept of "floating mass" should lead to increased development efforts.[34]

In the mind of the state, the idea of removing villagers' right to participate in any party politics—except voting at national election time—was to force individuals to be preoccupied "wholly with development efforts." Nothing could translate better the idea that everyone should be "occupied wholly with

developmental efforts" than the diversification and mobilization of the *rakyat*. Uprooted from their base, members of the floating mass were made to earn their livings from various occupations, ideally moving to different places, "to improve their own lives, materially as well as spiritually," in Moertopo's words. In a crucial way Moertopo's vision was in line with the diversification and multiplication of job opportunities and the dream for a better life away from the village. The extended era of "stabilization and rehabilitation" (1966–1975) can be seen as the period that set the foundation for the elimination of the political subjectivity of peasants in the villages, which turned them into a politically passive but productive floating mass drifting in and out of the cities and countryside in search of jobs. While villagers were moving in and out of the rural areas, military command posts were stationed permanently in all villages to ensure the nonexistence of political activity in the rural areas. The floating mass concept was intended to create a condition that would let villagers "live in peace, to work and construct," even if they had to move around as opportunity arose.[35]

The floating mass concept in some ways set villagers free from their rural base, but it also brought the peasants back into the fold of the state. It created conditions for the diversification of job opportunities in the villages and encouraged both circular and permanent migration to the city, which needed labor power. By the 1970s, identifying the peasants in terms of their place, occupation, and status was no longer easy because they were marked not only by diversity but also by mobility. Other labels such as "informal workers" were attached to the floating mass, and the Indonesian anthropologist Koentjaraningrat notes the difficulty of categorizing peasants and migrants as two separate categories given the high frequency of migration in the rural ring around Jakarta:

> It was apparent that not all of (villagers) were landless peasants. Some were landowners who sharecropped their land or who only harvested the kinds of fruit which required the least care, thus freeing them for work in construction or road-building projects in the city or elsewhere, allowing them to earn a substantial amount of cash in a short period of time. Some even left their land uncultivated and speculated on rising land prices while working in the city. Naturally, many landless peasants would not leave the village if they could earn money by setting up food stands, cigarette stands or the like, right in the village.[36]

Koentjaraningrat does not discuss the political displacement of the peasants and the formation of the floating mass in the Suharto era, but he points to a new

subjectivity emerging out of the changing conditions of village life in Java. This new floating subjectivity, which peasants recognized only through words such as *pindah* (moving) or *rantau* (commute) but never "migrate," could be seen as peasants' own modality of survival, but such a strategy is connected to the state's technique of population control via occupational mobility. "Peasants on the move," to use Li Tana's phrase,[37] keep flexibility and variety in people's livelihoods and as a result, as Ronald Hill points out, "rural people are in many areas less than committed to agriculture having added significant off-farm and non-farm employment to their domestic economies."[38] In the city, as I discuss in the following section, they are often demonized as vagrants (*gelandangan*) for their "circulatory migration" and lack of commitment to establishing a home in the city. This tactic of survival has therefore created a floating world, but one that is inseparable from the state's modality of governance.

The diversity and mobility of the peasant world is certainly not new; one can trace patterns of such movement throughout the history of Southeast Asia.[39] The new wave of such diverse mobility was characterized by its "new non-farm activities, sustained or created by the contemporary process of development, which are underpinning diversification."[40] This new type of diversification emerged in the 1970s and in the case of Indonesia, is inseparable from the state's politics of modernization and discourses of stability and security.[41] Moertopo understood turning the peasants into a floating mass via rural diversification and mobility would allow them experience modernity and modernization. Participation in this process was central to the depoliticization of the peasants in the rural areas and the organization of their production and wage levels. Moertopo stated that "this process of modernization will naturally involve conflicts, as new norms come into conflict with traditional norms. Consequently, modernization requires planned social and cultural change. . . . As 'planned change,' modernization must clearly determine the direction which will be taken."[42]

Central to this "planned social and cultural change" was the appropriation of periurban areas as industrial zones for the containment of the otherwise scattered floating mass. The creation of the periurban areas as exceptional spaces designated for national development in which peasants could find accommodation as off-farm productive laborers was not merely aimed at creating sociocultural change in the village; it was intimately connected to the politics of the city. The state and the city authorities were only too happy to see rural-to-urban migrants locate themselves in the periurban areas. They wanted to alter the sociopolitical ground of the peasantry by detaching the peasants from their village, but they did not want them to end up in the city itself.

To understand the political significance of Jakarta's periurban area, we need to first turn to the city, for the urban area also plays a role in the governing of the peasants. In the city the floating mass among the urban population was rendered politically unorganized and only permitted to join tightly controlled state-sponsored social (never political) organizations. They too were to be absorbed into the periurban area away from the center, for both political and cosmetic reasons: as a foreign consultant hired by the government pointed out, "the leadership simply doesn't want rustic looking people pushing bikes around in their capital city."[43]

The Urban

Peasants in the City

The floating mass strategy of cutting the rural population adrift from organized political activity and the discourse of the clean environment (*bersih lingkungan*) had immediate consequences for the city. In her study of the labor market in the urban construction sector, Kartini Sjahrir points out that the "stabilization and rehabilitation" program pushed many villagers to leave the countryside for the city where they hoped to find new jobs and be able to disappear into the general urban population without being interrogated and harassed.[44] For villagers, escape to the city was thus considered favorable.

The cleansing of the villages in the era of "stabilization and rehabilitation" had a spatial implication as it generated significant flow of migration to the urban center, especially the capital city, which by then, had become the focus of national development. Ali Sadikin, who was the governor of Jakarta from 1966 to 1977, recalled in his memoir that the waves of migration from the villages had already entered the city even though urban development had not yet "taken off."[45] During this era, Sadikin also witnessed many vagrants in the city.[46] In the governor's words, their "numbers increased almost on the daily basis. And this posed a problem for me. . . . In short, vagrants in the capital city have become a serious problem. Their numbers are high."[47] Most of the vagrants, the governor believed, were not local but from different parts of rural Java. Vagrancy in Indonesian political tradition, for both the left and the right, connotes instability and indecisiveness, qualities that could lead to destruction.[48] For the governor, with the mandate from the state to prevent social unrest and political disturbance, vagrants were not only nuisance, they were also potentially threatening to public order.

Sadikin witnessed the impact of labor migration from the countryside in the aftermath of the 1965 coup. Many villagers escaped to the city with the hope of getting new jobs without harassment from the state's "clean environment"

mission. However, as a floating mass in the city, they became subjected to the play of power and knowledge by the municipality. Instead of seeing the vagrants as "circular migrants," Sadikin considered them "illiterate and unskilled cheap laborers from the countryside, trishaw drivers, construction workers, vendors, the homeless, beggars, and prostitutes."[49] Thus, he viewed them as deviant "others" in need of a space that would take them away from the visibility of "clean" Jakarta (the heart of the nation's modernity).[50] The circular migrants, as pointed out earlier, were not able to settle their families permanently in the city.[51] Many of them preferred a solitary existence, sleeping under bridges or in their trishaw (*becak*), or putting up temporary accommodation or staying in a *pondok* (a hut-like lodging place, especially one made of cheap and impermanent materials), all of which the governor considered unacceptable for a city that was trying hard to become a modern metropolis.[52]

Guarding the City

At the beginning of his tenure, Sadikin called on the central government for help and two measures were carried out in the early 1970s. The first was an effort to make Jakarta a closed city; the second involved, through state enforcement, the deportation of migrants to the outer islands under a national program known as *transmigrasi*. Several scholars and activists have written about the deportation and relocation of less desirable people from the city and the politics of the *transmigrasi*.[53] It is sufficient to emphasize here that these programs were related to the violent discourses of the clean environment and the floating mass. Furthermore, these measures point to the problematic relations between the city and the countryside, and perhaps, more significantly, the importance of finding a spatial solution for a productive governing of the floating mass, especially in the context of the realization on the part of the policy-makers that "*Urbanisasi* [rural migration to the city] never stops as it cannot be stopped."[54] And, perhaps, following the logic of the floating mass, it should never be stopped for the (circular) migrants were seen as valuable resources to be mobilized for national development and their mobility made the political formation of identity and place difficult.

It eventually became clear to Sadikin that the closed city and *transmigrasi* measures were insufficient, impractical, and counterproductive. The question was more how to control and in some way make use of the labor power embedded in the floating mass for the advantage of the city and the nation. For instance, many migrants from the villages were young men, and it was soon discovered that they would be a great labor pool for the construction industry necessary for city-building.[55] Consistent with the concept of the floating mass,

the government left these migrant laborers unregulated to prevent unionization and put them in the hands of "patron-client" informal networks of construction workers in the city, which continued to fuel and supply labor to and from rural areas.[56] The laborers were allowed to occupy unused land close to where they worked and many continued to stay there more permanently, but there was no base for them to organize politically.

The millions of former villagers thus found themselves living in urban shantytowns with no organized political life. They remained without any protection from the state and had to enact practices of self-help and mutual assistance, which defined the informal sector (see chapter 7). Their presence was and is tolerated because the city needs their labor, but their settlements are considered illegal and subject to eviction at any time, especially when funds have become available for "national development." In some ways one can understand the formation of "informality," the term used for and by the urban poor, as actually a form of governance in which survival intersects with the state's organization of the urban floating mass. As peasants have become important nonfarm labor forces in the city, a new kind of space was called on to resolve the problem of *urbanisasi*.

The Periurban

The Rise of the Periurban Edge

In 1967, a year after Suharto came to power, the government issued its master plan for Jakarta (1965–1985). The plan called for the city to be expanded outward concentrically fifteen kilometers from the National Monument, the center of the city. Governor Sadikin was delighted that the concentric development plan was essentially a means to manage population growth, for it included for the first time the areas of Botabek (an acronym for Bogor, Tangerang, and Bekasi, each representing the extended area of Jakarta to the south, west, and east, respectively). The governor recalled that "in its development, the area of Jabotabek [acronym for Jakarta, Bogor, Tangerang, and Bekasi] consists of the urban area, the rural area, and the transitional area (*transisi*), each with its own specificity."[57]

For Sadikin, the term "transitional area" referred to more than just a transitory space in the process of becoming a city. Instead the transitional area was designated to be an exceptional space that would serve as a counter-magnet for migrants to Jakarta. The governor was interested in the concept of the extended space in so far as it could resolve the population problems he had been facing in Jakarta. In his mind, the creation of a periurban area would protect Jakarta from the influx of less desirable migrants and "push population from Jakarta

outwards to the development zone (*wilayah pengembangan*)."[58] Furthermore, the extended space would give clarity to the issues of territory, boundary, and authority. Sadikin's memoir records his obsession with boundaries and the difficulty of arriving at an agreement with the governor of West Java. He emphasized the importance of dealing with the private sector without diminishing the authority of the city hall. The Jabotabek concept offered the opportunity for the governor to fulfill his wish to retain the city hall's authority over Jakarta while allowing the private sector to advance its entrepreneurial spirit on the outskirts of the city away from the controlled center.[59] Once developed by private developers, the periurban area would alleviate population and security problems in the city. The city authorities did not have to suffer the headache of planning. They did not have to deal with issues of service provision or even transport because those would be arranged by private capital. In the 1990s, for instance, Mitsubishi Colt pickups ran informally and some were provided by multinational corporations at the periurban area for their workers and staff.[60]

The experiment with an extended development zone began in the coastal areas of North Jakarta (better known as the backyard of the city—see chapter 5) rather than in the Botabek areas. In 1973, the first export processing zones (EPZs) were formed in North Jakarta in an area of 10.5 hectares adjacent to the Tanjung Priok Harbor facilities. Defined as an area of land "lying outside the normal customs of jurisdiction," the area offered "substantial incentives to attract foreign firms into the zones."[61] For private developers the zones offered a combination of

> duty-free import of manufactured intermediate goods and raw materials, company income tax holidays, subsidized provision of factory space and/or utilities, streamlined bureaucratic and administrative procedures to avoid costly red tape, exemptions from industrial regulations applying outside the zones, guarantees on the absence of strikes and guaranteed repatriation of profits.[62]

Under the control of (but not necessarily owned by) a state company called PT Bonded Warehouses Indonesia (BWI), the EPZ in North Jakarta was a pilot project and proved to be the first of many. The EPZ, a postwar invention of geopolitical economic space for the operation of multinational corporations, made the subsequent periurban areas of Jakarta an economic space of exception.[63] These World Bank–prompted free-trade EPZs have become the prime locations for the operation of international industrial capitalism; not surprisingly, the exploitation of the low-wage floating mass population was an added

bonus for capitalists and added to the everyday exploitation of the "freedom" to work and stay in and around Jakarta.

This strategy of containing the floating mass by zoning was made official in 1976 by Presidential Instruction No. 13.[64] Clusters of industrial zones in the surrounding inland areas of Jakarta were created to absorb both private capital and the floating labor mass. Consistent with the idea of protecting the capital city by deflecting migration to the periurban areas, most of the industries in the city were relocated in 1975 to the outskirts of Jakarta. They were expected to become part of the newly established Jakarta Industrial Estate Pulo Gadung, which by 1977 had already absorbed some 13,000 workers, a figure that was expected to quickly rise to 150,000.[65] By the mid-1980s (pushed by the liberalized economy), investment by the private sector in industries increased sharply, which drove up the growth rate of the surrounding areas of Jakarta such as Tangerang and Bekasi.[66] Deregulation immediately resulted in the absorption of about 18 percent of the country's labor force while contributing some 25 percent to the overall gross domestic product (GDP).[67] The workers were part of the mobilization described by Dianne Wolf as "ten large-scale modern factories, driven by Western machinery and technology [standing] in the middle of the agricultural land of two villages [in Java] that still have neither running water nor electricity."[68] In these factories, the floating mass were turned into a productive labor force and, as Wolf has shown, this included young, unmarried village women who left the rural areas, some against the wishes of their parents, to find nonfarm-related occupations. "Because of these industries," Hasan Poerbo, then a researcher at the Institute of Technology Bandung, observed, "you have tens, hundreds of thousands of people actually moving around. And many of the people employed by these industries are young, unmarried women."[69] Women were thus absorbed into the "formal" sector because "their labor is cheaper and women are more industrious when it comes to working with small parts needed for the manufacturing of electronics, garments and shoes," while "men are employed in the informal sector."[70] Yet, as Soetjipto Wirosardjono, then the deputy chairman of the Central Bureau of Statistics points out, it is "only because of the informal sector that workers can be paid such a low salary."[71]

By the 1980s, a metropolitan newspaper was reporting that the development zone at the periurban had become the destination of migrants from rural areas and outer regions.[72] A series of Presidential Instructions has made possible the development of the periurban areas and also the *desakota* region of Java, all of which had immediate impact on the population flow.[73] Urban researchers Ida Ayu Indira Dharmapatni and Tommy Firman indicate that "besides receiv-

ing migrants from Jakarta city, Botabek has been increasingly targeted as the destination of migrants from all over Indonesia, mainly from Java. Migrants have chosen Botabek instead of Jakarta because of its lower living costs, employment opportunities resulting from the spillover of industrial growth from Jakarta, and its high accessibility to Jakarta via a well-developed transportation system."[74] A series of decrees and permits were issued to domestic and foreign private enterprises to develop the periurban areas as the space for the floating mass, as if to fulfill Moertopo's wish for them to "live in peace, to work and construct."[75] Hundreds of licenses were issued in the early 1990s to both domestic and foreign trade company representatives, especially those from the industrialized countries of Asia such as Japan, Hong Kong, Taiwan, Singapore, and South Korea. These companies have since turned the periurban areas of Jakarta into "the largest concentration of both foreign and domestic investment in Indonesia."[76] This contour of investment represents just the instance of regional restructuring of economic space in which Indonesia provides cheap labor power for the low-end subcontracting network of industrial production in Asia. With the periurban area designated as a zone for the restructuring of economic and social life, domestic developers, often with ties to the ruling elites, mobilized their capital to build a series of new towns for the growing members of the middle class.

The consequences of this are clear; Dharmapatni and Firman note that "in Bekasi alone, for example, if we assume a person-land ratio of four persons per hectare, the 3,000 hectares of industrial estate development will have to displace 12,000 farmers. If this assumption is valid for the whole of Botabek, then the 6,500 hectares planned for industrial development will have to displace about 26,000 farmers."[77] We may never know exactly how the peasants responded to this draconian displacement, but under the doctrine of the floating mass they would have most likely disappeared into the general workforce of the factories in support of the national development effort. Such displacement indicates that although the periurban areas of Botabek had their own histories, under Suharto's politics of space they were in a no-man's-land in which the juridical and the political intersected for the governance of the floating mass. As far as the city of Jakarta is concerned, the result was unambiguous, for as Dharmapatni and Firman point out, "permanent movement from West Java (including Botabek) and other parts of Indonesia into Jakarta city declined during 1975–90 and was accompanied by a reverse movement of permanent migrants from Jakarta city to Botabek area."[78] We do not know how the establishment of the periurban contributed to the decrease in the number of *gepeng* (a contraction of *gelandangan* and *pengemis* [vagrants and beggars]) in the city of Jakarta,

but Wirosardjono reports that "in the census of October 1990 only 24,000 people were counted as *gelandangan* while they used to number more than 100,000."[79]

The political economy of space and the control of population are therefore interconnected, and both were central to the extensive "stabilization and rehabilitation" program of Indonesia under the New Order of Suharto. The exodus of villagers from the rural areas finally prompted the government to create a space for containing them. The periurban areas of Jabotabek offered just such a space "to exploit incarceral modes of labor control."[80] Not surprisingly the development zone was never left unwatched. The administration of the periurban areas around Jakarta was initially performed by personnel working for the Department of Internal Affairs, a major apparatus of political control responsible for the "development of village society."[81]

The Periurban Fringe as the Space of Exception

Anne-Marie Willis, after surveying a number of uses of the term "periurban" by various scholars, summarizes the associations underpinning it:

> Over-reading, then, the periurban seems to be characterized by flux: rapid changes in land-use. Built forms, economic activities; mismatches between administrative structures and territory; influxes of new populations; conflicts between new and existing landholders; and visually, somewhere that seems disjunctive, that jars with longstanding preconceptions of the distinctiveness of places, as either fundamentally rural or urban. Linked to this is that the periurban is always nearly associated with the naming of problems, whether these be issues of urban governance, exploitation of labor, lack of planning and infrastructure, degradation of natural resources and biodiversity or threats to urban food security through loss of agricultural land. This would suggest that change in these territories is undirected, random, opportunistic. The periurban could be considered as a naming of ever-changing spaces of opportunism.[82]

What we learn from this characterization of the periurban is that it is a space filled with both potentials and problems. The periurban may be better understood as a "space of exception," which Giorgio Agamben describes as being set "in an ambiguous, uncertain, borderline fringe, at the intersection of the legal and the political."[83] In the case of the periurban of Jakarta, the region was made possible and thus governable and productive by the construction of the category of floating mass. The periurban, with all its problems, informality,

and opportunities, is in fact a space with *political* calculation, and its seeming lack of governance is a form of governance. The borderline fringe keeps alive the possibility for new enterprises to exploit its resources in the project of constructing new subjects.[84] However, it would be misleading to say that the residential and industrial zones have developed outside state policies. Instead, while the government has refrained from getting involved in the management of the new towns, it gains a crucial benefit from such arrangements, which is to turn the borderline fringe into a territory supportive of national security and development.[85] The periurban allows the private sector and the local government to benefit from overriding land use planning, permits, and regulation. For instance, in the course of the 1990s, when the large-scale construction of profitable new towns was booming, government regulations on land in the periurban changed several times for the convenience of developers and to attract further investments. As Dharmapatni and Firman note, "pressures on prime agricultural land in other places such as Teluk Naga, Tangerang, have continued, as a consortium of seven private developers is presently applying for 4,500 hectares to be developed as a 'modern tourism city.' "[86] Situated at the uncertain intersection between the legal and the political, there are ample opportunities for different informal enterprises to grow. One is the proliferation of informal fees and brokers (*calo*), including thugs (*preman*), in the system of land acquisition and building construction for development.[87] The periurban development zone permits informal enterprises to grow. It seems advantageous for the periurban to maintain a degree of ambiguity and suggest the possibility of informal exploitation of the resources of the area. In the end the state served as protective power for the assemblage of loosely affiliated sociopolitical forces and actors capable of preparing development programs for themselves.

Finally, with regard to the space of exception's capacity for the deterritorialization and reterritorialization, one should also raise the question of resistance and what the space has meant for the displaced, as two well-known journalists, Maruli Tobing and Emmanuel Subangun, did in 1980:

> When all the efforts of the poor, year after year, decade after decade, have brought no prospect of real change into their experience, we may ask: why do these hungry, debt-ridden people not protest? Isn't protest against injustice a continual, central element in the *wayang* [traditional shadow-puppet] stories and in all other kinds of popular myths? . . . Then why, in the concrete reality that has surrounded millions of poor peasants for decades, as the village has been incorporated into the open economy and extreme poverty is now juxtaposed with excessive life-styles—why do the peasants not protest?[88]

Putting the issue of differentiation within the seemingly monolithic notion of "the peasants" aside, Tobing and Subangun are clearly disturbed by the absence of resistance. One could look for "resistances of everyday life" and the subtle expression of the "weapons of the weak,"[89] but the periurban has been sustained for over three decades not merely by force and isolation but also by opportunity and mobility in which the exploited too are contributing to the operation of power. The decline of the peasantry in the periurban and beyond is due to the state's intolerance of any political organization in the village, the military's coercion, and self-policing,[90] but as this chapter shows, it is also due to the mobile opportunities opened up by the spatial ambiguity of the periurban.

In reality, the new town, with its recreation of the American suburban house, will never be as exclusive and self-contained as it has been promoted. For the operation of their daily lives, the residents of the new towns continue to rely on housemaids, vendors, security guards, drivers, and workers from outside their gated community. The new towns provide opportunities for rural family members to work as off-farm workers. They promote the integration of the rural and periurban labor markets and help to alleviate poverty in the village, but at the same time they contribute to the decline of labor in the agricultural sector. Meanwhile, the imposition of a new town raises land prices and even with the draconian methods of land acquisition, agricultural landowners are inclined to benefit from selling their property to developers. Dharmapatni and Firman point out that "uncontrolled conversion of prime agricultural land has been exacerbated by the reluctance of farmers to retain their land as land prices increase,"[91] for they too are eagerly pursuing the wealth created by the space of exception. The massive conversion of agricultural land into development sites was marked by power relations in which agricultural households basically gave up their lands with unfair compensation. Such submission was encouraged in part by the decline in agriculture, whereby selling their land became much more profitable for farmers than using their fields for paddy cultivation.

Farmers' lands continue to be sold, often in an unjust marketplace, but many of these displaced individuals have found options of relatively higher wages in the low-wage regime of the industrial and housing construction sectors developed in their region. In some ways, the systematic decline of income in the farming sector is due to the state policy of integrating the rural and urban labor markets. Studying the relation between economic development and poverty reduction in Indonesia, the economist Rick Barichello notes that from the mid-1980s, "there have not been large budget allocations to the agricultural sector" and "little has been done to enhance productivity of the agricultural crops and commodities."[92] And yet, why do the peasants not protest in the

midst of the declining rural livelihoods? The reason may well be that, as Barichello and others suggest, the income growth and poverty reduction in rural areas is due to nonfarm income and the integration of the rural and urban labor markets. In accomplishing this task, the periurban has played a historic role.

The peasant world has been transformed via the formation of the periurban areas. Such spatial formation, as I have shown in this chapter, needs to be understood as a paradigm of governance with a mission to temporarily and permanently solve problems that are at once demographic, economic, and political.

Epilogue: Back to the City

Max Lane, in his *Unfinished Nation: Indonesia before and after Suharto,* indicates that mass action politics (banned since 1965) such as street protest mobilizations, factory strikes, and land occupations, have been revived since the late 1980s.[93] However, it is still fair to say that since the establishment of the Jabotabek in the mid-1970s (after the Malari protest event) and up to the collapse of the Suharto regime, no serious political unrest took place in the capital city and its periurban area even though social, economical, and environmental crises have become clearly visible in the city.[94] It may sound spatially deterministic to claim that the relative peace and order in both the city and the countryside under the authoritarian state was due to the production of the periurban. Nevertheless, we could say that the rural–urban linkages and the exceptional space of the periurban area served to turn the floating mass into a self-benefiting productive population throughout much of the Suharto era.

The power of space remains an issue for speculation and research is still needed to examine the ways in which the periurban area was in fact received and used daily by the multitude. What we do know is that the Asian financial crisis, which substantially scaled down factories and housing construction in the Botabek area, unleashed masses of unemployed workers onto the streets of the capital city. Many of the floating mass, having lost their jobs in the periurban factories and construction sectors, decided to take up occupations associated with the informal sector in the city.[95] During this time many ignored the government offer of 70 percent discounts on train tickets for travelling across Java back to their villages (perhaps to get back into agricultural work).[96] In the post-Suharto *reformasi* era, the new reality was vividly expressed by a metropolitan newspaper in 2000:

> The presence of vendors (*kaki lima*) in the capital city is not surprising. However, today their presences have been extremely ignited (*marak*). They do not just display their merchandise on pushcarts or under plastic or canvas tents.

> Instead they set up their places with permanent stalls, which they also use as their dwellings.[97]

The vendors have registered their presence in the city as part of the post-Suharto urban social movements that claim the right to survive in the city.[98] Unlike the past, today they do not seem to be afraid of authority. As one vendor points out, "for today's conditions are different from those before the *reformasi*. Today's traders are more daring compared with the past. If they [the security personnel] dismiss us, we will react against them."[99] These forces from below contributed to what Sutiyoso, the post-Suharto governor of Jakarta, described as "the multidimensional crisis, which has contributed to the change in people's behavior, and with fewer job opportunities have caused difficulties in upholding security and order."[100] The governor (appointed during Suharto's regime), found it unbelievable that "during my first term as governor between 1997 and 2002, 4,538 demonstrations were staged by Jakartans against me . . . from small-scale rallies to ones that led to anarchy."[101] The responses that eventually came however were equally harsh. An activist reported that massive evictions took place in Jakarta during the first five years after Suharto, leaving 78,000 urban poor homeless and at least 65,000 street vendors stripped of their livelihoods.[102]

By way of conclusion, it should be noted that the social movements after the fall of Suharto are largely taking place in the center, while unrest has occurred in the industrial estates that have grown up around Jakarta, it is largely fragmented. One can only speculate on the historical role of the city as an arena of conflict, but perhaps the periurban are deprived of a symbolic core and the collective capacity of the floating mass to organize.[103] This phenomenon indicates the profound connection between space and politics that continue to mark Jakarta after the New Order.

SPATIAL CONJUNCTURES

Chapter 5

The Coast and the Last Frontier

> *We are all seaman here, we have sailed the seven seas with astronomical maps. What will Sukab gain by staring a thousand times at the twilight and moon? . . . Sukab is crazy! He has been crazy since whenever! In this* kampung, *there has never been a house on stilts facing the coast. Never before and never now and never should there be such thing in the future. Everyone in this* kampung *is bounded by tradition. Look, all the houses on stilts here turn their back on the coast. They face the streets instead. Why suddenly should there be a house facing the coast?*
>
> —Seno Gumira Ajidarma, *Sepotong Senja untuk Pacarku,* 62, 65

The theme of the previous chapter was Jakarta's expansion into the periurban fringe, which served at least three functions: to attract industry and laborers, to control the population and provide security for the capital city, and to create a new citizenry. Through the Ministry of Internal Affairs, the development zone was made available for private investors to invest and to develop into series of privately organized, and thus secured, new towns for industries and residences. Based on the principle of large public-private partnership in urban land development and management, this new space at the fringe absorbed the burden of population growth in Jakarta. While the technocrats' mission, the developers' interest, and the state's vision might have differed, their views on matters of national development meshed well.

For instance, the first major consortium, Bumi Serpong Damai (BSD), consisted of ten real estate companies and was formed "to establish a self-contained new town" about thirty kilometers southwest of Jakarta. Jo Santoso,

one of the BSD's senior planners described the rationale behind the project in 1988:

> One of the most important results of the modernization process is the increasing urban population, especially the genesis of the middle- and low-income classes. These groups of people are basically looking for a new living environment which conforms more to their new lifestyles. The BSD's new city project can be seen as an attempt to realize the dream of creating a new living environment that is able to accommodate the new middle class's prerequisites for a higher standard of life.[1]

However, such aspirations did not last long. In less than ten years, the inland expansion in the form of periurbanization had reached its limit. Traffic gridlock, transport crises, the disappearance of green spaces, shortage of land and infrastructure provision, and neglect of housing for low-income residents were all signs of the failure of the periurban project to sustain national development. There seems to be no remedy to these problems; indeed, as if in an effort to forget their existence, President Suharto issued Presidential Instruction No. 52/1995 to create Jakarta anew. The hitherto neglected coastal area of Jakarta was brought back to life to represent this ambitious national undertaking. Although the periurban expansion was falling out of favor, the forces that brought it into being hardly disappeared; they were instead rechannelled toward a once abandoned area to create a new waterfront city. This chapter continues the theme of spatial expansion but focuses on the late 1990s and the early 2000s to show the incorporation of the once neglected coastal area, which became seen as the last frontier for the exploitation of urban resources in the discourses of city- and national-building. It also outlines how such a project triggered popular protests around the idea of environment that eventually became a central component of political struggle in the post-Suharto era, a development that is also taken up by the next chapter.

The Coast

In Indonesia, the word "coast" (*pantai*) has various meanings and associations, including mythical aspirations for connection, integration, and expansion. It recalls the pre-national "oceanic feeling" of Southeast Asia and the Pacific Rim and a time when the maritime polity united all the islands and waters in the region.[2] Coastal cities are often also associated with the diaspora, with migrants and trading communities that have been instrumental in integrating various port cities in the region with the *tanah sebrang* (overseas) from

where they have come and to where they might (never) return.[3] In *Arus Balik* (The Reversed Current), an epic novel by Pramoedya Ananta Toer, coastal cities are associated with an era when the archipelagic people from the southern hemisphere were able to sail to the north to integrate the regions of Southeast Asia before they were defeated by the "reversed current" and the inward-looking land-based political regimes.[4] In many European travel writings, coastal cities in Southeast Asia carry an "imperial nostalgia" for a "contact zone" filled with dangerous adventures and promises of untapped resources for capitalist and scientific discoverers.[5] During the Cold War era, coastal cities were both a threat to and a strategic guard for the ideological division between "us" and "them." In the post–Cold War the superpower binary has lost its power to divide Southeast Asia and coastal cities define intercity competition for capital and labor. The coast today features capitalist cosmopolitanism, the blurring of the state's boundaries, and the opening up of national territory to uneven regional cooperation.[6] In short, the coast serves the needs of the time and produces subject positions necessary for that time.

The epigraph to this chapter is from the short story collection *Sepotong Senja untuk Pacarku* (A Piece of Twilight for My Lover) by the Indonesian writer Seno Gumira Ajidarma. The work is about the coming of a new era, an event that produces a particular subjectivity. Seno describes the uncanny appearance of a house that faces the coast, an orientation that challenges the traditions of a seaside community. Sukab, the occupant of the house, lives in a world of his own. His habit of staring at the twilight appears eccentric to the people of the local community. Unlike them, Sukab lives in the city, not by the sea. He stays at his beach house only once in a while but he has stared at the twilight a thousand times.

Seno's collection, written in the last decade of the twentieth century, teases out some defining features of a new era for the coast of Jakarta, which had become the last frontier for the remaking of the city. By then, too, no one could be sure about the survival of the fishing communities or the possibility of having free access to the coast and staring at the twilight like Sukab. In 1997, a metropolitan newspaper opened a report on Jakarta Bay with a prophetic statement: "What we know today is Jakarta Bay may no longer be there if the reclamation of the northern coast goes ahead."[7]

Represented as a national project throughout the authoritarian regime of Suharto, the Jakarta Bay enterprise received no resistance. Controversy over environmental issues surfaced only after the demise of Suharto's rule in 1998, and even then the plan to reclaim the coastal area for the city and national branding continues. The most recent Jakarta spatial plan (2010–2030) issued

by the municipal government, for instance, still includes reclamation of the coastal area although the project has triggered popular protests about the destruction of the environment, which have become a central component of political struggle in the post-Suharto era.

The topic of coastal cities is particularly compelling in light of the momentous urban transformation taking place in Indonesia since 1995, when the state formally declared the northern coast (Pantura) of Jakarta the site to represent the nation's globalization efforts. The decision to move development back to the north and to stretch the territory of Jakarta to the sea, however, required an investment of meaning into the area. For the majority of Jakartans today, the idea of the coastal city is ironically new, and even though Jakarta is a coastal city, the coast (with the exception of those who live by the sea) seems to be a place far removed from the everyday life of the urban population.

Since independence, the northern coast of Jakarta had almost been forgotten and left behind in ruins. Such a sense of distance might be attributed to the fact that the city has abandoned its coastal identity since the mid-nineteenth century when the Dutch moved its administrative center and European population to the higher ground of the inland area away from the health hazards and the constant threat of flooding on the northern coast. Since then the coast has become the "other space" or the "space of the others" and associated with poor coolies, fishermen, and the Chinese communities who continue to live and work in the area of North Jakarta. They too at various moments have been tempted to leave the north to look for different opportunities closer to the center of power—and for higher ground and a supposedly greener and less polluted area.

As Jakarta moved further inland, leaving behind its precolonial and colonial past, the coastal area effectively became the city's backyard. It was the site of a rundown harbor with warehouses, traditional houses on stilts populated by fishing communities, swampy land and mangrove forest, electricity plants and the garbage dumps of the city. It generated spooky legends exploited by the film industry in the 1960s and 1970s that portrayed Ancol (a coastal area), which today has become a recreational park, as a mysterious and eerie (*angker*) place where ghosts dump dead babies. The recreational facilities built there in the late 1970s have changed such associations, but these are accessible only to those who can pay and the recently built luxurious gated communities have distanced the area even more from the everyday life of Jakarta. Thus, while Jakarta is known as a coastal city, the image of the coast seems metaphysical. Very few Indonesian writers have used the real-life coast as a setting for their novels. In the imagination of Seno, for instance, the coast embodies temporal disjuncture. To go there is to move either too far ahead or too far behind in time. Sukab

finds himself out of time as the coast is about to be transformed from a place of times past into a place ahead of time.

But how can the phantom-like coast of Jakarta compete for its future position on the world map of global cities? By the middle of the 1990s, the government's policy statements had begun to portray Jakarta as a coastal city of the future. The coast has been transformed from its position as the backyard of the city into the gateway of the nation in which the global and the local qualities of the country are on display. It is seen today as a new frontier that will bring the nation to its rightful place in the world. The idea of the coastal city thus has begun to yield cultural capital values, but such values are not inherent. Rather they are things that must be built into the coast.

How Jakarta Bay and the discourses around it articulate a subject position for the city and the nation is the subject of this chapter. Along the way, I show how the coast can be seen as both the pioneer of and the last frontier for capitalist urban development in Jakarta. I argue that the urgency of returning to the coast as catalyst for globalization is not only the imperative of waterfront competition in the region, but also a consequence of a particular crisis of self-imaging faced by the nation following the overdevelopment in the capital city. I emphasize the domination of political and economic coalition in the Suharto era and tease out the voices of discontent from both governmental agencies and environmental groups in the post-*reformasi* time. The relative absence of conflict in the Suharto era was due in large measure to the authoritarian politics of Indonesia, the marginal position of fishermen communities, and belated development of the coast in the urban history of Jakarta.

The City of Flow

In 2000, the city administration and the government ministries organized a one-day seminar on waterfront cities. Governor Sutiyoso (1997–2007), one of the main speakers, indicated that the coastline of Jakarta Bay had become one of "the largest garbage dumps in the world" and it was "vital" that the coastline be turned into an area representative of the future of the capital city.[8] The governor was convinced that land reclaimed from the sea along the northern coast would "realize the potential of Jakarta Bay and the waterfront will become an important strategic area for the future of the city."[9] Amid criticism from ministers and environmental groups about the negative impact of reclamation on the already deteriorating ecological condition of the city, the governor, arguing that "those who are developing Jakarta are not ministers," was determined to go ahead.[10]

The reclamation would create 2,700 hectares of land along thirty-two kilometers of the city's northern coastline. The reclaimed land would become the

forefront of the capital city and the location for hotels, business centers, shopping malls, office buildings, marinas, an entertainment complex, industrial parks, and upscale accommodation for some 1.19 million residents (figure 5.1).

In addition, the city administration would also revitalize some 2,500 hectares of the area known as "Kota" (Old Batavia). Together, Jakarta Bay and Kota would become the symbol of "the rebirth of Jayakarta," which would assume "its place as the front door to the city and the nation."[11] They would represent the "renewed Jakarta" that was "moving into the era of increased international importance in the 21st Century."[12] The Jakarta Bay mega-project is thus considered as one of the most significant, not only for the city but also for the nation. The Jakarta Bay coastline is essential to the reinvention of Jakarta, which seeks to turn itself into one of the world-class waterfront cities. To achieve this ambition, the governor was even willing to ignore critical environmental impact



Figure 5.1. The coast as the last frontier for a remaking of Jakarta. Source: Yuwono, *Palapa Nusantara, 2015.*

analyses, saying that "reclamation has been implemented successfully in many cities overseas, such as Singapore and Tokyo. Why can't we do the same thing here?"[13] Sutiyoso added, "It's my dream to turn the bay and its coastal area into something like Tokyo Bay or the Baltimore coastline."[14]

To view the revitalization of Jakarta's coast in terms of a global trend of waterfront projects should in no way obscure the reality of the erosion of urban development *within* the city. By the mid-1990s (prior to Sutiyoso's tenure), the city of Jakarta was experiencing an uncontrollable urban sprawl in its periurban areas. With the new satellite towns expanding, a metropolitan newspaper reported that "there are only more traffic jams, especially in the roads leading to these towns."[15] Everyone seems to have quickly noticed that "the dream promoted by the concept of the new town. . . . [which] promised the reduction of traffic jam in Jakarta" has gone wrong.[16] As soon as a new town is built, the traffic in Jakarta gets worse.

The traffic gridlock is problematical for a city, which for the past twenty years has relied on the new town as a central urban development paradigm for the prevention of traffic jams in the city. Debates and finger-pointing have ensued. For example, Moh S. Hidayat, a director of a major private real estate company, argued that sufficient time should be allowed for a new town to grow into a self-sufficient place and that it was unreasonable to expect that a new town could immediately help relieve the traffic in the city. As someone who took up the challenge from the national government in the 1980s to develop large-scale housing developments, Hidayat pointed to the lack of any useful guidelines from the government for the development of new towns. "We have to admit that in every sector, from concepts and regulation to investment, private developers have moved faster than the national government."[17] So fast, in fact, that by the mid-1990s, the 1985–2005 Jakarta spatial plan had become obsolete and had to be revised.[18]

Jakartans have learned (and to some degree are still learning) that new towns, automobiles, and flyovers do little to maintain the flow of traffic that typically sustains a thriving city. By the middle of the 1990s, the streets of Jakarta were marked by the tension caused by traffic jams. It even caught the attention of the head of state (even though he had never experienced a traffic jam). President Suharto was particularly sensitive to the image of traffic jams and their political and economic implications. The words used for a traffic jam, such as *macet* and *mogok,* mean not only "stagnation" and "broken down" but also "on strike." The president was reported as being "very concerned" about the traffic jams in Jakarta. "I don't have to say how much economic and financial loss has been inflicted by traffic jams."[19] Both the president and the urban

population of Jakarta realized that their city had really gone awry. They felt the trouble through their daily experience of traffic jams. The traffic of Jakarta, like the economy of the nation, was supposed to pick up speed, but there were only deadlocks even on the flyovers and in the express tunnels. Thus, in August 1997, during the opening ceremony of another twenty-five flyovers and underpasses to support the growth of the new towns, Surjadi Soedirdja, the governor of Jakarta (1992–1997), made clear that the concept of new town had failed. "The expansive development of new towns in Botabek [a contraction of Bogor-Jakarta-Tangerang-Bekasi] has only increased the volume of traffic in Jakarta."[20]

The traffic jams and the rapid and uncoordinated formation of new towns have given Jakarta an atmosphere of unruliness and hopelessness (which has often been blamed on the poor migrants to the city), but they have also provided a context for looking for another place to start anew and to conserve the environment before further damage is done to the city. That other place is the coastal area of Jakarta, which in the context of the spatial development of the city, could be seen as the last frontier for the remaking of Jakarta one more time. With the expansive space along the coastline, the waterfront seemed to promise a city that would flow. A metropolitan newspaper reported in 1995 that "the reclaimed land on the northern coast will replace the central business district 'golden triangle' of Sudirman-Thamrin-Kuningan."[21] The center would be shifted to the coast where there would be no traffic jams, and its new landmarks would be visible without the necessity of driving into the chaotic center. Thus, by the middle of the 1990s, as developers began to exhaust the potential of the southern, eastern, and western periurban territories for new town projects, they started to look for new sites, especially in the long-abandoned backyard of the city, the northern coast of Jakarta.

The Presidential Instruction

On 16 August 1990, in a customary state address on the eve of Independence Day that was delivered before the parliament, President Suharto declared that

> we are presently in the final years of implementing the first 25-Year Period of Long-Term Development and are now completing the basic framework for development. Afterwards, we will begin a new phase in our development, namely the take-off stage. . . . I once made an appeal to make the coming take-off stage the second 'National Awakening,' God willing, in 1993. This makes us realize the long journey we have embarked upon, moving from a backward nation as a result of colonialism to an advanced nation in the realm

> of independence. . . . The development we are presently carrying out cannot be separated from general global developments; . . . we have resolved not to lag behind in these developments.[22]

We may never know for sure how Suharto reconciled globalization with national awakening, but the urgency of not lagging behind prompted him to issue Presidential Instruction No. 52/1995 to secure a mega-project known today as the waterfront development of the Pantura Jakarta project. "Let us develop Pantura into an area that we can rely on in the era of globalization."[23]

The wake-up call from Suharto stemmed from a sense that Indonesia was entering a new era in which public aspirations were, in the words of Warsito Rasman, the director general of public administration and regional autonomy in the Ministry of Internal Affairs, "no longer limited to only the basic goods and services, like food and clothing, but rather [extended] to more secondary and tertiary products."[24] In his remarkable keynote speech to the seminar on "Management of Coastal Cities" in Jakarta in September 1992, Rasman stated that the more fundamental change in Indonesian society is "the aspiration to be involved in public policy-making processes . . . [in which] economic development must allow more people to be actors in business activities."[25] The globalization process, Rasman argued, had opened up the coastal cities which he considered as having "potential for economic development compared to the 'inner cities.'"[26] He further indicated that the coastal cities "have more access to the rest of the world, and their people [are] more cosmopolitanized, more open to change."[27] The Jakarta Waterfront Development Program was soon formed with the mission to "augment the historical waterfront area with the most important commercial and business district in the city [and] reinforce Jakarta as the most important commercial and financial center for Indonesia."[28]

The Jakarta Bay project, however, was not intended to be more than a showcasing of the nation to the world. As indicated above, it was also seen as a means to forget the unresolved problems in the city and to create new memories of the coast. It was conceived as a logical outcome of the next step of national progress and Suharto was quick to incorporate the coast into the national development agenda. He legalized the reclamation of the city's northern coastal area by issuing a Presidential Instruction, which allowed Governor Sutiyoso to continue dreaming about Jakarta as a waterfront city in the post-Suharto era.[29] Consistent with the era, nobody then dared to oppose Suharto. In Suharto's narrative, the return to the coast was not only logical but also vital. The decision to move there, according to the president, was a strategic response to the era of globalization. Thus the idea of globalization was used to justify the gentrification

of the relatively underexploited Jakarta coast to give the city one more chance to showcase national development.

This initiative, however, would not have assumed significance had there been no sense that a waterfront city might bring political and economic power back to the nation. Nor would Suharto have been interested had he not been aware that some developers (such as Ciputra—known as the "maestro of property development"—and Hendro Gondokusumo of the Dharmala Group) had amassed a large fortune through land reclamation and by turning mangrove forests into luxurious housing estates.

With the Presidential Instruction, future governors of Jakarta would inherit the mission to spearhead the expansion of the city with an extra 2,700 hectares of reclaimed land over the 32-kilometer-long coastline, which meant covering the provinces of West Java and Banten with reclaimed land for hotels, office buildings, business centers, elite housing estates, condominiums, mega-shopping malls, seaports, and industrial and transportation infrastructure for an estimated 750,000 to 1.19 million residents (figure 5.2).

As was often the case under Suharto, the Jakarta Bay project immediately attracted members of the oligarchic regime, which included the president's



PETA LOKASI PENGEMBANGAN REKLAMASI PANTAI UTARA JAKARTA
PT. Bhakti Bangun Eramulia
(Pantai Mas) Izin Prinsip tahun 1992
luas ± 88 Ha
PT. Muara Wisesa Samudra
(Pantai Hijau) Izin Prinsip thn 1987
luas ± 54 Ha
BPL. Pluit/PT. Jakarta Propertindo.
DA thn 1997 luas ± 294 Ha
PT. Kapuk Nata Indah
DA thn 1997 luas ± 674 Ha
PT. Pembangunan Jaya Ancol
Izin Prinsip Tahun 2004
luas ± 343 Ha
PT. Pembangunan Jaya Ancol
Izin Prinsip Tahun 2000, luas 60 Ha
PT. Pembangunan Jaya Ancol
MoU Tahun 1997 luas ± 340 Ha
PT. Pembangunan Jaya Ancol
MoU Tahun 1995
luas ± 20 Ha dan 40 Ha
PT. Pembangunan Jaya Ancol
MoU Tahun 1996 luas ± 42 Ha
PT. Taman Harapan Indah (Pantai Mutiara)
Izin Prinsip Thn 1986, Luas ± 100 Ha
PT. Pelindo II
Kontribusi 25% dari PT. MKY
Reklamasi seluas ± 125 Ha
PT. Manggala Krida Yudha
DA Tahun 1996 luas ± 375 Ha
PT. Jaladri Kartika Paksi
MoU Tahun 1997 luas ± 200 Ha
Sumber : BPR Pantura
Izin prinsip
MOU
DA

Figure 5.2. The coastal city with the reclamation land divided among major developers. Source: *Properti Indonesia*, June 2009.

children (Tommy Soeharto, Siti Hutami Endang Adiningsih, and Indra Lukmana), the prominent businessman Sudwikatmono, members of the president's extended family, and close business associates such as the Ciputra-Salim Group, as well as big developers such as Samadikun Hartono (of the Modern Group) and Gondokusumo.[30] These well-connected groups were the early birds and before other proposals came in they had already cluttered the desk of the municipality's planning department with their design proposals. With the optimism of "nationalist urbanism," the land reclamation of Jakarta Bay started on Independence Day, 1995.

Earlier Discursive Formations

The coast of Jakarta carries particular meaning for the decolonized nation. The first attempt to develop parts of the coastline in postcolonial Indonesia came from the first president, Sukarno. Unlike his systematic project to transform the central part of Jakarta, Sukarno's proposal for the coast was relatively modest. He first ordered the creation of Pluit in the northwest as a water catchment area to minimize the problem of flooding in Jakarta. He then developed the Ancol region in the northeast as a place for recreation. Sukarno reminded Soemarno Sosroatmodjo, the governor of Jakarta (1960–1964 and 1965–1966) that "you need to envision the needs of your people, the people of Jakarta, not in one or two years time, but in fifty or one hundred years ahead. You must create a place where people can enjoy fresh air from the sea and watch their children playing on the beach."[31]

The larger aim, however, was to turn Ancol into a showcase of the nation. The president was particularly impressed by a design drawing of Ancol by Ir. Santoso from the State Department of Electrical Power (PUTL) that highlighted "the boulevard, the hotels and the places for recreation" and immediately instructed the formation of the Ancol Development Authority to reclaim land for the construction of the project.[32] According to Soekardjo Harjosoewirjo, the operational site manager, the project started in February 1962 and was led by the French construction company Compagnic Industriale de Travaux, who sent twenty-five experts to reclaim some 552 hectares of land. The process resulted in a mass exodus of various wild animals, including monkeys and snakes from their natural habitats.[33] And in 1965, close to the end of his reign, the president proposed a tower named after him in Ancol. Had this tower been built, it would probably have made the coast of Jakarta, as intended by Sukarno, the center of the anti-imperial struggle in the region and the beacon of the newly emerging forces of Asia and Africa. It is not clear, however, if Sukarno, toward the end of his regime, sought to revive the symbolism of the maritime for Southeast

Asians to unify the region, which had been divided by the colonial legacy and Cold War ideology.

Neglected—or rather abandoned—for years, the coastline of Jakarta only began to enter the popular imagination in the 1970s when Ancol and the off-coast Thousand Islands were developed into recreational beaches for upper-middle-class Indonesians. By then developers too had begun to offer exclusive maritime lifestyles for the newly rich. In 1984, Gondokusumo, the head of PT Dharmala Intiland, reclaimed parts of the Pluit coastline and turned it into the first large-scale gated waterfront community in Jakarta. Inspired by the Gold Coast of Queensland, Australia, the Pantai Mutiara complex provided each of its luxurious houses with a private quay.[34] It boasts to be "the first in Southeast Asia that provides a housing complex with a canal for its occupants to pursue success on both sea and land."[35]

In the 1990s, in violation of the natural preservation law of the city, Ciputra expanded his Marina Ancol project by converting the nearby mangrove forest into 1,160 luxurious private houses in a complex called Pantai Indah Kapuk. He also managed to have the project honored by an international property group. Awarded the Gold Nugget Merit Prize in 1992 by California's *Builder* magazine, this controversial project impressed Indonesian authorities. The state might have acknowledged the environmental problems caused by Pantai Indah Kapuk, but it was greatly impressed by the project because, in the words of Rasman, "it received an award from an internationally recognized institution."[36] For Ciputra, international recognition was not just proof of his professionalism; it was also proof of private developers' ability to control both the official and popular imaginations. It also propelled the transformation of the underdeveloped coast from the terrestrial swampland to profitable land and a spatial index of success in life.

By the mid-1990s, the exemplary works of Pantai Indah Kapuk and Pantai Mutiara had convinced the government of the economic potential of developing Jakarta Bay. A. R. Soehoed, an engineering consultant for Pantai Mutiara, attributes the idea of Jakarta Bay to these pioneering adventures of the city's private developers: "Considering the success of several private developers in the developing their waterfront projects, the city government finally came up with the idea of reclaiming the whole bay of Jakarta for the waterfront project."[37]

Urban Boosterism and the Coastal Pioneer

The connection between the development of Jakarta's coast and the urban developers in the city is significant and has not been sufficiently commented on. Ciputra, the pioneer (*sang pelopor*) of the Indonesian real estate business, began his career in 1967 with the recreational park of Ancol, which was built to replace

the free public beach of Cilingcing, known then as Palm Beach. Ancol destroyed Palm Beach forever. A few years after the reclamation, Palm Beach sank into the sea when a substantial amount of its sand was taken away and used to convert the 550 hectares of marshland and swamp in Ancol into an area for urban recreation and residential and industrial development. People who lived in the Cilingcing area witnessed the disappearance of their beach and tried to protest but they were afraid to confront "the big ships with uniformed guards protecting the sand reclamation of Ancol."[38] The formation of Ancol thus also meant the end of the era when beaches were accessible to the urban underclass of Jakarta. Ancol was designed to impress domestic and international tourists and help produce the city's middle class and the fee to enter, according to Ciputra, simply could not go any lower.[39] What became of particular interest was how the Ancol coast project produced an important subject position for Ciputra to subsequently develop the city of Jakarta and launch his image as the *sang pelopor* of urban development.

In March 1994, the Ancol Dreamland project received the Prix d'Excellence Special Mention Award from the International Real Estate Federation (FIABCI).[40] This award curiously coincided with Ciputra being a presidential member of FIABCI. Founded in 1945 in France, FIABCI is essentially a consortium of brokerages and property business clubs that today consists of professionals from over forty countries. It declares itself "a nonpolitical entity whose objective is to help its members add an international dimension to their business."[41] Ciputra's Ancol project was regarded as "being a first class and important project and environmentally excellent."[42] FIABCI was particularly impressed by how fast the once swampy land was transformed into beach resorts with a four-star hotel and a recreation center. Most importantly, the project exemplified the role of the private sector in transforming the city. In this sense, Ciputra harnessed the international image of FIABCI to help promote the reputation of the private sector in leading the urban development of Jakarta. Much of Ciputra's reputation has indeed been built around his involvement in FIABCI, which by the middle of the 1990s, was able to articulate a vision for the future city. The influence of FIABCI, via Ciputra, could not have been more direct.

In 1996, a metropolitan newspaper reported the recent meeting of FIABCI in Tokyo.[43] It highlighted the conclusion and resolution of the meeting, which the paper deemed interesting. The congress, attended by a thousand participants from fifty-two countries, proposed that "the city government should reduce its intervention in developing and managing the city and . . . give more roles to the private sector . . . so that the city can become more efficient."[44] A few weeks after his return to Indonesia, Ciputra presented his vision for Jakarta

to the Ministry of Internal Affairs. With the theme "Managing the New City," Ciputra proposed that the Indonesian government establish an urban council (Dewan Kota).[45] The council would consist of three groups, namely the government, members of society (*masyarakat*), and private developers. These three actors (though it has never been clear who represents society) would work together as a management team for the city. Under this arrangement, the government would provide the legal basis for the decisions made by the team, but the government would first listen to the aspirations of the developers and members of society. The urban council has never been formed, but the idea of the private sector taking the lead and local government playing a supporting role has been largely accepted as sensible and consistent with the framework of national development strategy.[46] It coincided with the priorities of the state to deregulate, debureaucratize, and distribute opportunities to the private sector to actively take part in development.[47]

Thus, the postcolonial history of privatized urban development in Jakarta and the identity formation of Indonesian real estate could be said to originate from projects developed on the coast. Through his coastal projects, which received international recognition, Ciputra created an image of authority and prestige for himself before both the government and members of Indonesian society. In this sense, the privatization of the public place had its origin in the coast and then moved in the 1980s to the periurban areas of the city, before moving back to the coast as the last frontier. For many, the coast is a last area that can further boost the individual successes of the upwardly mobile. For some, it is the last chance to remake the image of the capital city and by extension the nation.

Looking Backward: The Urban Heritage

The call from President Suharto in 1995 to make the northern coast the last frontier for the renewal of national development coincided with increasing interest among developers, bureaucrats, and citizen groups in returning Jakarta to where it began. Rasman had also urged urban designers of Jakarta Bay to "think about a kind of mixed concept, or national/local identity that would convert traditional values into modern design, and maintain the heritage that has been wiped out in most coastal waterfronts."[48]

Indeed, unlike the new towns built on lands considered as carrying no historical substance, the northern coast of Jakarta has long been considered the origin of Jakarta. Unlike other parts of the city, the coastal area of Jakarta is filled with layers of history.[49] Furthermore, since the 1980s, through the city-sponsored Jakarta Heritage Park program, sporadic efforts have been made by

conservationists in the municipality to renovate some buildings from the era of Dutch colonial rule and revitalize some historic districts for tourism. Although such efforts had not registered with private interests, they have been successful in creating a sense that colonial ruins can be renewed without conflicting with the national interest. With the backing of the 1995 Presidential Instruction, Old Batavia, the coast, came to be seen as "offering an alternative space, one that is filled with qualities and challenges."[50] Governor Soedirdja pointed out that "we can't beautify the coast without improving the surrounding area [Old Batavia]. So, the city government seeks to turn Kota into tourist area without changing the architecture and urban form of the place."[51] The cost, however, would be too much for the city to cover by itself. Accordingly, Soedirdja added that "the city government wishes to mobilize funds from the private sector. We wish to convince developers that the business of revitalizing old towns has become a worldwide trend and that it is lucrative."[52]

In 1994, a year before Suharto declared the northern coast of Jakarta the front line for globalization, the Indonesian National Heritage Trust, the Indonesian Institute of Architects, and the Dutch Old Jakarta Foundation held a three-day workshop in the Sunda Kelapa Harbor with the theme "Sunda Kelapa as a Development Project." Attended by the governor of Jakarta, the mayor of North Jakarta, and Ciputra, the workshop was intended to synchronize interests and put forward operational ideas for the revitalization of North Jakarta.[53] The idea of revitalizing Old Batavia has long shaped the imagination of planners, business groups, and heritage conservation associations in both Jakarta and Amsterdam. Planners perceived it as a chance to experiment with planning methods; architects and historians as a chance to conserve the heritage of the city; and developers saw opportunities to gentrify the neglected property of the past. H. Suprawito, the mayor of North Jakarta, welcomed the variety of interests and initiatives as a chance for his territory to catch up with other regions in a unique way. He confirmed that his territory needed to be improved:

> Progress in the North Jakarta area is still considered behind other areas of Jakarta. However, it is now catching up. Dam and flyover constructions have been started just recently along with developments which seek to revitalize the potential of the old city of Sunda Kelapa. We should capitalize historic materials from North Jakarta for the upgrading of the neighborhood.improvements. As this place becomes a modern city, it will conserve its historical heritage, such as the Sunda Kelapa port. For many developers, this place is particularly attractive.[54]

We do not know for sure the connection between this 1994 workshop and the issuance of the Presidential Instruction a year later, but the National Heritage Trust certainly embraced the mega-project to better achieve its main objectives. Similarly, local government and developers also embraced the aims of revitalization. The public–private partnership is sustained by the narrative of glorious maritime history to project the power of Jakarta Bay outward onto its sphere of influence in East and Southeast Asia. Furthermore, the coastal project seems to respond well to Suharto's dream during the second National Awakening in 1993 of "a move to an advanced nation in the realm of independence."[55]

This vision of restoring national pride is most clearly reflected in the design approach proposed by Martono Yuwono, the head of the Sunda Kelapa development and a senior conservationist. In a design project known as the Jakarta History Corridor, Yuwono developed the idea of creating a north–south axis some twelve kilometers long that would link the castle of Fatahilah in the north to the National Monument (Monas) in the center of Jakarta. The landmark in the north would be anchored by the Monument Sumpah Palapa (which represents the oath of Gadjah Mada, the prime minister of the fourteenth-century Majapahit empire, to conquer Southeast Asian archipelago) and a cluster of historic buildings, including the compounds of Sunda Kelapa, Taman Fatahilah, Glodok, and Luar Batang. They would be connected to the National Monument in the center of Jakarta by a twelve-kilometer History Corridor adorned with museums, theme parks, shopping malls, as well as office buildings (figure 5.3).

In the History Corridor, according to Yuwono, a historical scenario of the nation across its different eras (Hindu, Islam, Colonial, and the Republic) would be represented and marked by "the traces of the Portuguese, Dutch, English, French, German, and Chinese." Adopting the design strategy of "genius loci," this architectural and spatial configuration is expected to enhance the environment for business, tourism, and identity formation, not only for the city but for the whole nation. Furthermore, the History Corridor is expected to educate Indonesians about the importance of history and the national struggle and to inspire them anew for the era of globalization, which is embodied in the coastal city of Jakarta.[56] The idea is certainly more than simply following the examples set by Baltimore, Sydney, Singapore, London, or Boston. In those places the orientation toward the global is hardly sustained in a meaningful way by a coherent national narrative. The Jakarta waterfront city, however, seems to carry the burden of having to synchronize the national past with the present and the future in a teleology of historical development. Prominent historians, however, have raised questions about the proposal.




Figure 5.3. Jakarta Historical Corridor: an axis of national pride. Source: Yuwono, *Palapa Nusantara, 2015.*

Looking Forward: The Global Imaginary

The attempt to find a connection with the birthplace of the city or to come to terms with the history of colonial encounters as exemplified by the Jakarta History Corridor is, however, only one among several ways of developing the image of the coast. According to the promotional materials of recent waterfront housing projects, the coastal area is the healthiest place to live in Jakarta. The developers of the recent Marina Coast Royal Residence, for instance, consider their property to be the least polluted area in the city. The area that was previously known for health hazards and flooding is now considered the greenest and the safest zone in Jakarta. "The clean air first comes to the north from the sea before it travels south," so the promotional material reads, and the area is protected from flood by a river and the sea. Furthermore, with a 24-hour security system guarding a single-entry compound, the Marina Coast Royal

Residence, which adopts the most fashionable Mediterranean-style architecture, offers its residents an exclusive lifestyle. In addition, "this luxurious community offers you the dream of the exotic coast of Jakarta. The beauty of the natural setting is combined with luxurious lifestyle that offers you and your family the image of success. Now you will be able to see the beauty of sunrise and sunset."[57]

The words used by the developers to sell the property include "exclusivity," "lucrative," "luxury," and "lucky." Targeting the upper middle class, and especially the ethnic Chinese among them who have traditionally preferred to live in the northern part of Jakarta where most of them work, the developers argue that the location will bring them luck because a dragon is believed to reside on the northern coast of Jakarta. With all the flaming energy of a dragon concentrated there, the north of Jakarta is once more being seen unproblematically as the territory of ethnic Chinese, with little regard to the ethnic diversity of this region. This ethnic group is portrayed in a totalized culture and promoted as super-rich and superstitious. We have thus an instance of not only place-selling, but also image-making, a situation that has been made possible by the northern coast's lack of contemporary history, other than that mobilized for marketing purposes. In this scenario, if there is a history, it has long been forgotten, so the argument goes, and a new one needs to be innovatively created. As the last frontier, it is also presumably the last opportunity to create new subjectivities, and a new forward-looking center, in stark contrast to Yuwono's History Corridor.

The imperative to create a center to compete with other centers is a common characteristic of neoliberal capitalist development in the region. The northern coast of Jakarta is no exception, especially it represents what President Suharto understood as the era of globalization. If the Marina Coast Royal Residence emphasizes the exclusivity, and thus the provincial mentality, of an elite community hidden behind a gated waterfront, Regatta, a luxurious condominium project, which aspires to become "the icon of the future Indonesia," promotes the image of openness to the world and to the vast horizon of the ocean. The architecture itself is spectacular and meant to be seen from the sea. Located on the land claimed from the shallow part of the Java Sea, the eleven-acre Regatta project was designed by Atkins, an international architectural firm that designed Dubai's superluxurious Burj Al-Arab. Regatta consists of ten condominiums, a hotel, and an amusement water park.

Developed by PT Dharmala Intiland, which developed the Pantai Mutiara described above, Regatta seeks to meet the country's need for an icon. The developer and the architects are determined to surpass other icons currently being built in Jakarta. "We have witnessed many grand projects fail to deliver



Figure 5.4. Model of Regatta, a waterfront condominium. Photo: A. Kusno.

their promise because they were blindly judged to possess iconic status."[58] The developer and the architects of Regatta are aware that "a country needs an icon, at least in the media, to make visitors or other countries aware of the existence of that particular country, which in this case means a nation-state."[59] Regatta thus emulates a sailboat and a lighthouse for "tall ships sail to distant lands guided only by a lighthouse, a compass, and the spirit of adventure."[60] The buildings, all with a futuristic form, are thus oriented toward major cities of the world. The condos respectively face toward Rio de Janeiro, Miami, Monte Carlo, Dubai, London, New York, Shanghai, Tokyo, Acapulco, and Sydney, according to the compass (figure 5.4).

The question is not how and why these cities are selected, for one wonders whether buyers or occupants would know of or care for such names or orientations. What is of interest here is the sense of competition with national monuments and other icons that are currently being built in Jakarta and other cities in the region. The relevance of such project for us is that it gives expression to a will to include an entire world within the city—a project that seeks to underscore the power of the national elite in constructing its own center by rebuking icons of both the past and the present.[61]

All Disquiet on the Waterfront

The mobilization of the idea of a coastal city in Jakarta today, with its allusion to indigenous maritime history and its accretions of interconnections with

the global world, is a discursive strategy that finds itself absorbed into a naturalized capitalist transformation. With almost everything of significance in other parts of Jakarta having been exploited, leaving only the visible traces of urban problems, the last frontier not only offered another chance to build the city anew, it also promised huge economic rewards. But like other frontiers that Jakarta has annexed, the idea of Jakarta Bay receives its share of critical comments, pressures, and protests. The opposition to the waterfront city, however, takes a more diverse form.

The Jakarta Bay project confronts memories of previous waterfront projects, especially their negative effects of flooding and environmental degradation.[62] After a series of devastating and record-breaking floods that inundated Jakarta, the reclamation of northern coast has received waves of critical commentary from environmental groups and the metropolitan press.[63] The protests had the effect of pressing the developer to make token compensation for the damage. But the issues are beyond environmental questions. In the post-Suharto *reformasi* era, the project of reclaiming the coast of Jakarta has become associated with all the malpractices of the previous regime.

In 2003, considering the environmental effects of the Jakarta Bay project, the Ministry of Environment had begun pressing President Megawati Sukarno Putri to revoke Suharto's Presidential Instruction of 1995, which initiated the reclamation of the northern coast.[64] The ministry's action was immediately responded to by the city government and all the developers involved in the reclamation project who filed a lawsuit against the state.[65] Governor Sutiyoso, who expected to see the new coastline formed while still in the office, decided that the reclamation must go through, for it would have been illegal, he maintained, to revoke the Presidential Instruction.

Apparently, Jakarta's governors and the developers are trying to continue the legacy of the Suharto era. However, in the new millennium Indonesia is witnessing the rise of civil society and the demands for an environmentally responsible and sustainable form of development. Moreover, the Jakarta Bay project today is facing issues that it has never encountered before, such as social justice and human rights. As much as the project recalls the legacy of authoritarian capitalist development, it also confronts the present challenge from its citizens over the meaning of development. The reclamation of Pantura is thus unpopular, prompting a wave of protests, critical comments, and lawsuits.

For environmental activists, such as those of the Wahana Lingkungan Hidup Indonesia (Walhi), "the project of reclaiming Pantura is clearly not for the well-being of the fishing communities in the area. Instead it is for the benefit of the rich who will do business while living there."[66] The environmental and legal activists of Walhi have even organized protests at the sales office of

the Marina Coast Royal Residence and distributed information concerning the illegality of the housing complex.[67] They informed potential buyers of the properties that they could be charged for participating in the deterioration of environment and the expulsion of fishing communities. During the campaign, the notions of human rights, governance, tradition, and environment were set against the reclamation project, which is accused of violating law, deteriorating the environment, displacing communities, and creating exclusivity in what is already a deeply divided city.

For the proponents of local development such as Erna Witular, the former minister of settlement and regional infrastructure, the idea of shifting settlements from land to water should be understood as a "return to our diversified culture, including our water-related traditions, which were destroyed by the centralized (land-based) policy."[68] Instead of using brick-and-mortar constructions associated with land-based culture, Witular proposes the use of "local materials, bamboo posts and wood, to ensure an environmentally friendly approach to waterfront settlement."[69] Witular and people who work in the local settlements are mounting a claim for the coast as a living present, rather than as a frontier to be exploited by nationalism and globalism of the past and future perfect.

What will come out of the struggle over Jakarta Bay is yet an unanswerable question. However, various significations have been produced. As I have shown is this chapter, for developers, the coast is a last frontier to be colonized for further profit and to boost the individual success of the upwardly mobile. For the state, it is the last chance to remake the image of the capital city and by extension the entire nation. For some historians and heritage enthusiasts, the return to the coast offers an opportunity to invent the historical identity of Jakarta. For members of civil society, it is a prime case of environmental exploitation where the 1,344 hectares of mangrove forest that existed in the 1960s have been reduced to less than 200.[70] The struggles between these various actors will continue, and what identities are being or will be produced remains unknown. The ecological impact however is being felt in the series of devastating floods in the city, which many believe are due in no small measure to the exploitation of Jakarta Bay. Some believe that at the end of the day the ecological devastation of the city stems from the mentality to conquer nature that has become a characteristic of Jakarta's people.

In *Sepotong Senja untuk Pacarku,* Seno reflects critically on the category of the coast in relation to the mentality of people living in Jakarta. He satirizes Jakarta and its relationship with the coast and has Sukab, the protagonist from the city, become so impressed by the twilight he sees on the coast of Jakarta that he decides to steal it for Alina, his lover. He cuts out what he saw on the

horizon and puts it in his pocket, leaving a postcard-sized hole in the sky. Seno's story offers reflections on how it is possible to steal and own the twilight, as well as on the cost of owning it.

> So I cut out the twilight before the sun had set. I cut along the four straight edges that frames the twilight and put it in my pocket, so that I can keep the beautiful scene forever and send it to you. . . . As I left the beach, I saw people in great numbers coming forward. They were all in shock and panic because the twilight had disappeared from their eyes. I too saw a blank hole as big as a postcard in the sky. . . . What if everyone takes away the twilight for his or her lover? Maybe it is time now to make fake twilight that can be sold in stores, packed in plastic bags, and sold on the streets. It is time now to mass-produce twilight so that our little vendors can sell them at the junction of the streets. "Twilight! Twilight! Only a dime for three!"[71]

Sukab manages to send the original to Alina, for only the original could convey his true love for her. But, alas, Alina only receives the twilight ten years later because it is stolen en route by a postman who is fascinated by it. By then, it is far too late. Alina has moved on with her life, and worse, after receiving the twilight from Sukab, she finds that she is the last human on earth. She thus spends the last moments of her life reporting to Sukab what the twilight has done to her and to the world.

> Shame on you, Sukab, for so blindly sending me twilight. The world is in a mess, you know? It is in a mess and completely shattered beyond estimate. After I opened the envelope, the twilight came out and immediately crashed with the sun which was already there. . . . The twilight, like a piece of cake, began to seethe. The sand spread out like a mat on Lime Hill and the waves dashed against everything on earth . . . not a single city has survived. The waves from your twilight tossed and rapidly inundated the earth. All the skyscrapers in the world and mountains on the earth are submerged in water. Sukab, the whole world is submerged in water. Everywhere there is only water and the twilight that never seems to go away. Everything is in total chaos, Sukab, because of your outrageous love.[72]

Chapter 6

Green Governmentality

The waterfront debate discussed in the previous chapter took place at the end of Suharto's rule (1966–1988). It sparked controversy and it could be seen as setting in motion a "green movement" for the *reformasi* of the post-Suharto era. The debate has broadened the public's awareness of the importance of preserving the city's green assets and gives direction for urban development as well as social and ecological movements. It has also made "Go Green" a new slogan for people living in Jakarta today (figure 6.1). Perhaps more importantly, it shows how environmental and sociopolitical issues are inextricably intertwined.

In this chapter, I conceive the green discourse as a "technology of thought" that constitutes what Foucault would call a political rationality of governance.[1] I draw out the governmentality side of the aspiration for a green environment in the context of post-Suharto Jakarta. I delineate the reworking of "green environment" in Jakarta as a domain of both political and ethical discourses that operate at the level of subject formation. I argue that a new configuration of power—based on collaboration among experts, clusters of communities, and the city government—is taking shape to govern the urban population. It does not overlook the environment and the impending hazards of global warming and efforts to make Jakarta and Indonesia a better place to live. Instead, this configuration offers a different context for an understanding of the ways in which the political cultures of the government and those of the citizen groups intersect in transforming the city.

Approaching Green Discourses

"Go Green" has become a catchall for urban development for people living in Jakarta today. This chapter looks at the ways in which different actors,



Figure 6.1. "Go Green," a message from the Jakarta city government, South Jakarta, 2010. Photo: L. Kurnia and A. Kusno.

institutions, and interpretative communities encounter and contest each other through various green environmental discourses. It looks at the increasing interest in a green environment among activists, architects, and middle-class residents of Jakarta who work in tandem with municipal efforts to provide more open green spaces for the city. It shows how the dynamic integration of society and nature occurs in the context of neoliberal model of governance and the specific sociopolitical crisis of Indonesia following the collapse of the authoritarian New Order regime of President Suharto. The massive exploitation of natural resources under the neoliberal (or neocolonial) order means that it is no longer possible to argue that the state is (or, in the case of Indonesia, ever was) the protector of the environment for all citizens. With an increasing number of

people living in deteriorating social and physical environments (beyond the state's capacity to repair), the deployment of green imagery is the end point of an exhausted regime of mass environmental exploitation. In this context, I show how metropolitan citizens and local authorities have mobilized to produce a so-called green environment. Their efforts to alleviate environmental degradation, however, are inseparable from their attempts to gain sociopolitical legitimacy.

Since the end of Suharto's rule, an increasing body of work has attempted to chart the changes in Indonesian urban regional governance, social movements, and the infrastructural space of urbanization.[2] These authors have shown the complexity of decentralized governance in relation to cities and to democratic development within Indonesia. This chapter seeks to contribute to the discussion they have opened up on postauthoritarian Jakarta by considering the actions of individuals and groups in civil society as the locus of authority. Specifically this chapter aims at an analysis of power and knowledge by focusing on the green environment discourses, following the lead of Michel Foucault's work on governmentality.[3] Thus I highlight the much publicized "green turn" in urban governance in Jakarta as neither ideological nor truthful (regardless of its merits) but as a pedagogical framework for managing social imagination in resolving the political crisis of postauthoritarian Indonesia. I tease out, discursively, different modes of representations and contexts that constitute this green imagination and consider the various events and practices in Foucauldian terms, as ways of governing the conduct of individuals and groups at a particular historical moment.[4]

I start with a consideration of the current initiatives of the middle-class citizen groups, with the encouragement of the Jakarta city government, to advocate more green spaces for the city. The green environment promoted by the city government from the perspective of branding the city aims to encourage foreign and domestic capital investment, as well as gain support from the middle class for doing so. In effect, private developers and middle-class communities (rather than the state) have taken over the protection of the urban environment by linking it to the greening of the city, in accord with their own interests in reconquering urban space. The broader reason for this movement of returning to the city, however, stems from the failure of the new towns in sustaining urbanization and the diminishing availability of profitable land at the outskirts of the city (see also chapter 4).[5] The concern over greening the environment thus operates in the context of "back to the city" discourses. The interest in a green urban environment reflects the paradoxical situation where creating green spaces for the upper middle and middle classes to return to

Jakarta necessitates the eviction of the poor from livelihoods and residences in urban spaces. Not surprisingly, this has spurred some architects and urban activists to reclaim the green imagery as a language of resistance.

Central to the context examined in this chapter is the Foucauldian idea of class politics, whereby both the poor and the middle class are able to gain access to the green discourse and mobilize it as a resource in securing their rights to the city. Consequently, green discourse becomes an accepted form of power, carried out through a system of manipulation and conditioning, that constitutes a productive (rather than a repressive) network for the whole social body. Since the green discourse could be mobilized by different social groups and adapted for their specific struggles, it becomes a mode of governance. This formulation of environmentalism as a mode of governance moves away from the debate of whether green discourse is ideological or scientific. The focus of analysis then shifts to how environmentalism is produced within a variety of discourses that are neither ideological nor truth but which constitute the effects of power.

This approach of seeing environmentalism as a mode of discursive governance no doubt stems from the political opening up created in postauthoritarian Indonesia, but environmentalism as a form and practice of power is by no means new in Indonesian urban history. Environmental discourse played a key role at the beginning of twentieth century when the Dutch colonial government centered in Jakarta introduced decentralization by giving the city the power to administer the segmented settlement system.[6] Responding to this new initiative, colonial reformers, planners, and architects such as H. F. Tillema and Thomas Karsten desegregated local building cultures by integrating them into a new kind of architecture and settlement pattern that prioritized environmental health and human comfort.[7] The colonial project of environmental development thus already articulated concepts of hygiene and health in a tropical environment, although in colonial Indonesia, as Freek Colombijn shows, this project was entangled predominantly with class dynamics rather than racial distinctions. As early as the 1910s, town plans already expressed and enacted "ethnically hybrid but homogenous class-based neighborhoods," even though the racially differentiated categories of "indigenous *kampung*" (as lower) and "European house" (as higher) were used to facilitate colonial rule.[8] The climatically sensitive modern settlement proposed by Tillema and Karsten in the 1920s, supposedly available to all ethnic groups, constituted yet another layer of spatial segregation based on social class. Meanwhile, the municipal project of *kampung* improvement, which also started in the 1920s, ended up benefiting the middle class and displacing the poor through a top-down process of gentrification exemplified by a technique of exclusion in the name of environmental development.[9]

Environmental discourse in the colonial era already embodied middle-class interests but was not then a politically utilizable concept for the poor because "kampong people lacked power."[10] The context of present-day green discourse is surely different, even while it recalls the environmentalism of the Dutch colonial administration. This is not to suggest that the poor today have power, but rather that power has become more inclusive in its "mechanism of disciplinary coercion."[11] Notwithstanding the colonial precedent, the contemporary green politics of Jakarta reflects neither this past environmentalism nor its potential in Indonesia's future. The significance of today's green architecture and urban space lies in the perceived "newness" or the "presentness" of its moral and cultural authority to which the subjects of government have come to attach themselves.

This chapter shows how the greening of the city today produces a form of governance that is based on the integration of the relatively independent voices of "communities" into the structure of governmentality. It identifies the green environment discourse as an emerging rationality of governing or self-governing a whole variety of localities. Speaking to this context, the chapter turns to how the discourse of "greening Jakarta" is practiced as a new form of power and knowledge through which the metropolitan society is constituted.[12]

Bourgeois Environmentalism: Middle-Class Citizen Initiatives and "Expert" Rules

"We need more trees, so we will cultivate them. We will plant 30,000 trees in Jakarta. . . . It will take consistency and sustainable action to make this city greener."[13] So proclaimed the then governor of Jakarta, Fauzi Bowo (2007–2012), on the fine Friday morning of 28 November 2008 at the fifteen-hectare Srengseng city forest in West Jakarta, where he planted a *lobi-lobi* tree and launched the "Clean and Green Jakarta" campaign. This ambitious project to plant a thousand trees in Jakarta's largest and most most biodiverse green area was powered by 300 volunteers and supported by citizen and business groups such as Jakarta Green Radio and the daily *Bisnis Indonesia,* as well as nongovernmental organizations (NGOs) with international affiliations such as Medco Foundation, Monfori Nusantara, and the Jakarta Green Monster Organization.[14] The engagement with the citizen groups—defined loosely here as taxpaying middle-class communities—has been the approach promoted by the new city government.[15] Although public–private partnerships have been adopted by the city government in pushing forward urban initiatives and agendas since the 1980s, earlier collaborations had involved big business groups rather than the current emphasis on engaging various middle-class communities.

As was the case with the tree-planting project, the government harnesses themes that are popular with the middle class, most notably, that of creating more green spaces in the city. Community-based urban initiatives are a new means for governing the city. "Greening Jakarta" thus could be seen as an example of governmentality in postauthoritarian Indonesia, which implicates the desires of both citizen groups and the state (in the figure of the city governor) for a transformation of Jakarta.

With the vanishing of presidential patronage in the post-Suharto era, the changed social environment in *zaman edan*—as former governor Sutiyoso (1997–2007) termed the chaotic time of the reform era—has forced the city government and governor to work with and adapt to the emergent forces and demands of civil society.[16] The rise of democratic voices made Fauzi, the first elected governor, perfectly aware of the need to change the strategy of governing the city: any urban project had to be justified in the name of the public and supported by "the people" (i.e., the middle class) of Jakarta. Yet, the prevailing sense of what I have elsewhere called "looseness in the center" has also prompted middle-class inhabitants of Jakarta to affiliate themselves with different communities, each having its own network so as to ensure survival and opportunities to prosper in the city.[17] Under these circumstances, Fauzi was determined to form a certain order for Jakarta by bringing together disparate communities to share a common platform, and by so doing ease the tasks of his administration. And he wanted to achieve this through community leaders—invariably middle-class professionals—who are dubbed "experts." Pronouncements such as "Give Jakarta to the experts. If not, disaster is only a matter of time," or "Jakarta is messy because it's mismanaged! Where is the expert?" amplified Fauzi's strategic approach to the governing of Jakarta through the specialist authority of professionals (he himself trained as an urban planner).[18]

This "community of experts" approach to municipal administration also reflected a pervading sense that the city government needed to appear sympathetic to city residents, who would then be persuaded (*diajak*) and moved (*digugah*) to take an active part in transforming and (re)building Jakarta. The expectations held of the governor were therefore spelled out plainly from the outset by Pramono Anung Wibowo, the secretary-general of the Indonesian Democratic Party of Struggle (Partai Demokrasi Indonesia Perjuangan [PDI-P]), who had backed Fauzi during his election campaign:

> At least, at the beginning of the term, the governor should be able to communicate to the public all of his programs. The reason has been to ask for public

> approval and support, and to invite the public to contribute in any way they can especially for ideas.[19]

Public participation and government through "community" was apparently Fauzi's affirmative strategy for transforming Jakarta. Urban initiatives thus overlap with the aspirations of the middle class citizenry; all are committed to restoring the green areas of the capital city.

The Laboratory of Governmentality

Even while serving as vice governor from 2002, Fauzi kept alive several ambitions of his own, one of which was to turn Jakarta into a world-class sustainable service city (*kota jasa*).[20] To realize this he required a particular type of people living and working together in the city, which would (need to) be refashioned according to their imagination. Having already been in city government for over twenty years prior to serving his five-year term as governor, Fauzi Bowo was quick to recognize the challenges of the changed times in which he found himself. As vice governor he had already launched the Program for Community Empowerment (Program Pemberdayaan Masyarakat Kelurahan [PPMK]) to encourage citizen participation in neighborhoods as part of a circuit of communication between the government and civil society. Soon after he was elected governor, the program was formalized as the Institute for the Empowerment of Jakarta Society (Lembaga Pemberdayaan Masyarakat Jakarta [LPMJ]; see http://lpmj.org/?lang=Eng), which was formed by the city government but remains outside the government bureaucracy and is run by experts (such as sociologists, anthropologists, and planners, often affiliated with universities). The mission is to distribute power by maximizing the potentials of people living in Jakarta to lead the project of becoming "urban citizens." Led by experts who are appointed, LPMJ seeks to bring together citizen groups who share a similar sense of belonging to a city that has been fractured by entrenched group interests, and regularly holds meetings, workshops, seminars, and teach-ins for members of various neighborhoods under a shared theme. In the past few years, the theme of "green environment" has been a force for unifying citizens.

But the mission to unify and empower citizens demands practices of subjectification to gain effect. The practices of subjectification in which individuals are recognized for their capacity to reflect and to strive for identity and identification can be seen as the experiment of sociologist Dr. Paulus Wirutomo, the dedicated director of LPMJ who is also a professor at the University of Indonesia. Wirutomo conceives the city government of Jakarta as an "isolated island" in the sea of its uncommitted population. His concern, in this time of "looseness

in the center" after the collapse of Suharto's New Order regime, is that there is no mutual understanding on rights or responsibilities between the city government and people in Jakarta:

> Everyone seems angry at the city government for problems in the city. Everyone asks for his and her rights to the city, but they don't see their civil responsibility as a requirement for citizenship in the city. The core of the issue here is the sense of "citizenship" (*sikap kewargaan*). . . . How to be a good citizen and how to bring about the consciousness of citizenship.[21]

Wirutomo therefore believes that, as social subjects, citizens should be assisted in realizing their potential to exercise both their rights and their obligations through their own choice to live in a better environment. He thus proposes the need to make Jakarta an "educating city," that is, a city of pedagogy to orient its citizens via the communities they have formed for themselves (be they bound by ties of schools, professions, politics, religion, ethnicity, lifestyles, hobbies, sports, arts, or shared neighborhoods). These communities are assets who ought to be encouraged to contribute in their own ways for the betterment of the city. Wirutomo argues that

> the community of doctors should contribute to a "healthy city" by providing practices of a family doctor. Architects should contribute to the building of an efficient, clean and healthy *kampung*. Artist and media groups should educate the public to develop their sense of obligation to become a good citizen. Neighborhood communities should continue the tradition of community work (*kerja bakti*), and so on, in such a way that they could help solve the city's problems.[22]

For Wirutomo, each individual and every community has a role to play in the city and, once organized by the city government, everyone should be able to share a common platform of action against the potential threats to the city. Wirutomo has put his "laboratory of governmentality" theory into practice in LPMJ, inviting the participation of various communities. Among the invitees on one occasion was Fachruddin Mangunjaya, a prominent public intellectual in Jakarta and leader of the Islamic Foundation for Ecology and Environment, whose impression and experience of the lab I now discuss.

Workshopping Jakarta's Green Initiative

In his blog, Mangunjaya wrote of his participation in Wirutomo's lab in August 2008, addressed to the mission to "Jakartanize citizens of Jakarta"—a

tall order considering the sheer number and heterogeneity of the city's population.[23] First, he was impressed by the capacity of the organizers (after seven days of deliberations) to bring together a dense diversity of participants, from academics and teachers to environmental activists and secondary school students. The workshop method of "appreciative inquiry" was an approach that reportedly proved to be working for urbanites in Chicago, Bangkok, and Mexico in their efforts to create a better citizen for a better city to live in. What kind of "appreciative inquiry" was adopted is not specified, but perhaps this is not so important as Mangunjaya reveals how it played out in the lab.

During the session participants were asked to suppress their thoughts of the negative and problematic aspects of the city and only focus, meditatively, on the positive side of the city. To Mangunjaya's astonishment, when criticism of the city was set aside, the space for appreciation began to emerge—not only in his mind, but also in the minds of other participants. Over two days participants were asked to formulate what they considered the best thing a citizen could do for his or her city. The results of everyone's free choices and apparently unmediated expression was, as he tells it: "we all came up unvaryingly with notions such as *green* community, *green* school, *green* industry and all the imaginable positive aspects that may come out of them . . . [after which] we drew up the action plan!"[24]

The post-Suharto mode of governing the population is indeed through the civilian's own imagination and voice. The collaboration between the city government, the experts, and the community encourages urban residents acting as autonomous individuals to initiate urban programs that will help them to realize their potential. It is from this perspective of self-reflection and imagining that subjectification and governance have become active practice. Issues of power are certainly at stake here for the city government, via its community of experts, as it seeks to engage the public in greening the city with a shared sense of responsibility. Economically, this effort contributes to attracting capital investments in order to allow Jakarta to become a world-class service city, the center of economic growth, one ideally sustained by environmental sensitivity. The commitment to create a green Jakarta represents a restoration of Jakarta to its "rightful" place in the nation (and in the world) by halting the environmental exploitations that have characterized the previous city governments. The issue of political interests is important, but what is also crucial is to discern the practices that produce ways of governing the conducts of individuals and groups.

"Let's save Jakarta" has become the mantra of the current city government and the middle class who seek a return to a city that will work for them. With the shared interest in greening and with green movements mushrooming in

Jakarta, Fauzi had no difficulty in declaring his commitment to regain Jakarta's green space—some 30 percent of the city area that over the past thirty years had been reduced to less than 10 percent due to the constructions of new homes, condominiums, malls, and office buildings. Many people believe that returning the balance in Jakarta to 30 percent green space would alleviate environmental problems, such as air pollution, water scarcity, and annual floods.[25] "Green areas," as urban planning expert Deden Rukmana points out, "are an important urban element that can help make cities self-sustainable and more livable," an aspiration that, as Rukmana is also well aware, has also caused a series of evictions in different parts of Jakarta.[26] To achieve the target of 30 percent green space, the city government has already made plans to destroy the dwellings of over fifteen thousand squatters around different "public spaces" such as those near railway tracks and riverbanks.[27] In 2008 alone, an urban activist recorded, "we counted four [mass] evictions: flower and fish vendors in Barito (South Jakarta), ceramics vendors in Rawasari (East Jakarta), residents in BMW Park (North Jakarta) and again residents in Pulo Mas (East Jakarta)."[28]

Such measures have stirred debate among residents of Jakarta. The middle class, largely in favor of the restoration of more green spaces in Jakarta, for instance, had welcomed the restoration of the newly revamped Ayodya Park in South Jakarta: "I never once saw the lake [in the park] because it was blocked by dozens of street vendors' kiosks."[29] The pro-eviction group feels that "there are times that the government has no choice but to remove people from their homes and places of work for the greater interest of the public."[30] To their critics, the commitment for a greener city is just a facade for acquiring lands in the city center for profit-oriented projects: "Officials forced people from their homes on the pretext the land would be used for public purposes, only to see the land developed into commercial property at the benefit of some well connected person."[31] One such case cited by critics was where the city government used the idea of restoring BMW Park in North Jakarta to justify evicting some four thousand squatters, but then decided to build an international sports stadium on the site.[32]

The city's attempt to reclaim Jakarta's green space stumbles on the question of who have been or are the violators of the green space. According to a report of the reputable NGO Urban Poor Consortium (UPC), the encroachment of green zones by poor people in Jakarta only amounts to 218.2 hectares, much less than the 1,960 hectares occupied by malls, apartments, luxury housing, golf courses, and gas stations.[33] But because malls and luxury condominiums are not considered targets for eviction, the reclamation of green space has always

fallen on the lands occupied by the urban poor. Yet, once the space is reclaimed by eviction, it is taken over by "private" properties that can at best be turned into public-oriented private spaces such as multifunction "superblocks" combining facilities for residences, public services, offices, shopping and entertainment centers. And this public-oriented private space has come to be considered as the embodiment of green living. The acquisition of green space, in an ironic turn, allows developers to realize "green properties." In this scenario, with the city government and the middle class reaching out to each other for a green city of the future, the real estate developers have had no trouble in promoting their green properties.

Urban Crisis, Back to the City, and Green Entrepreneurship

Despite the contradictions in the production of so-called green space in Jakarta, the notion of the "green" has truly entered the lexicon of property market in Jakarta today. A survey by the property magazine *Bisnis Properti* found that almost all respondents strongly felt that "the concept of green will live on forever" and that the "green turn" was not just a passing fad, but a permanent addition to Indonesia's landscape, especially to the cityscape of Jakarta.[34] Many respondents also felt that the material and ideological presence of green was "a requirement in life without which there will be environmental disaster."[35] The property business has seized the moment of going green, which sees developers signifying and branding their real estate in the city, as well as in periurban locations, as "The Green," "The Forest," "Eco City," "Eco Living," "Green Landscape," "Green Environment," "Green Tranquility," "Green Property," and so on (figure 6.2). Unlike past promotional strategies that spotlighted the architectural style or design of new buildings, today's brochures are dominated by images of trees, green lawns, and the "natural" environment as a whole, recalling the picturesque images of the once-upon-a-time "tropical Indies."

Ciputra, the developer notorious for mega-projects that have contributed significantly to the ecological degradation of Jakarta, has famously appropriated the green scene as the paradigm for the urban future (see also chapter 4). His 3 trillion rupiah (roughly $297 million) Ciputra World superblock, which stands on a 5.5 hectare plot of land in the central business district boasts a "130 000 sq m mall, an auditorium large enough to sit 1200 people, 170 apartment units, 136 condominiums, 64 000 sq m of office space, 170 Raffles Hotel rooms, and 88 units of Raffles Residence luxury apartments."[36] For Ciputra, Ciputra World qualifies as a green property, conceptually integrating the concepts of "back to



Figure 6.2. The Forest offers an exclusive "green" beach community in North Jakarta, 2009. Photo: A. Kusno.

the city" and "go to nature" to produce "environmental balance" (*kesimbangan lingkungan*).[37] Indeed, such environmental solutions, or green-washing, do not contradict the business-as-usual sought through entrepreneurship, technological innovation, and market mechanisms.

Ciputra is just one among many developers pushing the idea of "green" superblocks to ameliorate the chronic crises of the city. Marudi Suharman, executive director of a superblock by PT Bakrieland Development, the largest superblock developer in Jakarta, dismissed the "suburb town" paradigm that had been central to the real estate development of the New Order as outmoded, because people (the upper middle class) "would prefer to stay close to the working area where they do not waste too much time commuting. Efficiency will be an important issue in the future. People would now think twice about living on the outskirts of Jakarta."[38] The promise of the city superblock as "the most realistic and logical solution" to the problems of Jakarta has also been endorsed by landscape architect and environmentalist Nirwono Joga:

> Living in a superblock in a city centre obviously saves much time, cost and energy caused by traffic jams. Superblocks also save lots of land as they are integrated buildings with easy access. . . . Function-wise the residents do not have to go far or leave the area for various purposes, such as to go to work, school, the mall or to the cinema. . . . This means that there is not much traffic within the superblock compound, creating less pollution as many residents

> prefer to go by foot or bicycle. . . . Residents feel comfortable walking in the shade of lush, green trees through the scenic parks that have ponds. The development of green superblocks in the heart of highly populated cities will become a popular trend in the next 10 to 20 years.[39]

The green and healthy environment is close to the hearts of the middle class who are fed up with the periurban suburb and interested in exploring the possibility of going "back to the city" (figure 6.3).

The green turn in real estate and urban living is related to the exhaustion of the city itself. Residents of Jakarta have been exhausted by the recurrence of serious floods, paralyzing traffic jams, and lack of safety, among other things.[40]



Figure 6.3. "Back to the City," the slogan popularized by Agung Podomoro Group to promote exclusive residence in the center of the city. Source: Agung Podomoro Group marketing office, 2006; reprinted in *Properti Indonesia,* December 2006.

Furthermore, the slow recovery of the post-Suharto Indonesian economy has produced waves of migrants to Jakarta, adding to the numbers of workers laid off by the scaling down of periurban manufacturing who have taken up informal sector trades and jobs on the streets of the city. All this has contributed to the expansion of squatter settlements and the city government's responses to this phenomenon swing between large-scale forced evictions and tolerance, while at the same time fencing up public parks and installing barbed wire on sidewalks to keep out unauthorized vendors.

The public spaces of post-Suharto Jakarta thus have become a visible arena of conflict between the city government and the diverse communities comprising Jakarta's civil society. This situation calls for a new urban knowledge and spatial solutions that demand major land acquisitions and the remaking of the city in the image of the green superblock. Yet the size of superblocks can be anywhere from 1,000 to 100,000 square meters, each in competition for not only upper-middle-class consumers, but also for land that the city could use. Going back to the city and green living would first require efforts to rid the city of squatters and reclaim open public spaces for the use of this class of "green" citizens.

"Clean-up" operations have met with critical responses from pro-poor urban activists. The contestation has been posed in the language of resistance to eviction and rights to the city. The emergence of the green discourse has shaped a new style of resistance cast in the language of participation in the "green environment." This can be seen in the concerted attempts by one NGO to produce an environmental subject as a basis to fight evictions and struggle for the right of the urban poor to live in the city.

Pro-Poor Environmentalism: Governing the Margins

As is already clear, the green development objective that has emerged as key to the health of the city is to be realized not just by politicians, reformers, and planners, but also by a multitude of willing participants, mostly from tax-paying middle-class communities. Such continuous societal cultivation has been accompanied by coercive intervention, often with violence, to discipline, evict, and transform the squatter settlements of the poor. If the notion of going green is defined as civility, it equally suggests the uncivil or incivility, the underclass, and the marginal, which must be excluded or victimized through reformatory attention. The practice of discrimination is part and parcel of the green discourse, which as part of urban governance means the governing of the margins.[41]

In 2008, as sixteen evictions were planned to clear 55,540 square meters to reclaim green space, UPC, which has been at the forefront of the struggle to

defend the rights of the poor, proposed preserving poor housing areas that met the requirements of a green environment.[42] A battle over green concepts and assumptions thus ensued. As Dian Tri Irawati, a coordinating member of UPC, put it: "We want to redefine what a green area is. If a poor housing area can absorb rainwater and carbon dioxide, it means the green area doesn't have to be a building-free area."[43] This idea of green is deployed as part of the language of opposition directed against the threat of evictions as community activists seek to reverse the thinking that has pathologized the poor and to represent them instead as citizens with subjective capacity and as coparticipants in making the green environment. In this scenario, members of the urban poor can be and have been taught ways of greening their homes and their environment through waste management and landscaping. In some cases, such greening efforts have been successful in changing the image of a shanty town as a first step to prevent the poor from eviction. Although urban poor communities have utilized green practices to claim their right to a place in the metropolis, the city government does not always acknowledge or support their efforts. One case highlighted by Imam Prosojo, a University of Indonesia sociologist and member of LPMJ, is that of a neighborhood in a shanty town in Muara Kapuk, North Jakarta, whose offer to supply the fertilizer they processed from waste to the city's park agency was rebuffed. Though the neighborhood had worked to change the image of their settlement via green language, and succeeded, they continue to live under the threat of eviction.[44]

What is seen here are community-coordinated responses to official threats of eviction that play into the language of governance to advocate for poor communities as active participants in the discourse of green housing and urban management. UPC activists have harnessed the greening ideal to be realized and thereby reversed the very terms the city government used to gain authority over poor housing areas. By employing the language of the greens, UPC activists could justify their stance and even suggest that the city government translate its aspirations to the advantage of the poor: "instead of using the budget to evict poor people, we can use it to improve poor housing, by teaching people to manage waste and green their houses."[45]

What this shows is that despite the different approaches to educating poor communities, the pragmatism of UPC activism, the middle class, and the city government do work together. The city government and the urban poor meet on "green" ground, producing an alliance between macropolitical aspirations and the desire of poor communities to live in the city. The green discourse, though shaped by the city government and middle-class aspirations, is providing a new terrain of resistance for the urban poor, who are able to acquire

knowledge of the discourse through intermediaries such as experts and activists. The green discourse has become part of the discourse of resistance that the urban poor have begun to strategically carve out.

UPC's effort to upgrade the urban *kampung* highlights the limitations of government policy in guiding urbanization, especially following the monetary crisis that ushered in the "democratic" era of reform. As a prominent activist of Jakarta stated: "It is time for poor communities to seek solutions favourable to their own interests instead of expecting government policy to help them."[46] The post-Suharto era has created a space for the articulation of *kampung* interests even though such possibilities also create new competition among citizen groups for political goods associated with the green environment. In the following section, I offer another story illustrating how the rules of middle-class communities and experts (outside the government) in reconfiguring the idea of green space for the *kampung* force them to compete and act as an apparatus of education.

Urban Education, Civilian Rules, and Responsibility

Partly in response to the profound lack of affordable housing following the political-economic crisis in 1998, the urban poor were permitted to use the space beneath the elevated highways in Jakarta, leading to thousands setting up their living places there. In the years since, the occupants of these dwellings have set up lively social and (informal) economic networks in the vicinity, along with often militant "private" community organizations that have thwarted municipal control of these spaces. Consequently, as Sofyan Jaya, a North Jakarta community organizer pointed out, "several problems plague the space beneath elevated toll roads, including their being used as garbage dumps and becoming crime-prone areas."[47] Regardless of the diverse outcomes and different motivations in claiming rights to the city via the occupation of these spaces, the urban poor have changed the meaning of the elevated toll road from one of a relatively exclusive space for upper-middle-class motorists to that of the space providing homes for the underclass living beneath.

The city government, however, has never failed to keep up with the slippage. Following the damage caused to concrete pylons in a big fire on a North Jakarta toll road on 7 August 2007, an order was issued on 17 August, Independence Day, to evict some 10,000 families living under elevated roads.[48] To prevent their return, the outgoing governor Sutiyoso announced his plan to use the spaces under elevated roads for greenery and parks, badminton courts, and soccer fields. By mid-2008, squatters from several subdistricts beneath toll roads had been evicted, and some two thousand trees were planted in those

sites.[49] Expressing the determination of the city administration and toll road companies to continue with the evictions, the minister for public works iterated that "cleared tracts would be converted to green zones" that posed no danger to toll road users.[50] This proposal to "beautify" the city with open green space and popular sports amenities sparked debates about the definition and use of public space.

In the wake of the North Jakarta toll road fire, several architects became engaged in the greening debate by designing houses, common green areas, and playgrounds for the urban poor in these spaces.[51] UPC also commissioned a team of urban planners and architects to come up with a housing development concept at ten locations under elevated toll roads in Jakarta. In keeping with the concept of "a city for all," the NGO demanded government acknowledgment for the rights of the urban poor to live under flyovers. This initiative to win recognition through the building of homes, the UPC team believed, could "create a greater sense of belonging. The residents would subsequently maintain the aesthetics, cleanliness and security of their own neighbourhoods."[52]

Besides the UPC team, architect Andra Matin, working independently, was among the first to take up the role of an expert in fending off eviction by creating an environmentally friendly living space for the squatter communities under an elevated toll road and an intersection in North Jakarta.[53] Matin's design sought to change the image of the informal settlements as spaces of cultures of "poverty" by recovering the living and working environment of the urban poor as civilized and worthy: "People there keep pets like cats, and livestock like ducks and chickens. I have designed elevated houses so they could keep the animals under their houses."[54] Matin's buildings accommodated different individual and collective living needs: "The first level of the building would be more suitable for families while the rooms on the second level would be for singles."[55] He also designed a "common area" and "playground for children." The ordering of space sought to capitalize on the capacities of the urban poor for civility and responsibility. Projecting expressions of "family," "community," and "green spaces," Matin's buildings challenged the conception of such informal settlements that justified the city government's eviction program. Matin is one of several architects who find in their professional vocation a need to think about places for the urban poor in the city. Architects and planners operate as experts of ethics, environment, and lifestyles whose spatial ordering would provide a guarantee for the proper conduct of the communities. Empowered by the experts, the urban poor communities then expect to be accepted as "proper citizens" by the city government.

This approach to cultivating *kampung* dignity via environmentally friendly design for the urban poor came to national attention in the 1980s through Yusuf Mangunwijaya's work to counter the eviction of informal settlements along the Kali Code River in Yogyakarta.[56] Mangunwijaya upgraded the appearance of some thirty-five houses, which saved the community (where he too lived) from eviction and in 1992 garnered an Aga Khan award. The houses he upgraded were considered environmentally acceptable and dislodged stereotypes of slums or squatter settlements. Today, the efforts to cultivate a green environment as the basis for the right to live in the city are supported by middle-class architects, activists, and the like, and partially acknowledged by the city government. Characteristic of the democratic mood of the post-Suharto era, they encounter competing proposals from other members of civil society who feel responsible for the use of the space beneath the flyovers.

As the UPC team worked on their proposal, middle-class residents near the toll road in North Jakarta reacted to the city government's attempt to reclaim the space beneath. In 2007, Sofyan Jaya led the formation of the Development of Communities under Elevated Roads Group (Kelompok Masyarakat Peduli Kolong Tol [KMPKT]) in the mission to use the spaces under elevated highways for "sport activities, interactive parks or multifunction halls, complete with a green space. . . . It is the people's initiative because their area is close to an overpass where many illegal settlers used to be, causing problems like waste and crime."[57] In December 2008, with the help of U.S.-based NGO Mercy Corps, the local partner of the Focus Cities Research Initiative of the Canadian International Development Research Centre (IDRC),[58] over 600 members of the North Jakarta group participated in drawing up sixty-five design scenarios of how the space beneath the toll road could be used, including "a reading area because the kids in our neighbourhood are getting involved in things that could lead to gambling."[59] The official IDRC update indicated that "each of the plans includes a mix of land used, with particular emphasis on community space and green space."[60] Noting the lack of public space in the densely populated vicinity, a member of the group said, "this is a solution we are proposing to avoid further illegal use of the space. We hope all stakeholders will support our plan."[61] At the presentation of their plan to the Public Works Ministry, the city's spatial planning agency, and the city's toll road operator, Bambang Sugiyono, the North Jakarta mayor, welcomed the community initiative for greening the space, as did the spatial planning agency head, M. Suhardyoko, who said, "If approved [by the governor], the proposal and the funds will be discussed at meetings about construction projects."[62]

The case above indicates how the elevated highway has come to embody a diversity of claims for greening the environment as the structure itself is recomposed to accommodate the varied demands mobilized by social actors such as the urban poor, NGOs, architects, planners, and middle-class citizen groups. While the motivations of these social actors are diverse, their involvements in revitalizing urban space have centered on articulations of a green environment—whatever this means to them and to others. In large measure, the insurgent practices of the various social groups reveal both the power and the limit of the state's technology of governance. In its place, a new mode of governance, one that is discursively assembled by middle-class citizen groups, professionals, academics, and activists around the idea of the green environment, has begun to gain relative power in relation to the government.

When the outgoing governor of Jakarta issued a proposal to reclaim the public space beneath elevated highways for parks in 2007, he was thinking not only of evicting the poor but also of greening the city to upgrade the image of national progress as Jakarta and the nation continue their struggle for a place on the map as an environmentally sustainable world city. However, the interest in a green environment also stems from a shift of governmentality in which the city government offers approval and reward for the initiatives of a community of experts, who are now playing the key role of organizing perception, action, and evaluation. In this context, the green environment offers a discourse of unity, one that is resonant with the larger aspirations of the city government.

Conclusion

In 2007, the leaders of the Muslim National Awakening Party (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa [PKB]), assumed a new identity for the organization by adopting the green environment as the intellectual principle of the party (figure 6.4). During their twelfth anniversary in 2010, the party initiated a program of planting 10,000 "trees of life" in Bogor, West Java, to consolidate their position as *the* green party of Indonesia.[63] The chairman, Muhaimin Iskandar, acknowledged that attention to green environment stems from the fact that the Indonesian public has become more committed to conserving the environment due in part to the global campaign on the dangers of climate change. As a "green party" committed to safeguarding existing laws and regulations that are pro-environment, it has launched a website called "Green House" to promote the design of green high-rise buildings and established a council to oversee the preservation of existing environmental regulations.[64] It will also be proactive in working out a regulation that will require provincial governments to construct



Figure 6.4. "Care for the Environment, Save Our Future." The National Awakening Party (Partai Kebangkitan Bangsa [PKB]) uses a green message to win a campaign. Photo: A. Kusno.

urban parks for their cities. All these, according to Iskandar, are to show to the public that "we are serious about environmental issues."[65]

As politicians become the vanguard of environmentalism and private developers are marketing nature to customers, the city government, the community of architects, and urban advocates are also engaging with the urban population via discourses of green environment. They have all helped popularize the significance of "Go Green." The PKB and the municipal government, in their attempts to gain support from an increasingly green-conscious middle class, seek to redefine their authority in the image of the sustainable green city. The real estate industry in its quest for new ideas to appeal to trendy customers tries to market the notion of green properties. The pro-poor activists' struggles against evictions and for the rights of the poor to live in the city also appropriate the theory and practices of greening the environment. These diverse actors and institutions might not be aware of each other's culture-making activities, but they are taking part in producing what is there to be governed. Their loosely connected interaction—via green environment discourses—constitutes a shared form of knowledge and the regulation of public life. In this rhizomic process of power formation, bourgeois environmentalists intersect with (rather than contradict) pro-poor activists and, together, both help constitute the biopower of the state. The idea of reintegrating nature and society thus is central to the reconfiguration of governance in contemporary Jakarta.

Chapter 7

Housing the Margin

In the previous chapter, I showed how Jakarta is embracing environmentalism as if to redeem the past decades of extensive destruction of the urban ecology. Yet, the call for the reclaiming of green spaces prompts the questions of whose green spaces are being reclaimed and what civic space means in Indonesia's capital. As many Jakartans are hoping that the creation of open and green spaces will help mitigate the city's environmental problems, the government of Jakarta justifies many of its evictions by claiming that they are for the restoration of green space. This chapter deals with the recent attempts by the government to create housing for the low-income population. It looks at the policies and strategies adopted, and their assumptions and effects both for the urban poor and the future urban form of Jakarta.

On 19 May 2009, the then minister of housing Mohammad Yusuf Asy'ari hosted the Second National Congress of Housing and Settlement (Kongres Nasional Perumahan Rakyat II) at the Hotel Bidakara, Jakarta.[1] Attended by some 1,500 people from various parts of Indonesia, the congress is considered a milestone in the history of Indonesian housing. It proclaimed a "new era" for Indonesian housing and settlement.[2] While looking ahead, the congress also made a connection with the very first congress on housing, which was held over half a century ago in 1950, when the newly independent country was trying to mark decolonization with a mission to provide housing for its population, the *rakyat*. The 2009 congress closed with a declaration that

> We, participants of the National Congress of Housing and Settlement II, 2009 are heirs of the 1950 Congress of People's Housing which declared housing as the responsibility of the state. We feel responsible to implement the 1945 Constitution (Undang Undang Dasar [UUD 1945]) and the Human

> Rights Law (Undang Undang tentang [HAM]) which declare that everyone has the right to live well, materially and spiritually, and to settle in a house with good and healthy environment.[3]

The official publication of the Ministry of Housing, *Inforum,* also started its report on the 2009 Congress with a quotation from Mohammad Hatta, the first vice president of Indonesia, who opened the 1950 Congress on Healthy Housing for People (Kongres Perumahan Rakjat Sehat) where the term, *perumahan rakyat* (people's housing) was perhaps first coined by the newly independent state. "Indeed," Hatta said, "our goal [to provide housing for everyone] won't be realized in two years. It won't be fully completed in ten or twenty years. However, in forty years or in half a century, we will be able to fulfill our wish, if we are committed and make the effort with confidence."[4] The optimism of 1950 to provide housing for everyone within fifty years inspired those attending the 2009 congress to keep the housing mission going.

This symbolic reference to the early years of independence by participants in the 2009 congress seems to turn a blind eye on the long years of Suharto's New Order (1966–1998) during which a series of national workshops (known as *lokakarya nasional*) on housing were periodically held. By evoking the notion of *kongres* (rather than *lokakarya*), the 2009 meeting set up an identity of its own that reconnected its mission to that of the 1950s while dissociating itself from the housing policy of the New Order.[5] The break with the recent past seems ironic as most of the order today could be said to have been shaped during the Suharto era. The claim of a new era may be ironic but it is not entirely bogus. The post-Suharto era is indeed different from what preceded it. The notion of *rakyat* at least is easily mobilized today to fashion the new era, so with the 2009 congress one might imagine a new shift in the strategy of housing the poor.

Several new initiatives indeed were proclaimed by the congress, some of which are clearly a departure from those of the New Order. For instance, housing is now considered a human right, rather than simply a human need for shelter, as assumed by the New Order.[6] Oswar Mungkasa from the National Planning Board (Badan Perencanaan dan Pembangunan Nasional-Bappenas) explains in his contribution to *Inforum* that UUD 1945 already contained the principle of a right to housing for everyone, but it needed to be more specific in its formulation.[7] According to Mungkasa, the meaning of *hak rumah tinggal* (the right to live in a house) as stipulated in UUD 1945 can be extended to give a sense of *hak perumahan* (the right to housing). Such broadening of the meaning would allow Indonesia to conform to chapter 11 of the UN's International

Covenant on Economic and Social Rights, which defines the rights to housing as comprised of "security of tenure, availability of services, affordability, habitability, accessibility, location and cultural adequacy."[8] Mungkasa ends his article by reminding the local governments that, following the mandate of decentralization, they are now responsible for enacting the principle of human rights by taking the lead to solve the problem of settlement for the impoverished urban populations.[9]

Another major outcome of the 2009 congress indeed concerns the shift of power in urban management. The congress resolved that the state and private developers will no longer be the sole dictators of space. Instead, the local or city government (*pemerintah daerah* [*pemda*]) and its residents are now expected to play a dominant role in the development of space, which would include finding solutions to the issues of housing for the poor and the disadvantaged. Housing the poor in the post-Suharto era indeed fits with democratic expectations. The mission to create a pro-poor housing policy could be seen as stemming from democratic transformation, which has changed the nature of state–society relations. The new democratic era, while it continues to open up opportunities for private developers to direct the city, has broadened the space for the city and its residents (largely members of the upper middle class) to define the kind of city they want. The congress was clearly shaped by both internal and external forces.[10] It was guided by the spirit of decentralization in Indonesian politics, but it was also shaped by the trends in international urban management. Adopting those frameworks involved making commitments to ecologically sustainable urban development and to the practice of "good governance." Institutions related to housing are expected to be accountable, transparent, and responsive to the needs of the public.[11]

With the mission to house the *rakyat* in the new era, the allusion to the congress in 1950 could not be more strategic. In the 1950s, *perumahan rakyat* was one of the few discourses available to independent Indonesia to establish political legitimacy, largely because the Dutch colonial government lacked the political will to remedy deplorable housing conditions for the poor.[12] In his comprehensive study of housing during the late colonial time and early independence, Freek Colombijn indicates that in the first quarter of the twentieth century, the colonial administration, after years of neglect, was supportive of the pro-poor housing initiative but the Dutch leaders nevertheless remained reluctant to make significant commitments to public housing. In Colombijn's words, the colonial state "never intended to bear the brunt of the costs of housing."[13] As a "liberal" colonial state, the government sought to externalize the cost of public housing for Indonesians via private investments in the market. The

reluctance of the colonial state to provide public housing is reflected in the failure of two major government agencies—the N.V. Volkshuisvesting (Public Housing Corporation Ltd, established in 1925) and the Gementelijke Woningbedrijven (Municipal Housing Authority)—to supply adequate housing, and what was built did not reach the poor. In a nutshell, Colombijn concludes, "colonial public housing was too expensive for the lower incomes, too small to make much impact and of a design that was impractical for the lower incomes."[14]

As indicated above, soon after the transfer of power in 1950, independent Indonesia held the Congress on Healthy Housing for People—itself a development from previous meetings organized by the Japanese colonial administration.[15] The congress produced recommendations, and some actions, but more importantly, it ignited enthusiasm from the nationalist elites to turn *perumahan rakyat* into a primary concern of the newly independent nation.[16] The People's Housing Department (Djawatan Peroemahan Rakjat) was set up in 1951 to produce and finance housing for the low-income population (*rakjat djelata*).[17] However, the housing shortage remained an acute problem, and it soon overwhelmed the government. The state in the end had to appeal to the people to continue meeting their own housing needs.[18]

Today, Hatta's 1950 speech is being recalled to motivate contemporary leaders to fulfill the state's commitment. Yet, while the enthusiasm of the 1950s can be retrieved, it would be unrealistic today to expect a return to the socialist ethic of housing provision after years of market revolution under Suharto's New Order. Instead, a kind of pro-poor market provision has been initiated with the state regulating the private sector in order to attain its social goal of housing the poor. The state seeks to moderate neoliberal tendencies by achieving its goal of housing the poor even though, following the World Bank paradigm, the state is not expected to build or subsidize low-cost housing using state funds.[19] The "new era" seeks to eliminate state housing subsidies and replace them with an investment scheme as the basis for generating funding for housing the low-income population. The allusion to *perumahan rakyat* thus is not without real economic interest. The targeting of *perumahan rakyat,* as I show in this chapter, justifies the wholesale incorporation of the vast informal settlements into the formal housing market for the first time. In this sense, while the 2009 congress declares the emergence of city government and citizenry as the "players" of urban change, what this means is that the city is expected to create a good investment climate for financial markets to operate in the low-cost housing industry. The new era proclaimed by the Ministry of Housing therefore is a clear departure from the times of Sukarno and Suharto, but there are continuities in

terms of economic expansion, political interest, and urban renewal, which are all now conducted under conditions shaped by the declared goal of housing the *rakyat*.[20]

The new era cannot just be announced; it has to be created. The main task of this chapter, therefore, is to tease out the several measures put in place by the state and the local government to enable investment in low-cost housing. These would include the regularization of land tenure system, the dissolution of informal land markets, allocation of space for low-cost housing, and selection of a population group based on creditworthiness. These measures are clearly steps toward urban renewal with an emphasis on eradicating informal occupation of lands to satisfy the call for citizens' right to shelter and, by doing so, eradicating the need for informal occupation of lands. Such measures, however, are not only technical and managerial, they are also social and political, as they entail a displacement of informal and irregular workers (who cannot be accommodated by the formal financial scheme) to the fringes of the city.

The first part of this chapter, "Contexts," identifies how current issues of housing the poor are similar to and differ from those that faced the governments of previous eras. It teases out a shift in the strategy of housing provision in response to the state's fiscal crisis and the concomitant neoliberal democratic transformation that have produced a new way of financing *perumahan rakyat* in the post-Suharto era. The second part, "Discourses," identifies the contours of the new housing programs for *perumahan rakyat* to show financing works. It looks at a financial scheme for low-income housing called Liquidity Facility for Housing Finance (Fasilitas Likuiditas Pembiayaan Perumahan [FLPP]) and its practice of land certification as manifestations of the mainstream economics idea of "formalizing the informal." The dissolution of the dualism of formal and informal markets, this chapter suggests, entails the dislocation of the informal and further marginalization of the urban poor. The third part, "Practice," spatializes as well as temporalizes the practice of providing housing for the poor by looking at Jakarta's short-lived "1,000 towers" project, which was initiated in 2006 as the first post-Suharto low-cost apartment project. I explore how this subsidized housing program came to an end in 2010 and describe the subsequent creation of the FLPP. I also expose how the 1,000 towers project was appropriated by developers as a means of acquiring scarce urban land and promoting their own middle-class housing projects. I then provide a reading of spatial politics by showing how the program of *perumahan rakyat* has been tied to the gentrification of space in Jakarta. The last part of the chapter, "Utopia?" projects the future of urban form of Jakarta as the effects of the discourses and practices discussed in the preceding parts. It uses a

wishful-thinking book called *Jakarta: 500 Years* by Zaenuddin H. M., a senior Jakartan journalist, to show how his imagined urban form and social spirit of Jakarta in 2027 could be seen as an enactment of the urban renewal of Jakarta today. By way of conclusion, this part turns to the sociopolitical effects of the gentrified Jakarta on its surrounding area.

This chapter, as a whole, shows the spatial implications of urban renewal and population control and how the program of *perumahan rakyat* is implicated in people's exclusion and dislocation from the gentrified city. It thus is not just about housing and its current policy. Instead it is about the politics of space by way of pro-poor housing strategy. With a focus on the strategies of governing elites in Jakarta and the primary research materials limited to metropolitan media sources, the account that emerges is certainly not the whole story. Incomplete as the account is, it nevertheless attempts to link housing studies with the spatial politics of built environment. Finally I should also mention that while this chapter is critical of the current housing policies and projects a gloomy urban future, it acknowledges the importance of housing the poor and the genuine efforts made by the actors involved, both in practice and in its utopian impulse.

Contexts

Market Expansion and the Dissolution of Land's Dualism

In February 2009, a few months before the Second National Congress of Housing and Settlement, the then minister of housing, Asy'ari, met with Sri Mulyani (then minister of finance) and Boediono (then governor of the Bank of Indonesia) and signed an agreement to work together to package housing loans from *perumahan rakyat* into a bundle of marketable mortgage-backed securities that would be sold in the stock market.[21] Such an arrangement is part of the state's attempts to find a new source for creditors to finance *perumahan rakyat*. Harnessing the financial market is considered necessary for, according to Asy'ari, "We need 15 trillion rupiah [$1.5 billion] but the total subsidy for low-cost apartments is only 2.5 trillion rupiah [$250 million]."[22] The assumption is that by selling off mortgage-backed securities to investors, the capital accumulated by banks alone would be able to finance the construction of housing and therefore the government would no longer need to subsidize it. Sri Mulyani favors this strategy because the sale of the financial package "will help people obtain capital from bank, and developers too will profit from the increase of home buyers."[23] Meanwhile Boediono promised that the Bank of Indonesia would keep an eye on the quality of the securitized products—mortgage based securities, collateralized debt obligations, and their related instruments—to reassure investors.[24] Such a move toward asset securitization of *perumahan*

rakyat is considered revolutionary as for the first time in the history of Indonesian housing, the state is taking a concrete step to eliminate forever, it is hoped, subsidies for low- and modest-income housing.

Sri Mulyani and Boediono are known as mainstream professional economists who believe in the power of formal market mechanisms to generate urban productivity.[25] They follow the World Bank's paradigm, according to which the state is expected to play the role of creating the conditions that will improve the housing market of Indonesian cities. They are also aware that the key condition for asset securitization is the availability of a land market. However in Indonesia, as in other developing countries, there is more than one type of market operating in society. The informal land market (defined in full in the next section), for instance, constitutes a large portion of the land market, but this cannot be securitized unless it is formalized. Under these conditions, the state is expected to maximize the functioning of the land market by incorporating the informal land market into the formal one. Such integration will, it is hoped, enhance urban and national productivity and insure the proper functioning of the market itself. Low-income housing is a strategic target for informal-to-formal conversion, since the majority of the modest- and low-income population still relies on the informal land market for their shelter. Before we discuss discourses that seek to dissolve informal land market, we need to understand the politics of land dualism in urban Indonesia.

Legal Dualism of Land in a Historical Perspective

It should be noted at the outset that the formal/informal dualism discussed herein refers to the differentiation between registered and unregistered lands.[26] In principle, under the Basic Agrarian Law (BAL) of 1960, which establishes the "right of control by the state," all lands must (eventually) be registered with what is today called the National Land Agency (Badan Pertanahan Nasional [BPN]).[27] However in practice, the majority of Jakarta's land (estimated to be 70 percent in the mid-1990s; more recent data is unavailable) remains unregistered with BPN even though some of that land may be registered at the local level municipal administrative office (known as *kelurahan;* Jakarta today has as many as 265 of these).[28] An individual's ownership of informally registered land, called a land right claim, is based on letters, receipts, and documents issued by *kelurahan* offices and witnessed by *kelurahan* officials. This kind of land right claim is legal, but it is not recognized as legitimate by the BPN. The differentiation between the formally registered land (with the BPN) and the informally registered land (with the *kelurahan*) has significant symbolic and material consequences in how the city is understood. As Michael Leaf points

out, "the *kampung* lands which contain the city's extensive popular settlements are virtually all unregistered [in the eyes of BPN], while those of the formal sector—exclusive neighborhoods of developer's built housing—make up the bulk of the registered residential parcels."[29]

These categories and the legal dualism embedded in them are, no doubt, "inherited" from the colonial discourse of land tenure. The delicacies of these categories have been explored by Colombijn,[30] and it is sufficient here to note that the categories were constructed to secure a formal land market (known as European title) while leaving everything else partially and informally codified.[31] The latter includes indigenous titles that could be bought and sold "without any formalities or concomitant administrative costs."[32] In this way, the colonial state externalized the cost of providing low-income housing and the headache of administrating it by creating a relatively autonomous, informal domain in which the Indonesian population could be expected to handle their own housing situation. In this informal realm, people built dwellings for themselves. As indicated above, the independent Indonesian state in the 1950s sought to overcome this colonial construct of dualism, but failed and was forced to appeal to the people to build for themselves via mutual help (*gotong royong*). What this means is that the postcolonial state had no choice except to reinstall the colonial formal/informal dualism that it sought to transcend.[33]

Formal and informal dualism persisted throughout Suharto's New Order in the form of land registered with the BPN and land registered with the *kelurahan* (but not with the BPN). This separation also produced separate markets that ultimately consolidated the notions of "formally" and "informally registered land." These categories, like their colonial predecessors, are not static however, since, as Leaf points out, "the unregistered category is officially regarded as transitional—parcels of land do pass from the informal, unregistered market to the market for registered land."[34] However, for the low-income population, there are all kinds of advantages to staying on informally registered land because then they are not required to follow the various costly building standards and regulations. In Leaf's words, "by staying outside of the formal system, owners of unregistered parcels are able to avoid many of these controls—including subdivision requirements, minimal lot sizes, building setback regulations, and the need for construction permits—which may significantly raise the costs of building development."[35] So when the World Bank launched its mission to "formalize informal lands," it was basically trying to resolve the formal/informal dualism by registering the vast informally registered lands with the BPN. The issue however is not just about securing owners' rights under the national law; it is also about the removal of *kampung* (the popular settlements on informally

registered land in urban areas), as they are at odds with the manifold regulations that govern formal land use and building codes in the city.

For economists such as Sri Mulyani and Boediono, the resolution of the dualism of formal and informal means full legal recognition of lands and integration of the land markets, which are essential requirements for the securitization of housing. By resolving the dualism, so the story goes, the modest- and low-income population and their mortgages in *perumahan rakyat* would emerge as marketable assets in the secondary financial market. In short, for the economists, resolving the dualism will resolve the financial challenge of the pro-poor housing provision.[36] In this scenario, the vast savings of low-income households could be packaged as an investment to generate the capital necessary for funding *perumahan rakyat* in the long run. However, this well-intended mission to produce a sustainable capital flow in the production of low-income housing, relies on speculative financial capitalism. How the government intends to harness this volatile speculative market for the low-income housing is beyond the scope of this chapter, but this financial mechanism could produce a series of measures with substantial spatial consequences for the urban poor who have been relying on the informal urban land market for their survival in the city.

Politics of Land's Dualism

To understand why and how land market dualism has survived, first we need to recognize that the link between low-income housing and the urban and national economy has only recently been understood and appraised.[37] In the past, especially under Sukarno, *perumahan rakyat* was fundamentally a socialist ethic essential to the sociopolitical well-being of the nation and was never considered as driver of economic productivity. Under Suharto, while the connection between upper-middle-class housing and urban productivity was firmly established, housing for the low-income population was considered a social responsibility of the state and associated with subsidies. However, the government's investment in *perumahan rakyat* throughout the New Order was significantly lower than that of neighboring countries, and this may be attributed to a variety of conditions, of which the following two are particularly important.

First, as pointed out above, the large pool of land unregistered with BPN is land that accommodates low-income housing. In this instance, the occupation of land by the low-income population cannot be considered as squatting, for the term tends to obscure the fact that the state permitted the practice, and furthermore the land must have been informally registered in *kelurahan* even though it remained unregistered with the BPN. The Washington-based consultants the Urban Institute and local firm Hasfarm Dian Konsultan reported to the

Indonesian Ministry of Housing in 1990 that "much of the problem with squatting and other forms of very insecure tenure has been avoided in Indonesia because of the flexible land law system, which permits a variety of levels of land rights and corresponding degrees of tenure security."[38]

The informal occupation of land is institutional, with its own set of governance. It is largely a collective action involving local officers, brokers, and land mafioso who sell the rights for people to settle on any unregistered land. Such informal trading of rights to land involves various degrees of legality, often in the form of titles. While this system exhibits chaos, it is essential to providing low-income housing. Without this informal housing sector, there was just no way for the government to meet the demand for housing. The state's relative neglect of public housing is due to the large share of housing production taking place in the informal sector. In other words, self-regulated informal housing has helped the state externalize the cost of providing low-cost housing.

Second, the government of the New Order era allowed informal land to be occupied by the poor because the occupiers provided the low-cost labor needed to develop the rest of the city.[39] We could say that the state's tolerance of informal land occupation is the state's "in-kind subsidy" for the urban poor to motivate them to stay in the city so that they can serve the needs of the formal urban economy. This outcome may well be unintended as the government did not design the informal sector. The state however is fully aware of the benefit of keeping the informal sector alive. For instance, in 1991, Soetjipto Wirosardjono, in his capacity as deputy chairman of the Central Bureau of Statistics, explained how street vendors (*pedagang kaki lima*) have allowed "the industrialists and the business sector to pay such low salaries to the (formal) workers [that] without the informal sector, workers would simply be unable to survive on the level of salary they are receiving."[40] The very existence of these vendors and workers, we could add, relies on the availability of popular housing produced informally, even though the city government allegedly abhors such settlements. However, it should be clear that the informally occupied land of these vendors and workers remains uncertified and it therefore may not be used by the occupants as collateral for loans or to protect them from eviction.

For mainstream economists, this kind of informal land system is considered as distorting the operation of the market. Tolerated or undisturbed for decades, the informal land market has become today a new target of financial capital.[41] The large pool of informal settlements constitutes an immense concentration of resources, which, it is hoped, could be incorporated into the formal market for the revitalization of the national economy.[42] Today, the call has been sounded to capitalize the vast majority of land in the city that is informally

regulated, and this proposed development comes on the back of *perumahan rakyat*.

Crisis and Before

The current move to eradicate irregular settlements and to register land however is not fully an invention of the post-Suharto era. In the 1990s (when private developers grasped the opportunities to exploit the growing numbers of urban upper-middle-class via real estate housing), the New Order government had already been involved in finding alternatives to subsidizing low-cost housing. Experts from the World Bank and the Asian Development Bank were then involved in considering the potential of secondary mortgage finance.[43] Several seminars hosted by the Indonesian government were held in 1993, and by 1995, with a support from the Asian Development Bank, the Ministry of Finance had already drafted a framework for the establishment of secondary mortgage facilities.[44] The monetary crisis of 1997, however, delayed the development of the plan, and the idea was retrieved only in 2003, five years after the collapse of the Suharto regime. In that year, a committee was formed to draft plans for a secondary mortgage market. Presidential Instruction No. 19/2005 was soon issued, which saw the end of subsidies and the beginning of a new era that would work toward embracing the secondary mortgage market as the engine for the production of capital for financing low-income housing.[45] The securitization of *perumahan rakyat* shows the continuity of the capitalist project in the post-Suharto era, which is now targeting the modest- and low-income households.

It must be noted, however, that the 2005 Presidential Instruction was propelled by the monetary crisis in 1997, and it was formed in the chaotic time of political transition. Both the monetary and manufacturing sectors were in deep crisis and with the decline of the price of oil there was basically nothing to expect from the state budget, especially regarding low-cost housing subsidies—an area that had always been at the margin of state funding. As the state budget was forced to rely on loans from the International Monetary Fund (IMF), subsidies had become frowned upon. After the 1997 crisis and as part of the IMF agreement, the Bank of Indonesia stopped housing funding subsidies. In 2001, *Properti Indonesia,* a real estate magazine, reported that since the fall of Suharto funds for subsiding low-cost housing were missing for two years from the state budget.[46] The reason for the disappearance has never been clear, but *Properti Indonesia* believed that the neglect was due to "the all-out attention of the government to solving the crisis in the banking sector."[47]

In the time of financial crisis and structural adjustment from the IMF, mainstream economists seized their opportunity. For instance, in the early

2000s, *Properti Indonesia* published opinions from economists and planners and outlined the basic problem of housing: "All this time, housing developers have relied on banks for loans. As a result when the bank stops its credit flow to the property sector, developers are in big trouble. They have no money to build and there is no longer any generous bank to turn to."[48] With many banks declaring bankruptcy, a new source of funding was sought. It was at this moment of despair over the "monetary crisis" (*krismon*) that suggestions started being made that the housing industry should "make use of financial and stock markets," especially given the strategic plan from the Ministry of Housing stating that "in the next five years, the financing of housing will be integrated with the stock market."[49] In 2001, Syafruddin Arsyad Temenggung, a planner and deputy coordinator for Foreign Economic Cooperation, urged that "we shouldn't lose the momentum. . . . The moment of crisis is the right time . . . to build a financial system for housing."[50] Temenggung, a Cornell University graduate in Urban and Regional Economics, put forward a housing financing model based on the U.S. mortgage system. What Indonesia really needed, according to Temenggung, was a financial institution capable of packaging mortgage loans and selling them to investors in the stock market. The market would in turn produce capital for banks to provide long-term loans to home buyers with low interest rates. Since the success of this scheme relies on the selling of securities to investors, Tumenggung proposed that this investment system be handled by brokers, because "they know how to establish obligations and attract investors so that money can circulate."[51]

On 7 February 2005, President Soesilo Bambang Yudhoyono, who had just been elected, signed Presidential Instruction No. 19/2005.[52] The new president had already made low-cost housing part of his 100-day program, and thus the venture into the secondary financial markets became a priority. The presidential decree created PT Sarana Multigriya, a state-owned financial institution whose mandate was to establish the secondary mortgage market.[53] Headed by Erica Soeroto, a housing financier, PT Sarana Multigriya is now moving fast and Soeroto has been urging support from developers and banks, as well as Jakarta Stock Exchange, to work together. "If every component works together, then the business wheel will turn. The faster the selling of housing assets, the bigger the volume, and the faster the interest rate of loans will go down."[54] The "quick sell" was the key to the success of this operation.

The post-Suharto innovation in the field of housing is thus the harnessing of capitalism to finance *perumahan rakyat*.[55] The city and the nation as a whole stood to benefit: the city in its quest for capital investment would benefit from regularization of land and eradication of irregular settlements and the nation-

state would be able to claim legitimacy for its rule through a pro-poor housing program, albeit one reliant on the speculative and volatile nature of financial capitalism. The effort to harness capitalist projects for the benefit of the poor, however, is not straightforward, because the packaging of mortgage-backed securities requires several conditions. First, the land (and its irregular settlement) would have to be regularized and registered, which means the resolving of the formal/informal dualism. Second, the supply and demand of housing would have to be high as this would be an indicator for investors of the marketability of low-income housing. Third, the buyers would need to prove creditworthiness to satisfy their mortgage obligations, even though this may not be the concern of the investors in the secondary financial circuit whose intention is merely to sell after buying the package. The condition of creditworthiness, as I will discuss below, will not be met by workers in the informal sector, whose jobs and incomes are relatively unstable and unpredictable. Thus, the new housing program is by definition exclusionary, as it is intended primarily for "card-carrying" citizens who work in the formal sectors.

In February 2009, three months before the Second National Congress on Housing and Settlement, the government (represented by ministers of finance and housing) and the governor of the Bank of Indonesia jointly launched the program of selling mortgage-backed securities as the backbone for financing low-cost housing. Prior to stepping down as minister of housing, Asy'ari expressed his optimism that the new housing scheme would be successful because "so many (modest- to low-income) Indonesians still do not have a house."[56] The scheme known eventually as Liquidity Facility for Housing Finance (FLPP) has been put into practice by the subsequent minister of housing, Suharso Monoarfa.

Discourses

FLPP and Its Limits

"The year 2010 is the most dynamic year for the property industry," the Jakartan newspaper *Koran Jakarta* reported in its end-of-the-year evaluation of housing policy. That year, "many new programs were issued which will change the future of the property business."[57] The most important new program is the FLPP. After a year of hard work, Monoarfa was appointed as minister of housing in 2009[58] and launched FLPP on 1 October 2010, the day the state commemorated Hari Kesaktian Pancasila (The Day of Pancasila's Supremacy). The formation of FLPP was so significant that Monoarfa felt he had completed his mission, even though the struggle to implement it is just beginning. Monoarfa did not hesitate to call the FLPP scheme "a revolution in the history of housing finance in Indonesia."[59]

FLPP is essentially a product of the arrangement for the secondary financial market to invest in *perumahan rakyat*.[60] It is designed to bring down the interest rate of housing loans, a condition that, it is hoped, will increase the demand for housing, especially from the low-income population. As indicated above, the state-owned financial institution PT Sarana Multigriya Finansial was set up to invite banks to participate in mortgage-based securities.[61] Ideally, securities sales would provide sufficient funds for banks to give low-interest loans to modest- and low-income home buyers. This incentive would increase demands for low-cost housing, which in turn would strengthen the marketability of mortgage-based securities on the stock market.

To start the program, the state allocated 2.68 trillion rupiah ($268 million) from its 2010 budget to invest in FLPP. Monoarfa projected that "in ten years time the government will no longer need to provide budget for housing since this start-up fund and the investment thereafter will accumulate enough capital to continuously supply funds for the subsequent housing loans."[62] This temporal investment is matched by investment in space, with particular focus on the major cities, especially Jakarta and its surrounding Bodetabek (a contraction of Bogor-Depok-Tangerang-Bekasi). The *Koran Jakarta* reported:

> The Ministry of Housing has designated Jakarta, Bogor Depok, Tangerang, Bekasi, Bandung, Yogyakarta, and Semarang as having areas for experimentation with programs for low-cost housing [5–10 million rupiah ($500–$1,000) per unit] and for modest-cost housing [20–25 million rupiah per unit ($2,000–$2,500)]. The programs will be facilitated by a loan with interest rates from 5 to 6.24 percent for fifteen years. With this program, the monthly mortgage payment will only be around 160–220 thousand rupiah ($16–$22) per month.[63]

However, such a program, which focuses on generating demand, needs to be supported by several actors in the housing industry, especially those on the supply side, such as the local/city government (*pemda*), which had to provide land and developers who would design and build the housing estates. Irman A. Zahirrudin, director of Bank Tabungan Nasional, which has expanded its banking service via FLPP, said that "the supply of FLPP needs to be supported by the housing supply. This has been a major challenge for FLPP. We are ready to fund 120,000 houses through FLPP."[64] Since the launching of FLPP, the Ministry of Housing has been pressing the *pemda* and developers to speed up the process of building houses and apartments for the low-income population. Such urgent calls, however, do not always receive an immediate response, for both developers and the *pemda* have been accustomed to believing that the unprofitable low-

cost housing project is the responsibility of the state. Furthermore, the scarcity of land in the city and the desire of the municipality to build a business-oriented "service city" are factors that are at odds with the program of accommodating low-cost housing in the city. In 2006, Deputy Governor Fauzi Bowo had made it clear to central government that there was "no room for cheap apartments" in Jakarta (see part III). Still, toward the end of 2009, the Indonesian parliament issued a bylaw on housing that urged "both *pemda* and the state to provide budget that is large enough to support the housing program."[65]

While the *pemda* and the Ministry of Housing have their different aspirations and challenges, at least they agree on two aspects, both of which are related to the politics of urban space. First, both the city and the nation aspire to reduce the size of the *kawasan kumuh* (decrepit neighborhoods) in the city as part of their commitment to the United Nations Millennium Development. In Monoarfa's understanding, *kawasan kumuh* refers to spaces where "the quality of the infrastructure is low or deteriorating due to the increased number of people occupying the area illegally."[66] Monoarfa equates illegality with *kawasan kumuh* for he believes that people would only upgrade their own built environment if they were dwelling in formal housing. The key to solving illegality and *kawasan kumuh* is gentrification. While every irregular settlement could be given formal legal title and property registration, not all of them fit with the criteria of a habitable settlement. The *kawasan kumuh* that are overpopulated and lack infrastructure services would need to be transformed and renewed. And when this takes place, the higher living costs of the gentrified environment would make the poor self-evict. With this framework of formal housing program for the low-income population in the city, Monoarfa expects that by 2019, the *kawasan kumuh* can be reduced so that "30 percent of Indonesian cities are free of slums."[67]

Second, both the minister of housing and the governor of Jakarta agree that there is little a place like Jakarta can do to provide land for low-cost housing. In the words of Monoarfa, "it is impossible to build housing for the low-income population in Jakarta."[68] The challenge of finding space cannot be separated from the question of who has the right to live in the limited space of Jakarta. Converting *kawasan kumuh* to formal housing favors those who have the financial capacity to stay. Thus the goal of providing low-cost accommodations demands a framework for selecting who gets in and who is left out of the housing program. Ironically, *perumahan rakyat* operates as a device for evicting some of the urban poor (especially informal workers, as described later).

FLPP is designed to encourage modest- to low-income households to invest their savings in the financial market. It therefore only targets the section of the

population with relatively stable incomes, and those who have a taxpayer number (Nomor Pokok Wajib Pajak [NPWP]) and file an annual income report (Surat Pemberitahuan Tahunan [SPT]).[69] While this class of card-carrying citizens (i.e., workers in the formal sector) constitutes a large pool of potential buyers, they are by no means the only low-income workers in the city who need housing. Coexisting with the formal working class is an even larger number of self-employed workers in the informal sector. Setyo Maharso, the chairman of Real Estate Indonesia (REI), pointed out that FLPP should also accommodate "informal workers, such as street vendors and food stall operators (*tukang bakso, warteg dan lain-lain*) who are not eligible to receive credit from banks . . . [because] they do not understand (and are unable to produce) a NPWP and a SPT."[70] Maharso criticizes the FLPP scheme for excluding the informal workers, even though they "too have the right to own a house."[71] Maharso suggests an expansion of the scope of FLPP to include the informal workers and thus to broaden the market for formal housing. However, there is no way for banks to underwrite what they consider the sector's unpredictable income and uncertain employment.

The changing working and living conditions of the informal workers could not possibly be accommodated by the formal financial institutions and these workers' unstable incomes could not constitute marketable mortgage-backed securities. The informal workers are therefore excluded from FLPP, but they cannot escape its effects. As many of the informal workers live on land regulated through informal means, they are subject to eviction to make space for the formal low-cost housing program. It is ironic that housing one class of the low-income population demands the eviction of another class of the urban poor. Ineligible for FLPP, workers from the informal sector will remain a "floating mass" who do not have the right to housing.

Land Certification

As part of a network of financial capitalism, FLPP does not operate alone; connected to it is the program of land certification. In the context of FLPP's operation, land certification is a basic requirement. The minister of housing, therefore, continues to urge the local government to facilitate the process of converting informal land to formally registered land, "especially for the low-income population."[72]

Soon after the launching of FLPP, Jamil Anshari, a Ministry of Housing official, announced that his agency was "collaborating with the National Land Agency (Badan Pertanahan Nasional [BPN]) on a program to assist with land certification."[73] Land certification would give legal security, and, Anshari continued, "the land certificate can be used for collateral and credits."[74] This view

was broadly supported by the metropolitan press. *Koran Jakarta*'s special edition on land policy summarized the benefits of land certification as it would lead to not only security of tenure but also land ownership and an increase in land value. Moreover, "the certificate can be used for collateral for a loan."[75] The program was welcomed by homeowners who wanted their homes to be properly registered even though they did not plan to use them as collateral.

The initiatives from BPN and the Ministry of Housing gained support from the president. In 2008, as part of the "Pro-Rakyat" program, President Yudhoyono launched a program oriented toward land certification for the low-income population.[76] The program is called the Service for People's Land Certification (Layanan Rakyat untuk Sertifikasi Tanah [Larasita]). Organized by BPN, it aims at regularizing exchanges and ownership of land to end the informal system of land registration, which has often led to land disputes, unfair land acquisition by developers, and "illegal" land occupation by the urban poor. To show its full commitment to regularizing land, in 2008 BPN (an institution that was notoriously corrupt during the Suharto era) issued a regulation to ease land certification.[77] It also provides 124 Larasita vans and 248 motorbikes to serve people in various cities and regencies in Indonesia who wish to certify their land for the first time (but may be unable to visit a BPN office)[78] (figure 7.1). According to Joyo Winoto, the head of BPN, his bureau's efforts have received "great appreciation from the World Bank for pioneering mobile land information services."[79]

Land certification is not new in Indonesia. The World Bank has promoted a program of land certification since the New Order, and was especially vocal in



Figure 7.1. A Larasita van certifying land in central Jakarta. Photo: A. Kusno.

the mid-1990s. For the World Bank, land regularization is a mechanism to integrate the informal land market into the formal economy, as integration will promote private land and home ownership, which is recognized as the engine for urban productivity. The registration program however was carried out only reluctantly during the New Order. This reluctance could be attributed to the logistical cost of carrying out the registration, but there were also other planned and unplanned politics of development behind leaving lands largely unregistered (with BPN) throughout the New Order.

First, the Indonesian state was reluctant to give up its ownership of land. For the state, control over land allowed it to have the ultimate power to decide how the land should be used for "development." The period of liberalization in the 1990s, for instance, witnessed major private developers (with ties to the Suharto family) acquiring easily and cheaply massive amounts of land in both Jakarta and its periurban area (see chapters 4 and 5).[80] Had all the land been registered at that time, developers would have found these properties both difficult and expensive to acquire.

Second, just as the government allowed lands to be acquired and commodified, the state also recognized the legitimacy of irregular settlements where the urban poor lived. As discussed earlier, such recognition relieved the state from providing houses for the low-income population. Furthermore, if the central government allowed the poor to stay informally on land in the city (regardless of the legal issues), these individuals could then help support development projects as informal, low-paid laborers. Those factors explain why, until the 1990s, according to the Hasfarm and Urban Institute report, "a large share of [housing] production [took] place in the 'informal sector'—84 percent by our definition. . . . The land titles that result from this process of informal subdivision are legal and convey full rights of ownership, but they generally remained unregistered."[81] The report recognized that "in the future this informal production will be the only way of meeting urban housing demand,"[82] and recommended that "government should seek ways to upgrade the standing of valid but unregistered titles so as to increase their security and permit them to be used as loan collateral, both for housing and for business loans."[83] The report's subtler notion of "upgrading" is open to interpretation, but in the context of current attempts to resolve the formal/informal dualism, it can be taken as recommending formal land certification as a way to end housing production by informal means.

The target of land certification is not limited to the unregistered lands in the informal sector. It includes the land owned by the government that for reasons that will become clear below, has been abandoned (*terlantar*). Since a significant portion of the informal *kampung* in Jakarta, which have become the

main targets of evictions in the city today, are located on *tanah terlantar* (waste land), we need to understand how the abandoned land came to be, as the explanation exposes the politics of land certification and the spatial politics in which the city is engaged.

Tanah Terlantar

Gunawan Wiradi, the Indonesian expert on agrarian law, points out that the campaign to encourage land certification today is clearly not about land reform or equitable distribution of land. Instead, it is about quantifying government-owned land, for "no one seems to know the amount of land owned by government," and to obtain information about how it is being used.[84]

The state does indeed own an unknown amount of land in the city. It is not clear when the term *tanah terlantar* first appeared, but it refers to "unused" land, such as those beneath the flyovers, along the riverbanks, and the railway lines. It may have emerged during the monetary crisis of 1998, for *tanah terlantar* seems to be reserved for the most marginal of the marginal.*Tanah terlantar* has even been used by the government to accommodate the urban poor who needed space for temporary housing, especially during extraordinary economic crises. To be clear, *tanah terlantar* is different from the vast majority of land in the city that is regulated through informal means (roughly 84 percent in the 1990s, as noted earlier).[85] During the financial crisis of 1998, the state allowed homeless people to occupy much of the *tanah terlantar* in Jakarta as a temporary solution to an affordable housing shortage, and so many workers who had been laid-off from factories in Jakarta's periurban areas returned to the city and sought work or employment in the informal sector. Such arrangements are considered by some as illegal squatting, but that can be misleading, for the derogatory term obscures the fact that the occupation took place with permission from the state, even though this decision dismayed city government officials.

Tanah terlantar comprises mostly marginal land but may also encompass land suitable for development, such as Kemayoran, the former airport. In 1998–1999, while waiting for developers to ride out the financial crisis and take over the development of Kemayoran, the state opened up some spaces of the vast airfield for spontaneous settlements, only to have settlers evicted later by the administrations of governors Sutiyoso (1997–2007) and Fauzi Bowo (2007–2012). However, it is not easy to take back *tanah terlantar* once popular housing has been tolerated there. We just have to remember Sutiyoso's complaint about evicting the urban poor from the space beneath the turnpike after a fire: "The Public Work Ministry owns the land. . . . This is what happens when

an institution gives out building permits to squatters under the turnpike. Who wants to take the responsibility for what has happened now?"[86] The difficulty of taking back *tanah terlantar* is largely due to the manner in which settlement has developed and been governed. It was far from spontaneous. Historically, settlers in Jakarta used the systematic practice of informal *kampung* formation in Jakarta. In the case of the Kemayoran development, there were neighborhood associations (*Rukun Tetangga* and *Rukun Warga*) governed by *oknums* (officials who abuse power) with connections to the Kemayoran management office and local security thugs controlled by the company.[87] Moreover, the settlement constituted an informal land market as well. In this sense, the practices behind the occupation of *tanah terlantar* and that of the informal *kampung* are similar even though they are different in their historical formation. The inventory of land, by way of certification, will help clarify the quantity, function, and condition of *tanah terlantar,* and perhaps more importantly, clear it of irregular settlements, thus preventing the expansion of informal land market.

The current "new era" of housing policy, with its mandate to resolve the formal/informal dualism, would bring to an end such land irregularity. The goal of designating and clearing space for formal housing, for instance, rests increasingly on the program of the state and city administration "to relocate squatters living on riverbanks, along railways tracks and under elevated expressways."[88] After clearing, *tanah terlantar* would be subjected to a measure of urban renewal. On this question of what to do with *tanah terlantar* after it is cleared of informal settlements, the city and the nation have different opinions. The city government, for instance, prefers the greening of *tanah terlantar* to fulfill the need for green space in the city, whereas the Ministry of Housing is continuing to explore the possibility of turning *tanah terlantar* into the site of low-income formal housing.[89]

There are thus several factors involved in land certification that could serve both progressive and regressive urban agendas. Land certification will lead to the increasing of land supply for formal housing or green space, but it will also close down the possibility of informal settlement and eliminate the role of *tanah terlantar* in meeting the needs of the urban poor. Both FLPP and land certification, which are part of the Pro-Rakyat program, are meant to support the expansion of the urban formal land market. These programs will integrate informal land owned by government into the operation of the urban formal land market. The mission of the Ministry of Housing to increase the demand and supply of formal housing, meaning that the role of housing produced through informal means to meet the needs of the urban poor would have to come to an end. The practice of resolving the formal/informal dualism by way of land cer-

tification could not entail anything other than the eviction of the informal workers who are living on the informally regulated lands. This is the coercive side of the new housing program, that is, the displacement of informal workers from their informally regulated lands and their exclusion from programs meant to benefit the poor.

Finally, land certification also plays an important role in controlling urban population growth. In Jakarta, land certification would help the city's mission to eradicate the *kampung* that have been built on *tanah terlantar,* such as on river banks, along railway tracks, and beneath toll roads. It would help reduce the size of Indonesia's *kawasan kumuh,* which in 2010, according to minister of housing had increased to 57,000 hectares.[90] It would also help the city's 2010–2030 spatial plan agenda to limit the number of Jakarta's population to 12 million.[91] In addition, the city's Operation for Population Control (Operasi Yustisi Kependudukan [OYK]) is also promoting the eviction of vendors and migrants who occupy irregular settlements (see the Practice section below).

We now turn to the city of Jakarta's challenging of the state's pro-poor housing policies. I explore the case of the recent short-lived 1,000 towers project in the city (2006–2010), which was the only major state-subsidized pro-poor housing program prior to the invention of FLPP. While short-lived, it is important historically for its demise brought to an end the practice of state subsidies for in low-cost housing and gave rise to the current FLPP program. An examination of the failed 1,000 towers project also allows us to speculate on the effects of the current *perumahan rakyat* project on the future urban form of Jakarta.

Practice

The 1,000 Towers: A Lesson from the Recent Past

Decentralization in Indonesia has expanded Jakarta's authority. The city has the power to establish its own agenda, but while "Jakarta is no longer the satellite of the central government," the city is not free from the state's influence.[92] Government Regulation (Peraturan Pemerintah) No. 38/2007, for instance, obliges the local government (*pemda*) to provide housing for its low-income population.[93] The broadening of the city's authority has thus come with an obligation to produce low-cost housing, which previously was the responsibility of the state. Such delegation of authority is often at odds with the priorities of the city. For Jakarta, with its problems of land scarcity and growing population, housing the urban poor has always been a challenge. The city has its own set of priorities to turn itself into a world class "service city" (*kota jasa*), which basically means an investment-friendly city of consumption "where

everyone visiting the city could be well-served."[94] Such an aspiration is at odds with the state's initiative to build low-cost apartments in the city.

The Ministry of Housing nevertheless continues to warn that *pemda* should develop initiatives for housing especially by providing land for *perumahan rakyat*. To stress the urgency of his call, Minister of Housing Monoarfa has even outlined a mission for the *pemda:* "Many people are in need of housing, especially civil servants and people who live in the *kawasan kumuh*. Building houses and apartments for civil servants and revitalizing *kawasan kumuh* should be *pemda*'s priority so that people do not have to keep renting in the future."[95] Monoarfa continued:

> I urge *pemda* to provide a land bank for housing. . . . Lands in strategic places that are still cheap can be bought with the local government budget. Land is an asset that can be sold to developers interested in building low-cost housing. In the past, during the tenure of Ali Sadikin, Pemda DKI bought lands in strategic places in Jakarta but this is not being done any more. Local government should not be afraid to invest in land, because it has to fulfill the needs of *rakyat*.[96]

Such suggestions have been repeatedly made by Monoarfa, an indication that it is difficult to make *pemda* take *perumahan rakyat* seriously.[97] At the time when the city is marketing its land for prestigious projects, such as office buildings, condominiums, hotels, and new towns, as well as converting its remaining land to green spaces, a project involving *perumahan rakyat* reminds the city only of its lack of land. It also raises a series of questions that always haunt governors: Who owns Jakarta? How many people can the city accommodate? What kind of people does the city want? Should *perumahan rakyat* be located in the city, in the periurban, or on the outskirts of the city? Should it just be the responsibility of other regions?

When Monoarfa became minister of housing in 2009, he already knew that it would be quite impossible for Jakarta to find land for low-cost housing. Prior to his appointment, a major attempt had already been made to build low-cost apartments in Jakarta, but the project, known as the 1,000 towers, ended in failure. In this part of the chapter I provide an account of this doomed project, as it is relevant for understanding the challenges Jakarta faces in responding to the pro-poor housing initiative.

In August 2006, the outspoken vice president Jusuf Kalla put forward his populist Pro-Rakyat low-cost housing project known as the 1,000 towers for the low-income population in Indonesia, which according to Kalla, then numbered

2 million.[98] His 1,000 towers project was also meant "to eliminate the image of a poor city."[99] "Today," Kalla announced, "the image of poverty in Indonesia is not coming from the hinterland of Mount Kidul. Instead the symbol of Indonesian poverty comes from the shanty towns along the Ciliwung River [of Jakarta]."[100] The mention of Ciliwung River shows the attention of the vice president to the image problem of Jakarta, and he further stated that 50 percent of the 1,000 low-cost tower apartments should be located in Jakarta and its surrounding areas. The government would allocate 50 trillion rupiah ($5 billion) for the project.[101] Kalla expected that the 1,000 towers project would bring the urban poor out of their slum-like environment and enable them to live not far from Jakarta, because the towers would be located in the city. With towers in the city, the vice president was hopeful that there will be a reduction in commuting traffic.[102] Many commuters are workers who cannot afford to live in Jakarta, so if there were affordable places in the city, they would be among the most likely buyers. Characteristically of Kalla, he announced the project would be fast-tracked. In 2009 alone, Jabodetabek (a contraction of Jakarta-Bogor-Depok-Tangerang-Bekasi) expected to get eighty-seven towers.[103] By 2011, all 1,000 towers were expected to have been built all over Indonesia.

For developers in Jakarta, the call from Kalla was a call that spoke of fortune. The possibility of acquiring land in the city and taking part in a project backed by government subsidies must have seemed too good to be true. With the vice president, known as "Mr. Action," behind the project, developers expected that they could challenge the city government, especially since the then governor Fauzi declared that "Jakarta simply has no space for cheap apartments" in response to Kalla's project.[104] The governor pointed out that the city had only 1 percent of an area of 650 square kilometers that could be used for housing. Be that as it may, in the minds of the developers there were ways to get around this limitation.

In 2008, two years after the 1,000 towers agenda was launched, almost all the major developers had put in applications to build low-cost towers, known then as *rusunami* (a contraction of *rumah susun sederhana milik,* low-cost government subsidized ownership apartments). For the first time in the history of Indonesian housing, *perumahan rakyat* became a major enterprise for big private developers in Jakarta. The then minister of housing Asy'ari was very pleased to see the participation of "major developers such as Agung Podomoro Group, Moderland Realty, and Bakrieland."[105] So popular was the project that *Properti Review,* a real estate magazine, called the phenomenon the "Rakyat Apartment Boom," especially after the "Kings of Property" arrived.[106] The media attributed the popularity of the 1,000 towers project to the generous government subsidy

for the project. In 2008, the government provided 800 billion rupiah ($80 million) to subsidize the project, but in 2009 the financial support had jumped to 2.3 trillion rupiah ($230 million).[107] Vice president Kalla even promised 10 trillion rupiah ($1 billion) to support the project.[108] Subsidies were a major attraction, but the opportunity to build in a city with such a scarcity of land was probably the main driving force behind the developers' interest. Developers took advantage of their partnership with the government institutions that owned land in the city.[109] PT Bakrieland development, for instance, formed a partnership with Perumnas (a contraction of Perumahan Nasional), a state-owned housing company, in order to gain access to its forty hectares of land in East Jakarta.[110]

While developers promoted their *rusunami* in the language of pro-*rakyat,* patriotism, and corporate responsibility, it has become clear that, at least in Jakarta, the 1,000 towers project was a vehicle for private developers to acquire the remaining "unused" or informally registered state land in the city. Moreover, it has also become clear that *rusunami* in the city are often too expensive for the modest- to low-income population. Buyers from the upper-middle income bracket were also invited to purchase apartments. The exterior design of the towers may disguise the basic purpose of the developers, but their interiors are designed to attract the upper middle class who are seeking an apartment in the city. An impression from a visitor to the showroom of Kalibata Residence (one of the *rusunami* built by Agung Podomoro Group), for instance, revealed the developers' trick: "the model and the interior of one of the show units made my heart race. The design is classy. To access the tower one needs an access card. The complex is supported by shopping and fitness centers. They are facilities provided by the developer for the security and comfort of the occupants."[111] Furthermore, there are plenty of parking spaces for cars and "if one looks at the location, it becomes clear that the tower is a strategic place for investment."[112] Firdaus Turmudji, a member of the city council, has also observed that the developers took advantage of the state subsidies and properties to build middle-class condominiums instead of low-cost apartments. Turmudji points out that "permission was given to build subsidized apartments for the low-income population, but in reality only a few units were made available for such purpose. The rest are luxurious apartments."[113]

By the middle of 2009, it had become clear that in Jakarta the 1,000 towers project had missed its target. *Kompas,* a national newspaper, reported in May 2009 that "forty thousand *rusunami* units have been sold, but subsidized credits have only been given to two thousand units."[114] The small number of credit buyers indicates that, as property analyst Panangian Simanungkalit pointed out,

"most of the consumers are well off as they paid cash."[115] Ministry of Housing official Zulfi Syarif also acknowledged that "ownership of *rusunami* is dominated by the upper middle class."[116] Syarif conceded that the failure lay in the fact that the government focused only on the supply of *rusunami,* and it did not control the demand side. As a result, the project failed to achieve its stated objective.

Less than three years after it was initiated, the 1,000 towers project had fallen apart, primarily because it was not supported by any sustained funding scheme and because of the lax enforcement of the requirements that were intended to determine which developers should receive the government subsidy.[117] By 2009, the 1,000 towers project had slowed down and had come to halt in 2010 when the subsidy from the government was halted for reasons that are not entirely clear (figure 7.2).

The failure of the 1,000 towers project contributed to the demise of government subsidies for housing. What we also learn from the case of the 1000 towers is that developers are continuing to take advantage of government programs, especially ones that concern land acquisition. Developers argued that the failure of subsidy scheme has prompted them to broaden the market of *rusunami* to include members of the upper middle class who are looking for apartments in the city.[118] The developers made no effort to disguise the fact that they were making plans for the day when they could find a reason to abandon their commitment to *perumahan rakyat*.[119] In retrospect, we could say that the developers anticipated the failure of the 1,000 towers project and actually prepared an exit plan that contributed to its demise. Developers in Jakarta designed the supposedly low-cost apartments for a middle-class lifestyle, thinking that, at the right moment, the *rusunami* could be easily converted into upper-middle-class apartments.[120]

The 1,000 towers project was superseded by yet another program, FLPP, which, as I discussed in the previous section, is centered on financing demand instead of supply. Yet, no matter how innovative FLPP might turn out to be in Jakarta, it would still have to confront the issues of space, location, and the political geography of the capital city, which has increasingly become an exclusive environment for its upper-middle-class residents. As Jakarta has less and less space for irregular settlements, the city has evolved into one where the center is increasingly dominated by "superblocks," exclusively occupied by the elites and the upper middle class who have "returned to the city."[121] Connected to the center is the periurban with its own clusters of upper-middle-class new towns, and, as I discuss in the next section, farther out, at the interface between the periurban and the rural areas, are the spaces occupied by new migrants and victims of eviction from the city, ironically as a result of supposedly pro-*rakyat* housing programs.



Figure 7.2. Kemanggisan Residence, one of the unfinished 1,000 towers. Photo: Courtesy of Suryono Herlambang.

Too Far to Live

As pointed out above, the new minister of housing Monoarfa has often been frustrated by the reluctance of the Jakarta City Government to collaborate on the project of housing the poor. He has even warned that "matters concerning housing are now the responsibility of the region, as this has been arranged in our constitution (*undang-undang*). If there is a governor who doesn't pay attention to housing, then one should question his or her commitment to his or her own *rakyat*."[122] Invoking the *rakyat* to remind local government of its responsibilities shows that the term continues to carry weight even though it has

often been used and abused for interests that have nothing to do with the *rakyat*. The term nevertheless still connotes legitimacy, leadership, and the moral community.[123] The central government is now giving the city and its residents the mandate of taking care of *rakyat*—a task that was previously assigned to the nation-state.

While the reality of the *rakyat* has often been neglected by the ruling elites, it cannot be totally ignored. Governor Fauzi knew this perfectly well. He was quick to point out that even though there was no space available in the city for cheap apartments (especially after the occupation of the remaining lands by the 1,000 towers project), his administration was committed to serving the *rakyat*'s need for housing. His administration, he emphasized, had built some low-cost rental apartments (*rusunawa* [a contraction of *rumah susun sewa*]). In a country seeking to install a regime of property ownership, building rental apartments for the low-income population indeed shows a commitment to serve the *rakyat,* even though the number is still far below the target, since the city government is capable of providing only a thousand units per year, far below the target of 70,000 units.[124]

The problem, however, is not the limited supply but the extremely low demand. The occupancy rate of the units that are available is very low. *Koran Jakarta* reported in 2010 that Jakarta had 5,600 units or fifty-six rental towers in thirteen locations, but three thousand units or thirty towers were empty, even though the rent was low, "between 120 to 350 thousand rupiah [$12–$35] per month."[125] *Rusunawa* have not reached the majority of low-income population. The reasons are multiple, ranging from the fact that the poor are simply too poor to pay even such low rents, to building maintenance problems, and, most importantly, the towers being too far from the city, where accessing public transport remains a problem.

Teguh Satria, a council member of REI, has observed that "the challenge of *rusunawa* is location."[126] In Satria's opinion, locations closer to the city would be favorable but, as Fauzi pointed out, there is simply no space available for cheap apartments, let alone providing land for low-cost rental apartments. There are also reports of abuse by officials in charge of *rusunawa* who are making money by renting only to those who can pay more. Aside from the problems of poor infrastructure and bureaucratic corruption, there is also a requirement that further limits the accessibility of *rusunawa*. Agus Subardiono, head of the Housing and Building Department of the city government, indicated that "it is not easy for people to get a *rusunawa*. There is a selection process. Priority is given to residents who have been evicted from Jakarta's riverside and beneath

the toll road. Only the low-income population is accepted and they have to have a Jakarta resident ID."[127] *Rusunawa,* which are supposed to accommodate the poorest, contain their own structure of exclusion. And, in the context of Jakarta's own agenda to minimize the number of commuters and to curb population growth, *rusunawa,* located as they are at the periphery, serve to define the limits of the city.

Limited space has certainly exacerbated the difficulties of accommodating the urban poor in Jakarta, but the strategic plan to limit Jakarta's inner city population has added to that problem. As Margani Mustar, a Population and Settlement official in the city government, has pointed out, "Population control is a priority of the Jakarta administration."[128] Mustar added that his office has been kept busy with controlling the rate of population increase. Since the end of 2010, the OYK and the transmigration and family planning programs have been carried out simultaneously in the five administrative territories of Jakarta. The OYK especially targets "densely populated settlements, rented houses (*rumah kos*), low-cost apartment buildings, and employment agencies . . . to look for those who don't have ID, have no permanent residence, and are unemployed."[129] These indigents are sent to "the city's social work department and after rehabilitation [are] sent back to their home town."[130]

Given the Jakarta administration's focus on reducing its marginalized population, it is perhaps too much to expect that the city will house them. What the municipality has done is to build *rusunawa* on the outskirts hoping that the surrounding periurban would help absorb the surplus population evicted from the urban center. Both *rusunawa* and the OYK are therefore projects that bring together society and space in defining, along class lines, the center and the margins of Jakarta. They raise the question of where *perumahan rakyat* should be located in a city where the devolution of power from the nation to the city continues to perpetuate spatial division, social inequality, and poverty.

If historical considerations and comments on the present produce only a gloomy narrative of continuity, and the revolution in the financing of pro-poor housing is after all a movement that continues to deny the poor the right to live in Jakarta, what is left to imagine for the future of the city? If the progress of Jakarta necessarily involves evictions of the poor, it is not difficult to imagine what the future of Jakarta will look like. In the following section, I discuss an end-of-history book by Zaenuddin H. M., a senior journalist and a writer, that projects a "desirable" future by setting Jakarta in some era to come. This book does not, however, describe *how* the transition from the actual to the utopian will be made. What I have discussed in the first three parts of this chapter can be seen as providing a context for Zaenuddin's work.

Utopia?

The Chosen Population

In 2008, the year when major developers (in collaboration with state enterprises) acquired the last pieces of available urban land for the 1,000 towers project, Zaenuddin published a futuristic book titled *Jakarta 500 Years: Obsessions and Hopes of Jakarta in the Year 2027*. In it he writes,

> In 2027, Jakarta will be occupied only by a "chosen population" (*orang-orang terpilih*). . . . Jakarta will no longer be attractive to migrants who flock into the city [from the villages] after Ramadhan. People will think twice about coming to the city because screening will be harsh, so that population growth can be controlled. The selection of the Jakarta population is accompanied by the strict policy of the Jakarta city government towards newcomers. Those who come without skill or capital but only by means of blind determination (*nekat*) will be restricted by regulations. They will be arrested and deported back to their home town.[131]

Zaenuddin wrote his book as a "Betawi who is also a resident of Jakarta." He hopes that it will be useful for readers, "especially policy makers who care about the future of Jakarta."[132] The book can be read as a satirical warning, but it can also be seen as a projection of a desirable future currently under construction. It has been difficult to gauge how the book was received, but the then governor Fauzi responded by endorsing the book. The governor was hopeful that "the book will bring the government and people of Jakarta together in responding to the challenges and problems the city is facing by making use of every potential and opportunity that have come to the city."[133] This brave and unsettling book about the future, however, is unambiguously written from the perspective of the present. In 2027 (when Jakarta will celebrate its 500th birthday), "the urban poor [such as *gepeng* (beggars and vagrants)] will have no place in a city populated only by the 'chosen people.' "[134] Jakarta will not tolerate people without skills, and it will only welcome those who can participate in and contribute to a city filled with "international business."[135] Given the discourses on housing and the likely scenario of the dislocation of the informal discussed in the earlier sections, Zaenuddin's prediction is not baseless, nor is it an illusion. Written as part of the government's "Visit Indonesia Year 2008" promotion, the book registers the idea that future aspirations are as important as the present realities, if not more so. *Jakarta 500 Years* deals with today's dreams and nightmares. It covers topics (as listed in the table of contents) such as "Jakarta, Green Garden," "Jam-Free Traffic," "Goodbye Flooding," "The Chosen

People," "Get Out, Gepeng," "Demography," "Welcome Business City," "Global Restaurant," "Silaturrahmi Jazz," "Memories of Old City," and finally "Back to Religion," as if to thank the Creator, for after all, "God is above everything."

Such diverse topics do not conceal the fact that three chapters of the book are about the problem of Jakarta's population. As a result of the 2010–2030 Jakarta spatial plan, Zainuddin envisioned that by 2027 "twelve million people will have been formally registered . . . everyone has an ID, an address, and a profession."[136] As a result of this transformation, there will be no "informal" people remaining in the capital, none of the poor residents who previously lived in unpredictable conditions, dependent on uncertain livelihoods.

Zaenuddin's work is based on the contemporary challenges facing Jakarta and its aspiration to be a transformed society, one that is based on the eradication of *kawasan kumuh,* regularization of land, and the control of population growth. His future Jakarta is also predicated on the periurban absorbing a large share of the population evicted voluntarily or by force from their informal spaces and livelihoods in the city. This area is outside the scope of Zainuddin's utopianism, even though it is expected to absorb the problems that Jakarta seeks to externalize. From the spaces outside the city, Zainuddin expects the outcasts to no longer see Jakarta as a space of hope.

The Future Urban Form

Toward the end of 2010, *Koran Jakarta* reported that "in the past two decades, Bekasi, Depok, Tangerang, and Bogor (Bodetabek) have been the places for the development of *rumah sejahtera* (decent housing for the poor), but today this region has been filled with upper-middle-class residents."[137] The vice chairman of REI, Muhammad Nawir, observed that "the land price in Bodetabek has become expensive. It is no longer possible to build *rumah sejahtera* there that cost less than 60 million rupiah [$6,000] per unit."[138] Prompted by the increase in land prices in the periurban, the state housing developer, Perumnas, which pioneered low-cost housing in the periurban in the 1970s, has also turned to the more lucrative business of middle-class housing projects. Where have the low-income housing projects gone? Teddy Robinson Siahaan, the director of marketing for Perumnas, provided an answer to this question: "They have gone farther and farther away, now they are located in Karawang, Cikopo and, on a smaller scale, Cikarang."[139] This is a further indication that the target consumers for such housing projects are not workers in Jakarta. Instead the houses will be "more for the locals, civil servants, and members of the military and police."[140]

With the decrease in affordable housing in the periurban, where have the evictees, the poor, and the informal workers gone? What can we say about those who have been displaced from the city? There is no straightforward answer to this, but what we have begun to hear are discursive forms of discontent. For instance, in January 2011, *Kompas* reported that the periurban has increasingly seen hot spots of criminal activity: "Crime seems to have been increasing on the borders of Jakarta, Tangerang, and Depok, especially the theft of motorbikes. . . . There are also thefts taking place in informal rental places (*kos* and *kontrakan*)."[141] The reason, according to *Kompas,* was "the weak social ties between people who live in those areas."[142] These are petty crimes, but they are significant, for the targets are the modest- to low-income people who go to work (very likely in Jakarta) by motorbike and, as newcomers, rent places in the periurban. A series of violent incidents in the periurban was also reported, involving attacks by some Islamic mass organizations on religious minorities.[143] We cannot say that there is a connection between the evictions of the urban poor to the fringe of the city and the increased hot spots of crime and violence in the periurban area. There is no evidence that the marginalized populations who have been displaced into the periphery are more likely to be involved in theft and violent acts but, left alone and without social protection, they have become the targets of violent acts. One can imagine a dystopian scenario similar to that indicated by Mike Davis, where membership of hard-line religion will take the place of their disillusionment with the broken promises of both the city and the state.[144]

Whatever the urban form of Jakarta will look like in the future, it seems most likely that it will be a kind of middle-class utopia that seeks to repress all visible evidence of the subordinate population. Here the "chosen people" of Zaenuddin will live in a center harmonized by their collective imagined isolation from the subordinate class and social conflicts. The chosen twelve million cosmopolitan elites in Jakarta will be joined by another "chosen population" living in the clusters of gated new towns in the periurban, which will include more and more exclusive housing complexes.[145] Surrounding them will be perhaps clusters of interstitial zones, part urban and part rural, where life will be organized increasingly under the influence of Sharia law. Cutting across these different layers of space will be the vagrants, the informal workers, and the poor who will continue to float in and out of the city.[146]

There are certainly members of the subordinated class who persist and manage to stay in Jakarta, thanks in part to the efforts of nongovernmental organizations (NGOs). The urban renewal program's eviction of the poor has

indeed been challenged by pro-poor activism from NGOs such as Urban Poor Consortium and the Forum of Urban Citizens (Forum Warga Kota Jakarta [FAKTA]).[147] These forces sometimes are successful but have mostly failed to reclaim the urban center for the poor.[148] The NGOs have been at the forefront defending the rights of the urban poor to stay in the city, and they have been involved in mobilizing the resources of the poor so that they can house themselves, but we still do not know for sure what the future holds for the evictees, the poor, and the informal workers. They may continue to "disappear" into the various spatial interfaces they can find in both the city and the periurban, creating their own centers at the margin of urban spaces. Some, if not most, however may give up the city's promises of modernity, its wheel of fortune, and its claim to be a "city for all," and join hard-line mass organizations that are pressing for a different foundation for the urban future. This scenario could lead to a geography of dystopia that would pose an uncertain future for the city (figure 7.3).

There is a good deal to be gloomy about. Jakartans may not currently think much of policy and politics for they have come to realize that in a place like Jakarta, new policy rapidly becomes obsolete, and the future will pretty much look like the present and the past. Yet, while today may look like the past, it has more possibilities. The future may be very different though by no means neces-



Figure 7.3. "Shall we have a bet on whether the new governor can change our fate or not?!" Source: *Berita Kota*, 5 August 2007.

sarily better. Whatever the future may be like, Jakartans today acknowledge the stark reality that the low-income population is being displaced farther and farther away from the city. What this chapter has tried to show is that this displacement has carried out in the name of *perumahan rakyat*. As the term *perumahan rakyat* continues to be invoked by the center for its own renewal, it risks betraying the *rakyat* one more time.

Epilogue

Turning Time: An Interview

Temporal Coordination

Etienne Turpin: Your work is based on a coordination of time and space that serves as a framework for your analysis of Jakarta. Could you tell us something about how you read this coordination?

Abidin Kusno: While every aspect of our activities is largely governed by time, we are in many ways constructing time as well, for time is a social and political construct. We invest time with narrative, which gives meaning to our life. The state also invests time with a narrative that gives life to the nation. The state therefore always seeks to control time. The whole ideology of development during Suharto's era (1966–1998), for instance, is based on a temporal assumption drawn from modernization theory. There were series of five-year plans of development that would eventually lead Indonesia to *lepas landas* (take off) like an airplane. *Lepas* means free: free from poverty, among others, so as to achieve the national goal of "a society that is just and prosperous." To arrive at the platform for takeoff, the whole society would have to follow the order of the state as development needs political stability, or so the story goes. The whole nation here is given a homogenous time occupied by an idea of development.

As a member of a generation who grew up in the time of Suharto, I was given the idea (via school and media) that we were moving upward as long as we followed the order of the state. Yet, it was also unavoidable that we saw things that contradicted the linear time of development. I moved to Jakarta in the late 1980s, and anyone who was in the city at that time witnessed not only progress but also contradictions. This was the time of the construction boom.

Capital accumulation and authoritarianism came hand in hand moving forward frantically in the form of city-building to outpace the growth of *kampung* settlements. This is an example of the contradiction of the time of development. I have since then sought to understand such contradictory expressions in the city, and an analysis of space offers such an opportunity. Unlike time, space cannot be fully controlled. Space reveals the contradiction of development time. There seems to be a gap between time and space. This is the gap that the state has sought to deny by seeing it as a transitional phenomenon. Yet such a gap never seems to go away. I became interested in seeing how such a gap shapes the subjectivity of people who are living there. How did the state, the professionals, and the citizens respond to the contradiction of development?

ET: How has that ideology of development changed, or how do you see it as having changed, since the Suharto period?

AK: I am not sure if the ideology of development has changed since the end of Suharto. Development has a history longer than the Suharto regime. We could trace the idea back to colonial time. Is there a new construct of time after the end of the Suharto New Order? My work on the post-Suharto era is an attempt to answer this question. What have time and space done to each other after the New Order? This is not just a research question, but also a moral and political question. When we analyze the Suharto era, we assume an "anti-authoritarian" position without much difficulty, but how about today fifteen years into *reformasi*? How should we develop a critical relation to the new time?

Framing the post-Suharto era as a new time opens up many ways to conceive power and construct possibilities. I remember at the beginning of the reform era the keyword was *rakyat* (poor people). Perhaps because of democratization, the notion of *rakyat* suddenly appeared everywhere. *Rakyat* seemed to be the majority at a time when the middle class found themselves in decline as they lost their jobs following the financial crisis. *Rakyat* seems to not only represent the new time, but it survives the New Order. The development ideology of Suharto was supposed to emancipate them, but after more than thirty years *rakyat* still remains poor and marginal. Perhaps the emergence of *"rakyat"* in the post-Suharto era represents the failure of developmentalist ideology. This has led me to consider how *rakyat* was situated in the developmentalist time of Suharto. Did they stay outside the hegemonic time of development?

The post-Suharto era makes us rethink the Suharto era. Yet Suharto's time is inseparable from what came before it. I began to feel that there were at least three interrelated temporalities that we have to recognize to grasp the present.

The first one is the *longue durée* (from Fernand Braudel) of colonial history. This produced Batavia/Jakarta and connected the city to global commodity supply chains and the international division of labor since the time of VOC.[1] In this long time frame, the developmentalist time of Suharto and its contemporary incarnation is just part of the longer history of capitalism. The second temporality is the developmentalist time of Suharto that developed out of the "revolution" against communism and Sukarno's time. It is still an influence haunting people who want to leave behind Suharto's time. The ghost of the Suharto New Order continues to exert power. The *kampung* is still considered by the state as the other "transitional" space that will be transformed or formalized. Communism is still a negative reference. The perception is still there that all Chinese are rich and can be squeezed for money. In other words, whole categories constructed as the New Order's internal other are still working to define national identity. The time of Suharto continues into the reform era. The third temporality refers to the time of *rakyat,* which continues to exist as the other within development time. The *rakyat,* the kampong, and the informal land market occupy a central place at the margin of the capital and the state. The production of space in the post-Suharto era needs to be set against these three interrelated temporalities.

The Autonomous *Rakyat*

ET: Let's discuss the third temporality. Is this time of *rakyat* a time of informality? Is it included in the other two times or is it produced by them? Or does it produce itself? This is really a question of how autonomous the informal time is, a distinction made by AbdouMaliq Simone, who suggests that the informal is extremely autonomous.[2]

AK: Maliq used to work for international development agencies and knew very well the limit of a developmentalist paradigm, which assumes the poor need guidance in order to develop. He is interested in the idea of the irreducibility of the human subject. His work puts an emphasis on the agency of the urban poor who are irreducible to the homogenizing onslaught of the developmentalist time. His position, however, is not a romantic one. There are images of violence and vulnerability that accompany the vitality of the urban poor. They are autonomous yet dependent on the contradictory structure of development. This approach is useful as it moves beyond the narrative of victimization yet it shows how the urban poor are always located in a contingent and precarious—but also productive—network that they help establish. In this sense the urban poor do not resist the development time that exploits them (they cannot afford to resist),

but they also make use of the contradictions embedded in development, which needs the cheap labor (power of the informal sector). In the temporality of the informal, the *rakyat* is simultaneously within and outside the time of capitalist development. While the agency of the poor is an important subject, I am more interested in looking at how the elites and the government legitimized their power after the downfall of Suharto, specifically through the category of *rakyat,* which has become popular.

ET: The elites may imagine the poor in a singular term, but as you pointed out there are hierarchies within the category of the poor. The card-carrying poor of Jakarta (Jakarta residents) have more social capital than the migrants who do not have Jakarta's ID, and the latter can be exploited by the former.

AK: Yes, the government can exclude those who are not Jakarta residents from its system of governance.[3] One could say that the migrants with no ID have a broader sphere of autonomy because they escape from regulation (as well as benefits), but they are also very vulnerable and easily exploited and criminalized, not least by the residents of Jakarta who are equally poor. I suspect, although I don't have the data, that a large number of workers in Jakarta today are those who do not have a Jakarta ID. One could assume that many of them used to work in the periurban factories and took up residency there, but the disappearance of secure jobs in the manufacturing sector has forced them to turn to the city and work in the informal sector. In any case, the post-Suharto Jakarta is marked by the proliferation of both non-card-carrying workers and poor residents of Jakarta. They are the *rakyat*. They have become more visible in post-Suharto Jakarta and yet they are denied their right to live in the city. One area of my research concerns the responses of the elites, ranging from the government and business groups to the middle class and the professionals (such as architects and urban designers) to the appearance of *rakyat* in the city. The emergence of populist politics today can be connected to the appearance of *rakyat*.

Informality

ET: The NGOs, too, must have responded to the appearance of *rakyat* who (re)turned to Jakarta to survive the impact of the financial crisis. Back then, you participated in a workshop organized by the Urban Poor Consortium (UPC) to conceptualize the idea of informality.[4] How was it analyzed then?

AK: That was a time when Jakarta was still heavily affected by the influx of people from the periurban areas who lost their jobs due to the closing or scaling

down of factories there.[5] Sutiyoso (1997–2007) aggressively tried to stop them from coming in by evicting irregular *kampungs*. We were wondering if informality—the condition of living marginally in the city—would create an identity for the urban poor, which in turn would shape their struggle for their right to live and work in the city. We were also wondering how this informality could be understood intellectually, morally, and politically. Were they victims? Were they collaborators with capital? Were they leading autonomous existences? Little did we realize that we were also trying to give the post-Suharto period a name. Can it be called the era of *rakyat* and the time of informality?

ET: To name this kind of temporality?

AK: There was a feeling that the workshop was an inquiry into a possibility of producing a collective identity for the urban poor to stage their struggles. The term "informal" could then be understood as a political construct, just like the idea of the autonomous subject.

I think we tried to show first, the positive contribution of the informal sector to the economic life of the city, and second, that the informal is not a transitional feature. Instead it is a permanent feature of our city. Such a formulation is intended to register the idea that the informal has the right to stay in the city. This politics of value contains a temporal dimension because it requires patience to trace and show how the economic network of the poor is not only autonomous and self-referential but also relational and tied to the formal social and economic life of the city. The weakness of this formulation is that it suggests that the government could just sit back letting the poor help themselves with their own network.

ET: Mike Davis said this about the UN and its concern for housing when he considered the valorization of the slums: "Look how they work so well. They are so great. We don't need to build housing. Look at their ingenuity."[6]

AK: Yes, we can say that he problematizes the idea of community resilience and the UN's self-help assessment because it frees the government from responsibility. The neoliberals easily appropriate the idea to further the agenda of liberating the state from the responsibility of taking care of the poor. The state can say that the survival of the poor is the poor's own responsibility, and it is all about them coming up with their own setting and their own network to survive. The state may give them a reward by acknowledging their "autonomy," but that does not mean that they won't be evicted.

ET: In the end it's up to you. You decide whether or not you will survive?

AK: We should note that while the neoliberal idea is quite influential in Indonesia, the state is still aware that it cannot leave the poor alone because the poor *rakyat* embodies the moral economy of the Indonesian state. There are thus always programs to manage the *rakyat* either by transmigrating them to the outer islands, or "allowing" them to survive in the city through the provision of an informal land market. It is important for the state to domesticate the notion of *rakyat* by showing care through programs even though such programs often privilege only one section of *rakyat*. For example, in the case of housing for *rakyat* in Jakarta, the target groups are those who have IDs and ideally those with stable incomes to qualify for state subsidies. While the programs may look inclusive, often the requirements discourage the others from participating.

The state, too, cannot always use violence to evict people, especially today. The method of relocating the poor seems to have become more subtle by way of land certification (see chapter 7). As the affordable informal land market disappears through land titling, there will be less and less people living in the city.

Cosmopolitanism

ET: Could the scenario that Mike Davis suggests, that is the rise of fundamentalism, take place in Jakarta?

AK: It is possible that the moment will come when the urban poor start to feel that they are not being taken care of, that they are outside, and once they are outside they could create a different meaning or alternative world view for themselves. When the urban poor begin to feel that they are not connected to the ideology of development, when they say, "We won't be able to move up, no matter how hard we try," then they will search for a new value, or new ideology. Davis makes it very clear that an extreme version of religious beliefs may come in as this new value.[7] We are not sure whether this could ever happen in Jakarta as it seems to me the ideology of development, or at least the dream of becoming urban middle class and the image of a "wheel of fortune" is still alive. While nationalist ideology may no longer sell in Jakarta, the city is still perceived as the space of opportunities where what you need is not committed ideologies or values, but creativity and networks that demand a form of cosmopolitanism. This attitude may continue to prevent Jakarta from moving toward religious fundamentalism.

ET: Is there still a significant residue of the promise of development from Suharto-time?

AK: It is an afterlife of Suharto's promise of development as the promise is now generated more by the market than by the state. The capital city continues to be promoted as the site of modernity. Thanks to capitalist modernization the city encourages you to be secular, rather than continuing with your rural ideals and religion. Jakarta is still a symbol of modernity, national development, and the site for identity transformation; it is a site to take refuge in from traditionalism. To become urban is to become a supralocal cosmopolitan Indonesian subject.[8] In some way that prevents religious fundamentalism from getting hold of Jakarta. If you look at the geography of Jakarta, the impact of religion is widespread only in the periurban areas, but not so much in the city. So that counters Davis' idea; it is probably the power of the urban cityness that prevents religious fundamentalism from replacing the ideology of modernity.

ET: Jakarta also has a lot of "modernization," at least relatively, compared to what Davis cites as examples, cities like Kinshasa and other extremely impoverished cities with massive slums. As much as the *kampung* fabric is wound through Jakarta, there is, relatively speaking, far more development and potential. Even if you cannot move up in obvious ways, there are a lot of ways to try. There is a lot of capital concentrated in the city.

AK: Right. Even though we talk about the superblock excluding the poor, it is not entirely true. If we look at the staffs, the shopkeepers, and the service workers who work in the shopping mall, we will see that they are from the lower-middle class. There are also a lot of women working there too. Of course they could be seen as being exploited with low salaries and long hours of work without proper housing accommodation, but there are still more opportunities there than in the countryside. In some ways, this prevents hard-line religious or traditional communities from taking over the city.

Meredith Miller: I am wondering how that complicates the idea of the autonomy of the urban poor. When you consider it spatially—in the sense that there may not be enough of a concentration of *kampungs* to cultivate a religious fundamentalism, but really *kampungs* are strung throughout the city, coexisting with and sometimes relying on the superblocks for jobs—is that a kind of spatial difference as well as a social one?

AK: You are right. The idea that Jakarta is a divided city consisting of *kota* (town) and *kampung* (urban village)—the dual city—fails to capture their intertwined sociality and overlapping territories. Also, the idea of autonomy is not a very satisfactory concept to understand the work of *kampung* in Jakarta. So far the superdevelopment of Jakarta is still sustained by the surrounding *kam-*

pung even though there are less and less opportunities for workers to live in the city due to the shrinking of *kampung* areas and the expansion of land certification.

So how do we account for the idea of autonomy of the urban poor when *kampung–kota* interaction has been quite intensive? I think it may be more productive to think of the idea of autonomy of the urban poor contextually. The autonomy of the *kampung* (in the form of informal land markets) can be a construct of the state and capital for capital accumulation, but as I have written elsewhere, that autonomy can also be taken away (via land certification) (see chapter 7).

Historically, before the emergence of hiring agencies, the *kampung* was the first site for migrants to become urban subjects. They were socialized, learned how to survive, and became connected to the urban networks of all kinds. The issue here is that many of these *kampung* are either disappearing because of new mega projects or in the process of formalization via land titling. While the urban form of Jakarta may still give an impression of a big *kampung*, it has become more and more difficult and expensive to live in the existing *kampung*, and workers are increasingly finding themselves living farther and farther away from the city where they work. This displacement has contributed to ending an era when the *kampung* served as a space of urban pedagogy.

The displacement of workers to the periurban may shape the way that workers think about themselves. Am I still an urban subject when I could not even find an affordable place to live in the city where I work? When the workers who serve the city are finding themselves living farther and farther away from the city, this is the beginning of the end of cityness. Migrants will see only less and less opportunity to live in the city even if they are still able to work there. This could lead to a feeling of exclusion and worsen the sense of anti-urban among the marginal who have no alternative but to stay in the periurban.

The Periurban

ET: Do you think an anti-urban morality could emerge in the periurban? Could you say more about the politics of morality in the periurban?

AK: First of all, the moral economy of the Indonesian state is to bring justice and prosperity to society. The Agrarian Law of 1960, for instance, embodies such morality as it states that while an individual can own land, it is the state that controls it. The existence of, and to a certain degree persistence of, informal land markets, could be seen as an in-kind contribution of the state to the urban poor so that they can live and work in the city. However, this approach is being

challenged today as the state is becoming more committed to the World Bank's idea of land certification in Jakarta to further expand the formal land market, an idea that could be traced back to that of Hernando de Soto. This move will eventually eliminate informal land markets and make living in the city impossible for the poor. We can say that the dissolution of the informal land market means the disappearance of the state's moral economy.

Meanwhile the disillusionment with the promise of development that was once institutionalized under Suharto, alongside the process of democratization and politics of decentralization, have opened up all kinds of possibilities for different values to develop. Some of them are progressive, but a lot of them are extremely conservative. So this is the moment of openness that we are now trying to grapple with: the looseness in the center has opened up a space for new investment in ideologies and contestations over values and world views. Space is implicated in this kind of struggle.

We only have to remember when Jakarta had its first election for the position of governor in 2007, the Islamic political party (Partai Keadilan Sejahtera [PKS]) was actually thinking about controlling Jakarta. They had their own candidate, and if that candidate was successful, it is not entirely impossible that the Islamic party would be very influential in the city. All of the other political parties, suddenly realizing how dangerous it would be if the Islamic party had a successful candidate, or if the governor of Jakarta was someone who was very pro-Islam, all supported Fauzi Bowo. Fauzi Bowo is someone who is quite secular and open to multiculturalism, and his election victory shows that the majority of people in Jakarta want to keep the city secular and cosmopolitan. PKS failed to take over Jakarta because the city is too secular and too cosmopolitan for any religion to take over. However, PKS was quite successful in winning elections in the surrounding periurban regions of Jakarta.

ET: PKS moved out to the surrounding areas of Jakarta?

AK: Yes, as PKS moved into Depok, alcohol disappeared from stores. At a conference at Universitas Indonesia that I attended, we had difficulty finding beer. Our international friends were better prepared. They brought beer from their countries. One brought whiskey and put it in an empty water bottle [laughter].

ET: Do you think the voluntary relocation of workers to the periurban subjects them to fundamentalism and extremism?

AK: I do not know for sure, but hypothetically speaking, as mentioned earlier, those who were displaced to the periurban may feel that the "cityness" of Ja-

karta is not for them. Instead the city is only for the upper-middle class. That is why I thought we should criticize the massive land acquisition for superblocks and the unavailability of affordable housing for the poor and low-income workers in the city. We should problematize the World Bank's "formalization of the informal land market" by way of land titling because I think that such practices will only create more landlords and strengthen the hegemony of homeownership. All the land will just end up in the hands of the rich and rental costs will go up. We should ask ourselves the questions: What is going to happen if there is no space for the urban poor to live in the city? What is going to happen if we continue to displace the urban poor to the periurban areas? We imagine a dystopian scenario that marginal workers who are displaced to the periurban could be subjected to an anti-urban politics of morality.

MM: If you are talking here about eliminating that boundary and inviting the periphery in, or inviting the urban poor back into the city as a way of breaking up that type of morality, could we also ask about creating other kinds of centers outside of Jakarta? Could the periurban be made more cosmopolitan?

AK: It would not be fair to say that the periurban areas are less cosmopolitan and underdeveloped. They have new towns with first class facilities. They have people from different ethnic, religious, and regional backgrounds. They have been absorbing more and more people from Jakarta and other rural areas, and they are trying to become a center of a certain kind. However decentralization in each of the regions around Jakarta has made people interested in capitalizing on difference—that we are different from Jakarta, that we have our own cultures and values, etc. Religion and ethnicity have become a major source for the construction of identity. Whether the periurban can become more cosmopolitan depends on how the region defines itself. Of course we hope that they would create a form of "cityness" that is more inclusive and progressive than Jakarta. But so far, looking at the emerging politics of morality and the "gated" new towns built by developers from Jakarta for people from Jakarta in the periurban, it would be a challenging task to make the periurban more cosmopolitan.

ET: Pushing out the urban poor also connects to the discourse of green governmentality that you have analyzed (see chapter 6). In fact, there are so many things pressurizing these displacements: property value, real estate investment, N11, and investments by Goldman Sachs and Price Waterhouse Cooper. So the pressures on the city to exclude the urban poor are quite severe.

AK: Investment in financial capital is different from investment in the manufacturing sector. Factories need cheap labor to keep their enterprises going. In

this sense, enterprises would welcome the informal sector so that the cost of labor can be kept low. Running an office for financial capital does not require a pool of cheap laborers. What is needed is technology and communication. It needs a Central Business District (CBD) sustained by high-tech infrastructure and populated by well-paid financiers and managers. This group prefers a quality of environment that brings us to green discourse by demanding a particular norm and form of the city with almost no connection to the informal sector. The interesting thing to consider is how the green discourse lifestyle of Jakarta's middle class intersects with the need in the city to build a first-class infrastructure for financial capitalism. How does this intersection create a new geography for the city?

Wish Image

ET: All six sites that we researched for the first phase of the project are affected by the World Bank's Urgent Flood Mitigation Plan. One thing that we are really interested in is the rhetoric of that plan: that there will be some visionary technological solution that will just make everything work. The German philosopher Walter Benjamin said that if you propose a technological solution for a social problem, what you are proposing is a "wish image." I feel like your statement about the "new" waterfront—how Jakarta is turning back around to face the world—relates to this idea of the wish image. The city had turned away from the coast, and now it is turning back toward the international with new technological solutions.[9]

AK: Yes, the wish image is a good term and a useful concept from Benjamin to show that the line that differentiates speculation from imagination is very thin. The waterfront project that I wrote about could be seen as an example of a wish image (see chapter 5). The urban problems of Jakarta, developed out of earlier wish images, could supposedly be erased or forgotten by creating another wish image at the coast. I was asking a question of whether the coast is the beginning or the end of capitalist development in Jakarta. The waterfront proposes a new gateway to register a new beginning for a new global world of Jakarta. It proposes a "technical solution" to the infrastructural problem of Jakarta. But it is also conceived in an ideological manner where one could see (as in the Nusantara Corridor waterfront project) an unfolding of a "mythical" glorious past from the colonial time to independence to the global era. It is conceived as more than a technical solution to the urban center. There is a narrative of national origin and destiny for what is, after all, a project of capitalist speculation. I sought to problematize all these ideological constructions. At the end of my

story there is an image of inundation and the sinking of the whole world. To me, that is the most likely destiny of the city. That piece is, in some way, an attempt to wake up Jakarta to realize that profit-oriented development and ecology do not always work together.

ET: The gateway too, in a way, is a wish image. These developments are not going to solve any social problems. But do you think that the wish image of Regatta, or these other excessive developments, represent an ideology that still has some effect on the urban poor? Are these forms charged enough that even the poor are willing to believe in them as wish images?

AK: Projects such as Regatta could be seen as wish images of the upper-middle class who seek to transcend the deteriorating city (see chapter 5). The branding of this high-end residential complex incorporates the image of the world. It wants to be an icon of the city, but it is directed to the upper-middle class consumers who are looking for a new wish image. It is not like the city-nation building of the Sukarno era, nor is it a public monument to glorify national achievement. Projects like Regatta show quite bluntly the leadership of the private business sector in bringing Jakarta to the next level of development. It is a private enterprise heavily guarded by the staff from the marketing office. Its selling point is its secured location bordered by the sea in a gated compound within a gated community. On the seawall leading to Regatta are signs such as "don't sit here." Those signs are directed to the lower class who often find their way into the neighborhood because they work there. It is also a common sight however, to see the lower classes ignoring these signs. They go on dates there, occasionally picnic, and even take their pictures with Regatta as the background. How can we understand this kind of practice? Is Regatta a wish image for the lower class who work in the neighborhood?

The wish image of Regatta and its kind are constructed on the basis of distinction—a wish image to consolidate class identity—but such an identity is filled with contradiction. So much of the daily activities of people living in a place like Regatta are sustained by the services provided by the lower-class communities. The gate that restricts the movement of the lower class never quite works, but it works as a wish image as reflected in the project's amazing architectural style. Many of these wish images are being built in Jakarta today.

ET: But the wish is, in a way, also part of the integrity of the city.

AK: That is an interesting proposition, that there is always a kind of wish operating in Jakarta and that the wish integrates the city. The wish image that used

to be produced by the state under "nationalist urbanism" is being produced and reproduced by capital and the citizens. It takes a range of images from those associated with the world city to those of the green environment and the religious city. The nationalist ideology is no longer there to unify perception, and this opens up possibilities for different wishes and new dreams and nightmares. For conservative and religious people, their wish may well be turning Jakarta into a more religious place. But there is also the wish of the cosmopolitan class. There is also the environmentalist and the whole idea of the green city. There are populist politicians. So there are wish images waiting to be represented that have given Jakarta a life based on wishing. The city has a lot of energy and people still want to dream there. What is interesting is whether there is a shared dream that everyone can identify with such as that packaged under nationalist urbanism of the previous era. But perhaps that is less important than the fact that people still have wishes and this possibility of wishing gives Jakarta its "cityness."

ET: How about the wish image of the poor?

AK: In my opinion, it would be the possibility of upward mobility toward becoming urban middle class. The city would need to preserve such a possibility to allow *rakyat* to feel that in some way the city is something that they continue to believe in and it is something that they can be led to believe.[10]

ET: But, what Benjamin says is that to posit a utopian future is necessary to transform the act of wishing into action.

AK: Action, according to Benjamin, stems from waking up from the dreamworld of commodities. The commodities that flooded Paris did not emancipate the poor who dreamed of becoming middle class and who then carried out a revolution. In the Indonesian case, commodities did not reach everyone in the same way and national development did not lead to the emancipation of the poor. Once the construction of wish images was halted by financial crisis, the city exploded not by revolutionary force, but by reactionary acts that targeted Suharto's internal others, such as the urban poor, ethnic Chinese, and women.

However, there is a shift in the mode of governance, which in some ways, has allowed the country to refresh itself. The construction of a sense of new time is helpful and in fact a new time is unfolding even though it continues to be shaped by the past. For example, today Jakarta's city government (instead of the state) is under huge pressure to perform. It has to work with the private sec-

tor to rebuild the city so that it will not just be creating more wish images. It has to take *rakyat* into consideration even though the space of *kampung* and the pro-poor informal land market is shrinking. It has come up with a series of progressive, populist projects: Sutiyoso's busway, Fauzi Bowo's green discourse, and Jokowi's series of pro-poor programs, including his plan to stop the construction of more shopping malls because he believes that commodities and consumerism cannot emancipate people.

ET: It is about a dream that could not be fulfilled by commodities. It is interesting if we go back to what you were saying about Batavia under VOC as being only a place for commodities to pass—a passageway—but never really a place of its own. So, in a way, some critical perspectives toward commodities are a kind of waking up against a city that is modeled, or shaped, by commodity circulation.

AK: Jakarta has been part of the international commodity chain since colonial time. It built Amsterdam, one could say. As such its history is inseparable from the history of capital. But capital didn't come only to exploit; it came with ideologies and wish images. The colonial government started a new kind of uneven development and filled the city with social problems while making it the center of almost everything, including commodities. It has become a center for the production of wish images. The wish images are a product of capital and they also in turn reproduce capital. But this process is not totalizing, for it carries with it cleavages, gaps, and contradictions that allow critical perspectives to come and go.

ET: But the project of wealth accumulation becomes a virus. People take on that ideology through the colonial project. Rudolf Mrazek's book, in a way, is really about this virus; how the Dutch colonial disposition toward modernization is very contagious.[11] It is hard to resist!

AK: Yes, capital accumulation can be taken over by postcolonial subjects. Today, capital also moves around the city by leapfrogging from one profitable area to another, leaving gaps and cleavages in the city. For instance, after exhausting the central part of the city, capital intends to jump over to the northern coast to build a waterfront city. It may come back to the city to take over the rest of *kampung*. But Mrazek also mentions in his book how the Dutch in the early twentieth century always felt that Jakarta was constantly on the move. The city belonged to "the age in motion," though compared to Surakarta, its movement was less threatening to a colonial order.[12] Today we seem to be seeing Jakarta undergoing another step in an age of motion.

Memory

ET: I want to connect this back to the question of memory. Because it is also something that your work has in common with *Engineers of Happy Land,* which begins, as you know, with the Marcel Proust quote about extracting memory from objects.[13] It seems to me that you do this through the city itself. Could you talk about this as a strategy and what it means to "reactivate" memory?

AK: The issue is how to bring space into a dialogue with time so that the memory that is lost to history can be retrieved as a political project. In principle, the built environment (the object in Proust's terms) keeps and releases the memory of people living in it. It often takes the form of ruins (following capital flight) that not only express the wish images of its time, but also represent the effort of shaping society.

ET: Benjamin takes this idea from Proust. I think it is really important; the idea of retrieving certain forms of agency, or of delaminating them, in a sense, from nationalist narratives. I think that is the other revolutionary agenda in *The Appearances of Memory.* If we can see those through the appearance, and the activation of that memory as something that was potentially connected to nationalism, but not *necessarily* connected to nationalism, in the same way as in Benjamin's reading of Paris. . . .

AK: Time cannot always domesticate space, and space, in turn, can haunt time. This makes memory work important, especially when history is colonized by the state. If history has been hijacked by official nationalism, then to rewrite the history of Jakarta is to reactivate memory with the aid of the built environment. And, as indicated earlier, there is the contradiction of the developmentalist time that finds expression in space. These are some ways to make memory a political project.

The Times of *Banjir*

ET: Where does *banjir* [flood] fit in the diagram of space-time relations?

AK: Flood has a temporal dimension because it occurs at certain times, such as during high tide and the raining season. The spatial dimension can be found in words such as *banjir kiriman* (flood caused by the rain from upstream) and *daerah rawan banjir* (flood prone areas that are often associated with *kampung*). It reflects the spatial order of the city. When some parts of the city are flooded, people often ask if the major thoroughfares such as Sudirman Street, or the elite housing areas such as Pondok Indah, or the presidential palace are inun-

dated. The scale of the disaster is measured by whether these elite areas are flooded. It will not be an item of major news if only the *kampung* area was flooded. Flooding happens in Jakarta so often that it has become a common phenomenon and does not seem to warrant a serious response. We can find accounts on *banjir* in early twentieth-century literary and popular representations. It was represented not only as a threat or a fearful disaster that caused misery but also an adventurous and even festive and humorous event. It is very contradictory. There is also a mysterious feeling about *banjir*. Why was one area flooded last year but not this year? *Banjir* comes and goes bringing misery, critical awareness, and fortunes to some people who are making money out of the disaster.

MM: How does *banjir* shape people's behavior?

AK: Historian Restu Gunawan wrote a wonderful book about canals and *banjir* in Jakarta.[14] There is one interesting depiction that when *banjir* comes, all the people escape, and when *banjir* is over, they all come back again. People know that *banjir* will come back but they never seem to forget that it will go away too. There are three types of people: those whose houses are flooded; those whose houses are not flooded but who do a lot of helpful things (without protest) for those who are flooded, such as distributing food and providing shelter. The third type includes those who make money from flooding by overcharging on the services they provide for the victims, such as transporting them to safe areas. So *banjir* produces different types of subjectivities. It would be interesting to see how the World Bank's flood mitigation plan could end *banjir* and eliminate all these subjectivities.

ET: It is also interesting with respect to Bangkok because it is another case where people say, "Well, it happens and we move out of the way, people do different things than they normally do, then the water goes away and we go back to normal time." In a way, it has an almost religious temporality, like a religious calendar. It is like this week you have Mardi Gras, and then you have Ash Wednesday, and then you go into a different kind of time, a theologically-intense time. I think it is interesting that ecologically, up to a certain point, you can have a displacement of normal time that is almost theological. *Banjir* comes, *banjir* goes.

AK: Like a ritual of renewal?

ET: But at a certain point, it becomes more serious, and people say, "Okay, we can't get rid of *banjir*, but we have to mitigate the scale of its effects."

AK: The scale of its effects points to the question: who are the victims? People who live in *kampung* are not only seen as the victims but they are also seen as contributors to *banjir.* They build houses and settlements along the riverbed, which narrows the river over time, and they throw garbage into the river (similar to the dumping of industrial waste by enterprises). So they are thought to be the cause—the perpetrators. As both victim and perpetrator of *banjir,* residents of the *kampung* will be subject to what Foucault would call "regulatory discipline" or "regulatory framework." They become the docile subjects. When there is a flood, the government will come in and give them "everyday needs" like rice. Even the middle class and the rich will donate a lot of money toward their plight. This allows the victims to feel that the state is still protecting them. They also become the subject of disciplinary practices because they are said to be perpetrators too, which gives justification to the state to relocate them. It allows the state to say, "You should be away from the riverbank; it is dangerous and is actually causing flooding in the city." This would open up a space for a "technical solution."

ET: So it allows people to assert that the poor pose a danger to the city?

AK: Yes and no. Yes, because the government and the middle class continue to blame the urban poor. They say, "You narrowed the river, you threw garbage in the river," but there is nothing new in this charge. People are getting tired of it. Today, people know that there are other practices that cause floods, such as the rich building their villas upstream. Upstream is supposed to be the catchment area where the water is held to be moderated before it goes down toward the city, but now the water catchment areas are disappearing to make space for the villas. People in Jakarta are aware that there are multiple causes of *banjir.* There is an increasing awareness that the business elites who built superblocks, new towns, and real estate in the water catchment areas are main contributors to *banjir.* So a new consciousness is emerging: that the elites are contributing to *banjir.* Blame is also being directed to city hall for its incapacity to mitigate floods. The latest *banjir* has really removed the association of *banjir* with the *kampung*, because several rich areas were badly inundated,[15] including Menteng (in the Center), Pluit (in the North), and even Sudirman Street where the government displays its spectacle of economic development. Here *banjir* has created a new spectacle of dystopia.

ET: You cannot blame that scale of *banjir* on the *kampung*! In the public consciousness and in the mass media, who is to blame for the recent flood?

AK: The recent flood coverage is quite comprehensive. It emphasizes the issues of land use violations by developers, the shrinking of water catchment areas, the nar-

rowing of rivers (caused by irregular settlements), the poor maintenance of the embankment, the pump, and the dam. The problem is no longer just the irregular settlements at the riverbank (although this contributes to the narrowing of river), but all sectors (including developers, the government, and the upper-middle class) who lack environmental consciousness. While local factors received attention, translocal forces like climate change have also been represented to the public.

ET: Sure, there is the upstream developments, deforestation, the exponential increase in impervious surfaces in the city . . .

MM: Right, but the collective consciousness is also related to the physical infrastructure itself, such as in the map you showed us where all the floodgates in the city are operating independently. Maybe the cause of *banjir* cannot be traced precisely, but the effects of it, the distribution of the floodwaters, is something that—if you had access to correct information—you would be able to identify with the floodgates' operations and determine why the water is here and not there.

AK: In Jakarta, you have all these rivers coming in, and the whole canal system and all the gates are supposed to channel the flows and control the volume of water that goes through the city. The task is to keep the balance in such a way that certain places will not be fully inundated because you can distribute the flow here and there. And, of course, there are political decisions involved because you have to preserve the Menteng area and you have to keep the presidential palace dry—unless you have no choice, and then you have to open the gates there. So there is human intervention involved, but what is happening now with *banjir* is that even that intervention is no longer enough.

The floodgates control the distribution of flood, but its capacity to control depends on the soundness of other infrastructural elements such as the pumps and the system of embankments. The floodgates are controlled by the Public Works who decides which gates should not be opened until it is absolutely necessary. For instance, during the last flood, President SBY gave permission to open the gate, which caused flooding in the presidential palace. This kind of decision is needed to moderate flooding in other areas. We do not know the system of control, but we know that the areas prone to flood do not follow the contours of the city. While the design of this floodgate system was engineered based on calculations, its operations are inseparable from social and political considerations. It has been like that since it was constructed by Dutch engineer Hans van Breen to make sure that the Menteng neighborhood where Europeans lived

would never be inundated. Not surprisingly, the Manggarai central floodgate located in the south of Menteng has been guarded by police since colonial time.

Again, while the floodgate system can shape the distribution of flood in Jakarta, it can't save Jakarta from flooding. The capacity of the city's water infrastructure to mitigate floods not only depends on a range of other parts of the infrastructure system, but it also faces a major challenge in the continuing development of mega-projects that neglect the ecosystem of the city. The uncoordinated urban renewals and development of mega-projects like superblocks and new towns have overwhelmed the canal system. These projects create for themselves their own system of flood mitigation, such as leveling the ground in such a way so that water would flow out of a property to the surrounding lower areas. The centralized floodgates system is still playing a role in flood distribution but its effectiveness has been compromised by the ad hoc development of the city.

MM: And is the infrastructure management not coordinated at all? Is it completely ad hoc and decentralized?

AK: I think it is fragmented by capital, which advances without the support of a coherent infrastructure. It is common to hear developers seeking ways to maximize gains by requesting that infrastructure be provided by the government. Yet it has never been clear who should take care of what. There is some confusion too between the central and the local government when it comes to infrastructure provision, so in the end Jakarta is left with an ad hoc system of infrastructure management.

MM: Does anyone know about the floodgates and the decision making process?

AK: Interesting question, but I don't know the process.

ET: We need to interview some controllers. We'll give them a bottle of whiskey and get them talking. [Laughs]

AK: I think they would say that better gate management will not help much anymore because all the infrastructures that support the gates are deteriorating. The embankments are collapsing and the pumps need maintenance. They are all old. As a matter of fact, the scale of the recent flood was largely caused by the poor maintenance of the embankment and pumps: a canal wall collapsed and water went into Menteng and Pluit (which are below the sea level) and flooded because more than half the water pumps were inundated. The gate distributed flood water, but the flood had a deeper cause. Now we should add, as pointed out earlier, the mega-structure of superblocks and new towns along

with their self-centered localized system of flood mitigation have made Jakarta more susceptible to *banjir*.

To go back to the six projects that you picked up from World Bank's flood mitigation initiatives, I think they won't help much since they overlooked the change in the urban form of Jakarta. The city has been fragmented by capital, which circulated without a coordinated infrastructure. Perhaps it is within this pattern of fragmentation that the new governor, Jokowi, has proposed a deep tunnel system to resolve, once and for all, Jakarta's flooding problem. It is not clear whether his project will just become another of the wish images we talked about.

Climate Change

ET: I want to go back to the question of the cause and how the cause that was understood to be the informal is now understood to include the rich. I am curious about climate change, both in the discourse around spatial justice and the discourse around the recent flood. The United States is the country that believes in climate change the least in the world, and then Australia, I think. I am curious about Southeast Asia. Is there an increasing discourse about unequal exposure to climate change risks? Are some poorer countries making claims, like, "We should receive more development money, aid, loans, etc., because we have to deal with it, but we did not create this problem. Affluent countries are creating this problem, and we are the ones who have to confront the results." Is this being articulated?

AK: I have not had a chance to get to know the Indonesian response to this debate, but if I am not mistaken, President Susilo Bambang Yudhoyono has stated his commitment to follow the Kyoto Protocol and help tackle the climate change issue. But, there is also a commitment to pursue economic growth. The Indonesians take on this whole issue to follow "ecological modernization." There is still a belief that you can continue to have economic growth without damaging the ecology. To this end, the issues of climate change could be resolved through technology, and the whole discourse on "green architecture," for instance, embodies this paradigm of "ecological modernization while promoting green living and other changes in lifestyle."

ET: But the green discourse is more about lifestyle. The "go green" paradigm is not an environmental project as much as it is a lifestyle project where people can say, "We want to be in a park because it's nice and fresh."

AK: I guess your question is whether there is a systemic response to climate change issues?

ET: Well, we can see, in a certain sense, that an abstraction related to *rakyat* and this question of how a certain sort of class demands, like a class consciousness, could be connected to an environmental consciousness. It is not just the poor people of Jakarta, it is not just the poor people of Bangkok, it is not just the poor people of New York, it is all the global poor who will suffer the most. So, in the Benjaminian way, maybe, the articulation of a certain project connects to a threat—a threat of erasure.

AK: You mean a transnational consciousness among the urban poor in the region who see that climate change will have an enormous impact on them?

ET: Right, and while the *banjir* in a certain rhythm provides opportunities, at a certain threshold, it becomes much more dangerous. It becomes an irreversible threat.

AK: Could the ecological threat be translated into a struggle for the poor to survive? It is an interesting line of thought. Elsewhere I wrote about how the "green"—the wish image of the middle class—has been used by the urban poor, with the help of NGOs, to claim their rights to live in the city. The Urban Poor Consortium (UPC) tried to frame the everyday life of the urban poor in terms of their ecological practices. They tried to show that ecological living is, in fact, part of the urban poor's life and without knowing it, their lives are quite "green." The urban poor live with many recycled things (this is just one example), and they are already participating in the green discourse, even though they do not articulate it in that manner. The green discourse stems from the affluent middle class, as do the ideas of climate change and ecological awareness. The main concern for the poor is really how to continue to live. It is still difficult to see how climate change movements could be coming from the poor.

ET: The example you just mention shows how the green discourse can be constructed for a political project.

AK: It is a political construct, yes, for the urban poor want to be allowed to remain in the city. Green becomes the rallying point with the idea that they should not be relocated because they have contributed to greening the urban environment. However, even though this has been quite a substantial claim, it is largely ignored by the authorities. The poor continue to live under threat of eviction no matter how green they claim to be.

ET: It does not matter how green you are!

AK: On the issues of climate change, it is difficult to imagine how the poor would come together behind the topic of climate change when they need to think about their survival the next day. Climate change may become a rallying point for the urban poor if an understanding is formed between the middle class and the government that *banjir*, for instance, and potentially larger catastrophes, are issues of justice (not only issues of engineering), and thus inseparable from global injustices. The north-south debate can then be put on the table.

The north-south debate, I think, is quite substantial for it acknowledges the history of colonialism and the contemporary unevenness of global power relations. As you point out, the north knows that the problem of climate change cannot be resolved without a cooperation of the south, and they blame it on the south: "They are developing too fast. It is true that we were responsible in the past, but now they should not repeat what we have done."

ET: It is their fault.

AK: Yes, but it is also linked to the fact that corporations continue to externalize environmental costs. They continue to build with what they call "green technology," but they assume no ecological cost. The mega-projects we discussed could introduce "green superblocks," build "new green towns," and plant more trees, which is not a bad contribution, but they are not addressing the environmental degradation of the city. It is interesting to follow Governor Jokowi who instigates the idea of "no more shopping malls." When it comes to the scale of climate change, this proposal is probably insignificant, but the local politics embedded in his argument is the point. What is important is the emergence of a critical consciousness that environment can only be sustained by limiting consumption and accumulation of capital.

ET: The question is, if you can use the climate change discourse strategically, as a political construct, then can you still force concessions in that way? Maybe you do not solve it completely, but you still move in a direction toward . . .

AK: I think the issues have to be part of a global struggle. The world will have to demand capital to internalize ecological costs: "if you want to continue to expand you will have to internalize the cost to the environment." By doing that, it means that capital would not be able to profit as much anymore. Therefore, it would be a new way of thinking about development. It would no longer be a model based so much on economic growth, which is the current World Bank ideology, which measures everything on the basis of growth. But, it would have to look at something called justice.

MM: Justice yes, but how does the idea of justice work in relation to overcoming the problem of climate change?

AK: Justice. What I mean by that is one would have to begin to respect the environment by paying back what has been taken. The global north (after years of capital accumulation) is aware of the fact that they owe the global south for the environmental cost of their enterprises operating there. The United States continues to deny climate change because capital accumulation is at stake. If we can't make the enterprises pay, what option does a place like Jakarta have? Cities in the global south, such as Jakarta, have engaged in inter-city competition to attract foreign capital investment to achieve economic growth. To win the competition a friendly investment climate is often offered to investors and this may include no environmental cost. Imagine if cities in the global south begin to impose a regulation to enterprises saying that, "If you want to invest here, if you want to build a major industry here, then you have to pay for the cost to the environment." This would be a starting point for sustainable development. The global south would be promoting a completely different system of development that no longer depends on the endless accumulation of capital without ecological limit. The problem is that the global south is always badly positioned in competing for foreign investments.

ET: It is a race to the bottom in that sense. But there is a very important history in Indonesia, and in the region, which began with the Asian-African Conference. In the Bandung Museum of the Asian-African Conference, there is an amazing collection of newspaper front pages from the north, saying: "How dare these people meet without us? We weren't invited? How rude!" It is amazing, this sense of moral indignation, like: "How could you not invite France? How could you not invite America?" This question of Sukarno and the idea of collective action, of the global margins—it had a huge impact. This was an engine for decolonizing the global south. We could say that one of the most significant global movements that we could look to as an example for today comes out of Indonesia. It is a utopian project.

AK: Such a movement requires a strong sense of collective subjectivity that would say: "This is who we are. You want to deal with us, fine. But it will be on our own terms."

ET: On our own terms, which is the position of Frantz Fanon as well.

AK: Yes, but Asia today seems to have little capacity to produce such collective subjectivity. It is economically and politically divided. Can Asia unite with a col-

lective voice to save the environment and to stop competing for foreign capital investment? This would be a major step toward addressing the problem of climate change. This, however, may need a structural transformation, not just mitigating floods, even though this can be a strategic starting point for addressing climate change.

NOTES

Introduction

1. Rio Tambunan, "Tata Ruang Jakarta Diubah atas Pesan Sponsor" [Spatial planning of Jakarta changes following the order of sponsor], *Suara Pembaharuan,* 3 March 2002.

2. Ibid.

3. "More Green Space!" *Jakarta Post,* 7 November 2009.

4. Roy, "Urban Informality," 149; see also AlSayyad and Roy (eds.), *Urban Informality.*

5. As cited in "Jakarta: 'The Project City,'" *Jakarta Post,* 1 February 2012. The government is so business-minded that when it looks for a model to solve a problem, it looks for one that could generate profits. Referring to governmental bodies, Chaniago explains that "sometimes they're wrong when imitating solutions from other countries. They imitated projects and businesses, but not the policies" (ibid.).

6. As cited in "Yudhoyono Cita-citakan 'the Greater Jakarta'" [Yudhoyono aspires to be "the Greater Jakarta"], *Koran Jakarta,* 12 January 2011.

7. As cited in "Pemindahan ibukota mendesak dilakukan" [Moving the capital city is urgent], *Koran Jakarta,* 29 October 2010.

8. Chaniago as cited on the Visi Indonesia 2033 website, http://www.visi2033.or.id/.

9. The idea of making Palangkaraya the capital city of Indonesia goes back to the first president, Sukarno, who once considered moving the capital there. See "Pemindahan Ibu Kota patut dipertimbangkan" [Moving capital city deserves consideration], *Koran Jakarta,* 2 October 2010. The former Jakarta governor Sutiyoso proposed Jonggol as a location, which was also suggested by President Suharto, who apparently had been thinking of moving the governmental seat away from the city (ibid).

10. As cited in "Pemindahan ibukota mendesak dilakukan" [Moving the capital city is urgent] *Koran Jakarta,* 29 October 2010.

11. Ibid.

12. Kamil, "Recehan Ala Superblok," 80. Kamil further explains: "if the state has failed in building the city, then the public and the private sectors should take over. However, there are two problems with this perspective. First, even though there are many investors who want to build the city, they have neither the heart nor the vision to do so. Second, we have so many citizens who are poor and have no material access and capacity to improve themselves and their environment. For the first problem, architects can play a crucial role in leading investors to improve the quality of urban space, the public space, and the social space. For the second problem, architects should innovate within the limit of socioeconomic constraints with a spirit to improve (not to neglect) the slum-like (*kekumuhan*) and backwardness (*keterbelakangan*) (ibid).

13. Ong, "Introduction," 12.

14. See, among others, O'Connor, *A Theory of Indigenous Southeast Asian Urbanism;* Smith and Nemeth, "Urban Development in Southeast Asia"; Nas, "Early Indonesian Town"; McGee, "Emergence of *Desakota* Regions in Asia"; Olds, *Globalization and Urban Change;* Dick and Rimmer, "Beyond the Third World City"; Cowherd, "Cultural Construction of Jakarta"; Bunnell, Drummond, and Ho (eds.), *Critical Reflections on Cities in Southeast Asia;* Marshall, *Emerging Urbanity;* Benjamin, "Occupancy Urbanism"; Huyssen (ed.), *Other Cities, Other Worlds;* Simone, *City Life from Jakarta to Dakar;* Lim, *Incomplete Urbanism;* Roy and Ong (eds.), *Worlding Cities*.

15. See Robinson, *Ordinary Cities;* McFarlane, "The Comparative City"; Simone, *City Life from Jakarta to Dakar;* Benjamin, "Occupancy Urbanism"; Roy and Ong (eds.), *Worlding Cities;* Huyssen (ed.), *Other Cities, Other Worlds*.

16. Robinson, *Ordinary Cities*.

17. Simone, *City Life from Jakarta to Dakar.*

18. Roy, "Urban Informality."

19. For my account of architecture and urban form in the Sukarno and Suharto eras see Kusno, *Behind the Postcolonial*.

20. Wolters, *History, Culture and Religion in Southeast Asian Perspectives,* 52.

21. For an assessment of Jakarta in the post-Suharto era see: Bunnell and Miller, "Jakarta in Post-Suharto Indonesia"; Firman, "From 'Global City' to 'City of Crisis.' "

22. Gandy, "Learning from Lagos," 52.

23. From the St. Moritz website, http://www.thestmoritz.com.

24. Purwoko, "250 RW di Jakbar Kumuh" [250 neighborhood units in West Jakarta considered slums], *BeritaJakarta.com,* 5 October 2009, http://www.beritajakarta.com/v_ind/berita_print.asp?nnewsid=35446.

25. Chatterjee, *Nation and Its Fragments,* 207.

26. Shatkin, "Planning Privatopolis," 78.

27. See Kusno, *Appearances of Memory,* 71–100.

28. Karsten, "Town Development in the Indies," 55.

29. Buck-Morss, *Dreamworld and Catastrophe,* ix.

30. Ong, "Introduction."

31. Cited from Kooy, "Relations of Power, Networks of Water," 74; see also van Doorn, *Engineers and the Colonial System*.

32. The urban and rural uprisings in the late nineteenth and early twentieth centuries against the colonial regime of differentiation only triggered subtler strategies of control, displacement, and surveillance. The vision of developing "the welfare of the population" by way of improving the living quarters of the *kampung* stemmed not only from the relatively liberal climate, in which the city became the "laboratory of modernity," but also the need to suppress the emerging urban social movements and popular radicalism. It is no coincidence, therefore, that a significant part of urban modernization in colonial Indonesia was only put into practice after the crushing of the communist uprising and urban radicals in 1926–1927. See Kusno, *Appearances of Memory,* 182–202. The colonial politics of urban design has been noted by scholars since the 1980s. See, among others, AlSayyad (ed.), *Forms of Dominance;* King, *Colonial Urban Development;* Rabinow, *French Modern;* Wright, *Politics of Urban Design;* Yeoh, *Contesting Space*.

33. Graham and Marvin, *Splintering Urbanism*.

34. Ibid., 52.

35. Ibid., 22.

36. In criticizing homogenization, postcolonial studies often remark on the resistance of the local to the dominant forces of homogenization. They often celebrate heterogeneity and multiplicities; specificities and localities; the plurality and diversity of the many. This perspective, while valuable, has also overlooked colonial formation of heterogeneity in delinking aspects of public life from a larger collective action.

37. King, "Viewing the World as One," 1.

38. Chakrabarty, "Asia and the Twentieth Century."

39. "Exemplary center" refers to the way in which "the state drew its force . . . from its imaginative energies, its semiotic capacity to make inequality enchant" (Geertz, *Negara,* 123).

40. I am indebted to Michael Leaf for the term "market modernism."

41. The response to the exclusive zone is mixed. Some embraced it as the icon of national development. Others considered it as symbol of vice. In 2003, 2004, and 2009, bombings occurred within Jakarta's Golden Triangle. They targeted high-end economic and political establishments such as the Marriott Hotel, the Ritz-Carlton Hotel, and the Australian Embassy respectively.

42. Said, "Representing the Colonized," 207.

43. Kusno, *Appearances of Memory,* 30–38.

44. Lee, *Taking the Streets,* 1.

45. Blusse, "Insane Administration."

46. Ibid., 76–77.

47. Firman, "Rural to Urban Land Conversion in Indonesia."

48. Shatkin, "Planning Privatopolis."

49. Douglass, "Globalization, Mega-projects and the Environment."

50. For a discussion on Javanese cultural attitudes toward nature as supernatural see Boomgaard, "Sacred Trees and Haunted Forests in Indonesia." For the state's approach to the environment see Cribb, "Environmental Policy and Politics in Indonesia."

51. Douglass, "Globalization, Mega-projects and the Environment."

52. For floods in Jakarta from 2007 to 2011 see Deden Rukmana, "Jakarta Annual Flooding in February 2011," *Indonesia Urban Studies* (blog), 28 February 2011, http://indonesiaurbanstudies.blogspot.ca/2011/02/jakarta-annual-flooding-in-february.html.

53. Bunnell and Miller, "Jakarta in Post-Suharto Indonesia."

54. Hou Hanru uses the term "post-planning" for corrective practices of urban planning. See Hou, "Post-Planning."

55. Iman Firdaus, "Yang Tumbuh di Musim Krisis" [Those that grew during crisis], *Forum Keadilan* 27, 30 October 2005, 20–21.

56. "Upaya Menerapkan Hukum Syariah: Jakarta Target Utama PKS" [Attempts to apply Sharia law: Jakarta the prime target of PKS], *Berita Kota*, 5 August 2007.

57. Ibid. In the 2004 legislative election, the PKS were supported by 24 percent of Jakarta's 4.8 million voters, a result that boosted the party's confidence to support a gubernatorial candidate. See Adisti Sukma Sawitri, "Adang and PKS Face an Uphill Battle," *Jakarta Post*, 24 July 2007.

58. "Jakarta is for all" was the campaign slogan of Fauzi during his bid for governor against the PKS-supported Adang Dorodjatun. See Robert A Kusumaputra and E. Caesar Alexey, "Fauzi Bowo: Jakarta Untuk Semua" [Fauzi Bowo: Jakarta for all], *Kompas*, 2 August 2007.

59. In 2007, Depok elected a PKS mayor and Bekasi elected a PKS regent. See "Political Party Map of Greater Jakarta," *Jakarta Post*, 24 July 2007.

60. Rita Triana Budiarti, Sujudi Dwi Pratisto, and Astari Yunuarti, "Sengketa Pandangan Porno" [Conflict over what constitutes pornography], *Gatra,* 6 May 2006, 31.

61. Dewi Djakse, "Mereka Coba Mengepung" [They try to seize the city], *Gatra*, 6 May 2006, 29.

62. Anthony Herry Mohammad and Fachrul Rasyid H. F., "Menguji Niat Baik Perda" [Testing the goodwill of local regulation], *Gatra,* 6 May, 2006, 26.

63. Ibid., 25.

64. For a list of Islamic housing in Depok see Admin, "Daftar Perumahan Muslim di Depok," *Info Perumahan Muslim* (blog), 24 November 2009, http://infoperumahanmuslim.wordpress.com/2009/11/24/daftar-perumahan-muslim-di-depok/.

65. Natalia Ririh and Latief, "Menjaga Rumah dengan Adab-adab Islam" [Protecting the house with Islamic values], *Properti Kompas*, 12 August 2011.

66. Ibid.

67. Ibid.

68. "Konsep Per umahan Islami, Seperti Apa?" [Islamic housing, what is it like?], *Properti Kompas*, 4 July 2009.

69. Ibid.

70. The version of Jakarta Zaenuddin H. M. imagines in *Jakarta 500 Tahun* is a cosmopolitan city, one that reflects Fauzi's slogan "Jakarta is for all." Zaenuddin's last chapter is entitled "Back to Religion," because the chosen population of 12 million, in their material and technological wealth, will still seek spiritual guidance. The city residents will visit "places of worship such as mosques, churches, viharas, temples and other sacred places" (88). Zaenuddin's future Jakarta is a tolerant and multicultural city of multiple faiths—a manifestation of a city for all represented by the chosen 12 million.

71. The Muslim groups have not yet taken over the duties of the state in providing housing and social welfare services. For a discussion of the failure of Indonesian Islamic political parties, such as PKS, to play a role in helping the urban poor and thus gain support from them see Hadiz, "No Turkish Delight."

72. PKS has never been pro-poor. During the gubernatorial campaign, both Adang Dorodjatun (who was supported by PKS) and Fauzi did not want to submit to the pressure from the coalition of marginalized groups (consisting of Rakyat Miskin Kota, Persatuan Penyandang Cacat se-DKI, and Forum Waria Indonesia). The groups issued a motion of no confidence in both candidates for their failure to sign a memorandum of understanding that would state their commitment to the *rakyat*. See "Debat Kumis Fauzi" [Debating Fauzi's moustache], *Berita Kota,* 5 August 2007.

73. Hogan and Houston, "Corporate Cities"; see also Leisch, "Gated Communities in Indonesia."

74. The attempt to Islamize the shophouse can be seen as a negotiation between religious and secular identities in post-New Order Indonesia, in which developers erect shrines to ask local spirits to protect capitalist enterprises. For an exploration of these dynamics see Goh, "Malay-Muslim Spirits and Malaysian Capitalist Modernity." For a recent theoretical discussion and research agendas on religion and urbanism see Kong, "Global Shifts, Theoretical Shifts."

Chapter 1: The Nation-State and the City Hall

1. See Ryan, "'A Laudable Pride in the Whole of Us'" and Kolbe, "Symbols of Civic Pride."

2. King, "Terminologies and Types," 128.

3. Kolbe, "Symbols of Civic Pride," 413.

4. Chattopadhyay and White, "Urban Transformation and Civic Design," 2.

5. Ibid.

6. Blusse, "Insane Administration," 72.

7. Abeyasekere, *Jakarta,* 19.

8. Pragantha, "Mengenang Sergio Dello Strologo."

9. Patricia Ivana, "Adji Damais: A Living History," *Kemangbuzz.com* 1, 1 October 2010, http://www.kemangbuzz.com/content/previssue/view.php?edisi_id=7&art_id=12.

10. Tasa Nugraza Barley, "Putting the Spotlight on Jakarta's Old Town," *Jakarta Globe,* 2 September 2011.

11. For a description of the history of the *stadhuis* see Heuken, *Tempat-tempat Bersejarah di Jakarta.*

12. Blusse, "Batavia, 1619–1740," 166.

13. Pradaningrum Mijarto, "Paleis op de Dam dan Stadhui Batavia," *Kompas.com,* 9 June 2010, http://edukasi.kompas.com/read/2010/06/09/2144562/Paleis.op.de.Dam.dan.Stadhuis.Batavia.

14. Abeyasekere, *Jakarta,* 14.

15. According to Abeyasekere, slave owners in Batavia were predominantly European. At the beginning of the nineteenth century, slave owners expanded to include Chinese, Arabs, Indian, and Indonesians (ibid., 22).

16. Ibid.

17. Ibid., 21.

18. Taylor, *Social World of Batavia,* 57.

19. Blusse, "Insane Administration," 69.

20. From a letter from the VOC dated 1651, cited by Blusse (ibid., 75).

21. Blusse, "Batavia, 1619–1740," 169.

22. Ibid.

23. Ibid., 176.

24. Abeyasekere, *Jakarta,* 26.

25. Blusse, "Insane Administration."

26. Hering, *M.H. Thamrin,* 6–7.

27. See Handinoto, "Indische Empire Style" and Handinoto, "Daendels dan Perkembangan Arsitektur di Hindia Belanda Abad 19."

28. Abeyasekere, *Jakarta,* 57.

29. This section is drawn from Gerard Termorshuizen who has provided a detailed account of the case. See Termorshuizen, "A Murder in Batavia."

30. As cited in ibid., 148–150.

31. Ibid., 147.

32. Nas, "Origin and Development," 89.

33. Ibid., 86.

34. Ibid., 90–92.

35. Ibid., 101–105. Nas describes the complex linkage and negotiations among the top level (consisting of the king and his ministry in the metropole), the middle level (the governor-general and his Residents in the colony), and the lower level (i.e., the European citizenry in Batavia) that led to the formation of the municipality. Each of these levels had different interests and assumed different contexts. In the end, the middle level took the lead and defined what "local authority" really meant in the colony: "bureaucratic decentralization in order to reduce the burden of the governmental apparatus" (101).

36. Ibid., 102.

37. Ibid.

38. Ibid., 103.

39. Karsten's project was discussed quite extensively in *Locale Techniek* and other journals. One of the main concerns was the visibility of the buildings from the streets since they appear less than monumental in the vast field of Koningsplein. See, for instance, Preij, "Nog Eens."

40. Nas, "Origin and Development," 107.

41. Ibid. See also Abeyasekere, *Jakarta,* 108; Abeyasekere, "Colonial Urban Politics," 17–24.

42. As cited in Hering, *M.H. Thamrin,* 60–61.

43. Ibid., 61.

44. Abeyasekere, *Jakarta,* 54. The *Encyclopaedie van Nederlandsch-Indie* (1901) describes this particular architecture in further detail:

> The way of life of Europeans differs from that in the Netherlands. The houses are open and breezy. They are usually built at some distance from each other, with a spacious front and back garden. Just a ground floor with a front and back veranda, the immense inner hall with rooms on both sides and in the backyard two wings of outer buildings, connected to the house by roofed corridors. Here we find the servant quarters, stores, bathroom and latrine, the mews and stable for the horses. The walls, both external and internal are plastered and white washed, the facades have a plinth of black coal tar, the floor consists of marble blue or red tiles, grey or colored cement often covered with rattan mats.

> The sun is kept out by jalousies and screens. The front yard, the stairway and often the front verandas are decorated with flowerpots lime washed, white or rose. . . . Compared with Europe, more attention is paid to cleanliness and cuisine. The European takes a bath twice a day, breakfast consists of meat and eggs, at one o'clock a large rice meal (*rijsttafel*) with curry and several side dishes as there are spiced eggs and meat, steak, potatoes, vegetables and fruit. At five o'clock there is tea and at eight or nine a complete European dinner (as cited in Passchier, "Colonial Architecture in Indonesia," 103).

45. See Handinoto, "Indische Empire Style."

46. See Heuken, *Menteng.*

47. See Passchier, "Colonial Architecture in Indonesia," 103.

48. King, *Colonial Urban Development.*

49. See Sudiro, "Kala Itu," 124.

50. Damais (ed.), *Gedung Balai Kota Jakarta,* 19.

51. Ibid.

52. Ibid., 23.

53. Jakarta was only formalized as the capital city of the nation in 1964 by President Sukarno, ending the discussions and debates that had continued since 1955 on whether the capital city should be in Palangkaraya to be less "Jakarta-centric." See Sudiro, "Kala Itu," 94.

54. Damais (ed.), *Karya Jaya.*

55. See Santoso, *Kota Tanpa Warga.*

56. Suryono Herlambang indicates that as the city moved forward to embrace global economy in the 1990s it left behind the legacy of Ali Sadikin, who sought to establish public (i.e., middle class) participation in urban life. See Herlambang, "Kisah Lapangan Monas."

57. Sadikin, *Gita Jaya,* 109.

58. Sadikin noted that "many social organizations were connected to the interest of political and mass mobilization" (ibid., 141).

59. Ibid., 87.

60. Ibid., 88.

61. Ibid., 56–58; Prior to the five administrative centers, Mayor Sudiro had already divided the city into three administrative units: North, Central, and South Jakarta. Sudiro, "Kala Itu," 93.

62. Malo and Nas, "Queen City of the East," 130.

63. Ibid.

64. Bersih, Manusiawi, and Wibawa (BMW) was a concept introduced by Governor Wiyogo Atmodarminto (1987–1992) during the time of the liberalization of Indonesian economy.

65. Rio Tambunan, "Tata Ruang Jakarta Diubah atas Pesan Sponsor" [Spatial planning of Jakarta changes following the order of sponsor], *Suara Pembaharuan,* 3 March 2002.

66. Herlambang, "Kisah Lapangan Monas," xiii–xiv.

67. Abeyaekere, "Colonial Urban Politics," 25.

68. World Bank, *Cities in Transition,* 78–84.

69. Protests in Jakarta are often associated with national symbols such as the Thamrin-Sudirman corridor, the presidential palace, offices of ministries, the parliament, the central bank, and the supreme court, but the city hall today has increasingly become the preferred location of protests, especially for issues related to local legislation. For a discussion of protest movements in Jakarta see Lim, "Transient Civic Spaces in Jakarta Demopolis" and Padawangi, "Urban Centers as Megaphones."

70. As cited in "Sutiyoso: Most Maligned Governor?" *Jakarta Post,* 11 November 2002.

71. Andi Mallarangeng cited in Bambang Nurbianto, "Undemocratic Jakarta Makes Mockery of Local Autonomy Implementation," *Jakarta Post,* 19 November 2002.

72. Ibid.

73. "Upaya Menerapkan Hukum Syariah: Jakarta Target Utama PKS" [Attempts to apply Sharia law: Jakarta prime target of PKS], *Berita Kota,* 5 August 2007.

74. "Come on Shore" *Jakarta Post,* 17 December 2008.

75. "Bemo dan Bajaj Serbu Balai Kota DKI" [The three wheeler auto rickshaws of Bemo and Bajaj attacked Jakarta City Hall], *Warta Kota,* 20 July 2010; Indah Setiawati, "Include Us in Decision-Making," *Jakarta Post,* 31 October 2009. See also "Contract Teachers Throw Tomatoes at City Hall," *Jakarta Post,* 1 July 2010.

76. "Hundred Protest for Minimum Wage Increase," *Jakarta Post,* 9 December 2009.

77. "Guru PNS Berunjuk Rasa" [Public teachers demonstrate], *Warta Kota,* 27 March 2010; "Pendemo ancam duduki Balai Kota" [Demonstrators threaten to occupy city hall], *Berita Kota,* 1 July 2010; "Guru DKI Tuntut Tunjangan Kerja Daerah" [Teachers in Jakarta demand benefits], *Media Indonesia,* 22 June 2010.

78. Indah Setiawati, "City Administration Tells Sellers to Find New Jobs," *Jakarta Post,* 24 March 2010.

79. Hasyim Widhiarto, "NGOs Rally for Public Order Agency Dismissal," *Jakarta Post,* 13 March 2010.

80. "FBR Stages Protest Demanding Review of Public Order Agency after Deadly Clash," *Jakarta Post,* 15 April 2010.

Chapter 2: The Shophouse and the Chinese

1. See Knapp, *Chinese Houses of Southeast Asia*. For studies of shophouses and Chinese architecture in Indonesia see Widodo, *Boat and the City;* Widodo, "Chinese Diaspora's Urban Morphology"; Sopandi, "Vanishing Dwelling Culture"; Pratiwo, *Arsitektur Tradisional Tionghoa;* Pratiwo, "Chinese Town of Lasem"; Pratiwo, "Seeking the Spirit of the Age."

2. The basic floor plan, according to an architectural historian, "never seems to change from past to present." Handinoto, "Lingkungan 'Pecinaan,'" 28.

3. See Urban Redevelopment Authority, *Chinatown Historic District;* Liu, *Pastel Portraits;* Lee, "The Singapore Shophouse"; Chang and Teo, "The Shophouse Hotel"; and Fels, "Penang's Shophouse Culture."

4. "Ruko Primadona Baru Properti" [*Ruko:* The new prima donna in the property market], *Kontan,* 23 March 1998; Johan, "Rumah-Toko: Alternatif di Tengah Koreksi Pasar" [*Ruko:* An alternative choice for market recovery], *Bisnis Properti,* October 1995, 88–89.

5. For a discussion of the architectural and spatial impacts of the May riots see Kusno, *The Appearances of Memory,* 101–124.

6. "Ruko Terus Diburu" [Hunting *ruko*], *Properti Indonesia,* May 2006, 20.

7. Wahyuasih, "Masalah dan Dilema Perkembangan Ruko Dalam Arsitektur Lingkungan Perkotaan dan Pemukiman," 2.

8. Ibid.

9. The interrelationship between building typology and urban morphology has become central to architectural history, especially since the publication of Aldo Rossi's *The Architecture of the City* in 1966. This chapter however seeks to contribute to a more contextual analysis of building type, such as those provided by, among others, King, "Terminologies and Types"; Lawrence, "Type as Analytical Tool"; and Markus, "Social Practice and Building Typologies."

10. Budiman, "Portrait of the Chinese in Post-Suharto Indonesia."

11. MyFamily Accounting, "Mengapa orang cina lebih senang tinggal di ruko?" [Why do Chinese people like to live in *ruko*?], *MyFamily Accounting* (blog), 13 September 2007, http://myfamilyaccounting.wordpress.com/2007/09/13/mengapa-orang-cina-lebih-senang-tinggal-di-ruko/.

12. Ibid.

13. As cited in Robert Adhi Kusumaputra, "Ikawan bangun Hotel dalam 15 bulan" [Ikawan built a hotel in fifteen months], *Kompas,* 14 February 2011.

14. As cited in Arbain Rambey, "'Dilema bangunan ruko, antara tidak indah dan masalah kebutuhan" [The dilemma of *ruko,* between eyesore and need], 20 December 2002, http://bovian.multiply.com/journal/item/146/Dilema.

15. Cited in ibid.

16. As cited in Robert Adhi Kusumaputra, "Hendro Gondokusumo: Intiland Pionir Reklamasi di Asia Tenggara" [Hendro Gondokusumo: The Intiland Pioneer of Reclamation in Southeast Asia], *Kompas,* 16 February 2010.

17. Johannes Widodo, e-mail message to the author, 9 May 2011.

18. Handinoto, "Lingkungan 'Pecinaan.'" See also Khol, *Chinese Architecture.* Knapp indicates that "many (shophouses in Malacca) are quite similar to the shophouses and terrace homes found in towns in southern China in that they have prominent skywells—small courtyards—that open up the interiors to light and air" (Knapp, *Chinese Houses of Southeast Asia,* 20).

19. Bob Hering describes a colonial city such as Batavia/Betawi most vividly: "Racial discrimination, often endorsed by law . . . with *totok-belanda* and *indo-belanda* (pure Dutch and Eurasian Dutch) displaying notions of superiority, often mingling it with utter callousness toward natives and foreign Orientals laboring under their supervision. These attitudes of apartheid based upon colour and race, were further reflected in the peculiar, heterogenetic, caste-structured, spatial layout of the capital city" (Hering, *M.H. Thamrin,* 6–7).

20. Historian Susan Abeyasekere indicates the importance of women in shaping the intercultural traditions of colonial Jakarta: "Ethnic groups in Batavia differed from one another in socio-economic status, employment, areas of residence and health records. What brought them together was women (who through marriages, partnerships and concubinage) were the stable force within the city, helping men to adapt and exerting a constant influence on the children. . . . As a result of their influence, the life of the Europeans and Chinese became more Indonesian." As for the Chinese communities, "The day-to-day life of *peranakan* (Indies-born) Chinese, who made up the vast bulk of the Chinese population in Batavia, was intermingled with belief in Indonesian spirits, consultation of *dukun* (Indonesian healers) and so on" (Abeyasekere, *Jakarta,* 75–76).

21. Mrazek, *Engineers of Happy Land,* 176.

22. For a discussion of the Chinese as a racial minority and commercial bourgeoisie (provoked by Benedict Anderson) see Copper, *Studying Ethnic Chinese in Indonesia.*

23. See Kusno, *Appearances of Memory.*

24. Liem, *Riwajat Semarang.*

25. For a discussion on the revival of art deco *ruko* in the 1990s see Kusno, *Appearances of Memory.*

26. Lindsey, "Reconstituting the Ethnic Chinese"; Aguilar, Jr., "Citizenship, Inheritance and the Indigenising of 'Orang Chinese' in Indonesia."

27. Lindsey, "Reconstituting the Ethnic Chinese," 54.

28. Heryanto, "Ethnic Identities and Erasure."

29. Ibid.

30. Purdey, "Anti-Chinese Violence," 26. For a more recent assessment see Panggabean and Smith, "Exploring Anti-Chinese Riots."

31. In his analysis of the looting of Chinese stores in May 1998, James Siegel told a story of how a looter returned to the shop he had looted a few days earlier with the intention of buying some items from it. The looter found the shop was still closed, and he knocked at the door and asked why the owner had not opened the store at such a late hour. This story troubles the line that divides the normality of everyday life and the abnormality of times of chaos. It also indicates the profound ambiguity of Chinese *ruko* in the life of ordinary Indonesians, who were, as evidenced by the story above, both looters and customers. See Siegel, "Early Thoughts on the Violence."

32. Nugraha et al., "Peninjauan Faktor-faktor Penentu Rumah-Toko."

33. Ibid., 112.

34. Architects discovered that while the floor plan can be standardized, the facades at least could be designed in a distinct and personal way. This approach often starts the design process and concentrates on the integrity of the exterior, which constitutes the whole block of *ruko* (Author's conversation with architects in Jakarta, 12 June 2011).

35. There are of course other self-built (often unregulated and undocumented) *ruko* in various parts of the city, but *Properti Indonesia* concerns itself only with the *ruko* built by large developers.

36. "Ruko Terus Diburu," 20.

37. Ibid.

38. Ibid., 21.

39. Ibid., 28.

40. "Penggusuran Dicemaskan" [Worrying about eviction], *Regional.Kompas.com,* 25 November 2010, http://regional.kompas.com/read/2010/11/25/10143146/Penggusuran.Dicemaskan.

41. "Arsitektur Cuma Cari Untung" [Architecture only search for profit], *Regional.Kompas.com,* 3 December 2010, http://regional.kompas.com/read/2010/12/03/11003038/Arsitektur.Cuma.Cari.Untung.

42. "Penggusuran Dicemaskan."

43. "Mes Karyawan Disinyalir Tempat Perjudian" [Workers' place might be a place for gambling], *Musirawas Express,* 15 May 2010, http://musirawasekspres.blogspot.com/2010/05/mes-karyawan-disinyalir-tempat.html.

44. "Ruko Pabrik Sabu-sabu Disamarkan Jadi Pembuat Parfum" [Perfume-making conceals drug factory in a *ruko*], *Tempo.co,* 9 December 2005, http://www.tempo.co/read/news/2005/12/09/05770392/Ruko-Pabrik-Sabu-sabu-Disamarkan-Jadi-Pembuat-Parfum.

45. "Ruko-Ruko di Surabaya Jadi Tempat Prostitusi" [*Ruko* in Surabaya became a place for prostitution], *Surabayapagi.com,* 14 February 2011, http://www.surabayapagi.com/index.php?3b1ca0a43b79bdfd9f9305b812982962 1d905a5356bec5af4226282159ea5b88.

46. Ibid.

47. "Dua Gereja di Ruko Bandung City Square Ditutup oleh warga" [Two churches in *ruko* at Bandung Square are closed down by citizens], *Christiani Post,* 22 February 2006.

48. Ishoba, "Depok akan bangun komplek bisnis bercorak Islam terbesar" [Depok will build largest business complex with Islamic character], *Berbeda Jamaah Tapi Bersatu Untuk Jihadm* (blog), 21 December 2010, http://ishoba.wordpress.com/2010/12/21/depok-akan-bangun-komplek-bisnis-bercorak-islam-terbesar/.

49. Ibid.

50. Author's interview with a staff member in the marketing office for the *ruko* in Saladin Square, 8 June 2011.

51. Ishoba, "Depok akan bangun komplek bisnis bercorak Islam terbesar."

52. This chapter does not deal with the Muslim Chinese even though there are interesting cases of *ruko* mosques. For instance, Lautze Mosque, built in 1961 by Karim Oei, a Muslim Chinese, is located in the Chinese district of Sawah Baru, Jakarta. The mosque occupies two *ruko* to accommodate the growing number of Muslim Chinese from various parts of the city who need introductory training in the knowledge and practice of Islam before they return to the mosques of their respective communities. Lautze Mosque has never adopted a dome or minaret to signify Islamic identity. The four-story building maintains a plain facade of *ruko* similar to those of its neighborhood. With no iconic markers, the Lautze Mosque appears contextual as its facade blends into the homogenous surface of the surrounding *ruko*. The mosque is considered by many as an exemplary model of the assimilation of ethnic Chinese into the Muslim community. Its plain external appearance is seen as an acceptable representation of the Islamic presence by the Chinese Muslim community. The unaltered facade points to what the *ruko* does not easily reveal: the Muslim identity of some ethnic Chinese, which is not disclosed by building type or ornamentation. For a report on Lautze Mosque see Achmad Sabran, "Rasa Pembauran di Masjid Lautze" [Assimilation is felt in Lautze Mosque], *Kompas,* 9 September 2009. See also Maya Saputri, "Masjid Lau Tze, Budaya Tionghoa dan Nilai Islami" [Lautze Mosque, a mix of Chinese culture and Islamic values], *Kompas,* 2 September 2008.

Chapter 3: Researching Modernism

1. Jim Supangkat, "Bukan Pameran Potongan Jendela" [Not an exhibition of a window section], *Tempo,* April 1983.

2. Ibid., 21.

3. Ibid.

4. Ibid.

5. Ibid.

6. Herlambang and his colleagues at the Center for the Documentation of Architecture in Indonesia (Pusat Dokumentasi Arsitektur Indonesia) published in 2007 a book called *Tegang Bentang,* which organizes Indonesian architecture into four phases of development: Indies architecture of the colonial era; modernism of the postrevolutionary time; traditional regionalism of the New Order; and the contemporary post-*reformasi* era.

7. Widyarta, "Pendahuluan."

8. Cribb, *Indonesian Killings of 1965–1966.*

9. Lane, *Unfinished Nation.*

10. Goenawan, "Kemerdekaan Kreativitas," 107. Goenawan also points out that "politics" can mean two things: politics as domination, which refers to the intervention by the state and those with power; and politics as resistance of the weak against those in power.

11. Ibid., 109.

12. Ibid., 112.

13. I am indebted to Michael Leaf for the terms "state modernism" and "market modernism."

14. Kusno, *Behind the Postcolonial.*

15. From 1968 (especially with the establishment of the highly reputed architectural firm Atelier 6 in Bandung), all sorts of vernacular buildings were introduced into the architectural world. See Moersid, "Atelier 6 tentang Atelier 6."

16. Purwestri and Widyarta, "Mencari Lokalitas."

17. As cited in Herlambang, "ATAP, Delft: 1953–1957," 96.

18. Han Awal interviewed on 23 July 2010 at PT. Han Awal & Partners Architects in Bintaro, Jakarta.

19. Herlambang, "ATAP, Delft: 1953–1957."

20. Herlambang, "Generasi Ketiga Arsitek Indonesia?"

21. As cited in Herlambang, "ATAP, Delft: 1953–1957," 89.

22. Ibid., 96.

23. Ibid.

24. Yuswadi Saliya considers the work of Sujudi and those of the ATAP group as "modernism of a Prussian style." The ATAP group, Saliya explains, shows a strong

sense of autonomy and independence: "They are formalistic . . . they use gestalt to create a measured form instead of human scale . . . which gives the architecture a quality of self-sufficient monumentality" (Saliya, "Pagi Hari dan Lekang Siang Seorang Sujudi," 102). Saliya characterizes Sujudi as the true master of Indonesian modernism who brought to Indonesia an unprecedented way of expressing architectural language.

25. Herlambang, "ATAP, Delft: 1953–1957."

26. With Indonesia on their minds, while in Delft they searched for journals devoted to architecture and engineering in colonial Indonesia (such as *De Ingineur in Indonesie* and *Bouwen in Indonesie*) and discussed the works of Dutch modernist architects in Indonesia, such as those of Tillema, Berlage, Maclaine Pont, and Thomas Karsten. They followed the city-building discourses of President Sukarno who had just begun his campaign of turning Jakarta into the site of nation-building and of the Newly Emerging Forces of Asia and Africa. They also looked at what Le Corbusier did in Chandigarh (1952–1959). They were drawn to the issue of public housing as the embodiment of a national mission to shelter the people, the *rakyat*. See Herlambang, "ATAP, Delft: 1953–1957."

27. Ibid., 94.

28. Ibid.

29. Eryudhawan, "Sukarno, Bapak Arsitek Indonesia." Although modernist architecture began to play a modernizing role in the 1920s when Dutch architects subverted the neoclassical architectural style, it was not until Sukarno's construction of Jakarta as the beacon of the nation that it formally became the architectural style of decolonized Indonesia, to be adopted in governmental and commercial buildings as well as places of worship. For a discussion of the architecture of Sukarno see, among others, Kusno, "Di Bawah Bayangan Bung Karno."

30. Siegel, *New Criminal Type in Jakarta*.

31. Lee, *Taking the Streets*, 1.

32. Sukarno as cited in Abeyasekere, *Jakarta*, 210.

33. Sukarno, *Amanat Presiden Sukarno*, 27–28.

34. The thoroughfare, in the memory of Governor Ali Sadikin, "saves Jakarta from chaos, and leads the city to future" (Sadikin, *Bang Ali*, 478).

35. Herlambang, "ATAP, Delft: 1953–1957," 98. Sukarno had his own way of making it bear witness to Indonesian nationalism. "I have conceived the idea to build a Parliament House, a really fine one, something worthy of being the seat of 105 million people of the Republic of Indonesia. As you know I am an architect . . . oh yes, I am indeed a megalomaniac" (Sukarno 1966, as cited in Leclerc, "Mirrors and the Lighthouse," 54).

36. Partai Komunis Indonesia, *Untuk Mendjadikan Djakarta Raya Kota Demokrasi, Kota Persatuan, Kota Mobilisasi*.

37. Herlambang, "ATAP, Delft: 1953–1957."

38. Han, "Arsitektur untuk si Miskin di Indonesia."

39. Leaf, *Land Regulation and Housing Development*.

40. The Kampung Improvement Program began in 1927 as a reaction of colonial government to the poor living conditions of *kampung*, which were seen as posing a threat to European residents. The program, however, was limited to upgrading infrastructure with some constructions of new houses, but overall it failed to reach the lowest income groups. For a comprehensive account see Colombijn, *Under Construction*, 184–206. See also Silas, "Perjalanan panjang perumahan Indonesia dalam dan sekitar abad XX."

41. For a comprehensive discussion of housing in the late colonial and early postcolonial Indonesia see Colombijn, *Under Construction*.

42. Sardjono, "Menuju Tinggal Landas Pembangunan Nasional di Bidang Perumahan Rakyat," 3.

43. Cobban, "Public Housing in Colonial Indonesia."

44. Sardjono, "Dari Konggres Perumahan Rakyat Sehat 1950 sampai Lokakarya Kebijaksanaan Perumahan di Binagraha 1972."

45. Ibid., 5.

46. Ibid., 12.

47. Dorleans, "Perencanaan Kota dan Spekulasi Tanah di Jabotabek"; Luthfie et al., "Konglomerat Membangun Kota."

48. Sosrodarsono, "Sambutan Ketua Dewan Pengurus Lama." Pantjasila is the philosophical foundation of the Indonesian state announced by Sukarno in June 1945. It contains five principles, which are the existence of God, Nationality, Humanity, Democracy, and Social Justice.

49. Goenawan, "Kemerdekaan Kreativitas," 107. (My emphasis.)

50. The Indonesian Institute of Architects (Ikatan Arsitek Indonesia [IAI]) refashioned its identity by way of differentiating itself from the previous political order. In 1985, the IAI wrote as if recalling a traumatic childhood experience:

> almost fifteen years since its formation [in 1959], the path of the professional organization was never clear. The political situation at that time was not supportive, if not indeed constraining the normal growth of the organization. The mind-set (*alam pikiran*) of all Indonesians at that time was oriented towards the great national effort (*usaha besar nasional*) to struggle for its political aspiration. . . . At that time, all organizations were forced to choose a political affiliation. Criteria for the right to live were based on the power of the masses rather than on moral issues. Thus the IAI as a new organization with a different aspiration had no chance at all to develop

because it is grounded on the principle of nonaffiliation to any kind of political ideology (Arsitek Indonesia, "Ikatan Arsitek Indonesia," 9).

51. Promotional brochure of Grand Indonesia, Jakarta, 2009.

52. Herlambang, "Arsitek Muda Indonesia"; Tjahjono, "Kunjung Ulang Arsitek Muda Indonesia."

53. Widyarta et al., "AMI, AMI Next, AMI Last, FAM, SAMM, De Maya, BoomArs, dan Seterusnya," 158.

54. Tardiyana, "Arsitek Muda Indonesia (AMI) Sebuah Refleksi."

55. Wicaksono, *JongArsitek!*

56. Anderson, *Java in a Time of Revolution*. See also Foulcher, "Sumpah Pemuda."

57. Wicaksono, *JongArsitek!*

Chapter 4: The Peasantry and the Periurban Fringe

1. Watts, "Tanggerang," 5.

2. For them, in the words of J. M. van der Kroef, "Djakarta has cast a magic spell even on those who live far from the city's crowded, bustling roar. A modern city, with modern ways and urban conveniences is a concretization of revolutionary aspirations, affording education, material comforts and an escape from ennui, or so it is hoped" (Kroef, *Indonesia in the Modern World,* 1:157). Pramoedya Ananta Toer wrote in 1955, "Before I came to Jakarta I thought as you do. I dreamed that I would do great things, that I would be equal in mind and body to the opportunities I would find. Perhaps you will be luckier than I was. The wind blows through the provinces whispering that one cannot be fully Indonesian until one has seen Jakarta" (Toer, "Letter to a Friend from the Country").

3. Watts, "Tanggerang," 5.

4. Ibid., 19.

5. For a development of Jakarta's planned deconcentration in the Suharto era see Silver, *Planning the Megacity,* 111–124; see also Giebels, "JABOTABEK," 101–115.

6. Most analyses estimate the number of people slaughtered to be between 500,000 and 2 million. In addition, over 10,000 were detained for more than ten years. The killings and arrests mostly took place in the rural areas. See Cribb, *Indonesian Killings of 1965–1966*. For a recent account of the event see Roosa, *Pretext for Mass Murder.*

7. Aidit, "Indonesia's Class Structure," 254. The Communist Party leader, D. N. Aidit, who must have picked up his sophisticated view of the peasantry from Marx, Lenin, and Mao Tse Tung, had a nuanced definition of the peasants, which in some ways helped determine the targets of violence: "What we mean when we use the term

'peasants' is mainly the poor and middle peasants that make up the majority of the inhabitants of the villages. In leading the people's struggle in the countryside, the Party must always strive to be able to draw in and mobilize 90 per cent of the village inhabitants and must firmly base itself on the poor peasants and the peasant laborers as well as to make an alliance with the middle peasants" (254–255).

8. In 1950, soon after the transfer of sovereignty, Indonesian and Dutch experts were appointed by the Ministry of Public Works and Energy and the team produced a proposal under the name of "Jakarta Raya" (the Greater Jakarta), which according to Giebels, "had much in common with the later JABOTABEK." See Giebels, "JABOTABEK," 102.

9. This kind of debate in some ways is influenced by the urban bias thesis, for which see, among others, Lipton, *Why Poor People Stay Poor.*

10. McGee, "Presidential Address," 341. McGee explains: "what I mean by urbanization is the process of the growth of urban places within the administrative boundaries defined by nations as urban as well as at the margins of cities. The advancement of this process of urban spread into the densely crowded rural hinterlands created a *desakota* region. *Desakota* thus is one spatial and conceptual part of the urban phenomenon" (personal communication, 15 May 2009). Efforts to explore the characteristics of Asian urban geography had been made earlier, before World War II by Dutch and other European scholars. For a recent attempt see Kratoska et al. (eds.), *Locating Southeast Asia.*

11. McGee, "Emergence of *Desakota* Regions in Asia," 7.

12. Kelly, "Everyday Urbanization."

13. Davis, "Planet of Slums," 8.

14. Rigg, "Rural–Urban Interactions," 515.

15. Guldin, *What's a Peasant to Do?*

16. For an examination of the cultural, ideological and economic forces driving the development of the periurban areas of Jakarta see Firman, "Emergence of Extended Metropolitan Regions in Indonesia"; Firman, "Restructuring of Jakarta Metropolitan Area"; Leaf, "Suburbanization of Jakarta"; Leaf, "Building the Road for the BMW."

17. To understand the political history of an urban formation is to respond to the call for "geography of engagement." See McGee, "Presidential Address," 241.

18. The labor demand of the wet-rice agricultural system is not only large, but also fluctuates between the on and off seasons. The off season has prompted farmers to take up various nonagricultural occupations. Historically, farmers in Indonesia have therefore had multiple occupations.

19. In addition to these there are categories that one could find in the politics of urban Indonesia such as *massa* (the masses) and *rakyat* (the people). See Siegel, *New Criminal Type in Jakarta.*

20. For a discussion on the transformation of the terms see ibid.

21. Rashid and Quibria, "Is Land Reform Passé?" 145. For a review of the agricultural debate during the era of Sukarno and after, including a critical assessment of Clifford Geertz's work on agricultural involution see White, "Java and Social Theory"; for an assessment of the agrarian issues on the eve of the New Order see Slamet, *Views and Strategies*. See also Sukarno "Marhaen and Proletariat" and Aidit, *Kaum Tani Mengganjang Setan-Setan Desa,* 35.

22. Suharto, "Plans for Development," 101–102.

23. For an analysis of agrarian change as an issue of class formation and the exercise of class power during the era of Green Revolution see Pincus, *Class Power and Agrarian Change*.

24. Hart et al., *Agrarian Transformations*.

25. Gary Hansen reports that "in summary, while the Green Revolution has demonstrated its capacity to increase productivity, there is less convincing evidence concerning the flow of rural benefits to the producers" (Hansen, *Rural Local Government,* 57).

26. Hansen, *Rural Local Government*.

27. White, "Organization of Peasants and Rural Poor," 92.

28. Ibid., 98. See also Utrecht, "Political Mobilizations of Peasants."

29. White, "Java and Social Theory," 176–177.

30. As cited in Chalmers and Hadiz (eds.), *Politics of Economic Development,* 73.

31. Lane, *Unfinished Nation,* 2.

32. Ibid., 45.

33. Slamet, *Cultural Strategies for Survival,* 38.

34. Moertopo, "Acceleration and Modernisation," 47–48.

35. See *Kompas* editorial comment on the concept of the floating mass in the issue dated 25 December 1971. Reprinted in Bourchier and Hadiz (eds.), *Indonesian Politics and Society,* 70. The editor of *Kompas* was critical of the concept, asking, "If, for instance, the interests of the majority of the people in the villages are damaged by some individual in authority, to whom shall they turn for political protection?"

36. Koentjaraningrat, "Population Mobility," 112–113.

37. Tana, *Peasants on the Move;* Graeme Hugo recognizes peasants' mobility as "circular migration" (Hugo, "Population Mobility in West Java").

38. Hill, "Stasis and Change."

39. The existence of nonagricultural secondary economic activities in rural areas is an ancient phenomenon that seems to be widespread in Southeast Asia. See Reid, *Southeast Asia*.

40. Rigg, "Rural–Urban Relations," 235.

41. Jonathan Rigg points out that "what village studies since the 1980s almost invariably show is a dramatic diversification in people's livelihoods away from agriculture and into assorted non-farm activities" (ibid., 234).

42. As cited in Chalmers and Hadiz (eds.), *Politics of Economic Development,* 77.

43. As cited in Specter, "Letter from Jakarta."

44. Sjahrir, *Pasar Tenaga Kerja Indonesia,* 49.

45. See Sadikin, *Bang Ali,* 271. It is a common practice for Indonesian dignitaries to write memoirs at the end of their tenure in the government to be remembered as patriots who have served the nation. The publisher made a special comment in the memoir of Ali Sadikin. In the half-page preface, the publisher pointed out that "Ali Sadikin who worked as the Governor of Jakarta from 1966 to 1977 has tried to build Jakarta which at the beginning of his term did not look like a modern capital city. The still unstable political environment (*gejolak politik*) [after the failed coup of the 30th September Movement] has contributed to the problems in the city" (7).

46. Ali Sadikin did not define *gelandangan* for us, but Soetjipto Wirosardjono, deputy chairman of the Central Bureau of Statistics in the 1980s and 1990s, offers the following definition:

> new comers who have recently moved from rural areas to the city for employment and have not succeeded. Because they are poorly educated and have few contacts they start by becoming a scavenger. If the leader of scavengers has a house they will live there; if they cannot stay with him for some reason they will find themselves in the homeless status. They are socially ashamed to go back to the rural areas so they adapt to the situation [in the city]. They normally don't have any relatives in the city, or other people to fall back on. Although they are eligible to stay in the rehabilitation centers organized by the Ministry of Social Affairs, they often choose to stay outside. There are a lot of regulations in the rehabilitation centers. For example, as a homeless you can still find some income as a scavenger or as a beggar, which you can spend as you wish. So at least, outside the rehabilitation centers, they still possess a certain amount of freedom, which is very important for them (Wirosardjono, "Informal Sector," 67).

47. Sadikin, *Bang Ali,* 148–149.

48. Vagrants did not find a place in Sukarno's most inclusive category of "Marhaen," which referred to all kinds of destitute people in Indonesia. See also Aidit's position toward vagrants in Aidit, "Indonesia's Class Structure," 256–257.

49. Sadikin, *Gita Jaya,* 160.

50. His mission was to ensure that Jakarta would eventually become a metropolitan region, which would ultimately get rid of the negative image of Jakarta as a big village. See Sadikin, *Bang Ali,* 436–445.

51. Graeme Hugo points out that "circular migration allows highly valued social benefits of village residence to be essentially maintained" (Hugo, "Circular Migration," 62).

52. For a discussion of *pondok* see Jellinek, "Pondok of Jakarta," 67–71.

53. For *transmigrasi* see Hardjono, *Transmigration in Indonesia* and Otten, *Transmigrasi.*

54. Sadikin, *Bang Ali: Demi Jakarta,* 177. Sadikin used *urbanisasi* to refer to population growth.

55. Construction industries were prosperous in the 1970s due to the oil boom. See Sjahrir, *Pasar Tenaga Kerja Indonesia.*

56. Ibid.

57. Sadikin, *Bang Ali,* 366.

58. See Sadikin, *Gita Jaya* and Sedyawati et al., *Sejarah Kota Jakarta, 1850–1980,* 85.

59. Sadikin, *Bang Ali,* 386.

60. I would like to thank Terry McGee for the Mitsubishi Colt story.

61. Warr, "Jakarta Export Processing Zone," 28.

62. Ibid., 28–29.

63. Peter Warr notes that "the nominal ownership of firms operating in the zone differs radically from that seen in EPZs elsewhere in Asia. Of the 18 firms occupying the zone by 1982, three were nominally Indonesian-owned, three were joint ventures between Indonesians and foreign Chinese or Indians, one was Indian and the remaining eleven were owned by Hong Kong, Singapore or Taiwan interests" (Warr, "The Jakarta Export Processing Zone," 30). Warr adds that these firms are also indirectly owned by North American and European firms.

64. See Giebels, "JABOTABEK" and Sadikin, *Gita Jaya,* 223.

65. See Sedyawati et al., *Sejarah Kota Jakarta 1950–1980,* 34.

66. Wirosardjono pointed out in 1991 that the agglomeration of urban centers in the surrounding areas of Jakarta was due purely to the power of the market economy (Wirosardjono, "Informal Sector," 61).

67. Ibid.

68. Wolff, *Factory Daughters,* 109.

69. Poerbo, "A Glimpse of Tragedy," 76.

70. Ibid., 77.

71. Wirosardjono, "Informal Sector," 62.

72. Her Suganda, "Fenomena Kota Baru Sekitar Botabek" [New town: A new phenomenon in the surrounding Jakarta], *Kompas,* 10 September 1995.

73. Presidential Instruction No. 53/1989 allocated some 36,800 hectares for the development of a *desakota* industrial zone along the corridor of Purwakarta-Serang, with the possibility of further expansion (ibid.).

74. See Dharmapatni and Firman, "Problems and Challenges of Mega-Urban Regions in Indonesia," 308.

75. Presidential Instruction No. 53/1989 reorganized Bekasi (the periurban to the East of Jakarta) into clusters of industrial zones along the toll road to Purwakarta (on the way to Bandung).

76. See Firman, "Restructuring of Jakarta Metropolitan Area," 237.

77. Dharmapatni and Firman, "Problems and Challenges," 308.

78. Ibid., 307.

79. Wirosardjono, "Informal Sector," 67.

80. Ong, *Neoliberalism as Exception,* 21.

81. For a description of the role of the Ministry of Internal Affairs in the governance of urban politics and economy see Sadikin, *Bang Ali,* 83–87. See also White, "Organization of Peasants," 100.

82. Willis, "From Peri-urban to Unknown Territory," 3.

83. Agamben, *State of Exception,* 1 (citing Alessandro Fontana).

84. The periurban could also be said to have given rise to Real Estate Indonesia, an association of corporate housing developers, which was approved by Governor Sadikin in 1975.

85. For a discussion of the relations between the construction of the new town and the formation of the middle class in the context of the New Order's politics of nation-building in Jakarta see Kusno, *Behind the Postcolonial,* 97–119; Leaf, *Land Regulation*; Leaf, "Suburbanization of Jakarta."

86. Dharmapatni and Firman, "Problems and Challenges," 305.

87. See Firman, "New Town Development" and Leaf, "Building the Road for the BMW."

88. As translated and cited by White, "Organization of Peasants," 97. At the time of the 1997–1998 political and financial crises, groups of unemployed workers in the periurban area of Jakarta occupied golf courses. Some used their hoes to inscribe the turf with "This is the people's land" and others began to grow vegetables. See "Ratusan petani tanami lapangan golf Cimacan" [Hundreds of peasants plant golf course at Cimacan], *Kompas.com,* 15 June 1998, http://www.kompas.com/.

89. Scott, "Everyday Forms of Resistance"; Scott, *Weapons of the Weak;* and Ong, *Spirits of Resistance.*

90. White, "Organization of peasants and rural poor in Indonesia," 97.

91. Dharmapatni and Firman, "Problems and Challenges of Mega-Urban Regions in Indonesia," 305.

92. Barichello, "Economic Development."

93. For a history of Indonesian mass politics see Lane, *Unfinished Nation*.

94. For a detailed study of Indonesian peasants in the post-Suharto era see Lucas and Warren, "The State, the People, and Their Mediators."

95. For a discussion of the social environment of Jakarta in the immediate post-Suharto era see Kusno, *Appearances of Memory,* 25–48.

96. Cohen, "Easing Labour's Pain," 17.

97. "Jakarta mirip kota kaki lima" [Jakarta is like a city of vendors], *Kompas,* 12 June 2000.

98. For an exploration of this phenomenon see Kusno, *The Appearances of Memory,* 25–48.

99. "Belum efektif, penanganan pedagang kaki lima" [Not yet effective, the handling of vendors], *Suara Pembaharuan,* 12 August 1999.

100. "Sutiyoso Blames Public for His Failure," *Jakarta Post,* 19 July 2002.

101. "Sutiyoso: Most Maligned Governor?" *Jakarta Post,* 11 November 2002.

102. Maryanti, "Upaya Warga Meraih Kota," 175.

103. One of the political memories of the area that the state has incorporated into its narrative of "sacrifice for the nation" is the 1945–1949 fight in Jakarta, Karawang, and Bekasi for independence from the returning Dutch. The event inspired poet Chairil Anwar to write "Antara Karawang–Bekasi" (Between Karawang and Bekasi), and Promoedya Ananta Toer to write the novel *Di Tepi Kali Bekasi* (At the Riverside of Bekasi).

Chapter 5: The Coast and the Last Frontier

1. See Santoso, "Bumi Serpong Damai New Town," 36.

2. The notion of "oceanic feeling" is from Connery, "The Oceanic Feeling and the Regional Imaginary."

3. For a discussion of the roles of migrant communities, especially those of ethnic Chinese in shaping the morphology of port cities, see Widodo, *Boat and the City*.

4. Toer, *Arus Balik*.

5. For "contact zone," see Pratt, *Imperial Eyes*. See also Rosaldo, "Imperial Nostalgia."

6. One could consider here the case of the "Growth Triangle" that brings together the Indonesian province of Riau, the Malaysian province of Johor, and Singapore. For a critical analysis of Batam see Lindquist, *Anxieties of Mobility*.

7. "Teluk Jakarta, Berubah dari Waktu ke Waktu" [Jakarta Bay changes from time to time], *Kompas,* 29 April 1997.

8. "Sutiyoso Calls for Waterfront Revival Project," *Jakarta Post,* 2 September 2000. The one-day seminar on waterfront cities was jointly held by the city government, the City Waterfront Implementation Board (BPR Pantura), the Ministry of Settlement and Regional Infrastructure, the state-owned housing developer Perum Perumnas, and the Indonesian chapter of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations' Association for Planning and Housing.

9. Ibid.

10. Bambang Nurbianto, "Sutiyoso to Pursue Reclamation Project," *Jakarta Post,* 12 April 2003.

11. Mochammad Sidarta, "Jakarta Waterfront Development Program," *Jakarta Kota Pantai* 1, 2002, 10.

12. Ibid.

13. Bambang Nurbianto, "Sutiyoso Insists on Reclamation Plan," *Jakarta Post,* 3 November 2003.

14. "Sutiyoso Calls for Waterfront Revival Project."

15. "Konsep kota baru tak capai sasaran" [New town's concept misses target], *Media Indonesia,* 9 August 1997.

16. Ibid.

17. "Salah, Menuduh Kota Baru Salah Arah" [It is wrong to call new towns a mistake], *Media Indonesia,* 29 August 1997.

18. "Habibie: Tata ruang sering berubah jadi 'tata uang' " [Habibie: Spatial planning often becomes money planning], *Bisnis Indonesia,* 17 May 1996.

19. "Presiden: Kesembrawutan dan Kemacetan Lalu Lintas Sudah Memprihatinkan" [President: Chaotic street and traffic jams have become troubling], *Kompas,* 16 September 1995.

20. "Konsep kota baru tak capai sasaran" [New town concept misses target], *Media Indonesia,* 9 August 1997. The governor made a list of places in Botabek that claim to be new towns: in Tangerang: Bumi Serpong Damai, Bintaro Jaya, Lippo Karawaci, Tigaraksa, Gading Serpong, Modern Land, Citra Garden City; in Bogor: Royal City Sentul, Lido Lake Resort, Kota Legenda; in Bekasi: Cikarang baru.

21. "Reklamasi Pantai Jakarta Berdampak pada Nelayan" [Jakarta Bay reclamation affects fishermen], *Kompas,* 7 September 1995.

22. Suharto, "The State of the Nation," 181–182.

23. Suharto as cited in "Reklamasi ubah Wajah Pesisi Jakarta" [Reclamation changes the face of Jakarta Bay], *Bisnis Indonesia,* 9 July 1996.

24. Rasman, "Keynote Speech," 4.

25. Ibid., 4–5. The director general, however, was also quick to suggest that while people must be involved in the decision-making process, they must be "directed to the more 'program-oriented' and not 'ideological-oriented' matters" (5).

26. Ibid., 11.

27. Ibid.

28. Sidarta, "Jakarta Waterfront Development Program," 10.

29. Presidential Instruction 52/1995 on the implementation of the reclamation was issued on 13 July 1995 and followed by the issuance of bylaw no. 8/1995 by the City Council on 6 October. See "Reclamation Project Jinxed from the Outset," *Jakarta Post,* 27 May 2003.

30. See "Kota Abad 21 di Pantura Jakarta" [A twenty-first-century city on Jakarta's northern coast], *Properti Indonesia,* April 1995, 78–80.

31. As cited in Sastrosoemarto and Budiono, *Jejak Soekardjo Hardjosoewirjo,* 37.

32. See Soemarno, "Mengabdi dalam Keadaan yang Sukar," 249.

33. Sastrosoemarto and Boediono, *Jejak Soekardjo Hardjosoewirjo,* 32–35.

34. "Regatta: Mewujudkan Impian Menjadi Kenyataan" [Regatta: Realization of a dream], *Tempo,* 29 July 2007, 98–99.

35. Pantai Mutiara advertisement in *Kompas,* 14 September 1995.

36. Rasman, while pointing out the environmental issues of Ciputra project, was impressed, or rather puzzled, by the fact that the design of Pantai Indah Kapuk won an international award. See Rasman, "Keynote Speech," 12.

37. A. R. Soehoed, "Proyek Pantura: Proyek Pengembangan Jangka Panjang Bagi Ibu Kota" [Northern coast project: A long-term project for the capital city], *Jakarta Kota Pantai* 1, 2002, 8.

38. "Cilingcing Menjadi Tumbal Jakarta" [Cilingcing becomes the victim of Jakarta], *Kompas,* 4 February 1994.

39. "Antara Cilingcing dan Turis Asing" [Between Cilingcing and foreign tourists], *Kompas,* 4 February 1994.

40. "From Swamp Area to Multi-Modern Recreational City," *Properti Indonesia,* June 1994, 120.

41. See the FIABCI website, http://www.fiabci.com/about-profile.aspx.

42. "From Swamp Area to Multi-Modern Recreational City."

43. Ciputra, one of the speakers at the congress, impressed the audience by announcing that Indonesia (i.e., Jakarta) has built about thirty new towns in the past ten years in the periurban area. He also pointed out that this has made the country a world record breaker for building the most new towns and it is important therefore to figure out a way to manage the metropolis. By the mid-1990s, as I have indicated above, the development of new towns had caused problems for the city because people living in the new towns continue to depend on Jakarta for work and their livelihoods. The participation of Indonesian property professionals in FIABCI "is to share experiences with other countries on matters concerning the planning and the design of the city." The press also reported that members of the Indonesian delegation learned a lot of

things from different developed countries. From Japan, they learned how to build superblocks and from Chicago they learned how the city reduced its crime rate and eliminated shanty towns. See "Fiabci: Swasta Harus Berperan dalam Pengelolaan Kota" [FIABCI: Private sector must play a role in managing the city], *Media Indonesia,* 7 June 1996.

44. Ibid.

45. "Perlu Dewan Kota untuk Mengelola Kota Baru" [Need an urban council to manage the city], *Media Indonesia,* 7 June 1996.

46. A special report by *Properti Indonesia* in 1994 documented the transformation caused by private capital:

> In the past two years, property business in Indonesia is really booming, especially in 1994. Every element in the industry is heavily involved in generating the boom. The bank channels most of its credits to property business. . . . The government too is quick to release all kinds of permit to acquire lands thus allowing developers to control thousands of hectares of land. Today, almost every private bank is involved in property business, and almost all big business groups are involved in developing projects related to property business ("Membidik Peluang 95 [Aiming at opportunities 95]," *Properti Indonesia,* 11 December 1994, 32).

The booming property business in the city has given developers opportunities to design the city and organize (as well as ignore) populations in terms of their different positions in the economy, but, as discussed above, such a concentration of capital in the property market has amounted to urban sprawl producing severe traffic problems in the city of Jakarta.

47. President Suharto maintained that

> The measure of deregulation and de-bureaucratization are designed to put the state in its most appropriate place for development. They are certainly not measures to abolish the role of the state. It is definitely not a step towards liberalism. The role of the state remains very important in providing guidance and encouragement to people's initiative and creativity for achieving development goals. This is precisely the reason why our development is implemented through planning" (Suharto, "The State of the Nation," 184–185).

48. Rasman, "Keynote Speech," 11.

49. Yet the development of coastal areas has so far been limited to clusters of luxurious housing and entertainment parks, all of which offer no connection to the

history of the city. There has been some modest renovation and adaptive reuse of particular buildings, but new facilities are largely built with no reference to the heritage of the past.

50. Suprawito, "Sambutan Walikotamadya Jakarta Utara pada acara pembukaan Lokakarya," 44.

51. "Swasta Diajak Membenahi Kota Tua" [Private sector is invited to renovate the Old Town], *Kompas,* 6 September 1995.

52. Ibid.

53. On this occasion, Governor Soedirdja shared with the audience that his department had been developing a master plan for North Jakarta to become a "Coastal City." This new plan came in conjunction with his observation that

> [North] Jakarta has always been a unique but important place since the beginning of its establishment as Sunda Kelapa, Jayakarta, and Batavia. It is an old city which has been filled up with so many historic artifacts, including architectural heritages. Today, most of them are found in areas which have high economic values with a great possibility of vanishing without one even noticing them. . . . It is with such a consideration that the government of Jakarta is preparing a master plan for its waterfront areas, bearing in mind that the city has a historical background for its waterfront. . . . The future of Jakarta cannot be separated from its historical roots. Jakarta as a historic city must be rooted in strong cultural identity. There have been many examples of how history is preserved in coastal cities, such as Faneuil Hall in Boston, the Rocks in Sydney, and Boat Quay in Singapore (Soedirdja, "Sambutan Gubernur KDKI Jakarta," 6–8).

54. Suprawito, "Sambutan Walikotamadya Jakarta Utara, Bapak H. Suprawito," 4.

55. Suharto, "The State of the Nation," 181–182.

56. For a debate on the proposal to build the Jakarta History Corridor see "Membangun Koridor Sejarah Jakarta" [Building a corridor of Jakarta's history], *Kompas,* 4 September 2006; "Ethos Nasionalisme di Balik Misi Jakarta Kota Joang" [National ethos behind the mission of Jakarta, the city of struggle for independence], *Kompas,* 19 April 2006.

57. "Citra Kawasan Hunian Pribadi Sukses" [Privately managed settlement a success], *Property and Bank,* 19, July–August 2006, 17.

58. For a report on Regatta see Atkins, "Regatta," 65.

59. Ibid.

60. Ibid.

61. See also "Regatta: Ikon Masa Depan Indonesia" [Regatta: The future icon of Indonesia], *Kompas,* 27 July 2006.

62. See also Douglass, "Globalization, Mega-Projects and the Environment."

63. For a report on the controversy of the Jakarta Bay project see "Reclamation Project Jinxed from the Outset," *Jakarta Post,* 27 May 2003.

64. Minister of the Environment Nabiel Makarim declared that "Along with the Ministerial Decree No. 14/2003, the office also suggests the government revoke Presidential Decree No. 52/1995 on the plan as it could worsen environment devastation in the capital." See Tertiani Z. B. Simanjuntak, "Reclamation Plan for Waterfront Project Rejected," *Jakarta Post,* 20 February 2003.

65. Bambang Nurbianto, "City to Take Nabiel to Court over Reclamation Decree," *Jakarta Post,* 2 May 2003.

66. See Wahli's note as posted on the organization's website on 28 July 2006, "Reklamasi Pantura, Proyek Mercusuar yang Menghancurkan Lingkungan dan Memiskinkan Nelayan" [Coastal reclamation, a mega-project that will destroy the environment and impoverish fishermen], http://www.walhi.or.id.

67. See Wahli's note as posted on the organization's website on 13 August 2006, "Tolak Reklamasi Pantura, Selamatkan Kota Jakarta" [Reject coastal reclamation, save the city of Jakarta] and the note posted on 24 August 2006, "Koalisi LSM Peringatkan PT. Pembangunan Jaya Ancol Jakarta Baycity" [Coalition of civic associations warned PT Pembangunan Jaya Ancol Jakarta Baycity] at http://www.walhi.or.id.

68. Cited in "Sutiyoso Calls for Waterfront Revival Project."

69. Ibid.

70. Tito Sianipar, "Fishermen on the Brink," *Tempo,* 20 July 2010, 51.

71. Seno, *Sepotong Senja untuk Pacarku,* 8, 10.

72. Ibid., 186–187.

Chapter 6: Green Governmentality

1. Miller and Rose, *Governing the Present.*

2. See, among others, Nas (ed.), *Indonesian Town Revisited;* Kusumawijaya, *Jakarta: Metropolis Tunggang Langgang;* Verdiansyah (ed.), *Politik Kota dan Hak Warga Kota;* Bakker, "Trickle Down?"; Firman, "In Search of a Governance Institution Model"; Hudalah and Woltjer, "Spatial Planning System"; Lim, "Transient Civic Spaces"; Silver, *Planning the Megacity;* Douglass, "Globalization, Mega-Projects and the Environment"; Padawangi, "Urban Centers as Megaphones"; Bunnell and Miller, "Jakarta in Post-Suharto Indonesia."

3. Foucault, *Power/Knowledge.*

4. This chapter heeds Stephanie Rutherford's call in her analysis of the interaction between nature and governmentality to pay attention to "unintended consequences, acts of resistance, processes of occlusion, and multiple locations in the exercise of green governmentality" (Rutherford, "Green Governmentality," 305).

5. The failure of the new town concept was widely acknowledged even before the collapse of the New Order regime. Just before the end of his tenure, the then governor of Jakarta, Surjadi Soedirdja (1992–1997), commented that "the expansive development of new towns in Botabek has only increased the volume of traffic in Jakarta" (quoted in "Konsep kota baru tak capai sasaran" [New town concept misses target], *Media Indonesia,* 9 August 1997).

6. Silver, *Planning the Megacity;* Colombijn, *Under Construction.*

7. On the colonial discourse and postcolonial spatialities see Kusno, *Behind the Postcolonial,* 130–143.

8. Colombijn, *Under Construction,* 139.

9. Ibid., 199.

10. Ibid.

11. Foucault, *Power/Knowledge,* 105.

12. The idea of "bourgeois environmentalism" has been explored by various scholars, especially in the context of problematizing the Eurocentrism of environmentalist knowledge and movements in the global north. Bourgeois environmentalism, however, can also be used to illustrate the urban discourses of the global south. In Jakarta, for instance, in the name of championing a green environment, urban spaces have been reserved for the production and consumption activities of upper-middle-class residents. The pertinent question then is how the urban poor think about issues of the environment and how they are subjected to the values of bourgeois environmentalism. I thank Chang Jiat Hwee for pointing out to me the range of scholarship that deals with this issue. See also Gandy, "Landscape of Disaster"; Guha and Martinez-Alier, *Varieties of Environmentalism;* and McFarlane, "Governing the Contaminated City."

13. "Jakarta to Plant 30,000 Trees," *Jakarta Post,* 29 November 2008.

14. The website of the Jakarta Green Monster Organization, for example, informs visitors that the volunteer community is supported by a range of international governmental and nongovernmental organizations, such as Flora Fauna International, the United Nations Development Programme, the National Communities of the Netherlands, and Nippon Keidanren, as well as the Ministry of Forestry and the City Government of Jakarta (see further at http://jgm.or.id/v2/about-us/).

15. Evi Mariani, "When Taxpaying Communities Step In," *Jakarta Post,* 21 December 2009.

16. Kusno, *Appearances of Memory.*

17. Ibid., 25–48.

18. Alexey et al., "Idealisme Fauzi Bowo," 166.

19. Wibowo, "Mengapa memilih Fauzi," 216.

20. Riyadi Suparno, "Big Cities Show off Their Green Initiatives," *Jakarta Post,* 15 December 2009.

21. Paulus Wirutomo, "Jakarta sebagai educating city" [Jakarta as an educating city], 31 October 2009, at http://www.lpmj.org/?id=28&page=Artikel.

22. Ibid.

23. Fachruddin Mangunjaya, "'Mengusung mimpi' menuju Jakarta hijau ["Carrying the dream" toward a green Jakarta], *Official Blog of Fachruddin Mangunjaya,* 10 August 2008, http://nature-of indonesia.blogspot.com/2008/08/mengusung-mimpi-menuju-jakarta-hijau.html.

24. Ibid. (My emphasis.)

25. Deden Rukmana, "Restoring Green Areas in Jakarta," *Jakarta Post,* 12 December 2009; see also Douglass, "Globalization, Mega-Projects and the Environment."

26. Rukmana, "Restoring Green Areas in Jakarta."

27. Mustaqim Adamrah, "Evictions for Green Space Will Rise: Expert," *Jakarta Post,* 10 March 2008.

28. Triwik Kurniasari, "Fauzi Makes No Better Changes: NGOs," *Jakarta Post,* 9 October 2008.

29. Urban resident quoted in Triwik Kurniasari, "Redeveloped Ayodya Park Opens to the Public," *Jakarta Post,* 16 March 2009.

30. "Eviction, Yes?" *Jakarta Post,* 26 January 2008.

31. Ibid.

32. Triwik Kurniasari and Maulina Pravitasari, "Evicted from Park, Now on the Tracks," *Jakarta Post,* 29 August 2008.

33. Tifa Asrianti, "NGOs, Residents Propose Green Housing Concept," *Jakarta Post,* 28 March 2008.

34. Ferdinand Lamak, Zal Hanif, Rusdianto Erawan, Haryanto, and Ahmad Adhito, "Properti Ramah Lingkungan: Tak Sekedar Pohon dan Rumput Hijau" [Environmentally friendly property: Not just trees and green grass], *Bisnis Properti* 71, September 2009, 14.

35. Ibid.

36. "Ciputra Constructs Rp. 3 Trillion Superblock," *Tempo Interactive,* 11 May 2010, http://www.asiaviews.org/business/8-on-business/15373-onbusinessalias698.

37. Ciputra, "Inovasi, kreativitas dan entrepreneurship adalah kunci kesuksesan," 84.

38. Quoted in Prasetyo, "Superblok terbesar di Jakarta" [The biggest superblock in Jakarta], *Bisnis Properti* 35, July 2006, 52.

39. Nirwono Joga, "Creating the Green Superblock," *Jakarta Post,* 5 January 2010.

40. Kusno, *Appearances of Memory,* 25–70.

41. Miller and Rose, *Governing the Present.*

42. Asrianti, "NGOs, Residents Propose Green Housing Concept."

43. Quoted in ibid.

44. Indah Setiawati and T. Kurniasari, "Green Movement Mushrooms in Jakarta," *Jakarta Post,* 11 August 2008.

45. Quoted in Asrianti, "NGOs, Residents Propose Green Housing Concept."

46. As cited in Damar Harsanto, "Jakarta's Poor Urged to Resolve Their Own Problems," *Jakarta Post,* 14 September 2002.

47. "The Space Beneath: Residents Urge Beautifying Unused Area," *Jakarta Post,* 7 October 2009.

48. Evi Mariani, "Architects Design Safe Housing under Roads," *Jakarta Post,* 21 September 2007.

49. Tifa Asrianti, "Government to Evict Squatters from Turnpikes," *Jakarta Post,* 6 August 2008.

50. Ibid.

51. Evi Mariani, "Architects Design Safe Housing under Roads."

52. Ibid.

53. Evi Mariani, "Design Offers Humane Approach to Urban Problem," *Jakarta Post,* 27 September 2005.

54. Quoted in ibid.

55. Quoted in ibid.

56. Purwestri and Widyarta, "Mencari Lokalitas."

57. Quoted in Arientha Primanita, "North Jakarta Residents Have Plans to Exploit Underpass," *Jakarta Globe,* 16 December 2009.

58. International Development Research Centre (IDRC), "Participatory Planning Process in Dakar and Jakarta," 2.

59. Urban resident quoted in "The Space Beneath."

60. IDRC, "Participatory Planning Process in Dakar and Jakarta," 2.

61. Quoted in Primanita, "North Jakarta Residents Have Plans to Exploit Underpass."

62. Quoted in "The Space Beneath."

63. Muhammad Nur Hayid, "Meriahkan HUT Ke-12, PKB Tanam 10.000 'Pohon Kehidupan'" [HUT's twelfth birthday, PJB plants 10,000 "living trees"], *DetikNews,* 11 July 2010.

64. "Luncurkan Green House, PKB Gagas Pasal Wajib Taman Kota" [Launch of Green House, PKB proposes mandatory urban park], *Detik News,* 27 July 2010; "PKB Luncurkan Website greenhouse" [PKB launches greenhouse website], *Indo Pos,* 28 July 2010.

65. Quoted in "Luncurkan Green House."

Chapter 7: Housing the Margin

1. "Kongres Perumahan dan Pemukiman II tahun 2009" [Congress of housing and settlement II, 2009], *Inforum* 1, 2010, 11–13.

2. "Pembangunan Perumahan Rakyat Memasuki Era Baru" [Provision of pro-poor housing enters a new chapter], *Inforum* 1, 2010, 6–9.

3. For the declaration see *Suhadi Hadiwinoto* (blog), 4 June 2009, http://suhadi.hadiwinoto.org/2009/06/04/deklarasi-kongres-nasional-perumahan-dan-permukiman-ii/.

4. "Pembangunan Perumahan Rakyat Memasuki Era Baru," 6–9.

5. For a recent summary of housing policy in twentieth-century Indonesia see Silas, "Perjalanan panjang perumahan Indonesia dalam dan sekitar abad XX"; Winayanti (ed.), *Kilas Balik Perumahan Rakyat, 1900–2000*. For a comprehensive account of colonial and early postcolonial housing policies and practices see Colombijn, *Under Construction*. For a description of the housing market with policy implications during the Suharto era see Struyk et al., *Market for Shelter in Indonesian Cities*.

6. Oswar Mungkasa, "Sekilas tentang Perumahan sebagai Hak Asasi Manusia" [A note on housing as human rights], *Inforum* 1, 2010, 20–23.

7. Ibid.

8. Ibid., 23.

9. Ibid.

10. The congress follows the World Bank's enablement strategy for urban development. According to this doctrine, human capacity can best be advanced within an environment that supports freedom to participate in the free market with minimum intervention from the state. For a discussion of the enabling discourse see Jones and Ward, "World Bank's 'New' Urban Management Programme." For a regional assessment pertinent to housing see Porio, "Rethinking the Enabling Strategy in Social Housing."

11. "Kongres Perumahan dan Pemukiman II tahun 2009," 11–13.

12. See Colombijn, *Under Construction;* Cobban, "Public Housing in Colonial Indonesia." For a broader view see Harris, "Housing Policy for the Colonial City."

13. Colombijn, *Under Construction,* 329.

14. Colombijn, "Public Housing in Post-Colonial Indonesia," 441.

15. For a Japanese-Indonesian discussion of housing see Colombijn, *Under Construction,* 279–281.

16. For a discussion on the 1950 Konggres Peroemahan Rakjat Sehat see ibid., 336–339.

17. For the performance of Djawatan Peroemahan Rakjat see ibid., 341–344.

18. Ibid., 207–224.

19. One wonders if the decentralized Indonesian state fits with David Harvey's definition of a neoliberal state whose mission is to "create and preserve an institutional framework [in order to] secure private property rights and guarantee[s], by force if need be, the proper functioning of markets. . . . If markets do not exist, then they must be created by state action if necessary. But beyond these tasks the state should not venture" (Harvey, *Brief History of Neoliberalism,* 2).

20. For a discussion on the shift in Indonesian urban planning and management see Firman, "Indonesian Cities in the Early Reform Era"; Hudalah and Woltjer, "Spatial Planning System in Transitional Indonesia"; Silver, "Do the Donors Have it Right?"; and Nordholt, "New Forms of Urban Infrastructural Development Policy in Indonesia."

21. Aditya Suharmoko, "Indonesia Determined to Develop Secondary Mortgage Market," *Jakarta Post,* 13 February 2009.

22. Ibid.

23. Ibid.

24. Ibid.

25. See William Liddle, "Tawaran Budiono" [Budiono's offer], *Tempo,* 8 January 2006, 50.

26. The following account is based on the insightful study of Michael Leaf on land rights in Indonesia ("Legal Authority in an Extralegal Setting"). See also Leaf, "Land Rights for Residential Development in Jakarta, Indonesia" and Fitzpatrick, "Beyond Dualism."

27. See Harsono, *Hukum Agraria Indonesia,* 5–6.

28. According to a 1990 report by Washington-based consultants the Urban Institute and local firm Hasfarm Dian Konsultan, "the formal housing sector," defined using measures of housing quality and tenure security, includes 31 percent of dwelling units in urban Indonesia. Jakarta has the lowest share of units meeting definition (23 percent). See Struyk et al., *Market for Shelter in Indonesian Cities,* 351.

29. Leaf, "Legal Authority in an Extralegal Setting," 15. The Indonesian colloquial terms used for the physical and social dualism are *gedong* and *kampung,* and this has led to the different characterization of people's behaviors in terms of *gedongan* and *kampungan.*

30. Colombijn, *Under Construction,* 141–180.

31. The term "informal" is in fact insufficient to capture the wide range of categories by which the land in the colony was divided and ruled. For a description of colonial pluralism of land rights by an Indies town planner see Karsten, "Town Development in the Indies," 55.

32. Colombijn, *Under Construction,* 147.

33. In 1961, the state, via Minister of Social Housing Muljadi Djojomartono, issued a booklet titled "Perumahan Gotong-Rojong" (Self-help and mutual-aid housing), which stated:

> In the context of the Pembangunan Nasional Semesta Berentjana (Planned National Overall Development) and its realization in the field of housing, it is necessary to stimulate and maintain the spirit and vigor of *gotong-rojong* (mutual aid) still existing in the village community. Hence the Department of Social Welfare via the Office of Housing Welfare feels itself responsible to give guidance, information and material assistance in order to provide technical know-how to the Village Social Committee as how to build healthy houses on the basis of *gotong-rojong;* in this way the aspirations of the government will be materialized, i.e. that every family should have its own house, which though simple in construction, can meet the motto: "a healthy house, a healthy nation" (*Rumah Sehat, Rakjat Kuat*). I express the hope that this spirit of *gotong-rojong* still flourishing in its purest form in the village will spread out and stimulate the urban areas as well, though probably manifested in another form or style, so that with the spirit of *gotong-rojong* a satisfactory state of welfare will cover the whole country (see Kantor Kesedjahteraan dalam Perumahan, *Perumahan Gotong-Rojong,* 47–48).

34. Leaf, "Legal Authority in an Extralegal Setting," 15.

35. Ibid.

36. I am grateful to Michael Leaf for his suggestion of using the phrase "resolving the dualism" instead of "formalizing the informal" to capture the complexity of Indonesian land rights.

37. For a discussion of the economic turn in housing policy from a global historical perspective see Arku and Harris, "Housing as a Tool of Economic Development since 1929"; and Harris and Arku, "The Rise of Housing in International Development."

38. Struyk et al., *Market for Shelter in Indonesian Cities,* 362.

39. See Sjahrir, *Pasar Tenaga Kerja Indonesia* and also the debates on the informal sector in urban Indonesia in the special issue of *Prisma,* "The Cities of Janus," 51, 1991.

40. Wirosardjono, "The Informal Sector," 61.

41. Such a view is promoted in de Soto, *Mystery of Capital*. See the critique by Mitchell, "Properties of Markets."

42. Formalizing informal settlements is not a new idea. The Kampung Improvement Program could be seen as an earlier attempt as it helped formalize the land market and home ownership, but the scale of this project was small. For a recent assessment of it see Bredenoord and van Lindert, "Pro-Poor Housing Policies"; Tunas

and Peresthu, "Self-Help Housing in Indonesia"; and Steinberg, "People's Participation and Self-Help in the Indonesian Kampong."

43. Lea and Blanchard, "Indonesian Secondary Mortgage Facility Study." See also Lee, "Evolution of Housing Finance in Indonesia."

44. See Lea, Pollock, and Rosengard, "Creation of a Secondary Mortgage Facility in Indonesia."

45. Sasmaya Tuhuleley, "Secondary Mortgage Market Development," *Sasmaya Tuhuleley* (blog), 6 June 2010, http://sashi-blog.blogspot.com/2008/05/secondary-mortgage-market-development.html.

46. For a report on the disappearance of the housing subsidy from the state budget in the early post-Suharto era and the subsequent discussion about reforming housing finance see the special issues of *Properti Indonesia,* "Menunggu Manuver Erna" [Waiting for the maneuver of Erna], November 2000, 9–18; and "Amburadul Sistim Pembiayaan Rumah" [Chaotic system of housing finance], March 2001, 16–30.

47. "Lingkaran Setan Subsidi KPR" [A vicious circle: subsidizing low cost housing], *Properti Indonesia,* March 2001, 21.

48. "Obligasi OK, Gandeng Asing Lebih OK" [Obligations are OK, harnessing foreign capital is even better], *Properti Indonesia,* November 2000, 15.

49. Ibid.

50. Syafrudding Arsyad Temenggung, "Kita Jangan Sampai Kehilangan Momentum" [We shouldn't lose momentum], *Properti Indonesia,* March 2001, 24.

51. Ibid.

52. Tuhuleley, "Secondary Mortgage Market Development."

53. Ibid.

54. As cited in "SMM Terwujud, Bisnis Perumahan Lancar," [Housing business will go well after SMM is established], *Properti Indonesia,* November 2000, 14. Erica Soeroto suggests that (contrary to Lea and Blanchard's suggestion [see note 43], a secondary mortgage market (SMM) can be established without first creating secondary mortgage facilities (SMF). Soeroto believes that only a SMM can resolve the banking problem. Once a market is created, investors will come in along with the capital. This short cut ignores the suggestion of the World Bank-supported study in 2002 by the Housing Market Indonesia (HOMI) project, which recommended that "while access to funds from long-term investors should be facilitated, either directly or through the establishment of SMF, . . . a Secondary Mortgage Market (SMM) would currently not be feasible nor desirable in Indonesia." HOMI nevertheless suggests that "efforts could continue to facilitate off-balance-sheet-funding, including securitization in the future." See Hoek-Smit, "Implementing Indonesia's New Housing Policy," 3.

55. For a discussion of securitization of mortgages see Sassen, "When Local Housing Becomes an Electronic Instrument."

56. Aditya Suharmoko, "Indonesia Determined to Develop Secondary Mortgage Market," *Jakarta Post,* 13 February 2009.

57. "Aturan tambah, Target Meleset" [More regulation, more targets are missed], *Koran Jakarta,* 31 December 2010.

58. Suharso Monoarfa, citing personal reasons, resigned on 19 October 2011, days before the cabinet reshuffle announcement. He was replaced by Djan Faridz.

59. "Menpera Suharso Monoarfa: FLPP Dijamin Lebih Tepat Sasaran" [Minister of Housing Suharso Monoarfa: FLPP guarantees right target], *Koran Jakarta,* 27 September 2010.

60. "SMF Dorong Multifinance Masuk FLPP" [SMF encourages financial capital to enter FLPP], *Investor Daily,* 9 February 2011.

61. Adi Wikanto and Christine Novita N., "Peminat Transaksi Aset KPR Masih Minim" [Interest in the asset of low-cost housing is still low], *Kontan,* 4 June 2011.

62. "Menpera Suharso Monoarfa."

63. "Berharap pada Rumah Murah" [Expectation for low-cost housing], *Koran Jakarta,* 12 May 2011.

64. "Konsumen masih andalkan KPR" [Consumers still rely on housing credits], *Koran Jakarta,* 16 May 2011, 16.

65. "Aturan tambah, Target Meleset."

66. Suharso Monoarfa, "Lebih dekat dengan Menteri Negara Perumahan Rakyat Suharso Monoarfa" [Introducing Minister of Housing Suharso Monoarfa], *Inforum* 1, 2010, 16–17.

67. "2019, Indonesia Targetkan 30% Kota Tanpa Permukiman Kumuh" [2019, Indonesia will have 30 percent fewer slums], *Inforum* 1, 2010, 28.

68. As cited in "Suharso Monoarfa: Resmi Jabat Menpera 2009–2014" [Suharo Monoarfa formally becomes minister of housing], *Inforum* 1, 2010, 15.

69. The minister of housing argued that "with SPT there is no way to lie about income. If one lies, one is violating law and there is a punishment for that" ("Menpera Suharso Monoarfa").

70. As cited in "Menanti Renovasi Insentif Pajak" [Waiting for a reformed tax incentive package], *Koran Jakarta,* 17 December 2010.

71. Ibid.

72. "Agar proses KPR Makin Lancar" [So that the housing credit flows well], *Koran Jakarta,* 23 May 2011.

73. Wahyu Daniel, "Pemerintah janji bantu sertifikasi tanah orang miskin" [Government promises to certify lands belonging to poor people], *Detikfinance.com,* 21 May 2011, http://finance.detik.com/read/2011/05/21/143401/1643910/1016/pemerintah-janji-bantu-sertifikasi-tanah-orang-miskin.

74. Ibid.

75. "Merata hingga ke Pelosok Desa" [Equally distributed to villages], *Koran Jakarta,* 23 May 2011.

76. Ismoko Widjaya, "Badan Pertanahan Tak Boleh Jadi Momok Lagi" [Land bureau should not be a monster anymore], *Vivanews.com,* 16 December 2008, http://us.cangkang.vivanews.com/pilkada/jakarta/news/read/15981-_badan_pertanahan_tak_boleh_jadi_momok_lagi_.

77. Ibid. The regulation is known as Peraturan Kepala BPN RI no. 6/2008.

78. Pipiet Tri Noorastuti and Beno Junianto, "Badan Pertanahan Luncurkan Mobil Keliling" [Land bureau launches service vans], *Vivanews.com,* 9 February 2009, http://us.metro.news.viva.co.id/news/read/28457-badan_pertahanan_luncurkan_mobil_keliling.

79. Widjaya, "Badan Pertanahan Tak Boleh Jadi Momok Lagi."

80. Dorleans, "Urban Land Speculation and City Planning Problems"; Cowherd, "Planning or Cultural Construction?"; Firman, "Rural to Urban Land Conversion"; Winarso and Firman, "Residential Land Development."

81. Struyk et al., *Market for Shelter in Indonesian Cities,* 352.

82. Ibid.

83. Ibid.

84. Riza Sofyat, Budi Supriyantoro, and Windarto, "Untuk Rakyat, Pengusaha, atau Parpol?" [For people, business groups, or political parties?], *Trust* 41(6), 4–10 August 2008, 13.

85. Struyk et al., *Market for Shelter in Indonesian Cities,* 352.

86. Sutiyoso as cited in "Squatters Face Eviction in Week of Fire," *Jakarta Post,* 13 August 2007.

87. For a description of the formation of kampong in the *tanah terlantar* of Kemayoran, see the report of Nugraha and Prihasromo, *Alternatif Penyelesaian Sengketa Pemukiman Miskin Kota*.

88. Such program is a consistent feature of the city government. The quotation is from Sutiyoso, as cited in "Squatters Face Eviction in Week of Fire."

89. "Dikaji, Pembangunan Rusunawa di Pinggir Rel KA" [Building apartments for rental beside the railway track is being considered], *Inforum* 1, 2010, 30.

90. Monoarfa, "Lebih dekat dengan Menteri Negara Perumahan Rakyat Suharso Monoarfa," 16.

91. As pointed out by Margani Mustar, a municipal officer for population and settlement, in "Pengendalian Penduduk Jakarta" [Controlling the population growth of Jakarta], *Koran Jakarta,* 2 October 2010.

92. Former minister of environment Sarwono Kusumaatmadja during his bid for governor, as cited in "Candidates Say No to Sharia-based Bylaws," *Jakarta Post,* 1 August 2006.

93. "Pemda Belum Peduli Perumahan" [The city government still doesn't care about pro-poor housing], *Kompas,* 9 November 2009.

94. This aspiration of Fauzi's stemmed from his earlier position as the head of tourism for the city government during the administration of Governor Surjadi Soedirdja (1992–1997), who wanted to turn Jakarta into a "global city." See Suwardiman, "Perjalanan Karir Fauzi Bowo" [The career of Fauzi Bowo], *Kompas,* 2 August 2007.

95. "(Susahnya) berharap pada Inisiatif Pemda" [It is difficult to expect the city government's initiative], *Koran Jakarta,* 16 May 2011.

96. "Bebaskan IMB atau Tak Dapat DAK" [Ease building permit or no state funding for local government], *Koran Jakarta,* 1 October 2010; see also "Kemenpera Ajak Pemda Sediakan Bank Tanah Untuk Perumahan" [Ministry of Housing encourages city government to provide land bank for pro-poor housing], *Media Indonesia,* 26 May 2011.

97. The complaint of the state over the reluctance of *pemda* to provide land for low-cost housing could be seen in several reports by the media: "Pemda Belum Peduli Perumahan"; "(Susahnya) berharap pada Inisiatif Pemda" [It is difficult to expect the city government's initiative], *Koran Jakarta,* 16 May 2011; "Kemenpera Ajak Pemda Sediakan Bank Tanah Untuk Perumahan"; "Bebaskan IMB atau Tak Dapat DAK" [Ease building permits or no state funding for local government], *Koran Jakarta,* 1 October 2010.

98. "Duo Yusuf Resmikan Rusunami" [Two Yusufs launch low-cost apartments], *Vivanews.com,* 5 March 2009, http://us.log.viva.co.id/news/read/36396-duo_yusuf_resmikan_rusunami.

99. Ibid.

100. Ibid.

101. "No Room for Cheap Apartments: Fauzi," *Jakarta Post,* 16 August 2006.

102. According to one study, 88.6 percent of the city's 4.5 million commuters lived on the outskirts. Ibid.

103. "Permohonan Bangun Rusunami Capai 432 Tower" [Applications to build low-cost housing reach 432 towers], *Kompas,* 21 March 2009.

104. "No Room for Cheap Apartments."

105. Muhamad Yusuf Asy'ari, "Saya Happy . . . ," *Property Review* 1, 9 March 2008, 11.

106. "Setelah Raja-raja Properti Turun Gunung" [After the kings of property industry participate], *Property Review* 1, 9, March 2008, 6–7.

107. "Permohonan Bangun Rusunami Capai 432 Tower."

108. "Duo Yusuf Resmikan Rusunami."

109. "Lahan, Kendala Pembangunan Rusunami" [Land, the constraint for low-cost apartments], *Kompas,* 19 February 2009.

110. "Ambisi Membangun Kota Perumnas" [The ambition to build Perumnas City], *Property Review,* 9 March 2008, 20.

111. "Kalibata City, Kayaknya sih Rusunami Keren" [Kalibata City looks like a classy low-cost apartment], *Kompas,* 21 March 2009.

112. Ibid.

113. "Pembangunan Apartemen Kalibata City harus dievaluasi" [The building of Kalibata City needs evaluation], *Post Kota,* 29 July 2011.

114. "Rusunami diduga salah sasaran" [Low-cost apartments seem to have missed the target], *Kompas,* 20 June 2009.

115. Ibid.

116. Ibid.

117. "Pembangunan Rusunami Anjlok 70 Persen" [The building of low-cost apartments decreases 70 percent], *Kompas,* 15 July 2009.

118. Ibid. See also Ali Imron, "Pengembang Mulai Ubah Rusunami jadi Apartemen" [Developers start to change low-cost apartments into upper-middle class apartments], *Kompas,* 7 April 2009.

119. In the first quarter of 2009, as developers started to promote the towers, the municipality of Jakarta implemented sealing orders on eight *rusunami* projects for failing to obtain a building permit (IMB) and submit reports on environmental impact (*amdal*). The city government disapproved of the excessive floor coverage ratio (KLB) of the towers, which disregarded the limits of the available infrastructure and the density of the neighborhood where the tower was located. For developers, however, a larger KLB is needed to ensure the profitability of *rusunami,* and they argued that the previous governor of Jakarta had signed off on their KLB and that it was thus illegal for the current administration to revoke it. Some developers argued that the sealing orders and the uncertainty about the government subsidy scheme have prompted them to open *rusunami* for the upper-middle class who are looking for apartments in the city. See "Tangan besi di Daerah" [The iron hand of the city government], *Koran Jakarta,* 6 December 2010, and E. Caesar Alexey, "DKI Menyegel Rusun Kalibata" [City government stops construction of Kalibata apartments], *Kompas,* 1 April 2009.

120. Imron, "Pengembang Mulai Ubah Rusunami jadi Apartemen."

121. For a discussion of superblocks and "back to the city" see Kusno, *Appearances of Memory,* 71–100.

122. Monoarfa, as cited in "Bebaskan IMB atau Tak Dapat DAK."

123. For a discussion of the changing meaning of *rakyat* see Siegel, *New Criminal Type in Jakarta.*

124. "Dorong Pemda cepat bergerak" [Push city government to move fast], *Koran Jakarta,* 21 February 2011. *Koran Jakarta* also pointed out that "Jakarta residents need

70.000 units *rusunawa,* but because of the low budget, the city government can only build 800 to 1,000 units per year" ("9 Rusunawa Segera Dibangun" [Nine rental apartments soon to be built], *Koran Jakarta,* 17 January 2011).

125. "Kerja Keras Bangun Rusunawa" [Working hard to build rental apartments], *Koran Jakarta,* 20 September 2010, and "9 Rusunawa Segera Dibangun."

126. "Dorong Pemda cepat bergerak."

127. "9 Rusunawa Segera Dibangun."

128. "DKI Batasi Jumlah Penduduk" [Jakarta limits population growth], *Koran Jakarta,* 30 September 2010.

129. Ibid.

130. Ibid.

131. Zaenuddin, *Jakarta 500 Tahun,* 43, 45, 46.

132. Ibid., viii.

133. Fauzi Bowo in his introduction to *Jakarta 500 Tahun* (ibid., vi).

134. Ibid., 51.

135. Ibid., 45.

136. Ibid., 47.

137. "Menjauh dari Ibu Kota" [Farther away from capital city], *Koran Jakarta,* 1 October 2010.

138. Ibid.

139. Ibid.

140. Ibid.

141. "Titik Rawan Kejahatan Ibu Kota" [Crime-prone places in the capital city], *Kompas,* 13 January 2011.

142. Ibid.

143. Ulma Haryanto, "Attacks on Christian Congregations Soaring, Rights Group Reports," *Jakarta Globe,* 27 July 2010; Iman Firdaus, "Mencari Musuh Islam Sebenarnya" [Searching for the real enemy of Islam], *Forum Keadilan* 27, 30 October 2005, 18–19.

144. Davis, "Planet of Slums."

145. Islamic housing complexes have been proliferating in periurban Jakarta. In Depok alone there are at least fourteen Islamic housing complexes that have led to the city ranking first for Islamic housing production. Yet, while the Islamic housing complexes could be said to be responding to the influence of Islam and Sharia law promoted by PKS, which rules the regions, they experience the same problems as other housing complexes. They are not designed to house the poor and instead are exclusive complexes that have diminished the amount of affordable land available for the construction of low-income housing around the city. Just like the middle-class Islamic housing complexes in the periurban Jakarta, PKS has never been pro-poor. During

the gubernatorial campaign, both Adang Dorodjatun (who was supported by PKS) and Fauzi did not want to submit themselves to the pressure from the coalition of marginalized groups (consisting of Rakyat Miskin Kota, Persatuan Penyandang Cacat se-DKI, and Forum Waria Indonesia). The groups issued a motion of no confidence in both candidates for their failure to sign a memorandum of understanding stating their commitment to *rakyat*. See "Debat Kumis Fauzi" [Debating Fauzi's moustache], *Berita Kota,* 5 August 2007.

146. It would be appropriate here to recall the words of Terry McGee, the guru of Southeast Asian cities who predicted the future geography of Indonesian housing before the collapse of Suharto regime:

> Indonesians now live in three main types of housing: The wealthy mostly occupied single-family houses in large developments on the edge of the cities, or high-rise apartments in the city core. The middle class, which now comprise a majority of the urban population, lived in smaller houses in suburbs scattered throughout the periphery of cities, and in upgraded *kampung* style houses within city boundaries. For the urban poor, the majority now live in legalized and upgraded squatter settlements, or in low-rise, walk-up, low-income housing (McGee, "Future of Urbanisation in Developing Countries," xi).

147. For a report on the roles of NGOs in defending the urban poor in Kemayoran see Nugroho and Prihastomo, *Alternatif Penyelesaian Sengketa Pemukiman Miskin Kota*. For an exploration of living in the urban periphery in Jakarta (and elsewhere) as the basis for both survival and hope see Simone, *City Life from Jakarta to Dakar.*

148. For a discussion of the work of an NGO in providing urban services for an informal settlement see Winayanti and Lang, "Provision of Urban Services in an Informal Settlement."

Epilogue: Turning Time: An Interview

This chapter is based on an interview with Dr. Etienne Turpin and Professor Meredith Miller on 16 February 2013 as part of the Architecture + Adaptation research initiative at the University of Michigan. It has appeared as "Cosmopolitan Temporalities" in *Jakarta: Architecture + Adaptation* [English and Indonesian], edited by Etienne Turpin, Adam Bobbette, and Meredith Miller (Depok: University of Indonesia Press, 2013).

1. Vereenigde Oost-Indische Compagnie, or Dutch East India Company.
2. Simone, *City Life from Jakarta to Dakar.*
3. The Kartu Tanda Penduduk (KTP) is the Indonesian identity card, which among many other things, indicates place of birth and place of issue.

4. The workshop was called "Informality in Motion: The Urban Poor's Struggle over the Urban Space in Indonesia," Urban Poor Links and Jakarta Urban Poor Consortium, Bali, 9 September 2006.

5. Kusno, *The Appearances of Memory,* ch. 1.

6. Davis, *Planet of Slums*.

7. Davis, "Planet of Slums, Urban Involution and the Informal Proletariat."

8. Jakarta remains as Pramoedya Ananta Toer once described in the 1950s, "the wind blows through the provinces whispering that one cannot be fully Indonesian until one has seen Jakarta" (Toer, "Letter to a Friend from the Country").

9. Benjamin, *The Arcades Project*.

10. Siegel, *Fetish, Recognition, Revolution*.

11. Mrazek, *Engineers of Happy Land*.

12. Kusno, *The Appearances of Memory,* ch. 6. See also, Shiraishi, *An Age in Motion*.

13. Mrazek, *Engineers of Happy Land*.

14. Gunawan, *Gagalnya Sistem Kanal*.

15. Jakarta was extensively inundated throughout the month of January 2013. For a comprehensive report on the 2013 flood in Jakarta, see the special issue of *Tempo*, 28 January–3 February 2013, 44–57.

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ABOUT THE AUTHOR

Abidin Kusno, who received his doctorate in history and theory of architecture and urbanism from the State University of New York, Binghamton, is an architectural historian with interests in sociology, anthropology, visual cultures, history, and politics. Among his publications are *Appearances of Memory: Mnemonic Practices of Architecture and Urban Form in Indonesia* (2010) and *Behind the Postcolonial: Architecture, Urban Space and Political Cultures in Indonesia* (2000), as well as numerous journal articles and book chapters. He is currently associate professor and Canada research chair in Asian urbanism and culture at the Institute of Asian Research, University of British Columbia.



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These scattered opinions about the future of Jakarta have stemmed from the desire in post-Suharto Indonesia to correct the past wrongdoing and find ways to solve the city's problems. They point to the unplanned nature of the city, the weakly regulated form of urbanism, and the yearning for modernist planning (in the form of a new capital, a superblock, and a green design initiative) as an antidote to urban chaos and environmental degradation. The new architecture is expected to stand above the fallen city and represent a legitimate structure in the remaking of the city.



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